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SUMMARY 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the 
responsibility to protect (R2P), and; to investigate how best to apply the concepts in the face 
of humanitarian crises, in order to address concerns about their implementation. The failure 
of the Security Council to react to grave human rights abuses committed in the humanitarian 
crises of the 1990s, including Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1993-
1995) Haiti (1994-1997), and Kosovo (1999),triggered international debatesabout: how the 
international community should react when the fundamental human rights of populations are 
grossly and systematically violated within the boundaries of sovereign states, and; the need 
for a reappraisal of armed humanitarian intervention. Central to the debate was whether the 
international community should continue to adhere unconditionally to the principle of non-
intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or take a different course in the 
interest of human rights. The debate culminated in the establishment of the Canadian 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, with the 
mandate to find a balance between respect for sovereignty and intervention, for purposes of 
protecting human rights.  
Much of the scholarly literature on military intervention for human protection purposes deals 
with the legality and legitimacy of the military dimension of the concepts. The significance of 
the thesis is that: it focusesthe investigation on the potential abuse of the use of force for 
human protection purposes, when moral arguments are used to justify an intervention that is 
primarily motivated by the interests of the intervener, and; the propensity to use 
disproportionate force in the attainment of the stated objective of human protection, by 
powerful intervening states. The central argument of the thesis is that there are double 
standards, selectivity, abuses, andindiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in the 
implementation of R2P by powerful countries, and; that, whether a military intervention is 
unilateral, or sanctioned by the UN Security Council, there is the potential for abuse, and in 
addition, disproportionate force may be used.The thesis makes recommendations to address 
these concerns, in order to ensure the survival of the concept.  
KEY WORDS 
Humanitarian intervention, non-intervention, state sovereignty, two concepts of sovereignty, 
sovereignty as responsibility, responsibility to protect, military intervention, international 
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law, abuse and proportionality, motivations for intervention, altruism, national interest, rights 
and duties of states, egregious abuse of human rights, anticipatory military intervention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the Cold War period (1945-1989), the world was split between two hostile blocks: the 
Capitalist West and the Communist (Soviet) East. These two power blocks “sought to avoid 
intervention in internal and international armed conflicts in order to avoid a larger 
confrontation.”1 The hostility between these two blocks impeded the ability of the United 
Nations to implement the provisions in the Charter on securing international peace and 
security,2 primarily because of the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security 
Council. The use of the veto made intervention unlikely to take place at all, or if it did take 
place, it would be unilateral.3 Examples are the US’ intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union’s intervention in Afghanistan.4 Under Article 27(3), decisions in the Security Council 
are made by the affirmative vote of nine members of the Council, provided that a permanent 
member does not cast a negative vote. A permanent member can thus block a vote on a 
resolution by exercising a negative vote.  The decades of adversarial relations between the 
great powers during the Cold War made it impossible for the United Nations to fulfil its 
original mission, due to the large number of vetoes cast by the permanent members.5 As a 
consequence, during the Cold War, the only Chapter VII resolution of note adopted by the 
Security Council was United Nations Resolution 84,6 which recommended that Members of 
the United Nations should furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be 
necessary to repel the armed attack upon it by the forces from North Korea; this resolution 
passed only because of the absence 7 of the Soviet Union during the vote.8 The end of the 
Cold War brought to an end the ideological and superpower differences, and raised hopes that 
a new era of cooperation in the Security Council had dawned. There was the hope that a new 
opportunity had arisen for the realisation of the objectives of the United Nations Charter of 
                                                          
1T. G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, Ideas in action, Polity Press, 2012, p. 38. 
2 Article 24(1) provides: “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members  
   confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security  
and agree that in carrying out this responsibility, the Security Council acts on their behalf.” The Council was  
unable to discharge this responsibility because of disagreements between the two blocks. 
3 Weiss, note 1, p. 38. 
4Ibid. 
5  B. Boutros-Ghali, put the number of vetoes cast during the period 1946 and the end of the Cold War in  
    1990, at 279: Report of the UN Secretary General:” Agenda for  Peace”, A/47/277-s/24111, 17 June 1992,  
paragraph 14, p. 43. 
6 Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00fle85c.html [Accessed  
    8 February 2016] 
7 Under Article 27(3) the abstention or absence of a permanent member of the Security Council does not  
count as a veto. Hence the absence of the Soviet Union could not prevent the adoption of the resolution. 
8 S. Bailey and S. Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 257. 
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maintaining international peace and security, and of securing justice and human rights. With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the main “proponent of non-interference in 
internal affairs, at the end of the Cold-War, a changed attitude towards human rights was 
evident.”9 In the words of former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar: 
We are witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards 
the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail 
over frontiers and legal documents.10 
With the end of the Cold War, international attitudes towards humanitarian intervention have 
softened, and the use of force in the face of humanitarian crises has become acceptable to the 
international community and in international law.11 Thus, the beginning of the 1990s saw a 
“flurry of optimism regarding the new found scope of the international community to deal 
with humanitarian issues.”12 This era ushered in new ideas about state sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention, and “a new kind of international law and spirit, made possible in 
the changed conditions of a world no longer structured around the old uncertainties of a 
struggle between communism and capitalism.”13 Thus, the end of the Cold War made 
humanitarian intervention a widely accepted diplomatic norm,14 with the frequent use of 
human rights’ concerns as grounds for intervention.15 
As a legacy of the Cold War, however, the Security Council failed to act decisively in the 
face of humanitarian crises in the 1990s, in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The 
inaction of the Security Council contributed to the perpetration of mass atrocities during these 
crises. Grave human rights’ abuses were committed during these crises, but the Security 
Council was paralysed from acting, either by disagreements among the five permanent 
members, or lack of political will. The inability of the Security Council to react to grave 
abuses of human rights triggered international debate as to how the international community 
                                                          
9 R. Cohen, From Sovereign Responsibility to R2P, in Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect,  
Routledge, W. A. Knight and F. Egerton, eds. (2012), pp. 7-8.  
10 UN Press Release, SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991. 
11 A. Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law,  
    Cambridge University Press, (2003), p. 2. 
12 J. Davidson, Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Force for Good?, POLIS  Journal Vol. 7  
    Summer (2012), p. 129. 
13Orford, note 11 supra, 2. 
14 H. Kochler, Global Justice or Global Revenge-International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads, Springer- 
Verlag, Vienna, Austria, 2003, p. 38. 
15 F.D. Armstrong  & H Lambert, International Law and International Relations, Cambridge University Press,  
    (2010), p. 179. 
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should react when the fundamental human rights of populations are grossly and 
systematically violated within the boundaries of sovereign states. At the heart of the debate 
was whether the international community should continue to adhere unconditionally to the 
principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or take a different 
course in the interest of human rights. The debate culminated in the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 by the 
Government of Canada, with the mandate to find a balance between respect for sovereignty, 
and intervention for purposes of protecting human rights. The ICISS came up with the 
concept of R2P that articulated the theme that sovereignty entails responsibility, and this 
responsibility primarily lies on the state to protect its people; but where the state is unwilling 
or unable to discharge this responsibility, its sovereignty has to yield to the broader 
international community’s responsibility to protect the vulnerable population.  
The ICISS re-characterised sovereignty as responsibility, which implies that: state authorities 
are responsible for protecting the fundamental rights and welfare of citizens; state authorities 
are responsible internally to the citizens and externally, to the international community, 
through the UN, and; agents of state are accountable for their acts of commission and 
omission. The ICISS, while recognising the sacredness of sovereignty,acknowledged that 
there was international recognition that, in certain circumstances such as extreme violations 
of human rights, there must be exceptions to the non-intervention principle. Thus, in the 
contemporary international order, sovereignty is not a shield against armed intervention in the 
face of egregious human rights violations in a state. A state has a responsibility to protect the 
human rights of its population, and this duty is an attribute of its sovereignty.16 Failure to 
discharge this responsibility can provide a justification for external military intervention by 
the international community,to protect the victims of gross violations of human rights 
perpetrated on them by their own governments, if the state authorities are unable or unwilling 
to halt the abuses.17However, in order to pre-empt unilateral humanitarian interventions and 
the potential for abuses, the Security Council is internationally recognised as the body with 
the exclusive authority to grant authorisation for military intervention for human protection 
purposes, and to determine when and how interventions should be carried out. 18 
                                                          
16ICISS Report, p. XI 
17ICISS Report, p. XI. 
18 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, para. 139. 
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a) AIM OF THE THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the concepts of humanitarian intervention, and the 
responsibility to protect (R2P), and; to investigate how best to apply the concepts in the face 
of humanitarian crises, in order to address concerns about their implementation.To this end, 
the thesis investigates: why interventions have taken place in some states, and why there has 
been inaction in others; whether there is a duty to intervene, and if so whose duty it is; 
whether a state or an organisation has a right to intervene in another state; whether there are 
situations in which it would be wrong, not to intervene;19 what authority has the power to 
determine when, and, how interventions should be carried out; whether a state has a duty to 
protect the human rights of its population; whether this duty is an attribute of its sovereignty, 
and; whether a breach of this duty can be a justification for external military intervention. 
Much of the scholarly literature on military intervention for human protection purposes,deals 
with the legality and legitimacy of the military dimension of the concepts. The significance of 
this thesis is that, while it deals with the military aspect of the concepts, it takes a different 
approach, by focusing the investigation on the following questions: what are the reasons for 
the potential  abuse of the concepts, for the advancement of the national, strategic, and 
geopolitical interests of the interveners, and; what are the reasons for the propensity to use 
disproportionate force in the attainment of the stated objective of human protection, by 
powerful states? Thus, the research focuses on the question: whether powerful states that use 
force to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states on grounds of humanity are 
motivated by altruism or national or geopolitical interests. Answering this question will 
address the research problem, which is, why there is the potential for abuse of the concepts, 
and the indiscriminate use of force, in their implementation.  
The central argument of the thesis is that, there are double standards, selectivity, abuses, and 
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in the implementation of R2P by powerful 
countries, and; that, whether a military intervention is unilateral, or sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council, there is the potential for abuse, and in addition, disproportionate, and 
indiscriminate, and unjustifiable force may be used; which pose the greatest threat to the 
survival of the concept.  
                                                          
19 T. Nadin, From Right to Intervene to Duty to Protect: Michael Walzer on Humanitarian Intervention,  
European Journal of International Law, 24(1), 2013, pp. 67-82, 68. 
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The thesis examines the concept of state sovereignty, and the practice of humanitarian 
intervention in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and post-UN Charter interventions; 
the impact of the internationalisation of human rights, and the United Nations Charter on the 
development of R2P. The thesis examines the role that the humanitarian crises in the 1990s, 
played as stimuli, in the emergence of R2P. The thesisfurther, discusses the work of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the formulation of 
R2P and the core principles of the concept. The study further investigates the motivations of 
countries that carry out interventions, and the issues of double standards, and selectivity in 
the implementation of military intervention, for human protection purposes. 
Finally, the thesis makes recommendations towardsthe implementation of the military aspect 
of the responsibility to protect, in order to make a contribution towards, and the avoidance or 
minimisation of the abuse of the concept, and; to ensure that, where it becomes absolutely 
necessary to use force, it would be used for the primary objective of relieving human 
suffering, and that, only the force necessary for the attainment of the objective of the mission, 
would be applied. 
b) DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
The use of force for humanitarian purposes or humanitarian intervention has been the subject 
of various debates by scholars, and has generated controversy “both when it has happened – 
as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo – and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda.”20In 
Rwanda, the UN and Belgium had forces in Rwanda, but the UN mission was not given the 
authority to stop the killing.21The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 under Resolution 
197322 has also generated criticism. The resolution authorised “Members States that have 
notified the Security Council to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas.”23 The resolution established “a ban on all flights in the airspace” of Libya 
to protect civilians24, except “flights whose sole purpose was humanitarian”25. The 
                                                          
20Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001,  (ICISS),  
TheResponsibility to Protect, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001, p. VII, available at  
   http:www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.   (Hereinafter ICSS Report). [Accessed 12 June 2015] 
21 Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter, BBC News Africa, 7 April 2014, Available at 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506 [Accessed 12 June 2015] 
22S/RES/1973 of 11 March 2011. 
23Ibid. para. 4 
24Ibid. para 6. 
25Ibid. para 7. 
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resolution’s provision to use “all necessary measures” gave broad authorisation26 to NATO, 
which was interpreted by the organization to advance its pre-set goal of regime change.27 
 However, not every intervention has generated condemnation.28 In Africa regional 
organisations have intervened in neighbouring countries, in the face of UN Security 
Council’s inaction.29 The first example was the Economic Community of West African 
States’ (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia in 1990, through ECOMOG, the Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group of the organisation.30 ECOMOG intervened again in Sierra Leone in 
1998.31 Even though “there was no legal basis for the ECOWAS intervention under the UN 
Charter, it was supported by the United Nations and the whole of the international 
community”.32 These interventions were without UN Security Council authorisation, yet the 
UN did not criticise ECOWAS, but the UN commended the organisation in Resolution 788 
for its part in restoring “peace, security and stability in Liberia”.33 In the personal opinion of 
Ben Kioko, the Legal Advisor to the AU:   
It would appear that the UN Security Council has never complained about its 
powers being usurped because the interventions were in support of popular causes 
and were carried out partly because the UN Security Council had not taken action 
or was unlikely to do so at the time.34 
Kioko’s observation implies that in a situation where the UN Security Council fails to act, 
and where the intervention is for a popular cause, the UN would not complain about the 
usurpation of its powers, but rather praise the interveners.35 
                                                          
26 B. Smith, & A. Thorp, Interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya, House of Commons   
Library, International Affairs and Defence Section. SN/IA/5916, p. 2. 
27 A. Kuperman,  “Lessons from Libya,: How not to Intervene”, Policy Brief, BelferCenter for Science and   
   International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, September 2013, 1: available at  
http://belfercenter.ksg.havard.edu/publication/23387/lessons_from_libya.html.[Accessed 15 June 2015].  
28 J. Levitt, “Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in   
Liberia and Sierra Leone”, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 12 (1998), 333 at 347. 
29 J. Sarkin, The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention in Africa, Global Responsibility to  
   Protect 2 (2010), p. 371 at 375.  
30Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
32Levitt, note 28 supra, p. 347. 
33S/RES/788 (1992) of November 1992. 
34 B. Kioko, “The Right of Intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to  
Non-Intervention, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, 2003, 807 at 821. 
35Sarkin, note 29 supra, at 375. 
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The interventions by ECOWAS have been described as “the first true blow to the 
constitutional framework of the international system established in 1945 predicated on the 
ultimate control of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council”.36  However the 
countries had sound grounds for the interventions outside the post-1945 international order. 
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 exposed the horror of inaction.37  The slaughter of the 
innocent in Rwanda and the indifference of the international community and the United 
Nations “failure …to prevent, and subsequently to stop the genocide”38 moved African 
countries to take steps to ensure that such mass killings would not happen again.39 As Allain 
observes: 
Since the end of the 1990s, the African continent has been marginalised in ways it 
had not been during the height of the Cold War. This remains true in the area of 
international peace and security, where African states have come to realise that 
they cannot depend on the Members States of the UN Security Council to ensure 
stability on the continent. As a result, African leaders have decided to depart 
radically from the normative framework established by the United Nations in 
1945.40 
This observation implies that the ECOWAS interventions were not condemned because, 
firstly, the international community failed to act, and secondly, the genuine purpose was to 
protect suffering populations, and not in furtherance of geopolitical goals. In this connection, 
African states had to take action outside the established international order to alleviate human 
suffering. It can be argued that since no ulterior motives were at play, the force used was 
limited to the attainment of the objectives of the interventions. 
During the 1990s a debate raged between advocates of “humanitarian intervention”, i.e. the 
“right to intervene” in a country’s domestic affairs to protect its citizens from serious human 
rights abuses without the consent of the country concerned, or United Nations Security 
Council authorisation, on the one hand and on the other hand, the defenders of state 
                                                          
36 J. Allain, The True Challenge to the United nations System of Force: The Failure of Kosovo and Iraq and the  
    Emergence of the African Union, Max Planck United Nations Year Book Vol. 8 (2004) p. 238. 
37 K. Naumann, The Responsibility to protect – Humanitarian Intervention and the Use of Military Force,    
Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4 Winter 2004 – 2005. 
38United Nations Secretariat, report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United nations during   
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Doc. S/199/1257 (1999)  of 16 December 1999, p. 3. 
39Allain, note 36 supra, p. 263 
40Ibid. p. 259. 
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sovereignty, who insisted that matters within the territory of a state were the prerogative of 
that state.41 
Humanitarian intervention in its current form emerged in the 1990s. As the ICISS Report 
observes, the problems of the 21st century present the international community with new 
types of challenges, different from challenges that faced the world before the establishment of 
the UN in 1945.42  The issue of humanitarian intervention has become a clear example of 
issues that require urgent concerted action.43 
The roots of humanitarian intervention go back to the debates on natural law in the 
16thcentury.44 The Protestant Reformation that began in the 1520s played a large role in 
creating interest in the status of tyrants.45 The Reformation created in princes the awareness 
that the persecution of foreign religious dissidents was tyrannical.46 The period of the 
Reformation also witnessed the emergence of new centralised states.47 This development 
required the development of a new doctrine of law to reshape the existing concept of a law of 
nations, which regulated the relations between “individuals and public authorities within the 
commonwealth of Christendom, into the notion of a law for sovereign states.”48 In the 
discourse on sovereignty and inter-state relations, scholars influenced by the writings of 
Aquinas argued that princes had a duty to “protect not only their own, but also other princes’ 
subjects.”49 
Both Catholics and Protestants supported the idea that there was a right and a duty to protect 
victims of tyranny from their rulers.50  For example, in the first part of the 16th century, the 
Spanish theologian and lawyer Vitoria asserted that defending peoples in neighbouring 
countries from “tyrannical and oppressive laws against the innocent” was legitimate and 
therefore war could legitimately be waged against rulers guilty of “tyranny and 
                                                          
41 G. Evans, The Responsibility To Protect; Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, (2008), The 
    Brookings Institution, p.3. 
42ICISS Report, p. 3. 
43Ibid. 
44 A. Krieg, Motivations For Humanitarian Intervention, Theoretical  and Empirical Considerations, Springer  
    Briefs in Ethics, Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg, New York, London, 2013, p. 8. 
45 B. Simms, & D. J. B. Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 31 
46 G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), 18-19. 
47Simms & Trim, note 45 supra, p. 31. 
48Mattingly, note 46 supra, p. 284-5. 
49Simms & Trim, note 45 supra, pp. 21-32. 
50Ibid. p. 32. 
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oppression”.51The right to defend peoples against tyranny and oppression became accepted in 
the 16th century, as espoused in the Vindiciae contra tyrannos1579.52  The Vindiciae argued 
that tyranny was not only a crime but the culmination of all crimes, and a prince who stood 
idly by and watched the slaughter of the innocent was worse than the tyrant himself. 53 
In the 19th and early 20th century, some states claimed to have intervened in other states to 
protect the local populations”.54Fonteyne cites as examples, the United States interventions in 
Cuba at the end of the 19th century, and the protests of European Major Powers against 
Morocco’s treatment of political prisoners in the early twentieth century.55 He however 
observes that these cases lacked either a clear humanitarian motive or the highly coercive 
character of an armed intervention.56 The first example of humanitarian intervention was in 
1829 when France, Great Britain, and Russia, in terms of the Treaty of London, intervened 
militarily in Greece which was then under the Ottoman Empire, in order to put an end to 
bloodshed.57  Another example of state practice took place in 1860, when France undertook 
an armed intervention in Syria to protect Christians in the Ottoman Empire from massacre by 
the local Muslim population.58 
By the end of the 19th century, the right of humanitarian intervention had gained wide 
acceptance,59 and most international lawyers agreed on the right to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds.60 Thus international law authorities in their writings envisaged that force may be 
used against states that subjected their citizens to gross human rights abuses.61 It is necessary 
to find a new consensus and “forge unity” by finding a way to reconcile the prohibition on 
the use of force and the right of states to freedom from interference in their domestic affairs 
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54 J. P. L. Fontyene, ‘The Customary  International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current  
   Validity Under the U.N. Charter.’ California Western International Journal, Vol. 4 1974, p. 215. In The Use  
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55Ibid. p. 215. 
56Ibid. 
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60 T. J., Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 7th Edition, Percy Winfield , Macmillan,    
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    International, 1999, p. 36. 
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on the one hand, and the obligation of states to protect fundamental human rights on the other 
hand.62 
i) State Sovereignty 
One of the fundamental principles of international law is that the territorial sovereignty of the 
state is inviolable.63It is a fundamental norm, yet, it has been violated consistently form its 
beginnings,64 and powerful countries have always interfered in the internal affairs of weak 
countries. The foundation of the principle of state sovereignty was laid in the Treaties of 
Westphalia that established the supremacy of the sovereign authority of the state.65 In the 
classic Westphalian system of international order, the main characteristic of sovereignty is 
the state’s unquestioned authority over the people and property within its boundaries.66  State 
sovereignty means that the government of the state is competent to act without restraint 
within its borders, and no external force can interfere with its supremacy.67 The concept of 
sovereignty denotes that all states are equal, and are permitted by international law to choose 
the kind of governance, economic system, and foreign policy they prefer, without 
interference from other sovereign states.68  Non-interference in the domestic affairs of one 
state by another is the cornerstone of the concept of state sovereignty that underpins the 
system of relations among states.69While its supporters extol sovereignty because of the 
principle of non-intervention, which protects weak countries from interference in their 
internal affairs by powerful countries, it has the potential to contribute to gross violations of 
human rights by state authorities, because of the protection, that the principle of non-
intervention provides. 
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States70 codified the basic elements 
of state sovereignty.  Under the convention, a state must have the following attributes: (a) a 
                                                          
62ICISS Report, p. VII. 
63 M. N. Shaw,International Law (6th ed. 2008), p. 276. 
64A. Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction,Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 42. 
65T.G.Weiss, and D. Hubert,  The Responsibility to Protect, Research, Bibliography, Background,    
    Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State  
    Sovereignty (Ottawa International Development Research Centre, 2001), pp. 5-13. (Hereinafter ICISS  
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66  G. Evans and M. Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect”, Revisiting Humanitarian Intervention,  
 Foreign Affairs, 81, November/December 2002,  p. 102, available at http://www.foreign  
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67Shaw, supra note 63 supra, at 276-277 
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69Ibid. p. 6. 
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defined territory; (b) a permanent population; (c) a government; and (d) the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states.71  All states are juridically equal,72 and no state has the right 
to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another state.73 The equality of states 
enshrined in the concept of state sovereignty protects weaker states from more powerful 
states.74 It is a “…final defence against the rules of an unjust world”.75  It is no wonder then, 
that the strongest supporters of non-intervention are weaker third world states, fearful of 
severe infringement on their territorial sovereignty by powerful states.76 
The United Nations Charter adopted this basic model. The organisation is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all member states.77  The UN Charter expressly 
“Prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all Members to respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of other states”.78  The exceptions are actions taken by the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, where there is a “threat to the peace, a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression,”79 and actions pursuant to individual or collective self-
defence under Article 51.  The Charter also prohibits the organisation from interfering in the 
domestic affairs of member states by providing that: “Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in the matters that are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter.”80 
The principle of non-interference has been reinforced by United Nations resolutions and 
declarations. The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention81 prohibits all forms 
of intervention directly or indirectly, for whatever reason, in the domestic or external affairs 
of other states.82 The declaration prohibits States from the threat or use of force to violate the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
December 1933 and entered into force on 26 December 1934. 
71Ibid.Article 1.  There has to be a functioning government with exclusive authority over affairs in the   
territory of the state. 
72Ibid. Article 4 
73Ibid. Article 8 
74ICISS Supplementary Volume, supra, p. 6. 
75Former President of the OAU, Algerian president Boueteflika in his 1999 address to the UN General  
Assembly. 
76Abiew, supra note 61, p. 65. 
77 United Nations Charter 1945, Article  2(1) 
78Ibid. Article 2(4) 
79 Ibid. Article 39 
80Ibid.  Article 2(7) 
81Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their   
Independence and Sovereignty, GA Resolution 2131, (A/RES/36/103) adopted on 21 December 1965. 
82Ibid. para. 1. 
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territories of other States.83 The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law84 
duplicates verbatim Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the 1965 declaration.  The 
International Court of Justice has endorsed this principle with the observation that, “Between 
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of 
international relations;”85 and “the principle on which the whole of international law rests.”86 
In the Corfu Channel Case,87 the ICJ observed that: 
The alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as 
has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such cannot, whatever be the 
present defects in international organisation, find a place in international law. 
Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take 
here; for from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful 
States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international 
justice itself.88 
By this statement, the Court made it clear that coercive intervention is unlawful and has no 
place in international law, because if it was permitted, it would lead to abuse by powerful 
countries. The conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is that, with the inception of 
the UN Charter, with the exception of UNSC action under Chapter VII and action in 
individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, humanitarian 
intervention though not explicitly banned by the Charter,89 has been considered illegal.90 
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However, the principle of non-intervention based on state sovereignty is no longer accepted 
unquestionably.91 State sovereignty has been at the core of the international order, and 
because of its importance, it has come under close scrutiny.92 There is a debate between 
supporters of rigid non-intervention and those who support a flexible rule that permits 
intervention where the circumstances require action.93 The debate is between supporters of 
intervention based on human rights grounds and “anxious defenders” of state sovereignty, in 
which each side has “dug themselves deeper and deeper into opposing trenches”.94 
In spite of the foregoing, state sovereignty remains fundamental in the conduct of inter-state 
relations.95 The equality offered by the concept of state sovereignty protects weaker states 
from the powerful.96 What is required is a balance between application of the concept and the 
human rights of populations suffering mass atrocities. To defend state sovereignty does not 
necessarily imply the tolerance of the inhumane treatment of populations by their own 
governments. To defend state sovereignty does not necessarily imply the tolerance of the 
inhumane treatment of populations by their own governments. Rather, the concern is that, if 
sovereignty is disregarded and the right of intervention allowed without constraints, there is 
the likelihood that the principle will be abused by powerful states to advance their national 
interests and geopolitical objectives. 
c) NATURE AND SCOPE OF INQUIRY 
The main focus of the study is the military intervention aspect of the doctrine of 
responsibility to protect, the doctrine that is considered as the new approach to protecting 
people from mass atrocities.97 The study will conduct a critical investigation of the reasons 
for non-intervention in Darfur (2003 ff.) and Rwanda (1994), and military interventions in 
Libya (2011), Somalia (1992), Kosovo (1999), Bosnia (1995), Northern Iraq (1991) and Haiti 
(1994) to determine in each case whether:  
(i) There was a humanitarian crisis that warranted military intervention;  
                                                          
91 R. Little, “Recent Literature on intervention and non-intervention”, in Forbes & Hoffman, eds. Political  
Theory, International Relations and Ethics of Intervention, (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd 1993) 13 at 14. 
92Abiew, note 61 supra p. 36. 
93Fonteyne, note 54 supra, at 215. 
94 Evans and Sahnoun, note 66 supra, at 101. 
95ICISS Supplementary Volume, p. 17. 
96 Ibid. 
97 E. Massingham,  Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the Responsibility to Protect     
advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends? International Review of the Red Cross, (2009)  
Vol. 91 No. 876, at 803. 
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(ii) there was abuse of the concepts of humanitarian intervention or responsibility to 
protect;  
(iii) Disproportionate force was applied in the attainment of the objective of the mission. 
In the process the study will examine the evolution of the doctrines of “humanitarian 
intervention” and the “responsibility to protect”, the differences between the two, and the 
legality and legitimacy of the doctrines.  
The central argument of the study is that whether an intervention is legal or not, whether it is 
unilateral or collective, sanctioned by the UN Security Council or not, there is the potential 
for abuse, and in addition, in any case, disproportionate, and indiscriminate, and unjustifiable 
force may be used, which would cause more harm than the intervention was meant to avert. 
The study further argues that there are double standards with regard to military intervention 
under the responsibility to protect doctrine, in the sense that interventions may take place 
only in the territories of less powerful countries. 
The study will critically investigate whether altruism or national interests motivate states that 
intervene in others. It will critically examine whether there have been cases of abuse and 
disproportionate use of force in the above-mentioned interventions; and why there have been 
interventions in some states and inaction in others. The study argues the interventions have 
been motivated by national interests, not altruism and should be understood in the wider 
geopolitical context. 98 
There is no universally accepted definition or enumeration of forms of intervention that are 
forbidden by international law.99 Unfortunately, observes Thomas, “there is no satisfactory 
agreement among jurists as to the meaning and content of intervention in international 
law”.100 The term is used in the sense of “dictatorial interference” by a state in the internal or 
external affairs of another state, which usually involves the threat or use of force.101 Response 
by one state to a request from the legal government of another state, voluntarily and freely 
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made for assistance would not amount to intervention.102 Therefore, interference in the 
domestic affairs of one state by another, which does not involve coercion, would not amount 
to intervention.  In the Nicaraguan Case, the ICJ referred to “the element of coercion, which 
defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.”103 As Oppenheim 
puts it, “the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect 
depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in question. Interference pure 
and simple is not intervention.”104 
The study seeks to examine the case for flexibility; that in certain circumstances, in the 
interest of humanity, and subject to United Nations Security Council authorisation, 
intervention is permissible to protect people who are suffering egregious human rights abuses 
at the hands of their own government, or when the government is unable or unwilling to act 
to protect them.105  For example, if the international community had acted, many lives would 
have been saved during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.106 
The study will make recommendationstowards addressing issues as to: when to intervene, 
who should intervene, and how the intervention should be conducted, in order to avoid 
providing a pretext for more powerful states to advance their geopolitical interests at the 
expense of weaker states. 
d) HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
i) The scope to be addressed 
The subjects of this inquiry are the doctrines of military humanitarian intervention and the 
responsibility to protect. However, the main focus of the study would be an investigation of 
the coercive intervention aspect of the responsibility to protect. In the process, the study will 
discuss the evolution from humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect. 
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ii) Humanitarian Intervention 
During the 13th century, the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas on just war implied that tyranny 
was an abhorrent crime that could be legitimately opposed by every means including military 
action, if necessary.107  Simms and Trim state that, in the 16th century, his conviction “that 
there was a right, or obligation, to oppose tyranny, became part of princely practice and were 
developed in early treatises of what was eventually to become ‘international law’”.108  There 
was a discourse, during the 16th century among law scholars, statesmen and philosophers that 
tyranny and atrocity were illegitimate and therefore any action taken to end them was 
legitimate.109  Simms and Trim observe that partly in line with this discourse, “princes 
threatened or used force against regimes that egregiously ill-treated foreign civilian 
populations”.110 St. Aquinas, in his writings, stated that on the basis of religious solidarity, a 
sovereign was entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of another, when the latter inflicts 
serious human rights abuses on his people.111  Humanitarian intervention has its roots in 
Aquinas’ just war theory, which by implication justified coercive intervention to prevent or 
halt egregious human suffering.  
It is necessary at this stage to provide a definition of humanitarian intervention. At the core of 
humanitarian intervention is the use of military force for humanitarian purposes.112 Given the 
controversy surrounding the concept, there is no universally acceptable definition of the 
principle, “so there is little use in defining the doctrine of humanitarian intervention”113 
Another author has observed that “A usable general definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
would be extremely difficult to formulate and virtually impossible to apply vigorously.”114 
This thesis defines humanitarian intervention as, the use of armed force by one state or group 
of states, to intervene in the internal affairs of another state,without the consent of the latter, 
to protect the nationals of that state, from atrocious human rights abuses, perpetrated against 
them by their own government. It can be inferred from the various definitions that the 
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primary purpose of intervention is to protect people who are unable to defend themselves 
from human rights abuses, by their own government, and to avert or halt human suffering. To 
this end the force used in such interventions must be the minimum necessary for the 
attainment of the objective of the alleviating human suffering. 
Weiss defines humanitarian intervention as the use of force, against the wishes of the 
government of the target state, with humanitarian justifications.115It has been defined by 
Scheid as, military intervention into the territory of the target state by outside forces with the 
goal of protecting or rescuing defenceless people from “ongoing or imminent, grave, and 
massive human rights violations…”116Fonteyne defines it as “dictatorial interference by a 
State [or group of States] in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or 
altering the actual conditions of things.”117  Another scholar has defined it as:  
the theory of intervention on the ground of humanity […] recognizes the right of 
one State to exercise international control over the acts of another in regard to its 
internal sovereignty when contrary to the laws of humanity”.118 
It has also been defined:  
as coercive action by States involving the use of armed force in another State 
without the consent of its government, with or without authorisation from the 
United Nations Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt 
gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law”.119 
Oppenheim considers humanitarian intervention to be intervention in a foreign state to 
prevent it from committing egregious abuse of the fundamental rights of its own citizens in a 
way which ‘which shocks the conscience of mankind”.120 Fernando Teson has defined the 
doctrine as: 
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the proportionate trans-boundary help, including forcible help, provided by 
governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic rights and 
who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive 
government”.121 
Holzgrefe defines it as:  
…the threat or use of force across state borders by a state or group of states aimed 
at preventing or ending widespread violations of fundamental human rights of 
individuals other than its own citizens without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied.122 
Another scholar depicts it as: 
the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization 
primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from 
widespread deprivations of internationally recognised human rights.123 
Stowell has defined humanitarian intervention as the reliance upon force for the purpose of 
protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment that is “so arbitrary and persistently 
abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereign is presumed to act 
with reason and justice”.124Rougier, has defined it as:  
the theory of intervention on the ground of humanity…that recognises the right of 
one state to exercise an international control by military force over the acts of 
another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to laws of humanity.125 
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All these writers justify humanitarian intervention and are in agreement that in defence 
of a population suffering severe human rights abuse, force may be used across national 
boundaries legitimately to halt human suffering. 
The origins of humanitarian intervention can be traced to ancient times and the religious wars 
of the 16th and 17th centuries.126  However, its institution is a creation of the 19th century, 
because, as has been observed by Fonteyne, “Earlier instances of humanitarian intervention 
are too closely tied with a feeling of religious solidarity to allow them to be classified as 
genuinely humanitarian”. 127  Secondly, Green is also of the view that earlier practice of 
humanitarian intervention had its basis on a feeling of religious solidarity,128 Christian beliefs 
and the religious concept of the dignity of man.129 The secular grounds for humanitarian 
intervention emerged from the principle of providing assistance to people resisting the yoke of 
tyranny.130 
a. Views of some Proponents and Opponents of Humanitarian Intervention 
and a Discussion of their views  
There were several proponents of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. One of the 
leading advocates was Hugo Grotius. 
Writing in 1625, he states: 
There is also another question, whether a war for the subjects of another be just, 
for the purpose of defending them from injuries by their ruler. Certainly it is 
undoubted that ever since civil societies were formed, the ruler of each claimed 
some especial right over his own subjects…But …if a tyrant …practices atrocities 
towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social 
connexion is not cut off in such a case…it would not follow that others may not 
take up arms for them.131 
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Grotius lends his support to the view that it is legitimate to provide assistance to a population 
resisting tyranny.  He believed that while rulers had the unimpeded right to rule over their 
subjects, if the ruler severely abused his subjects, other states had the right to prevent or halt 
the abuses.  Thus while he recognizes state sovereignty, his position is that it is not absolute. 
His view has the following implications: (i) that force may be used across national boundaries 
by one state against another; (ii) the objective is to prevent or halt egregious human rights 
abuse; (iii) no imperative for the occupation of the country against which force is applied, 
and; (iv) no requirement for the overthrow of the government of the state.  
 De Vattel another advocate of humanitarian intervention observes that:  
The sovereign is the one to whom the Nation has entrusted the empire and care of 
government; it has endowed him with his rights; it alone is directly interested in 
the manner in which the leader it has chosen for itself uses his power. No foreign 
power, accordingly, is entitled to take notice of the administration of that 
sovereign, to stand up in judgment of his conduct and to force him to alter it in any 
way. If he buries his subjects under taxes, if he treats them harshly, it is the 
Nation’s business; no one else is called upon to admonish him, to force him to 
apply wiser and more equitable principles.  If the prince, attacking the fundamental 
laws, gives his people a legitimate reason to resist tyranny, if tyranny becomes so 
unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, any foreign power is entitled to help an 
oppressed people that has requested assistance. 132 
De Vattel appears to contradict himself by first asserting the right of the ruler to decide how 
he uses the power entrusted to him.  In this vein, he observes that no foreign power has the 
right to judge the conduct of the ruler or intervene, even if the ruler subjects the population to 
odious human right abuses. He then asserts the right of intervention by foreign powers to 
assist the people who are resisting tyranny.  As Mosler puts it, he appears not to have been 
able to resolve “the problem of the friction between Sovereignty and the Law of Nations”.133 
His view epitomises the debate about the dichotomy between sovereign independence and 
non-intervention on the one hand and humanitarianism on the other hand.134  Like Grotius, he 
is an advocate of intervention to assist those resisting tyranny, but does not advocate the 
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overthrow of the government or occupation of the territory of the state as objectives of 
intervention.   
Brochard states: 
Where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own 
citizens over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the 
family of nations are authorised by international law to intervene on grounds of 
humanity. When these human rights are habitually violated, one or more states 
may intervene in the name of the society of nations and,may take such measures as 
to substitute at least temporarily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of 
the state thus controlled. Whatever the origin, therefore, of the rights of the 
individual, it seems assured that these essential rights rest upon the ultimate 
sanction of international law, and will be protected, in the last resort, by the most 
appropriate organ of the international community.135  
Brochard shares the views of Grotius andVattel to the extent that the state has absolute 
sovereignty over matters within its territory; however, if the state seriously abuses the human 
rights of its population, foreign powers may intervene in that state on grounds of humanity. 
The point of divergence between his views and those of the other two writers is that he 
advocates the removal of the state government and the occupation of the territory of the state. 
His view defeats the purpose of humanitarian intervention which is to prevent or halt severe 
human rights abuses. His view, if applied, would be a recipe for the abuse of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention, and would invariably involve disproportionate and indiscriminate 
use of force, for that would be the only way to overthrow a government and occupy the 
territory of the state. 
Stowell expresses a similar view, justifying humanitarian intervention as: 
[…] an instance of intervention for the purpose of vindicating the law of nations 
against outrage.For it is a basic principle of every human society and the law 
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which governs it that no member may persist in conduct which is considered to 
violate the universally recognised principles of decency and humanity.136 
Stowell considers the vindication of the law of nations as the primary purpose of humanitarian 
an intervention. The implication of his views is that force may be used to intervene in a 
country to defend universally recognised principle of human rights, when these rights are 
violated in a severe manner.  
There are doubts expressed by various writers about the existence of the right to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes as a generally acceptable principle of customary international law.137 
Kant was of the view that the norm of non-intervention should be expanded.138 He states that: 
“No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.”139The 
implication of his view is that humanitarian intervention is prohibited. Thus even if a 
sovereign treats his subjects in a bad manner, no foreign power may intervene as long as the 
conduct of that sovereign does not impact adversely on that foreign power.  To intervene in 
another state to halt the ill-treatment of its citizens would amount to undermining the concept 
of the independence and sovereignty of states. It is submitted that there are times when 
sovereignty has to give way in the interest of humanity. However, when it becomes absolutely 
necessary to intervene in the interest of humanity in a sovereign state, the intervention should 
be carried out in accordance with clear guidelines, in order to avoid abuse and 
disproportionate application of force. 
Mimiani and Carnazzi-Amari, both Italian writers advocated rigid non-intervention:  
Carnazza-Amari quotes Mimiani as follows: 
The actions and crimes of a people within the limits of its territory do not infringe upon 
anyone else’s rights and do not give a basis for a legitimate intervention. Truely, what   
positive right of the other peoples does one infringe upon? Have you ever heard that the 
law requires that one be only confronted with good example…?140 
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 In his own words, Carnazza-Amari states:  
 Neither can anyone justify intervention in the case where local government does 
not respect the most elementary laws of humanity.141 
The views of Mimiani and Carnazzi-Amari are almost identical to that of Kant, discussed 
above.142 Their position is that if human rights abuses take place exclusively within the 
territory of a state, then no other state has the legitimate right to intervene to halt it since it 
does not infringe on any state’s rights. Their views demonstrate that they do not find anything 
unusual with human rights abuses. Such views are untenable, because the defenceless ought 
to be protected and defended, subject to clearly set parameters. 
Pradier-Fodere the French scholar is in agreement with this position. He states, concerning 
atrocious treatment of nationals by the state: 
This [humanitarian] intervention is illegal because it constitutes an infringement 
upon the independence of States, because the powers that are not directly 
immediately affected by these inhuman acts are not entitled to intervene. If the 
inhuman acts are committed against nationals of the country where they are 
committed, the powers are totally disinterested. The acts of inhumanity, however 
condemnable they may be, as long as they do not affect nor threaten the rights of 
other States,  do not provide the latter with a basis for lawful intervention, as no 
State can stand in judgement of the conduct of others. As long as they do not 
infringe upon the rights of the powers or of their subjects, they remain the sole 
business of the nationals of the country where they are committed.143 
Pradier-Fodere believes that human rights abuses, no matter how egregious and 
condemnable, are permissible if they are perpetrated against the nationals of the state which 
is committing these abuses. As long as the abuses do not affect the rights of other states or 
their nationals, no foreign power has the right to intervene to halt the abuses. In a nutshell, it 
is nobody’s business to intervene to defend or protect the population of a country where the 
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government is severely ill-treating them. This is an inflexible view and does not take into 
account “universally recognized principles of decency and humanity”.144 
Wolff articulated the principle of non-intervention, stating: 
Since by nature no nation has a right to any act which pertains to the exercise of 
the sovereignty of another nation;…if a state ruler should burden his subjects too 
heavily or treat them too harshly, the ruler of another state may not resist that by 
force…for no ruler of a state has the right to interfere in the government of 
another, and the government of one state is not subject to the decision of the ruler 
of another state.145 
Wolff shares the inflexible view on intervention, suggesting that the international   
community should turn a blind eye in the face of blatant abuse of human rights. In his view 
sovereignty is absolute, and no state has the right to subject the conduct of another state to 
judgement.  His view would condone genocide, and crimes against humanity, and is therefore 
absolutely untenable. 
The South American inflexible position on non-intervention is espoused by Pereira. He 
states: 
Internal oppression, however odious and violent it may be, does not affect, either 
directly or indirectly, external relations and does not endanger the existence of 
other States.  Accordingly, it cannot be used as a legal basis for use of force and 
violent means.146 
This view, like those of Kant, Wolff, Pradier-Fodere,Mimiani, and Carnazzi-Amari, 
represents the “…values of nationalism, sovereign independence and non-intervention.”147 A 
state may do anything it wants, inflict any amount of harm on its population within its 
territory or rule tyrannically, and no outside power may intervene on behalf of the suffering 
people, because the existence of other states is not endangered. This position leaves no room 
for compromise. It can promote genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity. Such a position epitomises the “era where the absolute personal jurisdiction of the 
Prince over his subjects was still largely regarded as a central attribute of sovereignty”.148  
However, this position may be unacceptable under the post-1945 international order. 
Despite these divergences, by the end of the 19th century, the right of humanitarian 
intervention had gained wide acceptance as a right of a state.149Abiew argues that the writings 
of authorities “suggested that force may be used against rulers who abused the rights of their 
nationals.”150Brownlie writes that “by the end of the 19th century, the majority of publicists 
admitted that a right of humanitarian intervention existed.”151  However, he goes on to state 
that the doctrine was “inherently vague” and “open to abuse by powerful states”.152Fonteyne 
observes that: 
[…] while divergences certainly existed as to the circumstances in which resort 
could be had  to the institution of humanitarian intervention, as well as to the 
manner in which such operations were to conducted, the principle itself was 
widely, if not unanimously, accepted as an integral part of customary international 
law.”153 
Fontyene quotes the International Law Association as stating that “the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention appears to have been so clearly established under customary 
international law that only its limits and not its existence is subject to debate.”154  The 
International Law Association observes that state practice justifiedhumanitarian intervention. 
Fonteyne’s expressed views support this position. 
The continued validity of the legal principles which led to the evolution of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention has been questioned in the light of the prohibition of the use of 
force under the UN Charter.155 Despite the prohibition on the use of force, there have been 
instances when powerful states have flouted international law to use force against weaker 
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states.156 On 20 December 1989, the US launched ‘Operation Just Cause’, a full-scale 
military invasion of Panama, with 24,000 troops armed with high-tech weaponry in order to 
bring its president, Manuel Noriega, to justice for drug trafficking.157  As one analyst has 
observed, the operation was carried out unilaterally, sanctioned neither by the UN nor the 
Organisation of American States, (OAS).158 This invasion had nothing to do with 
humanitarianism. It was rather a war on drugs, launched in flagrant disregard of the 
prohibition of the use of force by the UN Charter Article 2 (4).159 
The force applied was absolutely indiscriminate and disproportionate, resulting in the deaths 
of between 1,000-4,000 Panamanians.160 Ramsey Clark has observed that: 
It was a physical assault of stunning violence. It was a time for testing new 
equipment with no concern for human lives. It was a time for measuring the worth 
of technology against the life of a child. The stealth fighter in Panama!  And now 
we hear, well, they didn’t mean to hurt anybody.161 
Ramsey Clark’s observation raises issues of abuse of humanitarian intervention and the 
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in its implementation, even though the stated 
purpose of this intervention was not humanitarian but to bring Noriega to justice for drug 
trafficking.162 This is one reason why weak developing countries are apprehensive of the use 
of the concept as a pretext for waging war on them.163 Whether the purpose of the United 
States’ intervention was to provide humanitarian assistance or in the name of uprooting drug 
trafficking, there was no justification for the killing of the innocent.  
During the 1990s, as a result of serious humanitarian crises, the UN Security Council 
expanded the notion of “threat to international peace and security” to cover humanitarian 
concerns.164  Following this, the Security Council authorized Chapter VII interventions in 
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several countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Somalia and Iraq. For example in 
1991, Operation Desert Storm, an action taken with the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council, was launched by the United States and allied forces to evict the occupying forces of 
Iraq from Kuwait.  Subsequent to the allied victory, a humanitarian crisis erupted in 
Kurdistan, in the northern part of Iraq, where many Kurds perished as a result of military 
action by the forces of Saddam Hussein. The UN Security Council for the first time linked 
human suffering to a threat to international peace and security.165 Though the Security 
Council did not explicitly give authorisation for intervention, under Resolution 688 (1991)166, 
a United States-led coalition launched ‘Operation Provide Comfort,’ justifying the 
intervention on grounds of ‘the overwhelming humanitarian need’.167 
Another example of UN Security Council authorised intervention linking human suffering to 
a threat to international peace was ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in Somalia. Following the 
overthrow of President SiadBarre, there was a power vacuum and inter-clan fighting, which 
resulted in the death of more than 350,000 from famine.168 In response to the humanitarian 
crisis, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794 (1992), declaring that “…the 
magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the 
obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security”.169 
Support for humanitarian intervention can be  also be found UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Ghali’s, Agenda for Peace report,170 which introduced a novel method of resolving conflicts, 
namely, “peace-enforcement,” to be warranted under Article 40 of the Charter.171 This 
method of conflict resolution resembled humanitarian intervention, in the sense that peace-
enforcement units would be empowered to enforce ceasefire agreements by coercive means 
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in affected countries.172  He thereby dilutes the absolute concept of state sovereignty. He 
states:  
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory 
was never matched by reality; it is the task of leaders of States today to understand 
this and to find a balance between the needs of good governance and the 
requirements of an ever more interdependent world.173 
Deng’s view on state sovereignty also lends support to the concept of humanitarian 
intervention. He states in reference to suffering populations: 
But issues could not be left entirely to the states to manage, because in an age of 
concern with human rights and humanitarian issues, no state could say: ‘This is an 
internal issue and it does not matter how I manage my situation, it’s none of your 
concern.’ The world is watching closely, and if necessary, would get involved.174 
Thus, even though the validity of humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter is not 
universally accepted as an exception to the prohibition of force in Article 2(4), it is 
increasingly becoming accepted as such by the tacit endorsement of the UN. 
e) THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
In the 1990s, the international community was faced with humanitarian crises in several 
countries, including Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1993-1995) Haiti 
(1994-1997) and Kosovo (1999). In the face of these crises, particularly the genocide in 
Rwanda during which over 800,000 Tutsis and some Hutus were killed in just a hundred 
days, and the Srebrenica massacre where 7000 Bosnian Muslims perished, the international 
community, failed to respond effectively.175 The attitude of the international community as 
Kofi Annan put it in his 1998 speech to the DitchleyFoundation, was, “so long as the conflict 
rages within the borders of a single State, the old orthodoxy would require us to let it 
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rage.”176  The international community failed to respond at all, in some instances as Rwanda 
in 1994, while in others, the response was poorly executed, or was too little or too late as 
Somalia in 1993 and Bosnia in 1995.177 This was largely due to the controversy surrounding 
external military intervention to protect populations from mass abuse of human rights.178  The 
1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo which was conducted without United Nations Security 
Council authorization brought the controversy to a climax.179 There was serious disagreement 
among members of the Security Council, centring on the disregard for the existing 
international order which is based on the inviolability of state sovereignty, issues of legal 
justification and the manner in which the intervention was carried out.180 
A debate during the 1990s involved how to reconcile the tension between two fundamental 
principles which underpin the UN Charter, namely: on the one hand, the supreme sovereign 
authority of the state which entitles the state to make decisions within its territory without 
interference by other states, and the freedom from the threat or use of force against it; and on 
the other hand, the obligation of member states of the UN to protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as stipulated in the Preamble to the Charter.181 The tension between 
these two principles was exacerbated by the assertion of powerful states to a claim of the 
right to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of another state to protect populations 
suffering grave human rights abuses, with or without the consent of the state or United 
Nations authorisation. The legality of such a claim to this right was naturally questioned by 
generally weaker states vulnerable to military interventions, as a breach of the concept of 
state sovereignty. 
The dilemma was how to reconcile the prohibition on intervention by a state or group of 
states in the territorial sovereignty of another state on the one hand, and on the other hand, the 
imperative to bring to an end the inhumane treatment or human suffering inflicted by a 
government on its own nationals.182 The tensions created by these two positions caused 
paralysis183 in responses by the international community to humanitarian crises, which led to 
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the challenge issued by the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan in his address to the 
54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999. The main characteristic of traditional state 
sovereignty is the state’s unquestionable authority over people within its boundaries184 
However, in his address, Annan alluded to the fact that the traditional state-centred concept of 
sovereignty has to give way to a people-centred concept of sovereignty.  He observes that: 
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?185 
Annan acknowledges that sovereignty remains fundamental in the conduct of international 
relations. He however, challenges the international community to find a balance between the 
concept and the human rights of populations suffering mass atrocities. In the interest of 
humanity, human rights should take precedence over state sovereignty, if necessary, to 
prevent or halt gross and systematic violations of human rights. He argues that there was the 
need for a redefinition of the traditional meaning of sovereignty. He articulated this 
redefinition as the two concepts of sovereignty, namely, “the peoples’ sovereignty and the 
sovereign’s sovereignty.”186  He states that: 
State sovereignty, in its basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of 
globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to 
be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time 
individual sovereignty – which I mean the fundamental freedom of each 
individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties 
has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. 
When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to 
protect individual human beings, not those who abuse them.187 
The idea of people’s sovereignty or popular sovereignty considers the basis of sovereignty as 
respect for the popular will and government based on international standards of democracy 
and human rights.188 The advocates of popular sovereignty hold the view that the 
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“sovereignty of a state does not stand higher than the human rights of its inhabitants”. 189 The 
idea of popular sovereignty led to the formulation of the doctrine of sovereignty as 
responsibility by Francis M Deng, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Persons, which stipulates:  
Sovereignty as responsibility meant that the state has to take care of its citizens, 
and if - it needed support - call on the sub-regional, regional or continental 
organizations, or ultimately the international community. But if it did not do that, 
and its peoples were suffering and dying, the world would not watch and do 
nothing. They would find a way of getting involved.190 
The doctrine of sovereignty as responsibility, meant that sovereignty carries with it a 
responsibility on the part of governments to protect their citizens.191 As articulated by Deng, 
state sovereignty involves accountability: first to the population in the state, and secondly, to 
the international community, to ensure adherence to observance of human rights.192 Therefore 
when a state inflicts egregious human rights abuses on its people, its sovereignty falls into 
abeyance and other states may intervene to protect the people.193 Sovereignty is no longer 
considered to be sacrosanct.194 As argued by Ramesh Thakur, the unqualified concept of state 
sovereignty which gave a state immunity from accountability for the brutal treatment of its 
population, “has gone with the wind,”195 and “states bent on criminal behaviour should know 
that frontiers are not the absolute defence.”196  As has been posited by Ramesh Thakur, “to 
respect sovereignty at all times is to risk being complicit in human tragedies sometimes.”197 
Thakur articulates one of the basic principles of the responsibility to protect, namely, that 
where a population is suffering gross human rights abuses, and the state concerned is unable 
or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
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community’s residual responsibility to protect.198 His statement also endorses Deng’s view 
that where the people in a state are suffering and dying, the world would not watch and do 
nothing.199 To do so would be to condone human tragedies. 
The international community’s response to massive internal violence in Rwanda, Somalia and 
the Balkans during 1990s was inconsistent, “erratic, incomplete or counter-productive.”200 
For example, in Rwanda, United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda, (UNAMIR) for 
months witnessed mounting tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis. 201 The commander of 
the UN mission, General Dallaire, sent notices to the UN of impending genocide by the 
Hutus against the Tutsis, but the international community failed to respond to these 
warnings.202 Instead, the UN reduced the strength of the military force deployed to protect 
civilians to only 270 soldiers.203 The commander, General Dallaire, could do nothing but 
stand by while thousands of people were massacred.204 The number of UN forces may not 
have been sufficient initially, but as the ICISS Report observes, “credible strategies were 
available to prevent, or at least greatly mitigate the slaughter which followed”205.  However, 
the Security Council failed to act.206 That, according to the ICISS Report, was “a failure of 
international will – of civic courage – at the highest level”.207 As a result, many Africans 
arrived at the conclusion that despite all “the rhetoric about universal human rights, some 
human lives end up mattering a great deal less to the international community than others.”208 
It is understandable in this context, why the ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone without UN Security Council authorization were not condemned.209 
Another example is Somalia.  There, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II, 
(UNOSOM II) was established in March 1993 to take over from the United Task Force 
(UNITAF) - a multinational force led by the United States - authorized by the Security 
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Council to use “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia.210 The mandate was to take appropriate action, including the use 
of force if necessary, to establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance.211 In June 
1993, 24 UNOSOM II soldiers from Pakistan were killed in an attack in Mogadishu.212 In the 
same year, 18 United States’ soldiers lost their lives in an operation in Mogadishu.213  Early 
1994, the United States withdrew from the mission, followed by France, Sweden and 
Belgium214  The Security Council revised UNOSOM II’s mandate in 1994 to exclude the use 
of coercive methods, stressing reconciliation and reconstruction.215  UNOSOM II was 
withdrawn in early March 1995.216 The ICISS Report attributes the failure of the UN mission 
in Somalia to “…flawed planning, poor execution, and an excessive dependence on military 
force.”217 Yet another example was the Bosnia case and the failure of the UN to prevent the 
massacre of thousands of civilians who had sought shelter in UN “safe areas” in Srebrenica 
on July 11 1995, which, “raises the principle that intervention amounts to a promise to people 
in need: a promise cruelly betrayed”.218 
After the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, a serious debate began in the 
international community between advocates of the “right to intervene” on the one hand and 
proponents of the concept of national sovereignty, who were opposed to coercive 
intervention, on the other hand.219 The debate was about how to react effectively in the face 
of gross and systematic violations of the human rights of populations.220 The question was 
whether states have unconditional sovereignty over their affairs or whether the international 
community has the right to intervene in a country for humanitarian purposes.221 In his 
Millennium Report of 2000, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recalling the failure of the 
Security Council to act decisively in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, put forward a 
challenge to Member States of the UN, to take steps in defence of our “common 
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humanity”.222 It was imperative to find a compromise acceptable to these opposed positions. 
In response to Kofi Annan’s challenge in his 2000 Millennium General Assembly address, 
the Government of Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced the 
establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
in September 2000. 223 
The mandate of the Commission was to “build a broader understanding of the problem of 
reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty, more specifically, it 
was to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics – and often 
paralysis – towards action within the international system, particularly through the United 
Nations.”224 In other words, the responsibility of the ICISS was to create a balance between 
respect for the concept of state sovereignty and the concept of humanitarian intervention. The 
Commission came up with a new description of humanitarian intervention by placing 
emphasis on the responsibility of states to protect the powerless instead of the traditional 
“right to intervene,” which is the core of humanitarian intervention.225 
The debate was not about a right, but about a responsibility.226 “The expression ‘humanitarian 
intervention” did not help to carry the debate forward, so too do we believe that the language 
of past debates arguing for or against ‘a right to intervene’ by one state on the territory of 
another state is outdated and unhelpful.”227 “We prefer to talk not about a “right to intervene” 
but of a responsibility to protect.”228 The Commission concluded that the change in 
terminology would bring compromise into the debate because it meant that the interest of 
people should precede those of interveners.229 This turned the “right to intervene” language 
on its head by viewing intervention from the perspective of people who were victims of 
atrocitiesnot on the rights of the great and powerful to throw their weight around.230 
The Commission came up with the doctrine of responsibility to protect, a new approach to 
protecting people from mass atrocities, as the compromise between these two extreme 
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positions.231 The Commission did not advocate the abrogation of the concept of state 
sovereignty, but rather, influenced by Deng’s232 formulation of sovereignty as a 
responsibility, it argued that sovereignty implied that: (i) the state is responsible for 
protecting its citizens and ensuring their welfare; (ii) the state is responsible to its citizens 
internally and to the international community through the UN; and (iii) the state and its 
agents are accountable for their actions.233  The ICISS postulated that the primary 
responsibility for the protection of its population rested with the state itself, since the state 
concerned is in a better position to deal with problems in the state. However, a residual 
responsibility lies on the international community, which is activated when the state is unable 
or unwilling to meet this responsibility, or is complicit in the perpetration of atrocities.234 
The core of the responsibility to protect is to provide protection to the vulnerable and 
defenceless populations.235 Where a population is suffering serious harm as a consequence of 
internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, because it is complicit in it, the principle of non-intervention yields 
to the international responsibility to protect.236 The state in question cannot, as a consequence 
claim the protection granted by Article II of the Charter.237 
i) Legal foundations of the responsibility to protect 
The ICISS acknowledged that the doctrine of responsibility to protect had a legal foundation, 
firstly, in the concept of state sovereignty itself, which places a responsibility on the state not 
only to respect other state’s sovereignty, but in addition, to respect the human rights of its 
citizens.238 Secondly, the UN Charter commits the UN to “promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language or religion.”239 Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights240 
embodies the moral code and legal basis of human rights.241 This is buttressed by the 
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Covenants on Civil and Political Rights,242 as well as the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,243 which affirm human rights as a fundamental principle of international 
relations.244 Thirdly, ICISS observed that while it could not claim that the doctrine of 
responsibility to protect has emerged as a new principle of customary international law, 
growing practice of states and UN Security Council precedent suggested an emerging guiding 
principle, which could properly be termed “the responsibility to protect.”245 
ii) Core Principles of the responsibility to protect 
The Commission found that the responsibility to protect extended beyond the use of military 
force which is the core of humanitarian intervention, and that the concept has three 
elements246, namely: 
(i) The responsibility to prevent; 
(ii) The responsibility to react; and 
(iii) The responsibility to rebuild. 
The responsibility to prevent, the Commission noted, is the most important, because military 
intervention is a demonstration of the failure of preventive measures.  The responsibility to 
prevent is to address the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict.247 The 
responsibility to react is to respond to situations of compelling need with appropriate 
measures which may include coercive measures like economic sanctions, international 
prosecution, and only in extreme cases, military intervention.248 In the words of the 
Commission, “less intrusive and coercive measures should always be considered before more 
coercive and intrusive ones are applied.”249 The responsibility to rebuild is to provide, 
particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and 
reconciliation, addressing the causes of harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.250 
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f) FOCUS ON USE OF COERCIVE MILITARY FORCE IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT:  A JUSTIFICATION 
The study focuses on the coercive military dimension of R2P as formulated by ICISS, as it is 
the most controversial aspect of R2P251 because it legitimizes the use of force for human 
protection purposes and also because the ICISS Report accorded it great importance. The 
thesis discusses the situations when military action for human protection purposes is 
warranted and the tough thresholds established by the ICISS that must be met if military 
action is to be defensible.252 While the ICISS Report indicated that military force should be 
part of the strategies for implementing R2P, it overemphasised military force as “the 
centrepiece of R2P by focusing so much attention on the proposed guidelines for the use of 
force.”253 The importance accorded to the military dimension of R2P in the ICISS Report 
itself is demonstrated by a clear bias in favour of the military option over other options such 
as economic and political sanctions.254 A study of the ICISS report shows that under the 
heading “The responsibility to react,”255 the military option is accorded more detailed 
treatment, from pages 31 to 37 inclusive, i.e. seven pages, while other options such as 
economic and political sanctions are dealt with only from pages 29 to 31, i.e. about two and a 
quarter pages,256 thereby demonstrating the importance the Commission attached to this 
aspect of R2P. The centrality of the military dimension is reflected in the ICISS report as 
follows: “By far the most controversial form of …intervention is military, and a great part of 
our report necessarily focuses on that.”257 
To buttress this fact, the report provides detailed criteria for military intervention under six 
headings, namely: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means 
and reasonable prospects.258 Besides, the responsibility to rebuild, to provide full assistance 
with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation is required, “particularly after a military 
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intervention,” 259 which presupposes that the responsibility to rebuild arises only as a 
consequence of military action, thus reinforcing the importance of the military dimension. In 
the words of the ICISS Report, “responsibility to protect” implies above all else a 
responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection.260 Thus, even 
though the Commission avoided the phrase “humanitarian intervention,”261 and also placed 
emphasis on prevention of crises and rebuilding the affected state in the aftermath of crisis, 
the Commission’s report focused on the question of military intervention in response to 
humanitarian crises and mass atrocities.262 While Gareth Evans notes that “it is an absolute 
travesty of the RtoP principle to say that it is about military force and nothing else,”263 he 
shares the view that the military dimension of R2P is the most important aspect, with the 
assertion that “the question of military action remains the central one to the debate.”264 He 
asserts further that “…military intervention is not merely defensible; it is a compelling 
obligation.”265 In the view of Weiss, the central element of R2P is non-consensual 
intervention, rendering other elements of the concept secondary.266 He criticises the 2005 
World Summit Document refinement of the ICISS report concerning the use of force, “as a 
step backward, as ‘R2P lite’” – because humanitarian intervention has to be approved by the 
Security Council.” 267 The foregoing justify the focus on the military dimension of R2P. 
i) Criteria for military intervention 
The Commission acknowledged that military intervention is an extraordinary measure. 268 
Therefore, for military intervention to have legitimacy, it may be resorted to only where there 
is: (i) large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the 
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act or a failed state;269 
(ii) large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, 
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forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.270 In addition, the Commission laid down 
precautionary principles where there are compelling reasons to resort to military force. First, 
there should be the right intention. The primary purpose of military intervention must be to 
avert human suffering271.  Second, military intervention must be the last resort after the 
exhaustion of non-military options.272 Third, the force applied in military intervention should 
be the minimum necessary to attain the objective of human protection.273  Finally, there must 
be reasonable prospect of success in averting or halting human suffering.274 Above all, any 
such action can legally be undertaken only with the authorization of the UN Security Council 
which should be obtained prior to military action.275 
The Commission also set out operational principles276 to regulate military intervention, 
namely;   
(i) Clear objectives; unambiguous mandate with resources to match; 
(ii) Common military approach 
(iii) Incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force 
(iv) Rules of engagement to reflect the principle of proportionality and adherence 
to international humanitarian law. 
The UN 60th Anniversary World Summit from 14-16 September 2005, which was attended 
by heads of state and governments of UN Member States, formally accepted the 
responsibility of each State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity, crimes that may trigger the responsibility to 
protect.277  The summit, according to Evans, was preceded by “months of wrangling in New 
York about nearly every one of Annan’s sixty or so recommendations”.278 John Bolton, the 
United States Ambassador to the UN, in particular expressed opposition to UN reorganisation 
measures, which the United States’ Government thought would restrict US authority to use 
force and the new legal obligations these measures placed on member states to intervene 
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where genocide, ethnic cleansing, or war crimes were being committed.279 He argued that the 
Security Council was already empowered to intervene in countries like Sudan (Darfur), and 
maintained that the UN Charter “has never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for 
Security Council members to support enforcement action.”280  Jeffery Sachs, University of 
Columbia Economist and Annan’s adviser on the World Summit, observed that the US was 
attempting at the last minute to “gut” the summit document “with arguments that change by 
the day”.281  As a consequence, the summit, as Evans observes, was a disappointment, “with 
very little of substance agreed on anything”.282 
The only unanimous agreement in the World Summit Outcome Document was on paragraphs 
138 and 139.283 
Paragraph 138.  Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
Paragraph 139.   The international community, through the United Nations, also 
the has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VII of the Charter, to help to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a 
timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case to case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national governments are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. 
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The agreement on the language of paragraphs 138 and 139 is a cause for celebration for 
supporters of the responsibility to protect, firstly, because of the explicit emphasis on the 
responsibility of states to protect their own people.284 Secondly, paragraphs 138 and 139 
place emphasis on prevention and the need for countries to help each other to build 
preventive capacities.285 Like the ICISS report, the WSO Document placed emphasis on 
reactive measures of less coercive nature than military action.286 It was only when all 
peaceful, diplomatic and humanitarian means have failed that military force under Chapter 
VII may be resorted to.287 More important, the Outcome Document endorsed the 
recommendations of the ICISS by insisting on the central role of the UN Security Council 
before the use of force for protecting populations at risk. 288 
An important link between the ICISS report and the WSO Document was the work of the UN 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.289 The panel was 
tasked to “assess current threats to international peace and to security, to evaluate how our 
existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make 
recommendations for strengthening the UN so that it can provide collective security for all in 
the twenty first century.”290 In its report, the panel endorsed the notion that the international 
community has a responsibility to protect populations in the face of genocide, mass killings 
ethnic cleansing and other egregious violations of human rights, which states have been 
unable or unwilling to prevent or halt.291 The report further endorsed the ICISS criteria for the 
use of force outlined above.292 
ii) Use of force - Observations 
The main reason the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has generated fierce controversy is 
that proponents claim “a right to intervene” or non-consensual use of force by one state in the 
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territory of another state, ostensibly, to protect a suffering population in the latter.293 
Opponents of the doctrine, however, consider it as an assault on the concept of state 
sovereignty.294 The victims of international military interventions are likely to be developing 
countries, not Western countries.295 Historically, humanitarian interventions have been 
carried out by powerful states in the territories of weaker countries.296 
An example is Libya. Due to widespread and systematic attacks on the Libyan civilian 
population by the Government of Libya,297 the Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 1970, on 26 February 2011, which condemned “the gross and systematic violation 
of human rights” in Libya, and demanded an end to the violence. The resolution recalled the 
“Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population” and imposed international 
sanctions.298 On 17 March 2011, the Security Council passed resolution 1973, demanding an 
end to attacks against civilians, and authorised Member States to “take all necessary 
measures” to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya.299  A few days after the 
resolution was adopted, NATO planes began massive strikes on Libyan forces.300 The 
intensity of force used in military interventions should be the minimum necessary to attain 
the objective of the mission.301 Massive airstrikes conducted by NATO in Libya from high 
altitude killed ordinary people indiscriminately and destroyed infrastructure. This amounted 
to abuse of the concept and a disproportionate use of force, contrary to the recommendation 
of the ICISS. If the motive of NATO was solely to protect civilians, and provide 
humanitarian assistance, and not the attainment of its objective of removing Gaddafi from 
power, it would have assisted Libya to rebuild and would not have left the country in 
chaos.302 
Another example is Cote d’Ivoire. Following post-election violence perpetrated by the 
supporters of ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouatarra on civilians in Cote 
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d’Ivoire during late 2010 to early 2011, the Security Council passed Resolution 1975, 
condemning the gross human rights abuses.303 Referring to the “primary responsibility of 
each State to protect civilians”, the resolution called for ex-President Gbagbo to cede power 
to President Ouatarra, who had won the elections and authorised the UN Operations in Cote 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI), to use “all necessary means to protect life and property”.304 UNICI 
commenced operations on 4 April 2011which dislodged President Gbabgo from power.305 He 
was transferred to the International Criminal Court to face charges of “crimes against 
humanity, as an ‘indirect perpetrator’ of murder, rape, persecution and other inhumane 
acts”.306 
On the other hand, when gross human rights abuses occur in powerful countries, no 
intervention takes place. Gareth Evans refers to China’s: 
[…] ugly record in the past decade of violently suppressing dissent in Tibet and 
Xinjiang and domestic protest elsewhere, and the crackdowns of early 2008 in 
Tibet and elsewhere, in the context of sensitivities unleashed by the Olympic torch 
relay…and the Kremlin’s insouciant response to international criticism under 
President Putin, and the numerous abuses that have occurred in the course of the 
Russian suppressing of the Chechen independence movement since the mid-1990’s 
including the massacre of scores of civilians in Grozny in February 2000 and 
thousands of enforced  disappearances from 1999 until at least 2005.307 
It is inconceivable that coercive military can be contemplated against China, Russia or the 
United States, or any state that the protection of any of the five Permanent Security Council 
members, or any militarily powerful country.308 Application of the principle that military 
action can only be justified if there is a reasonable chance of success would necessarily 
exclude military action against any of the five permanent members,309 because the reality is 
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that “…there will always be some countries too militarily powerful for military action against 
them…” to succeed.310 
It is not surprising then, that the fiercest defenders of non-intervention are weaker states, 
mainly third world countries, fearful of severe restrictions on their sovereignty by stronger 
states.311 Countries such as Yemen, Syria and the Central African Republic, have literally 
been served notice that they are potential candidates for intervention,312 and have reason to be 
apprehensive. Concerning Yemen, Security Council Resolution 2014 of 21 October 2011 
explicitly referred to the Yemeni Government’s “primary responsibility to protect its 
population”. With Syria, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
genocide, AdamaDieng, has recommended that because the: 
Syrian Government is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international 
community must act on the commitments made by all Heads of State and 
Government at the 2005 World Summit to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their 
incitement.313 
Dieng reminds the international community of the obligations undertaken in terms of the 
World Summit Document paragraphs 139 to take collective measures, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII measures in the face of gross human rights abuses. By this 
statement, he recommends intervention in Syria. 
Another ground for opposition to the doctrine is that the motives for such interventions are 
not always altruistic, but may be grounded in the geopolitical interests of powerful states.314 
Altruism, according to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (7th ed.), “is the fact of 
caring about the needs of others and happiness of other people more than your own”. In the 
context of humanitarian intervention, the motivation should be “other oriented”.315 The 
NATO intervention in Libya demonstrates otherwise. The purpose of Security Council 
Resolution 1973 which authorised military intervention, was to prevent the mass killing of 
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civilians, and not for the interveners to take sides in the on-going civil war, or effect regime 
change, or target Gaddafi.316 However, Gaddafi was targeted, “eventually enabling the rebels 
to capture and summarily execute Gaddafi and seize power in October 2011,” thus fulfilling 
NATO’s pre-set goal of regime change.317 
Yet another example of intervention not motivated by altruism was the United States 
intervention in Haiti in 1994. Following the 30 September 1991 coup in that country which 
overthrew President Aristide, the military regime that replaced him persecuted the population 
leading to an exodus of Haitians into the United States.318 International pressure and 
economic sanctions failed to dislodge the military junta from power, or resolve the political 
crisis.319 This led the Security Council to pass Resolution 940 (1994) 0n 31 July 1994 
authorising:  
[…]Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and 
control and in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure 
from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island 
Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and  the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti.320 
The United States led the intervention because the crisis was in its immediate vicinity.321 In 
his address to the nation on 15 September 1994, President Clinton referred to the security 
interests of the United States, which included, “…promoting democracy on our 
hemisphere…”322 Thus, despite the fact that there was a humanitarian crisis in Haiti, “regime 
restoration was an explicit motivation for the Clinton administration to intervene in Haiti”.323 
Another reason for criticism of the humanitarian intervention is the selectivity in its 
application, which is related to the issue of motivation. For example, the situation in Syria is 
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quite similar to the Libyan situation which precipitated the NATO intervention.324Ulstein 
reports that:  
At the end of 2011, the revolt in Syria already displayed similar features to the 
Libyan uprising at the time the Security Council decided to intervene militarily to 
protect civilians there and by September 2012 the intensity of the conflict had 
reached the legal threshold for a non-international armed conflict.325 
The international community, despite the similarity, has failed to intervene. The reason may 
be lack of national interest, which reveals that the international community is “far away from 
a pure humanitarian ethic unmixed with other political considerations”326. 
The doctrine of responsibility to protect was formulated by the ICISS to be a compromise 
between the proponents of the “right to intervene” and the advocates of unadulterated 
national sovereignty.327 The main aspect of the doctrine of responsibility to protect which 
generates concerns is the use of military force - the core of humanitarian intervention.328 The 
Commission sought to allay these concerns by proposing precautionary principles and 
guidelines to regulate the use of military force for human protection purposes.329 These 
principles were, firstly, that, the primary purpose of intervention must be to halt or avert 
human suffering.330 Secondly, military intervention must be the last resort after exhaustion of 
peaceful means to resolve the crisis.331 Thirdly, the force used in the course of an intervention 
must be limited to that necessary for the attainment of the objective of the mission.332 Finally, 
there must be reasonable prospect of success of the mission to halt or avert human suffering 
and not cause more harm than the result of inaction.333 
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These principles and guidelines were set out by the Commission, to legitimise the developing 
doctrine and to ensure its widespread acceptance.334 The principles and guidelines were 
designed to distinguish the doctrine of responsibility to protect from the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as far as the use of force is concerned.335 Thus, the use of military 
force in the implementation of the responsibility to protect is just one of the measures for the 
protection of victims of serious human rights abuse. Military intervention can only be 
justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis 
has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have 
succeeded.336 Other means include political, economic, and judicial measures.337 
While humanitarian intervention advocated the right to intervene, thus viewing intervention 
from the perspective of the intervener, responsibility to protect emphasises the right to 
protection of the powerless and imposes on the international community a residual obligation 
to provide that protection where the state affected fails to do so. 338 In terms of the doctrine, 
force may only be used with UN authorisation. 
Much as the Commission’s efforts to make the doctrine more acceptable ought to be 
applauded, it is submitted that where the element of use of force for human protection is 
concerned, the question of double standards and the possibility of abuse will remain. It is 
unlikely that coercive military action would ever be taken against powerful states, like the 
USA, Russia or China, in the hypothetical scenario of egregious human rights abuses being 
perpetrated in the territories of these states. The Commission’s precautionary principle of 
“reasonable prospects of success”339 of military intervention to achieve the goal of human 
protection affirms this.  “In the case of any proposed action against a Permanent Five 
member, or any other major power, this particular criterion would always be a showstopper 
whatever other factors …were in play”.340  The Commission admitted as much, that: 
The application of this precautionary principle would on purely utilitarian grounds 
be likely to preclude military action against any of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council even if all the conditions described were met. It is difficult to 
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imagine a major conflict being avoided, or success being achieved, if such action 
were mounted against any of them. The same is true of other major powers who 
are not members of the Security Council.341 
This is a clear admission that the use of force in the implementation of the doctrine of 
responsibility to protect will only apply to weak countries.  The Commission attempts to go 
round this potential for double standards, by actually confirming it with the explanation that:  
The reality that interventions may not be able to be mounted in every case where 
there is justification for doing so, is no reason for them not to be mounted in every 
case.342 
This thesis attempts to make a case that to the extent that the use of force is remains an option 
in both concepts, the distinction between traditional humanitarian intervention and the 
responsibility to protect is blurred, and only weak countries may be targets of interventions. 
The potential for abuse of the concepts and the use of indiscriminate force cannot be 
discounted, because it is not clear whether powerful states that intervene in other countries 
are accountable for their actions. To powerful states, interventions introduce a new order in 
which the pretext to protect human rights takes precedence over state sovereignty, while to 
the less powerful, interventions herald a new world order in which powerful states use the 
pretext of protecting human rights to achieve geopolitical goals, by whatever means. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that powerful countries would not abuse the doctrine for 
ulterior motives, even where all the grounds of legitimacy are present and the operation is 
legally sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Even where humanitarian intervention has 
been undertaken with UN Security Council authorisation, there has been abuse of the 
mandate and disproportionate force has been applied in pursuit of pre-set goals. An example 
is the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, during which the organisation exceeded the 
mandate under UN Resolution 1973 to aggressively pursue its pre-set geopolitical objective 
of regime change, through the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force.  The main 
goal of UN Resolution 1973 was to protect civilians. However:  
                                                          
341ICISS Report, para. 4.42. 
342Ibid. 
49 
 
Evidence reveals that NATO’s primary aim was to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime, 
even at the expense of increasing harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces 
indiscriminately, including some in retreat and others in Qaddafi’s hometown of 
Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians. Moreover, NATO continued to aid 
the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected government cease-fire offers that 
could have ended the violence and spared civilians. Such military assistance 
included weapons, training, and covert deployment of hundreds of troops from 
Qatar, eventually enabling the rebels to capture and summarily execute Qaddafi 
and seize power in October 2011.343 
The lessons from NATO’s use of force in Libya are that: (i) there is the need for considerable 
caution when contemplating if and how to undertake humanitarian intervention, and;(ii) 
interveners are unable to resist the tendency to effect regime change, which increases the 
danger to civilians.344  Therefore, when military intervention becomes absolutely necessary, 
in order to avoid abuse and the potential disproportionate use of force, the precautionary 
principles345 set down by the ICISS must be adhered to strictly. 
g) SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THESIS 
The core of humanitarian intervention is the claim to the right to intervene militarily by one 
state or group of states in the internal affairs of another state, ostensibly, to protect suffering 
citizens of the latter.  It involves the non-consensual use of coercive force. This is in conflict 
with the doctrine of state sovereignty, which grants a state the right to take decisions in its 
own territory without interference from any outside authority. The UN Charter Article II346 
prohibits interference in a state’s internal affairs by other states. At the same time, the UN 
Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights347 and the two 1966 348 covenants impose on states 
obligations to respect the human rights of their citizens. The ICISS Report sought to reconcile 
these differences by the formulation of the doctrine of responsibility to protect. However, the 
debate has not gone away mainly because of the inconsistencies in the responses of the 
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international community to humanitarian crises, and questions about the legality and 
legitimacy of the doctrine.  
Much of the scholarly literature on the doctrine of responsibility to protect deals with the 
legality and legitimacy of the doctrine. The significance of the thesis is that it takes a 
different approach by focusing on the military intervention aspect of the responsibility to 
protect (R2P): specifically, the thesisinvestigates the potential for abuse of the doctrine for 
the advancement of national and strategic interests, and the propensity to use disproportionate 
force in the attainment of the stated objective of human protection, by powerful states. Abuse 
“refers to cases where moral arguments are used to justify a war that is not primarily 
motivated by the moral concerns espoused, but by short term interests of those instigating 
violence”.349 The thesisinvestigates: the motivations for military interventions; why there are 
interventions in some countries and inaction in others; whether some lives matter more than 
others; whether the motives are altruistic, economic, or geopolitical; whether powerful 
countries are accountable for their actions pursuant to the responsibility to protect and to 
whom, especially where the UN is bypassed, and; issues of abuse and proportionality in the 
use of force pursuant to interventions.To this end, the thesis will review past interventions in 
Libya, Somalia, Northern Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and; the reasons for inaction in 
Rwanda and Darfur. 
The thesis argues that the intensity and amount of military force applied in the exercise of 
R2P should be the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose of the operation, namely the 
protection of victims of human rights abuse. To achieve this, there should be clear guidelines 
and rules of engagement for the operation, otherwise the integrity of the armed intervention 
can be compromised, because in the absence of clear guidelines and other conditions, the 
mandate for the intervention may be extended to attain pre-set geopolitical objectives.  
The thesis will recommend that, to eliminate or minimise the potential for abuse and 
disproportionate use of force, military intervention under the responsibility to protect should 
be conducted not only with UN authorisation, but also under the direct command of the UN, 
in a form similar to peace-enforcement operations proposed by UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali in 1992.350  This can be achieved effectively, when the UN establishes its own 
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standing army, to be deployed in times of humanitarian crises; thereby, obviating the 
monopoly on interventions held by powerful states, who are not subjects of interventions 
themselves.  
h) METHODOLOGY 
This is legal research based on a literature study.  It will therefore rely heavily on existing 
literature, including the UN Charter, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001, the Supplementary 
Volume to ICISS Report, declarations and other international conventions, textbooks, articles 
in journals, the internet, comments in reputable newspapers, and general observations by 
eminent scholars.  
The thesis will conduct a case analysis of interventions in Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 
Somalia in 1992-1993, Kosovo in 1999, Haiti in 1994, and Bosnia in 1995, to determine 
whether there were issues of abuses, andevaluate the amount of force applied during the 
interventions, and; to establish the motivations for interventions and the reasons for inaction 
in other situations.  
i) LITERATURE REVIEW 
The term “humanitarian intervention” is an oxymoron. It combines benevolence with the use 
of force.351 As a doctrine, it has defied a generally acceptable definition because of its 
controversial nature. It has generated controversy because at the core of the doctrine is a 
claim of right to intervene in the affairs a state by another state or group of states without the 
consent of the affected state, and the likelihood that it can be used as a pretext to launch wars 
for ulterior motives . 352 
Bazyler argues that as a result of its controversial nature, “…there is little use in defining the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention”.353 Another author has observed that: “A usable 
general definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ would be extremely difficult to formulate 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
     Security Council on 31 January 1992.An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making  and  
     Peacekeeping: Available: Readex/Index to UN Documents and Publication 17 June 1992 (A/47/277 –    
S/2411) p.2. 
351Roberts, note 167, pp. 429-449. 
352 R. Goodman, note 163 supra, p. 107. 
353Bazyler, op. cit., note 113, p. 547. 
52 
 
and virtually impossible to apply vigorously”.354 However, several writers have attempted to 
provide various definitions. It has been defined as an armed intervention into the territory of a 
state by external forces for humanitarian purposes, with the objective of protecting or 
rescuing vulnerable people from mass atrocities.355Ryter has defined it as “…coercive action 
by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its 
government, with or without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council, for 
the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human rights or 
international humanitarian law”.356 Another author has observed that humanitarian 
intervention involves: “…the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human 
rights of persons other than the nationals of the intervening sate and without the permission 
of the state within which force is applied”.357 It has also been described as the use of military 
forces for the purpose of halting or impeding a humanitarian disaster.358 This view of 
humanitarian intervention is shared by various writers, including 
Abiew,359Teson,360Fonteyne,361 and Oppenheim.362 
What can be deduced from these definitions is that force may be used by one state or group of 
states in the territory of another state without its consent to protect the nationals of that state 
from gross human rights abuse perpetrated by the state.  The intervening state does not do so 
to protect its own nationals, but the nationals of another state. Thus “…humanitarian 
intervention is widely understood as an armed intervention for the purpose of saving lives of 
strangers”.363  This paints humanitarian intervention as intervention carried out with altruistic 
or philanthropic motives.364 However this does not answer the question why there are 
interventions in some countries but inaction in other countries where equally odious human 
rights abuses have taken place. 
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The right to intervene inherent in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has generated 
opposition from advocates of inflexible adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty. 
Bellamy argues that the right to intervene in other state is a “limited right” when it becomes 
necessary “to save strangers in dire need.”365   However, state sovereignty, in classical 
Westphalian terms means that, a state has supreme authority to make decisions within its 
territory without interference from external forces. The United Nations Charter was based on 
the equality of all states; therefore, state sovereignty is central to the UN system.366 The UN 
Charter recognises sovereignty as a prerequisite for ensuring stability and peace in 
international relations.367 The Charter rejects the use of force,368 and; prohibits the United 
Nations itself from interfering in the internal affairs of states.369 The exceptions to the use of 
force under the Charter are United Nations Security Council actions under Chapter VII, and 
actions taken by states in self-defence under Article 51. 
 The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States370 also clearly states that “…no state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for 
any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any state. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of 
the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.”371 
The United Nations Charter adopted the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, which makes it 
sacrosanct. Thus, it has been observed by Vincent that: “If a State has a right to sovereignty, 
this implies that other states have a duty to respect that right by among other things, 
refraining from intervention in its domestic affairs …The principle of non-intervention in 
international relations might be said, then, to be one of protecting the principle of 
sovereignty”.372 Intervention involves the use of force; therefore any form of intervention is 
prohibited under international law. 
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However, non-intervention in the classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty is no 
longer accepted without debate, as being sacred. It can be argued that the UN Charter itself 
provides grounds for humanitarian intervention in the interest of humanity because it imposes 
a duty on member states to protect fundamental human rights. The UN Charter states that one 
of the purposes of the UN is “to achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.373 The Preamble to the Charter also re-
affirms the faith of the founding fathers in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, and in equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and 
small. It would be impossible for the UN to solve international problems as envisaged by the 
Charter without harming the sovereignty of the state.374 
It is argued by Wheeler and Bellamy375 that under the United Nations Charter, human rights 
are as important as peace and security. Riesman376 argues that Articles 1 (3) and Articles 55 
and 56 of the UN Charter are sufficient for the UN Security Council to circumvent the 
prohibition of force under Article 2 (4), and legitimately authorise intervention in cases of 
massive human rights abuse, murder, or genocide. Shaw argues that customary international 
law through state practice might provide a basis for humanitarian 
intervention.377Hieronymi378 argues that “…unlimited sovereignty, not restrained by respect 
of law and human dignity and freedom, leads to …domestically widespread oppression”.  
The Genocide Convention also provides that any Contracting Party “may call upon the 
competent organs of the United nations to take action under the Charter of the United Nations 
as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide…”379 
Under this article, the Security Council may authorise the use of force to halt or prevent 
human rights abuse that amount to genocide.  
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It has also been argued that globalisation has eroded the strict notion of state sovereignty by 
its impact on the international state system. Globalization has been defined as “…the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that 
local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”.380 Krieg 
argues that “Together with the global social and economic interconnectivity arising towards 
the end of the 20th century, also politics experienced a shift from state-centric towards 
geocentric global politics. State sovereignty and autonomy have been compromised by 
international regimes that increasingly shape the policy making of nation states and thereby 
impact the lives of individuals homogenously across national borders”. To deal with matters 
of an international nature, it is necessary for the state to collaborate with other states. The 
sovereign state had to sacrifice part of its sovereignty in the interest of global cooperation.381 
In the words of Krieg,382 “The nation state of the Wesphalian world order with its full and 
uncompromised sovereignty and autonomy ceased to exist.” 
In spite of these arguments, even though state sovereignty has been diminished by various 
factors, it remains fundamental in the conduct of international relations, providing protection 
for weak countries from powerful countries. 
Krieg observes that the inflexible adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty is one of the 
reasons the UN failed to effectively address the 1990s crises in Rwanda and Kosovo.383In his 
report to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999, the then Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan made reference to the “prospects for human security and intervention in the next 
century.”384 Recalling the Security Council’s inaction relating to the crises in Rwanda and 
Kosovo, he urged the international community to come up with a new concept that will allow 
states to take action “in defence of our common humanity.”385 
His challenge led to the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) with the task of resolving the dichotomy between state sovereignty 
and the concept of humanitarian intervention. The ICISS interpreted Article 2 (1) of the 
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Charter to redefine sovereignty as a responsibility in both internal functions and external 
duties.386 This meant that states have a responsibility to protect their nationals from mass 
murder, rape, and starvation, but where they are unable or unwilling to do so, a residual 
responsibility shifts to the broader international community,387 and the “principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”388 Evans and Sahnoun389 
have stated that states are entitled to a right to sovereignty. As a corollary, they have a duty to 
cater for the wellbeing of their nationals, the duty to “protect communities from mass 
killings, women from systematic rape, and children from starvation…390” Consequently 
failed states have to be reminded by the international community that they have a 
responsibility to uphold human rights and freedoms. If they fail to discharge these duties, 
collective action should be taken to assist the state to fulfil its duties.391 
Unlike the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which has at its core the use of force, the 
doctrine of responsibility to protect the use of force is a last resort. The doctrine envisages 
that peaceful means should be exhausted before military action. This new doctrine was meant 
to be more acceptable to the international community and to assuage the fears of less 
powerful states about non-consensual interventions by more powerful countries, which 
characterised humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, like the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, the doctrine of responsibility to protect can be manipulated by powerful 
countries to serve their interests. Practical incidents, like the NATO intervention in Libya, 
have met opposition particularly from Third World countries. The NATO intervention in 
Libya demonstrates how even an intervention authorised by the UN Security Council can be 
abused without accountability by powerful countries.  
Heather M Morgan392 argues that, in the post-World War II era, excuses for the defence of 
human rights have been used for unilateral interventions unrelated to self-defence and since 
the end of the Cold War there have been claims that a “new customary rule of international 
law permitting the use of force for humanitarian aims is developing.”393 Morgan observes that 
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even collective humanitarian intervention authorised the UN Security Council is viewed by 
the 3rd World with unease and scepticism because of its unrepresentative composition.394 
The problem with the doctrine of responsibility to protect is the inconsistency in its 
application.395 This arises from the fact that the application of the doctrine is motivated by 
various factors which are not altruistic. Max Boot argues that motivations include the 
advancement of national interests.396 On the other hand it is argued that national interests 
should not influence action under responsibility to protect.397 Max Boot argues further that 
the likelihood of success also influence a state’s decision to intervene.398 A state will not 
consider intervening in a country like Russia or the United States, because these are powerful 
countries. Conversely, for a “less capable” country, the decision to intervene is easy to 
make.399 Thus the humanitarian motive is not the only one driving the intervening state or 
organization even where an intervention is authorized by the Security Council.  Therefore, 
complete disinterestedness or the absence of narrow self-interest at all is unrealistic because it 
cannot be expected that an intervening state will do so without expecting any benefits 
accruing to its national or strategic goals.Consequently, however altruistic an intervening 
state’s motive may be, the financial cost and potential cost in the lives of military personnel 
make it politically imperative that the intervening state should be able to claim some degree 
of self-interest in the intervention.400 Aside from the cost in finances and in lives, other 
motives of an intervening state may be to avoid refugee outflows into its territory or to avoid 
a haven for drug producers or terrorists, developing in the state’s neighbourhood.401Thus as 
pointed out by Michael Walzer absolute disinterestedness is highly unlikely.402 Robert 
Murray shares this view, asserting that a pragmatic approach to R2P allows states to carefully 
decide where an intervention will take place “under what conditions and just how beneficial 
such intervention might be to their own interests.”403 Evans and Sahnoun however are of the 
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view that intervention for altruistic motives is possible, because in an interdependent world 
“with crises as capable as they now are of generating major problems elsewhere…it is in 
every country’s interest to resolve such problems, quite apart from the humanitarian 
imperative.”404 It is submitted that while total disinterestedness is ideal, a state will not 
intervene in another on human protection grounds alone without taking into account its own 
self-interest, such as considerations of risk to its military personnel, the financial costs 
involved and strategic benefits. In other words it is unrealistic to expect that an intervention 
will be motivated solely by compassion for humanity. However even if compassion for 
humanity is not the sole driving force for intervention, it should take precedence over self-
interestedness. As Parekh puts it, the intervention should be disinterested in the sense that the 
humanitarian aspect should not become secondary to an otherwise self-interested 
intervention.405 It is reasonable that an intervening state expects to benefit from the operation, 
but as long as the overriding objective is to protect victims of human rights, it satisfies the 
right intention criterion. 
j) CONCLUSIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
A conclusion can be drawn that the subjects of intervention would primarily be less powerful 
countries in the 3rd World. It is therefore not surprising that the strongest opposition to 
intervention comes from the developing world.  States that intervene in the affairs of other 
states do not do so primarily for altruistic motives. Practical examples in Libya and Iraq have 
demonstrated that geopolitical reasons influence the decision to intervene. It is necessary to 
devise a mechanism to diminish abuse of the doctrine of responsibility to protect, otherwise 
opposition to the doctrine will reduce its relevance. 
Chapter 1 is the introduction, which sets out the objectives of the study, explains the research 
problem and provides an overview of the doctrines of state sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention, as well as the development of the doctrine of responsibility to protect. It also 
explains the nature, scope and focus of the study. Chapter 2 discusses the historical 
development of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. It focuses on the tension 
between the two concepts. The chapter discusses state practice of state sovereignty and 
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humanitarian intervention in the 19th century and early 20th century.  Chapter 3 critically 
investigates the right of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. It focuses on the 
internationalisation of human rights and the effect of the UN Charter on humanitarian 
intervention. Chapter 4 covers the development of the responsibility to protect doctrine. It 
covers the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), and discusses the legal foundations of the doctrine and its core 
principles and elements. The Conclusion contains the findings, recommendations, and the 
contribution of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
1.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the foundations and the historical evolution of the 
doctrines of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, from Medieval Times to the 
Treaty of Westphalia, and modern sovereignty, as understood in the post United Nations 
Charter period. In order to appreciate the practice of the doctrines of state sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention in the contemporary context, a discussion of the theoretical and 
historical background is imperative. Firstly, the chapter provides an extensive overview of the 
history and evolution of the doctrine of state sovereignty. It explains the various sources of 
the doctrine: the theories of Aristotle, Jean Bodin, Hobbes, and the works of other writers 
such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Gentili, and de Vattel. The chapter provides an explanation of the 
political and legal contexts of the theories and writings, and discusses the modern concept of 
sovereignty derived from the Treaties of Westphalia. It provides a discussion of the attributes 
of a state, as codified by the Montevideo Convention 1933, and the adoption and conception 
of the doctrine of state sovereignty in the post-United Nations era. The chapter discusses the 
controversies about the doctrine of state sovereignty: the notion that it is obsolete, yet 
indispensable, in interstate relations. A discussion of the controversial relationship of 
sovereignty with the protection of human rights and the historical limitations on sovereignty 
is also provided in the chapter.  
 
Secondly, the chapter provides a broad overview of the origins and evolution of the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention; its roots in the Just War theory and Christian theology. It 
discusses the exposition of the Just War theory by St. Thomas Aquinas, and how the Just War 
theory with its religious origins became secularised and universalised by writers such as 
Grotius, de Vitoria, Suarez, Wolff, Pufendorf, and Gentili into the modern concept of 
humanitarian intervention.  The chapter provides a discussion of the criteria for war laid 
down by the Just War theory and other scholars, and critically examines the controversy and 
disagreement on the definition and practice of the doctrine. The chapter discusses state 
practice of the doctrines of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention through an analysis of 
specific interventions in Greece (1827-1830), Syria (1860-1861), Bosnia, Herzegovina and 
63 
 
Bulgaria (1876-1878), and Macedonia (1903-1908, 1912-1913), in order to establish whether 
these interventions justified the claim that, by the end of the 19th century, a right of 
humanitarian intervention had been established as a principle of customary international law.  
 
Thirdly, the chapter investigates whether the right of humanitarian intervention which existed 
in the 19th century could serve as precedent for the practice of humanitarian intervention in 
the contemporary international order. The chapter makes a case that even if a right of 
humanitarian intervention existed by  the end of the nineteenth century, it existed  in a 
historical and political context very different from the current international order with its 
prohibition on the use of force, and can therefore not be used as a precedent for humanitarian 
intervention.   
 
The importance of the chapter is that by examining past violations of state sovereignty in the 
name of protecting the human rights of populations, it seeks to establish that powerful states 
have historically used humanitarian intervention as a pretext for the advancement of other 
interests, and therefore, instances of abuse in the contemporary international order are not 
recent developments, but have precedents in medieval times. A study of the history of 
sovereignty and humanitarian intervention will assist the thesis in making suitable 
recommendations and suggestions to ensure that the doctrine of state sovereignty, which is 
the foundation of interstate relations, would be preserved in order to provide protection for 
the weak against the powerful, in order to avoid anarchy in the international order. At the 
same time, guidelines may be suggested to regulate the implementation of future 
humanitarian interventions, in order to avoid the abuse of the doctrine and indiscriminate use 
of force by powerful states.       
1.2. State Sovereignty 
This section of the chapter deals with the history and evolution of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. The concept of state sovereignty is a key concept of international law,1 
considered to be essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, and;2 one 
of the most well established principles in the international order.3 The concept connotes the 
                                                          
1M. N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 488. 
2L. Axworthy, ‘RtoP and the Evolution of State Sovereignty’, in The Responsibility to Protect; The Promise of  
Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Time, J. Genser& I. Cotler, eds., Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 5. 
3F. Egerton, ‘What is Right with R2P? In The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, W. A. Knight  
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idea that, internally, a state has exclusive jurisdiction over matters within its territory, free 
from intervention by outside actors. Externally, sovereignty confers independence on a state, 
and makes it equal to its peers. The concept has been given different meanings, and its 
application has undergone changes in different historical and political contexts, from the 
times of absolute sovereignty in the theories of Aristotle, Bodin, and Hobbes, etc., when the 
concept involved the concentration of power in one person or a small group of people, to the 
contemporary Westphalian system, which involves a state’s right to statehood, territorial 
jurisdiction, and legal personality. A corollary of sovereignty is the principle of non-
intervention which imposes a duty on states to respect the independence of other states and to 
refrain from interfering in their internal affairs. While sovereignty, as explained above 
confers exclusive internal jurisdiction on a state, such an interpretation is controversial in the 
contemporary international order, because a strict application of the concept would mean that 
a state could do whatever it wanted within its territory, including gross abuse of the human 
rights of the citizens, free from outside interference. Thus, a state could commit genocide or 
ethnic cleansing within its territory, and the rest of the world would be restrained in deference 
to sovereignty, from acting.  
In practice, this would impact issues such as human rights, environmental and economic 
matters, which were previously internal matters for a state, but are now considered to be 
matters of international concern.4 The need to protect human rights in particular, led to the 
development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The doctrine acknowledges the 
state’s territorial integrity. However, if a state abuses the human rights of its citizens in a 
gross manner, then sovereignty has to give way to the duty of the international community to 
intervene in that state in order to protect the citizens. Thus much as sovereignty may be 
considered as a bulwark of protection for weak countries against powerful countries, because 
it requires equality and respect for the territorial integrity of states, humanitarian intervention 
dictates that respect for state sovereignty should be balanced with the need to address matters 
of international concern, such as the protection of human rights. Absolute sovereignty has as 
a consequence been eroded in the face of the internationalisation of matters such as human 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
& F. Egerton, eds., Routledge, 2012, p.77. 
4United Nations Charter 1945, Article 1. 
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rights. Despite its limitations however, sovereignty has remained resilient and adaptable, 5and 
continues to underpin the contemporary international order.  
Originally, sovereign authority was considered to be absolute, perpetual, and undivided, and 
in terms of which the private interest of the ruler or ruling class superseded the common 
interest.6 However, at the centre of the earliest conception of sovereignty by political theorists 
of early modern Europe, such as, Hobbes and Bodin, was the acknowledgement of the 
interdependence of authority and responsibility, and; that sovereignty entailed 
responsibilities.7The section discusses the definition of sovereignty, internal and external 
sovereignty, and the theories on absolute sovereignty espoused by philosophers like Bodin, 
Hobbes, Pufendorf, Gentili, and de Vattel, etc. The theories are discussed in detail to explain 
the historical and political contexts in which sovereignty developed. An objective of the 
section is to establish that the doctrine of sovereignty as it is known currently, has its origins 
in the absolute notion of sovereignty, envisaged by some of these philosophers, and; to 
demonstrate that, this notion of sovereignty is impracticable, in the current international 
order, in the light of concerns for human rights, and democratic system of governance. 
The role of the Treaties of Westphalia in the establishment of the concept of sovereign 
statehood and the independence and equality of states is discussed in the section. The 
Montevideo Convention which codified the concept of statehood, the equality of states, and 
the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, is also discussed. State 
sovereignty in the post-United Nations Charter era is also dealt with in the section. A 
discussion of the prohibition on the use of force and the corollary of non-intervention 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter is provided.  Acceptance of the concept of state 
sovereignty and the equality of states has not eliminated unilateral interventions by powerful 
countries in the domestic affairs of weaker states in the post UN Charter era. The section 
discusses the necessary limitations placed on state sovereignty due to the interdependence of 
states, the internalisation of human rights, and the requirements of international law. The 
section argues that the need to protect human rights dictates that, in some circumstances, 
sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention may have to give way to international 
                                                          
5 B Fassbender, “Sovereignty and constitutionalism in international law”, in N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in  
Transition, 1st ed., Hart Publishing, (2003), p.115. 
6 E. Andrew,  “Jean Bodin on Sovereignty”, Republics of Letters: A journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics,  
and the Arts 2, No. 2 (June 1, 2011), pp. 75-84 at 76-77. 
7L. Glanville, Sovereignty & the Responsibility to Protect, A New History, The University of Chicago Press, 2014,  
p. 6. 
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intervention in the internal affairs of affected states. The purpose is to establish that in such 
cases, interventions should occur under clear internationally accepted guidelines, in order to 
avoid abuse by intervening states. The section concludes that, despite its limitations, 
sovereignty remains an indispensable principle of international law which underpins 
international relations and protects weaker states from interference in their domestic affairs 
by more powerful states. 
1.2.1. Definition 
Sovereignty does not have a universally accepted definition. Oppenheim observes that:  
[…]there exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more controversial 
than that of sovereignty. It is an undisputable fact that this conception, from the 
moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, had 
never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon.8 
Henkin also is of the view that sovereignty “means many things, some essential, some 
insignificant; some agreed, some controversial; some are not warranted and should not be 
accepted”9 and goes on to suggest that the concept is obsolete, and therefore, “for legal 
purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a 
relic of an earlier era”.10 Sovereignty, however, is an important principle in international law 
which cannot be dispensed with, and as asserted by Perrez: 
[…]international law is based on the principle of sovereignty, that sovereignty is 
the most important if not the only structural principle of international law that 
shapes the content of nearly all rules of international law, that the international 
legal order is merely an expression of the uniform principle of external 
sovereignty, that sovereignty is the criterion for membership of the international 
society, and that sovereignty in sum is the ‘cornerstone of international law’ and 
the controlling principle of world order.11 
                                                          
8 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1 (4th ed., AD McNair ed. 1928), p. 137. 
9 L Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values, Dordrecht: Boston: M Nijhoff(1995), p. 8. 
10Ibid. p. 10. 
11 F. Perrez,  Cooperative Sovereignty from Independence to Interdependence in the Structure of International   
   Environmental Law, Springer Netherlands, (2000), p. 13. 
67 
 
Several writers have provided some definitions of the term. Weiss defines it as “the 
independent and unfettered power of a state in its jurisdiction.”12To Scheid, sovereignty 
entails the idea that “states are politically equal, independent, and self-governing 
(autonomous) entities.”13Bodley has defined it as follows: “Sovereignty is the most extensive 
form of jurisdiction under international law. In general terms, it denotes full and 
unchallengeable power over a piece of territory and all persons from time to time therein.”14 
To Shaw, sovereignty means that the government of the state is competent to act without 
restraint within its borders, and no external force can interfere with its supremacy.15 
Referring to Westphalia and the system of sovereign states established by the Treaties of 
Westphalia concluded in 1648, Krasner defines sovereignty as “an institutional arrangement 
for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of 
external actors from domestic authority structures.”16 “Westphalian sovereignty is violated 
when external actors influence or determine domestic authority structures.”17Brownlie 
observes that sovereignty consists of jurisdictions of states over territories and the duty to 
refrain from intervening in the exclusive jurisdiction of other states.18 Richard Bilder has 
defined it as simply “a state’s right to do as it wishes, particularly within its own territory, 
free of external constraint or interference”.19Bilder goes on to provide a list of scholarly 
definitions:20 
 The American Heritage Dictionary defines sovereignty as “supremacy 
of authority or rule as exercised by a sovereign or sovereign state” or, 
alternatively, as “complete independence and self-government.”21 
 Max Huber, as Arbitrator in the 1926 Island of Palmas case, wrote that: 
“Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence. 
                                                          
12 T. G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 2d. ed., Polity Press, 2012, p. 15. 
13D. E. Scheid, ‘Introduction to armed humanitarian intervention.’ In The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian  
    Intervention, D. E. Scheid, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 11. 
14 A. Bodley “Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The International Tribunal for the  
former Yugoslavia”, 1993, Vol. 31, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, p. 419. 
15Shaw, note 1 supra, p. 276. 
16 S. Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press’ (1999), p. 20. 
17Ibid. 
18 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (5th ed. 1998), p. 15. 
19 R.B. Bilder, Perspective on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An American Viewpoint, Canada-United  
    States Law Journal, Vol. 20, 1994, p. 10. 
20Ibid. 
21The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1725 (3rd ed. 1992) 
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Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise 
there, to the exclusion of any other states, the function of a state.” 22 
 Judge Alvarez, in his individual opinion in the Corfu Channel case, 
wrote that: “By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights 
and attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion 
of all other states, and also in its relations with other states.”23 
 Helmut Steinberger, in the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
says that: “Sovereignty …denotes the basic international legal status of 
a state that is not subject, within its territorial jurisdiction, to the 
governmental, executive, legislative, or territorial jurisdiction of a 
foreign state or to foreign law other than public international law.”24 
 Professor Lou Henkin, in How Nations Behave, writes that the 
principle holds that “…except as limited by international law or treaty, 
each state is master of its own territory.”25 
 And at a recent ASIL meeting, Professor Tom Franck suggested, 
interestingly and much more broadly, that a going definition of 
sovereignty is the loci of the formation of rights and duties generally 
recognized as establishing and implementing entitlements, 
distributions and obligations.” 26 
This thesisdefines sovereignty as a state’s freedom to determine, and control affairs within its 
territory, in accordance with its own laws, without the dictates of any external power, subject 
to the requirements of international law. Defined this way, sovereignty is meant to ensure the 
sovereign equality of states, and thereby provides protection for weak countries from 
interference in their domestic affairs by powerful states. 
1.2.2. Internal and External Sovereignty 
There seems to be general agreement from the several definitions provided by various the 
scholars that, firstly, sovereignty is an essential attribute of a state. Secondly, the essence of 
                                                          
22Island of Palmas Case, (US v Neth), 2 R. Int’l.Arb.Awards 821, 838 (1928) (Huber, Arb.). 
23Corfu Channel Case, (UK v Alb.) 1949, p. 43. 
24 H. Steinberger, 10 Encyclopedia of International Law, 408 (1981). 
25 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 1st ed., F. A. Praeger, (1968), p.18. 
26 The Transformation of Sovereignty, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of International   
Law, Vol. 88 (April 6-9, 1994, Washington, D.C.) 
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sovereignty is the power of the state to control affairs within its territory, without limitations, 
to the exclusion of outside powers. Thirdly, sovereignty has an external dimension besides 
the internal aspect. Sovereignty therefore consists of the international independence of a state, 
combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign 
dictation.27 However, it has been argued that absolute sovereignty is essentially an internal 
attribute of a state. The argument is that the application of the principle of sovereignty on the 
international plane, however, is “controversial and problematic.”28 This is because even 
though a state may lay claim to absolute sovereignty regarding its internal affairs, it is bound 
by international lawby virtue of membership of the international community.29  This position 
has been aptly expressed as follows: 
The 20th century has seen the attempt, particularly through the emergence in some 
instances of extreme nationalism, to transpose this essentially internal concept of 
sovereignty on to the international plane. In its extreme forms such a transposition 
is inimical to the normal functioning and development of international law and 
organisation. It is also inappropriate. Sovereignty as supreme legal power and 
authority is inapplicable to the position of states within the international 
community: no state has supreme legal power and authority over other states in 
general, nor are states generally subservient to the legal power and authority of 
other states. Thus the relationship of states on the international plane is 
characterized by their equality and independence and, in fact, their 
interdependence. Although states are often referred to as ‘sovereign’ states, that is 
descriptive of their internal constitutional position rather than of their legal status 
on the international plane.  
Despite the deficiencies in international law which at present make it an imperfect 
legal order - deficiencies which are gradually being overcome - the very notion of 
international law as a body of rules of conduct binding uponstates irrespective of 
their internal law, implies the idea of their subjection to international law.30 
This thesis argues that, sovereignty is an internal as well as an external attribute of states. 
Internal sovereignty confers on the state the authority to conduct affairs within its territory 
                                                          
27Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., (1990), p. 695. 
28Bilder, note 19 supra, p. 11. 
29Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1: Peace, (Jennings, R. and Watts, A. eds., 9th ed. 1992, p. 25. 
30Ibid. 
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free from external interference. Externally, sovereignty confers upon the state legal 
independence from other states, a legal personality, which in turn makes the state equal to its 
peers, and places a duty on other states not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the state. 
Sovereignty is not absolute, internally or externally, in the light of globalisation and the 
interdependence of states. There are limits on internal sovereignty, just as there are on 
external sovereignty. Chapter VII Article 39 of the UN Charter empowers the Security 
Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression and to make recommendations, or decide what measures to be taken to restore or 
maintain international peace and security, which may include measures not involving the use 
of armed force under Article 41, or action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary, 
under Article 42. Thus, at the international level, limitations are placed on the exercise of 
sovereign authority by a state, by virtue of its membership of the international community. 
Similarly, there are limitations on internal sovereignty. Thus, even though Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter guarantees to states protection from external interference “in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, this protection will not avail a state 
when international law is breached in matters such as the protection of human rights. Agents 
of the state responsible for perpetrating gross human rights abuses on its citizens within the 
state can be held accountable. Absolute sovereignty is therefore an illusion and impracticable 
under the contemporary legal order. This is to be expected, in the light of the interdependence 
of states. This exposition that sovereignty is an internal as well as an external attribute of a 
state finds agreement in the views of other writers. Ayoob, for example, argues that 
sovereignty is not only an internal attribute of states, but rather, “it is constituted by external 
recognition by peers (states) and by internal acquiescence.”31 Shaw seems to be in agreement 
with Ayoob, that sovereignty is not only an internal attribute of states with the observation 
that sovereignty “expresses internally the supremacy of the governmental institutions and 
externally the supremacy of the state as a legal person.”32Abiew shares this view. He 
observes that internally sovereignty means the exercise of supreme authority by a state within 
its territory while externally, it means equality of states.33 
                                                          
31Ayoob, M. Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6,  
    No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 82. 
32Shaw, note 1, p. 276. 
33 F.K. Abiew,  The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Kluwer Law  
     International, 1999, p. 25. 
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1.3. History and Evolution 
The concept of absolute sovereignty, according to Merriam, has its beginnings in Aristotle’s 
Politics and the classic body of Roman Law.34 In Politics, there is a recognition by Aristotle 
that there must be a supreme power existing in the state, and that this power may be in the 
hands of one, or a few, or of many.35  “Sovereignty,” as one writer has observed, “in its 
historical origins is a political concept which later became transformed” to provide a juristic 
base to the political power of the State.36 According to Louis Goodman, the doctrine of 
sovereignty was invented to give legitimacy to secular authority, with the decline of the 
Roman Empire, which at the time was the only body with “the revered qualities required to 
exercise authority over Europeans.”37Brierly has argued that the doctrine of sovereignty as 
known currently has its origins from the Reformation period onwards.38 
1.3.1. Theories on absolute Sovereignty 
1.3.1.1. Jean Bodin (1530-1596) 
The formulation of the theory of sovereignty as the right of a state to have supreme control of 
affairs in its territory is attributed to the French philosopher Jean Bodin. He is rightly 
regarded as the ‘father’ of the modern theory of sovereignty because he produced “the first 
systemic discussion of the nature”39 of the concept. “Bodin…developed what is commonly 
regarded as the first statement of modern theory of sovereignty: that there must be within 
every political community or state a determinate sovereign authority whose powers are 
decisive and whose powers are recognized as the rightful or legitimate basis of 
authority.”40Bodin lived at a time when France was in transition through civil war, from the 
feudal state into a centralised state.41 He framed the theory of sovereignty upon which the 
                                                          
34 C.E. Merriam, History of The Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau, Batoche Books, Kitchener, Ontario,  
     Canada, 2001, p. 5. 
35 Aristotle, Politics,Book III, ch. 7. Jowett’s translation, Cited in Merriam, p. 5. 
36 G. Jellinek,  Recht des ModernenStaates; AllgemeineStaatslehre (Berlin, 1900), p. 394 (quoted by J Maritain,  
     The Concept of Sovereignty, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun., 1950), pp. 343- 
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37 L.W. Goodman, Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention, American University International Law Review,  
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38 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, (6th ed. 1963), p. 7. 
39Merriam, note 34, p. 7. 
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French Monarchy rested.42 He defined the concept as follows: “Sovereignty is supreme 
power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by the laws.”43Bodin believed that sovereign 
authority must be absolute, perpetual, and undivided, and in terms of which the private 
interest of the ruler or ruling class superseded the common interest.44Bodin’s definition 
envisages authority which is supreme and perpetual in the sense that it has no limit as to 
time.45 Therefore, any person who exercises power for a limited period was not truly 
sovereign. By ‘perpetual’, Bodin did not mean eternal.  Rather, sovereignty signified the life 
time of the person exercising it.46 “The life tenure of supreme power therefore, constitutes 
sovereignty in an individual.”47 Sovereignty may therefore be validly transferred from one 
individual to another, so long as it is absolute and without conditions.48Bodin wrote his 
masterpiece Les Six Livres de la Republique,49 published in 1576, to demonstrate loyalty to 
the French King Henri III.50 In Bodin’s view, the sovereign prince cannot share his power 
without losing his status as sovereign. He writes: 
It is also by the common opinion of the lawyers manifest, that those royal rights 
cannot by the sovereign be yielded up, distracted, or any otherwise alienated; or by 
any tract of time be prescribed against…and if it chance a sovereign prince to 
communicate with his subject, he shall make him of his servant, his companion in 
the empire: in which doing he  shall lose his sovereignty, and be no more a 
sovereign: for that he only is a sovereign, which has none his superior or 
companion with himself in the same kingdom.51 
Sovereignty is indivisible. There cannot be two centres of power in a state. If a sovereign 
shares power with anyone, he ceases to be sovereign. The sovereign was accountable to no 
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at 84.  
46Merriam, note 34,  p. 7 
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one, but ‘to the immortal God alone.’52 The sovereign prince, he writes, ‘next under God, is 
not bound unto any.’53 With regard to laws, Bodin believed that, it was the sovereign’s 
prerogative to make law. He writes: ‘So we see the principal point of sovereign majesty, and 
absolute power, to consist principally in giving laws unto subjects in general, without their 
consent’54 and ‘a king or sovereign prince cannot be subject to his own laws.’55 
Bodin’s conception of sovereignty justified absolute monarchy and envisaged a situation 
where absolute power is vested in an individual, not bound by law, who had untrammelled 
power and control over subjects within his territory. The sovereign with such immense power 
could wage war on other states without restraint and could claim intervention in other states 
as a right, on the basis of religious solidarity or in advancement of his interests. This could 
have influenced the acceptance in the 19th century of the principle of a right of humanitarian 
intervention.  Bodin’s conception of absolute sovereignty would be unworkable in the current 
international order since it would amount to dictatorship. The assertion that the sovereign 
prince or king is accountable to the immortal God alone will not find acceptance in the 21st 
century.  Under the contemporary international order, sovereignty is vested in the state, and 
sovereign power is exercised in the interest of the citizens. A state that exercises sovereign 
power to the detriment of its citizens, by seriously abusing their human rights, stands to lose 
legitimacy, and may invite intervention by outside powers. 
Bodin’s views on sovereignty were shaped by the social and political environment of his 
time, which convinced him of the need for a supreme centre of authority to hold the state 
together to prevent disintegration. His conception of absolute sovereignty should therefore be 
understood in this context. During the 16th century when Bodin wrote his Six Livres, the 
‘social fabric and political stability of France were in a state of crisis.’56 Despite his position 
on absolute sovereignty, Bodin concedes that there are limits on sovereignty. In addition to 
being accountable to God, he writes that the sovereign prince must defer to the law of 
nations: 
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For if we shall say, that he only had absolute power, which is subject unto no law; 
there should then be no sovereign prince in the world, seeing that all princes of the 
earth are subject unto the laws of God, of nature, and of nations.57 
By making the exercise of sovereign power subject to the laws of God, of nature and of 
nations, he acknowledged that sovereign power should not be exercised arbitrarily, but should 
take into account the welfare of citizens and the human rights conferred upon them by natural 
law, by virtue of their being human. In other words, sovereigns had the responsibility to 
protect the human rights of their citizens. This is in accordance with current practice of state 
sovereignty, that sovereignty has limits, and sovereign power has to be exercised in 
compliance with international law. His view contributed to the foundation of the modern 
concept of state sovereignty. 
1.3.1.2. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1697) 
Another writer on sovereignty was Thomas Hobbes, (1588-1697), the English author of 
Leviathan.58 Like Bodin, he believed that there should be in a state, a repository of absolute, 
indivisible and final sovereignty signifying authority beyond which there is no appeal.59 Both 
writers believed that sovereigns are only limited by themselves.60 He identified with royalty 
“in a time of civil dissension”61 in his country. He believed that in order to contain civil 
dissent, there should be an identifiable repository of sovereign power which should be 
absolute and unquestionable. According to Hobbes, men originally lived in a state of nature, 
each equal to the other, with competing interests, in insecurity; in circumstances in which 
each felt threatened by the other and each person sought to dominate the other, “in that 
condition which is called war: and such a war as is of every man against every man”.62  
Hobbes began his justification of absolute sovereignty and the need for an unquestionable 
source of authority by portraying a situation in which men lived in solitude in a state of 
nature. Each depended on himself, on his own strength for protection and survival; fearful of 
constant threats of danger from other men. Such conditions engendered uncertainty. Each 
man was concerned only with how to survive from day to day. In conditions of uncertainty, 
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when a man did not know what a day would bring, there was no room for the expression of 
human endeavour: no learning, no commerce, no agriculture, no culture, no society, no 
medical practice, no law, and no human development whatsoever. In a nutshell, this was a 
dangerous and an unhappy existence, characterised by perpetual fear of violent death, 
solitude, poverty, brutality, and brevity of life.63 
Hobbes theorised that men can live in security, peace, and development only in a society. 
However, he asserts that “men have no pleasure in keeping company where there is no power 
able to overawe them all.”64 Therefore, to have a society, there must be a common power. 
Where there is a common power, there is law and justice. He believed, then, that this 
common power should be an unquestionable source of authority.65 In the absence of a 
common power, each man is the enemy of every other man: there is no law, and therefore, 
there is no distinction between what is just and what is unjust. No one owns anything. If two 
men want the same thing, they become enemies. The strongest is a law unto himself, and he 
takes by force what he wants. The only solution, according to Hobbes, was to establish a 
commonwealth which will defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of 
one another, by conferring all their power upon one man or assembly of men, and by 
reducing all their wills unto one will.66 The person or assembly of men unto whom these 
rights and powers are conferred is called sovereign, and is said to have sovereign power.67 
From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the rights and faculties of 
him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the 
people assembled.68 
Hobbes’ definition of sovereignty derives from this arrangement. Thus, sovereignty 
originated from the formation of a body politic or commonwealth by the voluntary transfer by 
men of all their rights and powers to one person or assembly of persons. The transfer of rights 
and powers by the people to one individual or assembly of persons is the essence of 
sovereignty. The sovereign becomes the representative of the people, and anything he does is 
considered to be the deed of the people who gave him the powers and rights, including those 
                                                          
63Ibid. p. 78. 
64Ibid. p 77. 
65Dunning, note 45 supra, p. 86. 
66Hobbes, Leviathan, note 58, p. 105. 
67Ibid. p. 106. 
68Ibid. Chapter VXIII, p. 107. 
76 
 
who did not participate in the covenant to transfer their powers and rights. By instituting a 
covenant the people have bound themselves by covenant “to own the actions and 
judgements”69 of the sovereign. To circumvent popular sovereignty, he asserts that by 
transferring all power to the sovereign, the people become his subjects and cannot without his 
leave “cast off the monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude.”70 
Both Bodin and Hobbes wrote about domestic sovereignty which involved the acceptance of 
a given authority structure.71 They both wrote at a time of religious wars in Europe that were 
undermining the stability of their countries and their primary concern was to establish stable 
authority acceptable as legitimate by all citizens. Thus, both preferred the concentration of 
power in the hands of one person or a group of people. Krasner argues that “the vision of 
Bodin and Hobbes has never been implemented…Authority has taken many different forms 
including monarchies, republics, democracies, unified systems and federal systems…High 
levels of centralization have not been associated with order and stability that Bodin and 
Hobbes were trying to guarantee.”72 This view is not shared by all scholars. Perrez argues 
that in the 18th and early 19th century, Bodin’s conception of sovereignty as absolute and 
perpetual power of the state was recognised as the unlimited independence of the 
state.73Bodin’s ideas about sovereignty influenced Wheaton to observe that “each state 
possesses and exercises exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction throughout the full extent of its 
territory...No state, can by its laws, directly affect, bind, or regulate property beyond its own 
territory, or control persons that do not reside within it, whether they be native-born subjects 
or not.”74 
Krasner’s argument overlooks the main purpose of Bodin’s and Hobbes’ theories, which was 
to identify the repository of supreme authority in a state, to preserve order, and to prevent the 
disintegration of the state and the right of the state to decide issues within its territory. Their 
theories form the foundation upon which modern state sovereignty was built. Sovereign 
power, whether concentrated or diffused is a necessary attribute of a state. In contemporary 
times, the state, represented by the government, is the repository of sovereign authority. The 
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state has the monopoly of the use of force, the power to make laws and enforce them and the 
power to exercise control over the inhabitants and property within the territory of the state. 
The contemporary international order has only adapted classical sovereignty to suit modern 
times, just like the adaptation of any other legal or political principle. The core tenets of 
sovereignty as envisaged by Bodin and Hobbes have not been entirely dispensed with, but 
adapted to contemporary times. It was not within the contemplation of the theorists of the 
concept of sovereignty that it would be implemented with its classical connotations, in 
contemporary times, in the light of the political and historical context in which they lived. 
1.3.1.3. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), 
AlbericoGentili (1552-1608), Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) 
The works of other writers on sovereignty have also influenced international law.75 Grotius 
considered sovereignty as “that power whose acts are not subject to the control of another, so 
that they may be made void by the act of any other human will.”76  In his treatise, The Law of 
Nature and of Nations (De Jure NaturaeetGentium, 1672), Samuel Pufendorf, states that 
sovereignty is the supreme power of the state.77  No organ in the society can render 
sovereign’s acts void: he is responsible to no other power, free from the restraint of all human 
law;78 and this power is one and indivisible.79 However, Pufendorf acknowledged that 
sovereignty did not signify omnipotence or absoluteness, but rather, supremacy and therefore 
certain limits may be placed on sovereignty.80 However sovereignty, though limited, remains 
nonetheless truly sovereign.81AlbericoGentili in his 1612 edition of De Jure Belli LibriTres, 
states that in ancient Rome, the citizens conferred their sovereignty on their emperor, but 
“they did so in order that they might be governed like men, not sold as cattle.”82 De Vattel 
wrote that men institute a commonwealth in order to secure their mutual welfare and 
security.83 He wrote that “liberty and independence belong to man by his very nature, and 
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…they cannot be taken from him without his consent.”84  He states further that, “States are 
formed by men, their policies are determined by men, and these men are subject to the natural 
law under what capacity they act.”85  His argument is that commonwealths that are formed by 
people, whether monarchies or republics, exercise sovereignty on behalf of their subjects.86 
The members of the commonwealth confer their sovereignty on an individual or assembly of 
persons, but their sovereignty is delegated for “the common good of all the citizens…”87 
Therefore according to De Vattel, “the welfare of the people is the supreme law.”88 
The views of Pufendorf, Gentili, and de Vattel are in agreement with those of Bodin and 
Hobbes in relation to the existence of unquestionable sovereign authority in a state.  Even an 
advocate of absolute sovereignty such as Bodin conceived that sovereign power derives from 
the people, and should therefore be exercised in the interest of the people. This understanding 
of the manner in which sovereign power should be exercised undoubtedly influenced the 
development of Westphalian sovereignty. 
1.4. Westphalian Sovereignty 
The modern concept of sovereignty is primarily concerned with statehood.89 The concept of 
sovereignty as it is understood currently, was established by the Peace Treaties of Westphalia 
signed at Munster and Osnabruck in 1648 between European States, which ended the Thirty 
Years War.90 Weiss has observed that, the current foundations of international law with 
regard to sovereignty were laid by the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648; and at the centre of 
this notion of sovereignty was idea that, the interference by one state in the internal affairs of 
another was not permissible.91 The treaties, according to Louis Goodman, involved the Pope, 
whose involvement was vital, because with the fall of the Roman Empire, European political 
leaders had difficulty exercising authority over their own populations; therefore the leaders of 
Western Europe utilised the prestige of the Pope “to grant leaders of proto-nations-states the 
authority to exercise power within national borders.”92 By separating the powers of the State 
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and the Church, the Peace of Westphalia conferred on nation-states “the special god-like 
features of Church authority.”93 These treaties are considered to have established the modern 
concept of sovereign statehood.94 In order to restore peace and order in Europe after thirty 
years of war, the Treaties of Westphalia established the supremacy of the sovereign authority 
of the state through a system of independent and equal states.95 Stephen Krasner has defined 
“Westphalian” as an “institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on 
two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority 
structures.”96 Krasner asserts that, “Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external actors 
influence or determine domestic authority structures.”97 It is clear that Westphalian 
sovereignty derived from the theories of sovereignty espoused by earlier writers like Bodin 
and Hobbes. The main difference is that the conception of sovereignty by Bodin and Hobbes 
involved the concentration of supreme authority in the hands of one person or a few people, 
while in the case of Westphalian sovereignty, supreme authority resides in the state. 
However, in terms of the supremacy of the state regarding the control of affairs within its 
territory to the exclusion of external actors, the ideas converge. 
The concept of statehood was codified by the Montevideo Convention.98A state must have 
the following attributes: a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning 
government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.99 All states are equal100 
and none has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state.101  The doctrine of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is a corollary of the principle of 
sovereignty.102  Robert Jackson calls respect for state sovereignty the cornerstone of the 
“global covenant”, which is the foundation of international order. According to Jackson, “The 
global covenant is the first attempt in world history to construct a society of states that 
operates with a doctrine of recognition and non-intervention that bridges different 
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civilisations and cultures around the world.”103Brownlie observes that “sovereignty and 
equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations.”104 
Territorial sovereignty underpins relations among states.105  The state can exercise its 
authority within its territory free from interference from external actors, and other states must 
respect its territorial sovereignty.106 As Asrat puts it, “other States have the correlative duty of 
respecting this base State authority, which is one of the important elements constituting 
statehood.”107 The concept of the state is the bedrock of international law, while the 
foundation of the state is sovereignty.108 As Shaw expresses it, “International law is based on 
the theory of the state. The state in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty, which 
expresses internally the supremacy of the governmental institutions and externally the 
supremacy of the state as a legal person.”109 
The importance of the concept of state sovereignty and its guarantee of the territorial integrity 
of states cannot be overemphasised. There would be no states without the concept of 
sovereignty, because there would be no national boundaries. Entire territories would be 
controlled by powerful states with the ambition to rule over weak states, which would always 
strive to free themselves, leading to a state of perpetual war and lawlessness. The 
international order in its current form would cease to exist. 
1.5. Post-1945 Understanding of Sovereignty 
The importance of the concept of state sovereignty in international relations is demonstrated 
by the fact that the United Nations was created in 1945 on the basis of the sovereign equality 
and the inviolability of the territorial integrity of states.110 The Charter enjoins member states 
to settle internal disputes by peaceful means,111 and prohibits the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state that is inconsistent with the 
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purposes of the organization.112 Similarly, the African Union was established on the 
sovereign equality of members of the Union, with all the rights encompassed in the concept 
of sovereignty.113 The Charter of the Organization of American States114 and the Helsinki 
Accord,115 also acknowledge the sovereign equality of members of their organisations, and 
respect for their territorial integrity. The International Court of Justice has endorsed the 
principle of non-intervention by declaring respect for territorial sovereignty to be an 
“essential foundation of international relations”116 and the principle on which the whole of 
international law rests.”117 Prominent United Nations’ declarations also affirm the concept of 
state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. An example is UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2131, 1965.118  In the Preamble and its opening paragraph, the resolution 
expresses its deep concern ‘at the gravity of the international situation and the increasing 
threat to universal peace due to armed intervention and other direct or indirect forms of 
interference threatening the sovereign personality and the political independence of 
States.”119  Also in the Preamble, the declaration cites UN Resolution 1514,120 on States 
“inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of 
their national territory…”121 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625122 also 
endorsed Resolution 2131 on the sovereign equality of states and the prohibition on 
intervention. In the Preamble, the resolution affirms the principle of sovereign equality of 
states and the principle of non-intervention.  The resolution makes it clear that intervention in 
the internal or external affairs of a state is a violation of international law. Thus, the concept 
of state sovereignty and its companion principle of non-intervention are generally recognised 
as fundamental in the maintenance of peace and security in international relations. Through 
the UN Charter and UN Declarations, and similar provisions in the Charters of other 
international organisations, states have accepted prohibitions on intervention in the domestic 
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affairs of sovereign states. The concept of state sovereignty is thus recognised internationally 
as being at the centre of inter-state relations.  
Nevertheless, acceptance of the concept of state sovereignty and the equality of states has not 
eliminated unilateral interventions by powerful countries in the domestic affairs of weaker 
countries in the post-1945 era. The greatest challenge to the doctrine of sovereignty, 
according to Ayoob, is the inclination of powerful countries, international organisations and 
regional organisations to intervene in the “domestic affairs of juridically sovereign states for 
ostensibly humanitarian purposes.”123 It is impossible to prevent interventions by powerful 
countries in weak countries, on humanitarian or other grounds. Powerful countries may 
ignore the sovereignty of weak states when it suits them. Probably the only restraint on such 
states is that each time they disregard international law and intervene in a weak state, they 
face international condemnation, which reaffirms the general recognition and resilience of the 
concept of state sovereignty. Whether such international condemnation is sufficient restraint 
is another matter.  
However, interventions cannot always be condemned as being without justification. For 
example, ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia (1990) and in Sierra Leone (2000) were 
necessary to halt organised violence. Even though the interventions were carried out without 
United Nations Security Council authorisation, there was no international condemnation. 
Rather, in Resolution 788124, the United Nations commended the organisation for its part in 
bringing peace security and stability to Liberia. Further, where genocide is perpetrated on a 
large scale like the example in Rwanda, there is justification for outside intervention. If the 
international community had made a timely intervention in Rwanda in 1994, many lives 
would have been saved. Apart from a lack of political will of the international community to 
intervene, another obstacle to intervention in Rwanda was probably due to respect for the 
concept of state sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention. Sovereignty should not be 
used as a shield in the face of gross human rights abuses, such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
or war crimes. Thus, there will always be limitations on sovereignty especially where human 
rights are concerned. Even an advocate of absolute sovereignty like Bodin acknowledged that 
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sovereignty has limits by subjecting the sovereign to the laws of God, of nature and of 
nations.125 
There are important and widely accepted limitations on state sovereignty and domestic 
jurisdiction in international law.126 Firstly, even though Article 2(7) reserves to states control 
over matters essentially within their jurisdiction, this does not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Thus for example, Article 2(7) will not provide 
immunity to a state from its duty to protect human rights, and persons who exercise the 
sovereign power of a state cannot do so with impunity. An example is Laurent Gbagbo, ex-
President of the Ivory Coast, who is on trial at The Hague, for crimes against humanity, for 
inciting post-election violence in Ivory Coast.  
Secondly, Article 1(3) of the UN Charter brings into the international domain matters not 
only of human rights, but also issues related to social, cultural, economic and humanitarian 
issues, thereby removing them from the internal jurisdiction of states. 127 Under Article 1 of 
the Charter, one of the Purposes of the United Nations is to “maintain international peace and 
security, and to this end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace…” It is clear then that the UN may take collective action against a state in the interest 
of peace and security. Thirdly, Article 2(1) provides that “All Members…shall fulfil in good 
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” Therefore, 
states are legally bound by obligations in international relations and law, and cannot invoke 
sovereignty to evade the performance of their obligations. By virtue of membership of the 
UN and other international organisations, a state accepts restrictions on its sovereignty.128  
From the foregoing examples, it is clear that the classical of concept of sovereignty has been 
eroded to the extent that matters that were once considered to be within the domestic sphere 
of states, like cultural, economic, social, and humanitarian, have been elevated unto the 
international plane. A state therefore has to take into account international repercussions of its 
internal actions. Most importantly, in the light of international concern for the protection of 
human rights, the concept of state sovereignty will continue to face challenges.  
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Interventions since the 1990s in Libya (2011)  Iraq (2003), Somalia (1992), Bosnia(1995), 
Kosovo (1999),  Sierra Leone (2000), Liberia (1990), and Haiti (1994), grounded in the 
protection of suffering populations, have, however, posed serious challenges to the concept of 
state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. In the light of the internationalisation 
of human rights, and the prevalence of internal strife in many countries, sovereignty and its 
corollary of non-intervention will continue to face limitations. Absolute sovereignty is 
undesirable and impracticable in the face of the interdependence of states. This has led to the 
erosion of the classical understanding of state sovereignty. Interventions cannot be eliminated 
because the contemporary trend is that a state has the duty to protect the human rights of its 
people. The trend has led to interventions based on the belief that the rights of people take 
precedence over the rights of states. The interventions were based on the belief that the rights 
of people should take precedence over the rights of states.129 This belief has found expression 
in the ICISS Report 2001, that states have a duty to protect the population within their 
territories. On the other hand, the international community failed to intervene in other 
countries where humanitarian crises existed, such as Darfur in Sudan, where since 2003 a 
large number of people have been killed or have been internally displaced, or have become 
refugees in other countries. In Rwanda, in 1994, the inaction of the Security Council led to 
the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Interventions have raised issues of 
motives, abuse, and disproportionate use of force, while inaction raised issues of selectivity 
and motives, and highlighted the tensions between the defence of state sovereignty on the one 
hand, and the imperative to intervene in the name of protecting human rights on the other 
hand.  
It is clear from recent cases of humanitarian interventions that the norm of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of states has “lost ground”.130Sarkin argues that the concept of state 
sovereignty, though not entirely dispensed with, has been eroded in contemporary times.131 
He observes that despite the classic definition of the concept of state sovereignty, in practice 
national sovereignty “fluctuates with shifting state obligations”, by the voluntary limitations 
placed by states on their sovereignty through the assumption of international obligations and 
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their membership of international organisations.132 Boutros Boutros-Ghali shares the view 
that sovereignty has been eroded when he states that, “The time of absolute sovereignty has 
passed; its theory was never matched by reality.”133 In other words, absolute freedom from 
interference in the domestic affairs of states is an illusory goal,134 because of the 
interdependence of states. Intervention to influence the policies of other states is the objective 
of diplomacy and international agreements, and,135 it is impossible to differentiate between 
what are permissible and impermissible acts of intervention.136 
Sovereignty in its origins involved absolutism in the sense that sovereign power was 
concentrated in the hands of one man or a few people who exercised power as they deemed 
fit. There were no constraints on the unilateral use of force in intervening in other countries’ 
domestic affairs, pursuant to national interests. The United Nations Charter placed a 
prohibition on the use of force except under prescribed circumstances. This has, however, not 
prevented powerful states from unilaterally intervening in the internal affairs of weaker 
countries, ostensibly in name of humanitarian intervention. Some of the interventions have 
been conducted without the authorisation of the United Nations, in total disregard of the 
concept of state sovereignty. 
It is submitted that the absolute concept of sovereignty is impracticable in the contemporary 
era, because of the internationalisation of human rights, the influences of globalisation and 
the interdependence of states. State sovereignty need to be respected, but unrestrained 
sovereignty may present a threat to international peace and stability because every state may 
consider it a sovereign right to do whatever it wishes, with no regard for international law. In 
such circumstances, the international order will be reduced to Hobbes’ state of nature. 
Sovereignty should not mean that a state is above international law. The early writers on 
sovereignty like Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius, Gentili, Pufendorf and de Vattel, while 
acknowledging that sovereignty was absolute, recognised that it was not unlimited, but 
subject to higher norms, in the form of the laws of God, the laws of nature, the laws of 
nations, and constitutional restrictions. Respect for sovereignty should be reconciled with the 
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need to protect human rights and the maintenance of international peace and stability. In the 
face of egregious human rights abuses by a state against its own people, the international 
community should not be constrained, by deference to sovereignty, from acting to protect 
victims.  
Regardless of the foregoing, sovereignty remains fundamental in the conduct of interstate 
relations, and therefore, unilateral interventions by powerful states should not be condoned as 
they constitute an abuse of the concept of humanitarian intervention and a violation of the 
sovereignty of other states.  Ayoob agrees with this position, by observing that “One cannot 
deny the fact that not merely the UN Charter but also the accumulated norms of international 
society create a distinct predisposition towards accepting sovereignty claims, unless a very 
strong case can be made that these claims need to be overridden.”137 The principle of 
sovereign equality of states is essential for maintaining equilibrium in interstate relations. 
There is no substitute for the concept of sovereignty. The concept may be considered as 
obsolete and disregarded by powerful states when it is in their interest to do so. However, as 
long as they claim sovereignty for themselves, they cannot deny it to other states. It is the 
only protection weak states have against unrestrained hegemony and aggression of powerful 
states. In its absence, there will be unmitigated apprehension among weak states of powerful 
states intervening in their territories at will, under the pretext of humanitarian intervention. 
Observance of the concept of sovereignty will go a long way to eliminate or reduce abuse and 
application of disproportionate force in the implementation of humanitarian intervention. 
1.6. Humanitarian Intervention 
This section traces the Christian origins of the concept from St Augustine to the St Thomas 
Aquinas and the internationalisation of the concept. The Just War Theory is discussed in 
detail in the section. The importance of the Just War Theory is that the foundations of the 
right of humanitarian intervention were laid by the Just War conception of war.  The 
principles of the Just War Theory are reflected in the recommendations of the ‘Responsibility 
to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ 
(ICISS), concerning the rules of military intervention, which will be discussed at a later stage 
in the thesis. This section concludes that the humanitarian interventions during the 19th 
century were unilateral interventions, not regulated by any supranational authority, but 
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motivated by the national and strategic interest of the intervening states and therefore could 
not be justified. It empowered powerful states to violate the sovereignty of other states at 
their discretion, unregulated by any supranational authority or international law.  Even if such 
a right existed by the end of the 19th century, such a right is inapplicable in the post-United 
Nations Charter era. 
In its classical application humanitarian intervention involves military intervention by one 
state or group of states in the territory of another to avert or halt gross human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the target state on its own population. The concept is controversial because it 
usually involves the unilateral violation of the sovereignty of one state by others without the 
consent of the affected state, and without the authorisation of the United Nations. The 
controversial nature of the concept is demonstrated by disagreement on its definition by 
various scholars. The section discusses the views of various writers, for example, Grotius, 
Suarez, Gentili, Brochard, de Vattel, Wheaton, Westlake, Lauterpacht, Oppenheim, Lawrence 
and Fonteyne, etc., justifying the concept, with the objective of establishing that humanitarian 
intervention was recognised by these writers by the end of the 19th century, as a right of 
states, and was accepted widely, if not unanimously, as an integral part of customary 
international law, as observed by Fonteyne.138 The section however, aims to reveal that this 
right did not receive universal recognition, because scholars like Kant, Mimiani, Carnazzi-
Amari, Prodier-Fodere, and Wolff did not endorse humanitarian intervention as a right of 
states. 
1.6.1. Definition 
Very few topics have generated as much controversy and disagreement with regard to its 
definition and practice as humanitarian intervention.139 The term has been viewed as an 
“oxymoron” because it associates “humanitarian” with the use of military force.140 At the 
centre of the controversy about humanitarian intervention is “that the very meaning of the 
term is itself controversial.”141 The controversy is partly due to the fact that the term 
‘humanitarian intervention’ contains normative assumptions, in the sense that the term is used 
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to convey altruism and apolitical concern for the welfare of humanity.142 “An intervening 
party that declares its actions as ‘humanitarian’ is explicitly attempting to legitimize these 
actions as non-partisan, and moral and hence inherently justified, rather than selfish and 
strategic, and hence inherently contentious.”143 Due to the controversy and confusion about 
the term “humanitarian intervention” and the very strong opposition expressed by 
humanitarian organisations and humanitarian workers towards the militarisation of the word 
‘humanitarian’ the ICISS made a “deliberate decision not to adopt this terminology, 
preferring to refer either to ‘intervention,’ or as appropriate ‘military intervention’, for human 
protection purposes.”144 The Commission also took note of the fact that the use in this context 
of an inherently approving word like ‘humanitarian’ tends to prejudge the very question in 
issue – that is whether the intervention is defensible.145 As cautioned by Kofi Annan:  
…let’s get right away from using the term “humanitarian” to describe military 
operations…Of course, military intervention may be undertaken for humanitarian 
motives. I myself believe, and I think it is implicit in the  Charter that there are 
times when the use of force may be legitimate and necessary because there is no 
other way to save masses of people from extreme violence and slaughter…Such 
military intervention should not however, in my view, be confused with 
humanitarian action. Otherwise, we will find ourselves using phrases like 
“humanitarian bombing”, and people will soon get cynical about the whole idea.146 
People are already cynical about humanitarian, because it is impossible to establish the 
motives of powerful states that intervene in others – whether such interventions are driven by 
altruistic motives or other ulterior motives. Humanitarian aid to people suffering gross human 
rights abuse should be distinguished from military intervention to halt gross human rights 
abuse. Military intervention is an act of war, accompanied by pain and suffering. Those who 
are horrified by the suffering and pain that war brings are uncompromising pacifists, and 
therefore reject the notion that war could ever be just.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is applied in connection 
with the use of military force, with the stated objective of protecting the fundamental human 
rights of the population or averting human suffering in a target state by one state or a group of 
states without the consent of the target state. For this purpose, the thesis defines humanitarian 
intervention as the use of armed force by one state or group of states in the territory of 
another state, without the consent of the target state or United Nations Security Council 
approval, for the purpose of ending gross human rights abuses of the nationals of the target 
state, perpetrated by the government of the target state. Therefore intervention by a state or 
group of states in another state for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the intervening 
states residing in the target state, or the use of the military to assist in humanitarian relief 
operations or peacekeeping operations, or intervention in a state at its request, or intervention 
to prevent state failure, will not be subjects of this thesis. 
There is no universally acceptable definition of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, so 
it serves little purpose to define it, given the controversy surrounding it.147  Humanitarian is 
sometimes given a broad definition by some scholars to include humanitarian assistance, and 
different forms of military activity such as peacekeeping and actual use of force to protect 
suffering populations.148 The concept has international law, political science, moral and 
international relations dimensions – therefore “one may come across different definitions and 
categorisations.”149  The definition used tends to reflect the field of the person employing 
it.150 Adam Roberts describes the term as “a semantic way to justify interfering in the affairs 
of another country.”151 The goal of humanitarian intervention is “to protect the citizens of the 
target state from flagrant violationsof their fundamental human rights usually by agents of the 
state.”152 Humanitarian intervention has been defined as an intervention in the territory of a 
sovereign state, for the protection, 
by a state or group of states of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to 
life, of nationals and residing in the territory of other states, involving the use or 
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threat of force, such protection taking place neither upon the authorisation by the 
relevant organs of the UN nor upon the invitation of the legitimate government of 
the target state.153 
George Lucas defines humanitarian intervention as the use of armed force for the purpose of 
halting or impeding a humanitarian catastrophe, or providing relief to a suffering 
population.154Sean D. Murphy has defined humanitarian intervention “as the threat or use of 
force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of 
protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally 
recognized human rights.”155 The term has also been defined as an armed intervention in 
another state, without the agreement of that state, to address…a humanitarian disaster, in 
particular caused by grave or large-scale violations of fundamental human rights.”156 Another 
writer has defined it as a “dictatorial or coercive interference in the sphere of jurisdiction of a 
sovereign state motivated or legitimated by humanitarian concerns.”157 It has also been 
defined as a “military intervention in a state, without the approval of its authorities, and with 
the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among its inhabitants.” 158 One 
author has defined it as:  
…an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to 
ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegrations or gross misuse of 
authority of the state and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of 
civil authority can emerge.159 
The Danish Institute of International Affairs defines it as:  
coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent 
of its government, with or without authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, 
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for the purpose of preventing or putting to a halt gross and massive violations of human rights 
or international humanitarian law.160 
Verwey has defined it as: 
…referring only to coercive action taken by states, at their initiative, and involving 
the use of armed force, for the purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious 
and wide-scale violations of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to 
life, inside the territory of another state.161 
Despite various definitions of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, there are many 
commonalities. Firstly, what comes out of these definitions is that humanitarian intervention 
involves the use of armed force. Secondly, the force is used by one state or group of state in 
the territory of another sovereign state. Thirdly, the intervention is without the consent of the 
target state. Fourthly, the intervention is to avert, halt or prevent, odious human rights abuses 
of the nationals of the target state, by the government of that state. Fifthly, the intervention is 
without United Nations Security Council authorisation. All the definitions are based on the 
assumption that the objective humanitarian intervention is invariably to halt or avert human 
rights abuses or to bring to an end human suffering.  This, however, has not always been the 
case, because sometimes a humanitarian intervention causes more harm than it was meant to 
avert. Secondly, the goal of an intervention may be for motives other than humanitarian. The 
case of Libya is an example of an intervention authorised by the United Nations Security 
Council which led to regime change and state failure. 
One issue that comes out of the definitions, in particular, that given by Parekh, is that the 
purpose of humanitarian intervention is not only to alleviate human suffering, but also the 
restoration of civil authority in a state where this has disintegrated.162Ayoob shares this view 
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with the observation that humanitarian interventions have occurred in states where existing 
institutions of state have collapsed that they are unable to provide security and order within 
the state.163 These states are referred to as failed states. Robert Rotberg has argued that 
“intervention is a major tool, both for humanitarian reasons and to prevent state failure.”164 A 
failed state has been defined as: “governments that cannot meet a crucial test for the effective 
assertion of national sovereignty: the ability to pacify their national territories and protect the 
basic security of the people living within their borders.”165 Definitely, where there is state 
failure, usually there would be anarchy, leading to human rights abuse, not necessarily by the 
state or its agents, but by other parties like warlords. However, state failure usually comes 
about due to intervention in that state by external powers. Iraq, Libya and probably, Somalia 
would fall into this category of state failure arising from interventions. Therefore, even 
though intervention in a state with the objective of preventing or halting gross human rights 
abuses may amount to humanitarian intervention as traditionally defined, the fact that the 
same intervening states would have brought about the failure of these states cannot be 
overlooked. 
1.6.2.     History and Evolution 
Humanitarian intervention, as a principle, emerged from the “political philosophy and 
diplomatic practice of the early European states system.”166 European sovereigns, through 
diplomatic contacts became aware of non-Christian rulers who often treated Christian 
converts in their domains harshly.167 These sovereigns considered it legitimate to use 
intervention and military threats to protect persecuted Christian converts.168 According to 
Henry Wheaton, from the time of the Reformation, European powers frequently used force or 
diplomatic pressure against each other in defence of religious minorities.169 As articulated by 
ManouchehrGanji, humanitarian intervention was historically intervention in defence of 
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persecuted religious minorities.170 The legitimacy of such interventions was based on the 
principles of natural law, natural rights, and just war, with the main focus on concern for 
humanity.171 Natural rights were considered to be universal, and therefore, if a ruler 
perpetrated gross human rights abuses on his subjects, intervention was justified in the 
interest of humanity.172 
The origins of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention can be traced to the theory of Just 
War in the Middle Ages.173 The Just War theory originated from Christian theology.174 St 
Augustine is considered to be the first theologian to provide a theory on war and justice.175 
He referred to the Bible and classified some wars as necessary and others as evil.176 However, 
another view is that St Augustine did not write about war and therefore, his views have been 
distorted.177 He referred to the Biblical prohibition on returning violence with violence by 
turning the other cheek,178 but conceded that where one sees that other human beings are 
victims of violence or are threatened with violence, one has a duty to defend them out of 
love, but one must love the perpetrator of the violence as well.179 It was St. Thomas Aquinas 
who provided the first systematic exposition of the theory in the 13th century in his treatises 
on just war, government, and tyranny.180 In his treatise Summa Theologica he provides an 
outline of the traditional Just War Theory.181 He discusses the justification for war and what 
is permissible in war from the Christian viewpoint.182 St. Aquinas was of the view that 
tyranny was an abhorrent crime and should be legitimately resisted including by military 
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force, if necessary.183 He believed that, in the name of religious solidarity, a sovereign was 
justified in intervening in the internal affairs of another to protect citizens from serious 
human rights abuses perpetrated by their state.184  Legal or moral justification for war could 
thus be based on the Just War Theory. Thus, a state that wanted to go to war had to provide a 
just cause, if the citizens were not to reject the call to arms. Aquinas had three yardsticks for a 
just war: war should be declared by a competent authority and; there must be a just cause and 
a proper intent. He considered proper intent to mean promoting good over evil. Aquinas 
supported the Crusades which involved the spread of Christianity in the face of Islam which 
he considered evil.185  His support for the Crusades has been described as more useful to 
current jihad than to a secular democracy.186 
Hehir argues that the reason behind the Just War tradition was to create a standard by which 
war could be evaluated, not to justify war.187 The theorists of the tradition considered war as a 
regrettable event which could be justified in extreme situations, but this did not mean an 
endorsement of war.188 Rather, the just war tradition “acknowledged that war always has evil 
consequences, principally the deaths of non-combatants, but that there are some wrongs that 
are worse than the wrong of war.”189 However, if a state may go to war in the face of wrongs 
that are worse than war, then this was a way to justify war - an endorsement of war under 
certain circumstances, which was exactly the objective of the Just War Theory. This 
contradicts Hehir's position that the Just War Tradition was to create a standard by which war 
could be evaluated but not to justify war. 
It is arguable that the foundations of the right of humanitarian intervention in the 19th century 
were laid by the Just War conception of war. What it meant was that a state which had the 
military capability had the right to intervene, upon its own judgement that natural law had 
been breached by another state. States went to war in solidarity with populations with whom 
they shared religious affinity. Similarly states could wage war to halt what they considered to 
be tyranny in another state. A state was therefore the judge of the legality of its own actions. 
There was no need for legal justification. All that was required was for a state to make the 
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decision to intervene in another state based upon its own assessment of the conditions in that 
state and the belief it had in its military might. 
1.6.3. Just War Theory Criteria for war 
The Just War Theory sets down two categories of criteria: namely, (a) justification for war 
(jus ad bellum) and (b) the conduct of war (jus in bello).190 These criteria are discussed as 
follows:191 
(a) Jus ad bellum – Justification for war 
The principles for the justification of war are:  (i) having a just cause for war; (ii) war being a 
last resort; (iii) declaration of war by the proper authority; (iv) having the right intention; (v) 
the likelihood of success, and; (v) the objective should be proportional to the means 
used.192These are discussed as follows: 
(i) Just cause: This is the primary requirement of jus ad bellum. The reason for 
going to war should be just. An act of aggression is inherently unjust, 
unless it is in retaliation for a grave injustice already committed, for 
example, resistance to aggression. Thus, the victim of aggression has a just 
cause to go to war to resist the aggression. Therefore, self-defence against 
an aggressor is a just cause for war. Self-defence includes providing 
assistance to victims of tyranny, or gross human rights abuses, which are 
grounds for humanitarian intervention in the contemporary order.  
(ii) Last resort: War should be the last resort. Every effort to find a peaceful 
solution to a crisis must be made before a declaration of war, because of 
the potential devastation a war can cause. War may result in the mass 
killing of innocent non-combatants, and wreak havoc on the economy and 
infrastructure of states, and the consequences of the devastation caused by 
war may last for a very long time. Therefore, war should not be resorted to 
lightly. In the same way, all peaceful options should be explored before the 
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use of force in the name of humanitarian intervention. This will avoid or 
minimise abuse of the concept.  
(iii) Proper authority: Only the proper authority should have the competence to 
declare war. This raises the issue of sovereignty. In the contemporary 
international legal order the sovereign power to declare war resides in the 
state, personified in the government. If the government is not tyrannical 
but accountable to the citizens, then it would be reasonable to take the state 
to war. However, if the government rules arbitrarily, without 
accountability to the citizens, then it would be unreasonable to commit the 
state to war. A government that rules arbitrarily should not have the 
sovereign power to declare war on behalf of the state. Therefore whether a 
government has the legitimate authority to declare war would depend on 
the relationship between the government and the citizens. 
(iv) Right intention:  A state that declares war should do so not in its national 
interest but in the interest of justice or for the purpose of correcting a grave 
injustice. A war is not just if national interests overshadow the pretext for 
going to war.  Concern for humanity should not be used as a mask for 
pursuing the national or geopolitical interests of a country. Thus, for 
example, humanitarian intervention should not be used as a pretext for an 
act of aggression to effect regime change in another country. That amounts 
to abuse of the concept. 
(v) Likelihood of success:  There should be reasonable prospects of attaining the 
objectives war. This is another important condition for just war. This 
principle may affect one state’s decision to intervene or not to intervene in 
another, on humanitarian grounds, because the state that seeks to intervene 
in another has to weigh the pros and cons and the costs involved. This can 
affect the decision whether to intervene on behalf an oppressed people or 
to resist aggression. If the cost of intervention would be too high in terms 
of finances and lives for the prospective intervening state, then there would 
be no motivation to intervene unless intervention serves its national 
interests. 
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(vi) The desired end should be proportional to the means used:  This principle 
overlaps the principle of proportionality in the conduct of war, jus bello.  
War should have an objective, and the means of attaining it should be 
proportionate to the wrong the war seeks to address. Thus, for example, if 
one state occupies a piece of another state’s territory through aggression, 
the amount of force used to repulse the aggression should be proportionate 
to the aggression. The aggrieved state should, for example, not repel the 
aggression and then proceed to occupy the aggressor state’s territory, but 
rather, should apply the force only necessary to recover its territory. 
(i) Jus in bello – Rules for the conduct of war 
The principles for just conduct of war involve discrimination and proportionality.  
(i) Discrimination: This deals with who may be legitimate targets in war. 
It is unjust in war to use force indiscriminately and kill civilians. 
Interventions which rely solely on aerial bombardment kill 
indiscriminately, since those who drop the bombs have no idea or do 
not care where they fall. The Just War Theory prohibits killing of non-
combatants in war. Combatants are, however, legitimate targets of 
force, because by becoming a soldier, the person is deemed to have 
accepted to be a legitimate target in war.  
(ii) Proportionality: Thisrequires that the amount of force used in war 
should be tempered in order to minimise casualties and destruction. In 
order words, it is unjust to use a harmer to kill an ant.  The principle 
deals with the amount of force that is morally permissible. The 
principle is utilitarian because its purpose is to reduce unnecessary 
suffering. Only the minimum force is necessary to achieve a goal. The 
use of force through aerial bombardment in humanitarian intervention 
amounts to disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force, because it 
kills non-combatants and is an example of the abuse of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention. 
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The Just War criteria have largely been incorporated in into the responsibility to protect 
principles for military intervention laid down in the ICISS Report.193 They serve as a guide to 
contemporary humanitarian interventions. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that 
the motives for interventions are principally for the stated humanitarian purpose in order to 
avoid abuse; that force is resorted to as a last option; that force used is limited to that 
absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the intervention; and that 
the intervention does not cause more harm than it was meant to avert or halt. The overall 
purpose is to prevent powerful states from attacking other states in pursuit of their national 
and strategic interests, with the pretext of protecting human rights or propagating democracy, 
while in fact the purpose may be to punish a state which pursues an independent policy and 
refuses to the bow to the dictates of powerful states. Scholars including Verwey,194 and 
Ramsbotham& Woodhouse,195  have also set out certain criteria for humanitarian 
intervention, which replicate the criteria of the Just War tradition, particularly in respect of: 
right intention, last resort, and the proportionality of force.  The Just War tradition justified 
war in certain circumstances, and provided guidelines for the declaration and conduct of war. 
These guidelines are relevant to humanitarian interventions in contemporary times, because 
the potential for abuse and disproportionate use of force is greater. The criteria set down by 
Just War tradition demonstrate that the potential for abuse and disproportionate use of force 
in interventions or war was within the contemplation of the theorists. Those guidelines were 
necessary when the Just War Theory was espoused, and more important in contemporary 
times as a result of the multiplicity of states with varying national interests, the penchant of 
powerful state to intervene in the domestic affairs of others states, the tremendous disparity in 
the military might of states, and the devastation that modern armaments can cause.  
1.6.4. Internationalisation of Aquinas’ Just War Theory 
Aquinas’s views concerning the right to resist tyranny became part of princely practice only 
during the 16th century.196 The interest in tyrants, according to Trim, was due to the Protestant 
Reformation in the 1520s.197 Prior to the Reformation, princes were reluctant to come to the 
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aid of heretics.198 The Reformation split ‘the unity of Christendom,’ and princes became 
favourably disposed to coming to the defence of religious dissidents in other lands, 
considering those who persecuted them as tyrannical.199 This period also saw the creation of 
the notion of a law for sovereign states.200 In the course of debates on the issues of 
sovereignty and interstate relations, the writings of Aquinas were drawn upon to justify the 
obligation of princes to protect “not only their own, but also other princes subjects.”201  His 
thoughts were expanded and universalised by writers such as Francisco de Vitoria (1486-
1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-
1704), Christian Wolff (1679-1754), and Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767).202  These writers 
secularised St Aquinas’ doctrine “in the doctrine of lawful assistance to a people struggling 
against tyranny.”203 The writers justified intervention on the basis of the doctrines of natural 
law, natural rights and just war out of concern for humanity.204 These natural rights were 
regarded as universal, conferred on all, simply for being human and obvious to all through 
the exercise of moral reasoning,205 and therefore, if a ruler subjected his subjects to atrocious 
treatment, foreign intervention or punishment was justified in the name of humanity.206 
Grotius initiated the idea of enforcement of international law through punitive military 
action.207 He writes: 
The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to 
those of kings, have a right of demanding punishments not only on account of 
injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of 
injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature 
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or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever…Truly it is more honourable to 
avenge the wrongs of others rather than one’s own…208 
He asserted that the international community had a right to punish violations of natural and 
positive law of nations, regardless of where they were committed or who the victims were.209 
This universal licence to punish, according to Grotius, was necessary to uphold natural 
justice, in the absence of a supranational authority responsible for administering retribution 
and deterrence.210 Thus, any member of the international community could administer 
punishment on the violator of natural law for the simple reason that there has been a 
violation.211 His theory justified war on states as punishment for violation of the law of 
nature.212 
Thus, any member of the international community that is not guilty of violating the law of 
nature may take punitive action against a violating state. Grotius endorses international 
punishment or revenge on violators of the law of nature, and therefore, humanitarian 
intervention could not be its purpose, because the objective of humanitarian intervention is to 
avert or halt human suffering, and not to exact revenge or retribution.  Other writers share this 
view that the international punishment envisaged by Grotius does not accord with the central 
purpose of humanitarian intervention as traditionally understood,213 because Grotius focuses 
on the “punishment of the wrong-doer, rather than with the rescue of the victims, which is the 
chief focus of humanitarian intervention in the modern sense.”214  However, Meron argues 
strongly that Grotius’ statement on the right to punish the perpetrators of grave abuses of 
human rights in another state reflects the current international law principle of ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ over crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.215 
It is questionable whether Grotius had in mind the principle of universal jurisdiction when he 
espoused the principle of international punishment. Universal jurisdiction for genocide, war 
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crimes, and crimes against humanity usually envisages punishment of individuals for 
committing these crimes after judicial proceedings. Grotius was not calling for the 
punishment of individuals after a criminal trial, but rather, war on states as punishment for 
violations of the law of nature. This could involve the indiscriminate use of force and the 
killing of non-combatants conduct prohibited by the Just War tradition. It could also amount 
to collective punishment, which current international law would not accept.  Besides, in his 
time, there was no supranational authority to set guidelines as to whether there had been a 
breach of the law of nature. It was left to the state implementing international punishment to 
decide whether there had been a breach, when and how to intervene, and the level of 
punishment considered to be appropriate. This was a recipe for the potential abuse of the 
concept by powerful states as a pretext for war for ulterior motives, and the use of 
indiscriminate force towards those ends. 
Though he approved of the principle of international punishment for the breach of natural 
law, he also endorsed humanitarian intervention for the protection of people under oppressive 
rule. Grotius modelled his concept of humanitarian intervention on the relationship between 
parent-child. 216 He observes that a sovereign, like a parent, has the responsibility “for the 
support of his dependents or subjects.”217 Thus, if a sovereign treated his subjects 
inhumanely, he loses “the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the 
privilege of freedom from foreign intervention under the law of nations.”218 Systematic 
mistreatment of subjects by the sovereign breaks the relationship between subjects and 
sovereign, which entitles other states to use force to exercise the suffering people’s natural 
right of collective self-defence219 to provide “assistance or protection.”220 Writing in 1625, 
Grotius states: “But…if a tyrant …practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just 
man can approve…it would not follow that others may not take up arms for them.”221 This 
statement of Grotius according to Professor HerschLauterpacht contained “the first 
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authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention - the principle that 
exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity begins.” 222 
Grotius acknowledged the concept of state sovereignty. Regardless of this, he was of the view 
that the human rights of vulnerable people should take precedence over sovereignty and the 
international community had the right to take up arms to defend them from inhumane 
treatment wherever this took place. This had, as its purpose, humanitarian intervention, a 
direct opposite of his concept of international punishment for the purpose of exacting 
revenge. Grotius thereby endorsed action against any state, not for the purpose of retribution, 
but for the protection of victims of human rights violations. Thus, any member of the 
international community could take up arms in the interest of oppressed people irrespective 
of where the oppression occurred or who the victims are, not necessarily as an instrument of 
punishment. Grotius therefore endorsed intervention on behalf of persecuted citizens of 
another state. 
The first authoritative statement of the principle of humanitarian intervention is attributed to 
Grotius.223  However, the principles of the concept predate him, as these ideas appeared 
earlier in the writings of Suarez and Gentili.224 Dunning gives an example in the 1579 
Vindiciae contra tyrannos, which stated that “it is the right and duty of princes to interfere in 
behalf of neighbouring peoples who are oppressed on account of adherence to the true 
religion, or by any obvious tyranny.”225  The Vindiciae contra tyrannos states that226 ‘tyranny 
is not simply a crime; but the chief and as it were, a summation of all crimes’; therefore, ‘a 
prince which standethidlely by, to beholdeth the wickedness of a tyrant, and the slaughter of 
the innocent…is worse than the tyrant him selfe.’227Furthermore, in his writings, Grotius 
referred to Aristotle, Seneca, and Roman emperors who used force against Persians to protect 
Christians from persecution.228 For example, in clear acknowledgement that Seneca was his 
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predecessor, Grotius writes on the danger of potential abuse of humanitarian intervention,229 
by quoting Seneca thus: 
Hence, Seneca thinks that I may make war upon one who is not one of my people 
but oppresses his own,..a procedure which is often connected with the protection of 
innocent persons. We know, it is true, from both ancient and modern history, that 
the desire for what is another’s seeks such pretexts as this for its own ends; but a 
right does not at once cease to exist in case it is to some extent abused by evil men. 
Pirates, also, sail the sea; arms are carried also by brigands. 230 
In quoting Seneca, he acknowledges that the potential for abuse of humanitarian intervention 
may be used as a pretext by states to further their own interest, but asserts that the need to 
protect human rights outweighs the potential for abuse of the concept. Late Middle Ages 
writers like the Spanish Francisco Suarez and the Italian AlbericoGentili also implicitly 
endorsed humanitarian intervention before Grotius. Suarez stated that:  
[…] this ground for war should rarely or never be approved, except in circumstances in which 
slaughter of innocent people and similar wrongs take place.231 
He impliedly endorsed humanitarian intervention by this statement, but restricted it to 
situations of mass killings and other grievous crimes. He was of the view that its application 
should be restricted because unrestrained intervention could lead to abuse and undermine 
territorial jurisdiction of states.232 Thus, he adds:  
[…] the assertion made by some writers that sovereign kings have the power of 
avenging injuries done in any part of the world, is entirely false, and throws into 
confusion all the orderly distinctions of jurisdiction.233 
Suarez expresses his recognition for sovereignty. Combined with his previous statement, he 
appears to seek a balance between sovereignty and the protection of the innocent. Gentili also 
believed that there was a justification for war to defend the common interests of humanity. In 
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his 1588 treatise, De Jure Belli LibriTres, Chapter XXV of book I (“Of an Honourable 
Reason for Waging War”), discussing the common interests of mankind as reasons for 
waging war, he states: 
There remains now one question concerning an honourable cause for waging 
war…which is undertaken for no private reason of our own, but for the common  
interest and in behalf of others. Look you, if men clearly sin against the laws of 
nature and of mankind, I believe that any one whatsoever may check such men by 
force of arms.”234 
Gentili was of the view that it is honourable to wage war against infringement of the laws of 
nature and of mankind. These laws deal with human rights, and therefore, a ruler infringes 
them when he mistreats his subjects. In such a situation, the international community may, in 
the interest of mankind, come to the aid of the suffering subjects by military force, in order to 
stop the suffering. He reiterates: “if subjects are treated cruelly and unjustly, the principle of 
defending them is approved,”235 and if a sovereign “remote from my nation harasses his 
own…the duty which I owe to the human race is prior and superior to that which I owe that 
sovereign.”236 These statements endorse the principle of humanitarian intervention on behalf 
of foreigners. Thus, even though Grotius is credited with the concept of humanitarian 
intervention, there were other scholars like Seneca, Suarez, and Gentili who preceded him in 
endorsing it.  
Brochard observes that: “Where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain 
rights of its own citizens over whom he has absolute sovereignty, other states of the family of 
nations are authorised by international law to intervene on grounds of humanity.”237Brochard 
implies that even though the state has absolute internal sovereignty, if grave human rights 
abuses are inflicted on the people, sovereignty has to give way to intervention by foreign 
forces in defence of the people. Brochard goes as far as recommending that the government 
of the target should be supplanted by the sovereignty of the intervening forces.238Stowell had 
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similar views.  He observed that when universally recognised principles of human rights are 
abused in a severe manner by a state, force may be used in defence of people suffering that 
abuse. 239 
Emmerich de Vattel and other writers also considered it lawful for foreign powers to 
intervene to assist a people resisting tyranny. He observes:  
If the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his people a legitimate reason 
to resist tyranny, if tyranny becomes unbearable as to cause the nation to rise, any 
foreign power is entitled to help an oppressed people that has requested 
assistance.240 
DeVattel considered that it was lawful for one state to intervene in another to support a revolt 
by people under the yoke of tyranny. Another writer in the late 18th century sharing this view 
was Johann Jakob Moser.241 He considered intervention to protect individuals from religious 
persecution as an exception to the general rule of non-intervention, though he stressed that 
the motive should be humanitarian, not religious.242 In the 19th century, humanitarian 
intervention became the subject of the writings of many scholars because it had become 
accepted as a right in state practice.243 Henry Wheaton, the American scholar, who leaned in 
favour of non-intervention, justified a right of intervention on humanitarian grounds as an 
exception to the rule.244 He declares: “Non-interference is the general rule, to which cases 
ofjustifiable interference form exceptions limited by the necessity of each particular case.”245 
Inspired by intervention in Greece between1827-1830, the primary purpose of which the 
European powers claimed was humanitarian, he endorsed the concept by his statement that: 
The interference of the Christian powers of Europe, in favour of the Greeks, who, 
after enduring ages of cruel oppression, had shaken off the Ottoman yoke, affords 
a further illustration of the principles of international law authorizing such 
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interference …where the general interests of humanity are infringed by the 
excesses of a barbarous and despotic government.246 
Wheaton based his support for humanitarian intervention on the intervention in Greece.247 
Thus, where a government mistreats it subjects in a barbarous manner, in the name of 
humanity, intervention in the state is an exception to the general rule of non-intervention. 
This view is shared by some early 20th century writers. Rougier, a leading French scholar, 
observed in his endorsement of humanitarian intervention, that such an intervention to be 
justified must be undertaken in solidarity of mankind.248 John Westlake, the English 
international lawyer, endorsed humanitarian intervention on grounds of ‘anarchy and 
misrule.’ He observed that it would be “idle to argue…that the duty of neighbouring states is 
to look on quietly in the face of misrule.”249 Lawrence joins the list of scholars in the 
19thcentury who endorsed intervention on humanitarian grounds. He argues that: 
should the cruelty be so long continued and so revolting that the best instincts of 
human nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for bringing it to 
an end and removing its cause without adding fuel to the fire of the conflict, there 
is nothing in the law of nations which will brand as a wrongdoer that state that 
steps forward and undertakes the necessary intervention… There is a great 
difference between declaring a national act to be legal, and therefore part of the 
order under which states have consented to live, and allowing it to be morally 
blameless as an exception to ordinary rules.250 
Lawrence thus shares the views of Wheaton, Rougier, and Westlake, among other scholars, 
that humanitarian intervention is a defensible exception to the rule of non-intervention.  It has 
been observed by Fonteyne that by the end of the 19th century, the right of humanitarian 
intervention had gained wide acceptance as a right of a state. 251 He argues that while there 
were divergences regarding the circumstances and the manner in which humanitarian 
intervention should be conducted, “the principle itself was widely, if not unanimously, 
                                                          
246Ibid. p. 101. 
247Ibid. p. 103 
248A Rougier, “La Theorie De L’InterventionD’Humanite”, Revue Generale de Droit International Public, Vol. 
17, 1910, pp. 648-526, cited by Knudsen, note 234 supra, p. 8. 
249 J. Westlake, International Law, Part I (2d. ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1910 (1904), pp. 319-320. Cited  
by Knudsen, note 162, p. 8. 
250 T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 7th ed., (Winfield, P. H. ed.), London Macmillan, 1925,  
      pp. 127-128. 
251Fonteyne, note 138 supra, p. 125. 
107 
 
accepted as an integral part of customary international law.”252 In the view of Abiew, the 
writings of authorities suggested that it was legitimate to use force against states that abused 
the rights of its nationals.253Brownlie observes that “by the end of the 19th century, majority 
of publicists admitted that a right of humanitarian intervention existed.”254Fonteyne quotes 
the International Law Association as stating that the doctrine had become “so clearly 
established under customary international law that only its limits and not its existence is 
subject to debate.”255 Thus in the 18th and 19th century, many international law scholars 
recognised the existence of minimum standards of humanity which could justify 
interventions.256 During the early 20th century, a right of humanitarian intervention was 
defended by scholars such as Oppenheim and Lauterpacht. Oppenheim observed that “should 
a state venture to treat its own subjects or a part thereof with such cruelty as would stagger 
humanity, public opinion of the rest world would call on the Powers to exercise 
intervention.”257Lauterpacht argued that “the exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops 
where outrage upon humanity begins.”258 One writer has argued that:  
From the most cursory review of international history of the past two centuries, it 
is apparent that intervention in foreign States is quite normal. Indeed if 
international history is thought of as the analysis of the influences of nations upon 
each other, it is arguable that the very terrain of history is mapped out on the grid 
of intervention…although this presupposes a wide conception of what intervention 
might be.259 
The right of humanitarian intervention espoused by these writers has not received universal 
acceptance. Kant was a defender of non-intervention.260 The Italian writers Mimiani and 
Carnazzi-Amari were advocates of rigid non-intervention.261 The French scholar Pradier-
Fodere also considered humanitarian intervention to be unlawful, because it “constitutes an 
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infringement upon the independence of states.”262 Wolff was another scholar who shared the 
inflexible notion of non-intervention. In his view, if a state treats its subjects harshly, no other 
state may intervene, because no state “has a right to interfere in the government of 
another…”263  In the light of the opposing views of these writers, it is clear that there was no 
universal acceptance of a right of humanitarian intervention by the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
From the foregoing, it is clear that humanitarian intervention was recognised as a “right” of 
states by most, but not all writers, on the topic by the end of the 19th century. It is 
questionable whether the recognition by a majority of writers could justify a right of 
humanitarian intervention to the extent of making it a principle of customary international 
law. Even if it was accepted as such, it is difficult to defend the principle, because, for 
example, there was no agreement on the definition of the concept itself. From the various 
definitions, it is obvious that different writers had different conceptions of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention itself. While some writers appear to conceive it as an action to halt 
persecution of religious minorities, others considered it as intervention to end tyranny, or to 
halt mass slaughter of populations, or to prevent failed states, or to free a weak occupied state 
from occupation by a powerful state, etc. The question then arises as to what right of 
intervention these writes espoused.  
The right of humanitarian intervention endorsed by majority of these writers were unilateral 
interventions, and therefore cannot be justified. The right empowered more powerful states to 
determine when a crisis existed, and to determine the appropriate response, which, invariably, 
was not based on international law. The interventions were motivated by national and 
strategic interests. The fact that most writers recognised that a right of humanitarian 
intervention existed does not provide legal justification for that right. The only basis was the 
advancement of the interests of the intervening states through unilateral action, clothed in the 
robes of humanitarianism. These states could only justify their interventions upon the 
successful outcome, regardless of the lack of any justification in law for their actions. W.V 
Harcourt writing in the mid-19th century concurs, that, intervention is “a high and summary 
procedure which sometimes snatch a remedy beyond the reach of law…In the case of 
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intervention as that of a revolution, its essence is illegality, and its justification is its 
success.”264 
1.7. State Practice of Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention in the 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century 
1.7.1. Introduction 
This section discusses the practice the concept of humanitarian intervention. State practice 
during this period was influenced by the widely accepted international law rule of a right of 
intervention, which was based on the Just War Theory. States were judges of the conditions 
under which war could be waged without regard to international law.  In an era when states 
were free to use force without limits to advance their national interests, legal justification for 
interventions was unnecessary. The absolute concept of sovereignty espoused by the earlier 
philosophers extended into the 19th and early 20th century, and states exercised sovereignty 
in their own interests. They did not consider themselves to be bound by international law, but 
by laws they had voluntarily agreed to, and therefore there could be no limitations on a state’s 
sovereignty without the expressed consent of the state. An objective of the section is to 
establish that most of the interventions during the period would not fall within the meaning of 
humanitarian intervention as understood in the contemporary era, because they were 
motivated by religious solidarity, or solely by national interests. To this end interventions in 
Greece (1827-1830, Syria (1860-1861), Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria (1876-1878), and 
Macedonia (1903-1903, 1912-1913) are discussed. 
The purpose of this section is to establish that in the 19th and early 20thcentury, interventions 
were carried out by only a few states.  The interventions were based on political interests, 
morality, and religious solidarity, and had no basis in international law. These countries acted 
unilaterally, without any accountability to a supranational authority as to the legality of the 
interventions and the manner in which they were carried out. Since legality was of no 
relevance, the potential for the abuse of humanitarian intervention as pretext for war was ever 
present.  Secondly, with the advent of the United Nations Charter era, unilateral interventions 
have been prohibited and therefore, a state that intervenes in another has a duty to provide 
legal justification, 
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1.7.2. Justification of State Practice  
Prior to the 19th century, the law of nations was governed by natural law.265 Natural law gave 
sovereigns unlimited rights to be the judges of the justness of their actions, thus giving them a 
free hand to wage war.266 The period between 1814 and 1914 witnessed the concept of 
positive law as opposed to the just war tradition.267 Positive law held that law consisted of 
treaties and state practice.268  In this context, states in principle had the freedom to use force 
in furtherance of their interests, and international law regarded actions relating “to the use of 
force and what constituted the national interest to be completely outside the scope of law.”269 
Thus, humanitarian intervention was neither legal nor illegal under international law in the 
19th century.270 States interpreted absolute notion of sovereignty as the right to wage war, and 
there were no legal rules to bind states to keep the peace.271 Theorists on sovereignty like 
Bodin and Hobbes conceived the concept to be absolute, undivided power without 
limitations. This understanding of sovereignty extended into the 19th and early 20thcentury. 
During this period, states were only bound by laws they had voluntarily agreed to, either by 
treaty or deriving from custom.272 States considered sovereignty to be a right to be exercised 
in their own interests.273 What existed then was unrestrained sovereignty.274 The Permanent 
Court of International Justice endorsed this in the Lotus Case when it stated that:275 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law…276 
This statement conveys the idea that there could be no limitations on a state’s sovereignty 
without the expressed consent of the state. In an era during which states were free to use force 
to advance national interests with virtually no limit on the use of force, legal justification for 
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interventions was not necessary, and therefore, states based interventions on political and 
ethical grounds to legitimize their actions.277 
State practice of the Major Powers, France, Great Britain, and Russia during this  period, was 
influenced by 19th century liberalism, which advocated other methods of settling disputes 
other than war, while endorsing the use of force to eliminate inhumane practices such as the 
slave trade and the persecution of Christians in the Ottoman Empire.278 As a consequence of 
this influence, great powers justified their interventions on humanitarian grounds.279 State 
practice of humanitarian intervention during the 19th century shows that the influence of 
liberal opinion made it possible for states willing to intervene in other countries to do so with 
significant public support and political acceptance.280 Thus even though the legality of an 
intervention was of little or no significance, an intervention was generally accepted if the 
intervention was undertaken, not solely to advance or secure national interests, but for a just 
or popular cause, like defence of persecuted populations.  
1.7.3. Interventions in Greece, (1827-1830), Syria (1860-1861), Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria (1876-1878) and Macedonia (1903-1908, 1912-
1913) 
The justification of interventions on humanitarian grounds as state practice is a creation of the 
latter part of the 19th century.281 There were earlier examples of interventions like the 
Crusades and the 16th and 17thcentury religious wars which could be considered humanitarian 
interventions, but they were based on religious solidarity, and therefore cannot be considered 
as truly humanitarian.282 Other interventions, like the United States intervention in Cuba 
during the latter part of the 19th century and the protests of the European Major Powers, Great 
Britain, and France against Morocco’s treatment of political prisoners at the beginning of the 
20th century did not have a “clear humanitarian motive or the highly coercive character of an 
armed intervention.”283 Examples of state practice of humanitarian intervention in the 19th 
century and early 20th century were those that occurred in Greece (1827-1830), Syria (1860-
                                                          
277Ibid. p. 66. 
278 Ibid. 
279Gill, note 139 supra, p. 64. 
280Ibid. p. 65. 
281Fonteyne, note 138 supra, p. 206. 
282Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
112 
 
1861),  Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria (1876-1878) and Macedonia (1903-1908, 1912-
1913).284 
The intervention of France, Great Britain, and Russia in Greece (1827-1830) was among the 
first historical examples of the use of humanitarian concern as justification for 
intervention.285 The Major Powers stated that the intervention was motivated no less by 
sentiments of humanity, than by interest for tranquillity of Europe.”286 The intervention arose 
from the massacres of Christians in Greece within the Ottoman Empire, which culminated in 
the signing of the Treaty of London by France, Great Britain and Russia.287 These powers 
agreed to unilaterally intervene to halt the bloodshed in Greece. They requested for limited 
autonomy for Greece within the Ottoman Empire and when this was rejected, they intervened 
militarily on 14 September 1829, leading to the independence of Greece in 1830.288  This 
intervention was based on religious solidarity and political expediency. It was to protect a 
Christian minority, and to bring peace to Europe, and therefore, the motives were not 
necessarily humanitarian, but based on religious solidarity. 
The second intervention which has been classified as humanitarian intervention was the 
intervention by France in Syria following the Protocol of the Conference of Paris, signed by 
France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, on 3 August 1860.289 The protocol was 
the result of the massacre of Christians in Syria by Moslems with the blessing of Turkey. The 
protocol authorised France to intervene in Syria. It has been argued that since Turkey signed 
the protocol, it had given its consent to interference in its territory, and therefore the action by 
France was not an intervention. As Thomas & Thomas have argued; “When consent is given 
by a state to foreign action of interventionary character, in reality there is no intervention.”290 
However, as observed by Stowell, Turkey consented to the intervention “only through 
constraint and a desire to avoid worse.”291Rougier however is of the view that this was a 
humanitarian intervention with the observation that: “The Syrian intervention was thus a 
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humanitarian intervention…”292  However, like the intervention of Britain, France and Russia 
in Turkey, the objective was to protect a Christian minority, and therefore to classify it as 
humanitarian intervention was to present a narrow conception of the doctrine. 
Another intervention classified as humanitarian was the declaration of war by Serbia and 
Montenegro against Turkey on 30 June 1876 in support of persecuted Christians in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Bulgaria.293  The declarations of war by Serbia and Montenegro were 
officially justified as humanitarian intervention, since they were in solidarity with suffering 
people in neighbouring countries.294  Yet another example of intervention classified as 
humanitarian was the declaration of war on Turkey by Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece in 1913, 
in response to the government of Turkey’s brutal “Turkification” of Christians in 
Montenegro.295 The stated reason for the declarations of war was that the three countries were 
“unable to tolerate any longer the sufferings of their brethren in Turkey.”296 The war ended 
with the signing of the 1913 Treaty of London under which Turkey surrendered part of 
Macedonia to be divided among the three Balkan Allies.297 The justification for their 
intervention was their humanitarian concern for the suffering of the Macedonian people. Like 
the previous interventions, this intervention was to protect a Christian minority, and not 
necessarily out of concern for the Macedonian people as a whole. 
The interventions discussed above demonstrate that in the 19th and early 20th century, there 
were only a few states which regularly intervened in other states.  These interventions were 
based on political interests, morality, and religious solidarity, and had no basis in 
international law. Most of these interventions would not meet the meaning of humanitarian 
intervention in the post-UN Charter era. The powers which intervened in others acted 
unilaterally and were neither accountable to a supranational authority, not bound by 
international law as to the legality of the interventions and the manner in which they were 
conducted. There were no standards as to what was permissible and what was not. Therefore, 
the potential for the use of humanitarian intervention as a basis for advancing the political 
objectives could not be discounted.  
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The right of humanitarian intervention which existed in the 19th and early 20th century, which 
was based on the Just War theory cannot be used as establishing a right of intervention in the 
post-1945 international order, in the light of the provisions of Article 2(4) on the UN Charter, 
which prohibits the use of force in inter-state relations. Under the current legal order, the only 
exceptions to the use of force under the UN Charter are: security measures to maintain and 
restore international peace and security (Article 42) and action taken by Member states in 
individual and collective self-defence under Article 51. The wording of Article 2(4) is 
unequivocal and imperative, and covers the use of force in all forms in inter-state relations. 
The drafters of the UN Charter wanted to ensure that states will not resort to self-help in 
resolving interstate disputes, hence the provisions on the prohibition of the use of force 
contained in Article 2(4) that leaves no room for humanitarian intervention, and the principle 
of non-intervention in Article 2(7) respectively. To this end there was no provision for states 
to take either individual or collective action in the interest of human rights and therefore, 
there is no international law principle that makes humanitarian intervention lawful. Broadly 
interpreted, Article 2(4) means that, force is to be usedonly, in the global interest, and; 
therefore, force may not be used in contravention of the purposes of the United Nations, 
which include the development of friendly relations among nations. Accordingly, a right of 
humanitarian intervention, which some scholars assert existed at the end of the 19th century, 
is of no relevance or application, in the post-1945 international order. 
1.8. Conclusion 
The doctrine of state sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law.  Sovereignty 
connotes the notion of independence and equality of states. The current international order is 
based on the sovereign equality of states. The doctrine confers on a state the right to manage 
its internal affairs free from the interference of other states and externally, it confers legal 
personality on a state and imposes a duty on other states to refrain from interfering in the 
domestic affairs the state. Thus, a state has the freedom to choose the type of political, 
economic, social, and cultural system it wants as well as its foreign policy. The earliest 
theorists of the doctrine, like Aristotle, Bodin, and Hobbes postulated sovereignty to be the 
concentration of supreme power in a state in the hands of one person or a few people. They 
theorised that sovereign authority must be absolute. The political and historical context in 
which these philosophers lived influenced their conception of the concept. For example, 
Bodin and Hobbes wrote at a time of religious wars in Europe that threatened the stability of 
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their countries and their primary concern was survival of the state. Hence, they considered the 
concentration of supreme power in the hands of one person or group of people as the best 
way to save the state from disintegration. However, even the absolute sovereignty defenders 
acknowledged that sovereignty had limitations and was subject to higher norms. What Bodin 
Hobbes and other philosophers bequeathed to the contemporary legal order is the principle 
that there is a repository of power in each state, and every state possesses exclusive 
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its territory. The Treaties of Westphalia 1648 established 
the concept of sovereign statehood. The cardinal principle at the centre of sovereign 
statehood is that all states are equal, and interference in the affairs of one state by another is 
prohibited, principles which were codified by the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States 1933, and adopted by the  United Nations Charter. The United Nations 
Charter went further by prohibiting the use of force in inter-state relations except in 
prescribed situations. The importance of the concept of state sovereignty is that it serves as a 
bulwark of protection for weak states against interference by powerful states. 
The concept of humanitarian intervention had its foundations on the Just War Theory.  The 
theory recognised that when a sovereign abuses or deprives his citizens of the rights to which 
they were entitled under natural law, other states had the right to intervene in the interest of 
the citizens. On this basis, intervening sovereigns were the sole judges of the justness of their 
actions, and therefore sovereigns had the freedom to wage war. In this context, there was no 
limit on the use of force, and there was no requirement for legal justification for 
interventions. Interventions were motivated by political, religious, and moral considerations 
with no regard to legality. Yet the intervening states justified their interventions on 
humanitarian grounds and by the end of the 19th century, there was a general recognition by 
most legal scholars on the subject, that humanitarian intervention was a right of states. 
However, the fact that most publicists recognised humanitarian intervention as an exception 
to the principle of non-intervention did not mean that a right of humanitarian intervention had 
become a principle of customary international law, because this view was not shared by all 
the eminent scholars on the subject. Besides, state practice alone cannot make the right of 
humanitarian intervention a principle of customary international law. The interventions by a 
few powerful states in other states, for whatever reason, cannot support the assertion that a 
right of humanitarian intervention had been established.  Even if a right of humanitarian 
intervention existed in the 19th century, it cannot serve as a precedent for intervention in the 
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current international legal order, because that right belonged to a bygone an era. The UN 
Charter has brought about a new international legal order. The Charter prohibits the use of 
force in inter-state relations. Under the current international legal order, the only exceptions 
to the use of force: are security measures to maintain or restore international peace and 
security with the authority of the United Nations Security Council and actions taken by 
Member States pursuant to individual and collective self-defence.  A right of humanitarian 
intervention does not exist in the contemporary legal order.  A state which intervenes in 
another state ought to have legal justification for the intervention, either by the sanction of the 
Security Council, or at the invitation of the country which is the target of the intervention.  
The new international order brought by the United Nations Charter has placed the concept of 
state sovereignty, the principles of equality of states and non-intervention at the core of 
interstate-relations.  This new order also takes into account the importance of human rights, 
and therefore ensures that in the face of gross human rights abuses, sovereignty cannot be 
allowed to stand in the way of humanitarian intervention to halt or alleviate human suffering. 
Otherwise, sovereignty may become irrelevant, obsolete, and a hindrance to the protection of 
suffering populations. There will always be the problem of how to address issues of abuse of 
the concept of humanitarian intervention and the limits to be placed on the force to be applied 
during its implementation. This problem existed in the 18th and early 19th century, and 
continues under the contemporary international legal order, as the debate on humanitarian 
intervention demonstrates. As a consequence of the fact some states are more powerful than 
others, there will always be the tendency for the more powerful states to interfere in the 
affairs of weaker states, by using humanitarian intervention as a pretext. Such interventions 
arouse suspicion, especially where the intervention takes place unilaterally. To avoid anarchy, 
unbridled hegemony, and bullying of weak states by powerful states, only an internationally 
representative body should have the authority to make decisions regarding the use of force, 
and the decisions in this regard should be binding on all states. Under the UN Charter only 
the Security Council is empowered to authorise the use of force. However, this body is 
unrepresentative and is dominated by very powerful countries. Therefore even when 
interventions have been authorised by the Security Council, the suspicion will remain, that 
the interventions serve the interests of one or more of the members of the Security Council.  
The emergence of a more representative body with the power to authorise the use of force 
will enhance the legitimacy of interventions. This will go a long way to eliminate the abuse 
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of humanitarian intervention as a pretext to advance national and strategic interests of 
powerful states, through the use of indiscriminate force.
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CHAPTER 2 
2. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 
CHARTER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA. 
2.1. Introduction 
The chapter investigates the hypothesis that the widespread recognition and promotion of 
human rights in the post-Cold War era has led to a substantial increase in humanitarian 
interventions resulting in the erosion of the traditional concept of state sovereignty and its 
corollary principle of non-intervention during this period. The chapter argues that the concept 
of humanitarian intervention, (re-conceptualised as ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P),1 the 
two subjects that constitute the focus of the thesis, are essentially post-Cold War era 
phenomena. The chapter further argues that humanitarian intervention is part of R2P, because 
they both involve the option of forcible military intervention in the face of serious 
humanitarian crises when necessary.2 An investigation of the role of international human 
rights in the change in international attitudes towards humanitarian intervention during the 
post-Cold War is conducted in the chapter. It is argued that the traditional definition of 
sovereignty, that says that a state has immunity from accountability for the brutal treatment of 
its citizens, is outdated, and belongs to the museum of antiquity, in the light of human rights, 
globalization, and the interdependence of states.  
The concept of sovereignty has undergone an evolution from the traditional Westphalian 
concept of the supremacy of the state to the concept of sovereignty with the people at the 
centre, or what has been described as popular sovereignty. The state has the primary 
responsibility to protect its people. If it is unable or unwilling to do so, it creates the 
conditions for its sovereignty to be subverted by external actors through interventions. Article 
2(4) places a general prohibition on the use of force except when it is authorised by the 
Security Council, or where the force is used in individual or collective self-defence. It is 
argued, therefore, that when it becomes necessary to conduct humanitarian intervention to 
protect the victims of human rights abuses, the body to authorize the intervention should be 
the United Nations Security Council. An intervention without the mandate of the United 
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Nations Security Council undermines the international order. Besides, the motives of 
powerful states that intervene in others are not necessarily humanitarian, but are inevitably 
influenced by geopolitical factors and the national interests of the intervening state.3 This 
raises the potential for major military powers to intervene in weaker sates to advance 
parochial interests. However, until the Security Council is able to exercise its function of 
maintaining international peace and security in the sphere of human rights by taking timely 
and effective action, the potential for unilateral armed intervention by powerful states cannot 
be ruled out. The chapter briefly explains issues that hobbled the capacity of the Security 
Council to implement enforcement measures in relation to human rights during the Cold War. 
Further, the chapter discusses the debate on the legality of humanitarian intervention since the 
beginning of the 1990s with a focus on interventions without the authorisation of the Security 
Council or without the consent of the target state, otherwise referred to as unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, because they are essentially illegal under the UN Charter. A 
cardinal principle of international law is the inviolability of the territory of a sovereign state.4  
The purpose of this principle enshrined in the UN Charter is to protect the territorial integrity 
and political independence of states.5 Thus, no country, however powerful, has the right to 
interfere in the internal affairs of any state through the use of force. Even though 
humanitarian intervention is not expressly prohibited by the Charter, the prohibition of the 
use of force under Article 2(4) renders it unlawful, unless it is undertaken with the 
authorisation of the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII. However, when 
serious human rights abuses such as genocide and ethnic cleansing occur in a state, and the 
Security Council is unable or unwilling to take enforcement measures to protect the suffering 
people, then the door is opened for other actors to step in to do what the Security Council will 
not or cannot do, because the world cannot stand by as passive witnesses to atrocities. 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention takes place in such situations, when in the name of 
human rights, a state or group of states uses force against the perpetrating state in order to end 
human suffering within that state.  However, the drawback of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is that it occurs without United Nations Security Council authorization and 
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without the consent of the target state, and therefore, it is inherently dangerous because it sets 
a precedent for other states to follow.  
The chapter nevertheless argues that the mandate of the United Nations Security Council is 
not an absolute prerequisite to justify military interventions, and therefore, when necessary, 
unilateral military interventions can be a timely response to serious humanitarian crises6 in 
the face of Security Council inaction. Thus, a state may intervene in another on ethical 
grounds because it considers it the right thing to do to stop a humanitarian crisis, or on legal 
grounds because it is a party to the Genocide Convention 1948, for example.7  As observed 
under the UN Charter, the Security Council is the body with the responsibility to authorise 
the use of force. However in the event of UN Security Council inaction, if other states are 
compelled to intervene to halt human suffering, it is argued that the intervention, though 
unlawful under the Charter, would be legitimate on moral or ethical grounds. D’Amato shares 
this view, stating that the Security Council is hobbled by the veto of the permanent members, 
and therefore, even without Security Council authorisation, “there are times of severe moral 
duty where any nation that has the requisite military force should step up and prevent 
slaughter.”8 
2.1.1. Structure of the chapter 
The chapter has three main parts, structured as follows: 
Part I discusses the internationalisation of human rights. The purpose is to investigate the 
impact of the widespread recognition of human rights on the traditional concept of state 
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. Part I gives a brief history of human rights, 
explains the nature of ‘human rights,’ and discusses the principle of the universality of human 
rights. This part also attempts to explain the correlation between international concerns for 
human rights, the softening of international attitudes towards armed interventions in the 
internal affairs of states, and the consequential increase in the number of humanitarian 
interventions. Human rights have become a matter of international concern. Therefore, in the 
contemporary international order, gross abuse of human rights in a state inflicted on its 
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people either by the state, or other events such as internal war, insurgency, repression, or state 
failure9, is a matter of concern to the international community. 
Westphalian sovereignty confers on a state supreme authority on a state in dealing with 
matters within its territory.10 However, worldwide concerns about human rights in the post-
Cold War era challenge this notion.  For example, with the advent of the concept of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), external military force may be used to override sovereignty 
to protect victims of gross human rights abuses.11 An example can be found in NATO’s 
intervention in Libya in 2011, authorised by the Security Council to protect civilian victims 
of mass killing by the forces of the Gaddafi regime.12 Sovereignty is not absolute in the 
contemporary international order, because in the post-Cold War era, the widely accepted 
view is that sovereignty involves a state’s responsibility to provide protection to persons and 
property, and to provide adequate governance within its territory.13 Thus, while the Charter 
acknowledges the sovereignty of states, it at the same time acknowledges the obligation of 
the international community to protect the human rights of victims of abuse, and to maintain 
international peace and security.14 Matters previously considered to be within the domestic 
jurisdiction of states, like human rights, humanitarian issues, and economic and social issues 
have been elevated unto the international plane, and are therefore no longer within the 
domestic sphere of states.15Westphalian sovereignty has adapted to changing circumstances 
brought about by the post-Cold War international order.16 Consequently, state sovereignty, 
though recognised by the UN Charter, is neither a licence for states to behave as they please, 
nor a barrier to necessary action by the international community in the interest of maintaining 
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international peace and security, including the protection of human rights.17 In this light, 
tension between respect for state sovereignty and the duty of the international community to 
protect victims of gross human rights abuse is unavoidable.  
Part II discusses the redefinition of state sovereignty and non-intervention after the Cold War. 
The purpose is to juxtapose traditional state sovereignty with the new understanding of 
sovereignty in the post-Cold War era, especially since the introduction of the new concept of 
R2P. Westphalian sovereignty enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, requires non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states.18 Traditional state sovereignty vests supreme 
authority in the state. However, in the post-Cold War era, the people are considered to be the 
source of authority.19 Post-Cold War sovereignty considers the people as the repository of 
authority and therefore, the state derives its legitimacy from the people. State sovereignty is 
recognised, but sovereignty is considered as a responsibility and the primary responsibility of 
the state is to protect its people.20 In situations where human rights are gravely abused in a 
state and the state is unwilling or unable to end or avert it, then sovereignty and non-
intervention have to give way on humanitarian grounds.21 
Sovereignty has therefore been redefined from a concept based on the supreme authority of 
the state to a concept based on the individual rights of the people.  Therefore, in the period 
after the Cold War, sovereignty, though not becoming irrelevant, “is the peoples’ sovereignty 
rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty.”22  This part discusses the notion that non-
intervention and the inviolability of the territories of the sovereign states are the building 
blocks of the international order and the collective security system established by the United 
Nations Charter. Sovereignty is a safeguard for international peace and security, because it 
imposes a duty on states not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and thereby, 
provides protection for weaker states from powerful states.  Nevertheless, sovereignty and 
non-intervention should not be permitted to impede international action in situations of 
excessive human rights abuses. 
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Part III investigates the reasons for the frequency of humanitarian interventions since the end 
of the Cold War and the impact on state sovereignty. This part discusses the legality of 
humanitarian intervention with a focus on unilateral humanitarian intervention, because it 
occurs without authorisation of United Nations Security Council. Under the Charter, armed 
intervention can be justified under the following circumstances: (i) in individual or collective 
self-defence in response to armed attack, as was the case with the NATO’s reason for the  
invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11;23  (ii) or it has to be authorised by the United Nations 
Security Council under Chapter VII, as in the case of the NATO intervention in Libya in 
2011; (iii) or carried out under Chapter VIII, by a regional organization, and subsequently 
impliedly authorised by the Security Council as was the case with ECOWAS’ intervention in 
Liberia in 1990.24  Armed intervention carried out under any of these circumstances in 
particular an intervention authorized by the United Nations Security Council or “collective 
humanitarian intervention”25 does not raise the issue of legality in the light of Article 2(7) and 
Chapter VII.26 On the other hand, unilateral intervention is based solely on the authority and 
decision of the intervening state or states and has therefore proved to be contentious.” 27 
For purposes of this chapter, unilateral intervention is defined as the use of force by a state or 
group of states in the territory of another state, without the United Nations Security Council 
authorisation or the consent of the target state, with the stated objective of averting or halting 
gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the government of the target state, or non-state 
actors, on its people, which the target state is unwilling or unable to avert or halt. Unilateral 
humanitarian intervention therefore flies in the face of Chapter VII of the Charter, in that it is 
conducted without the recommendation or authorisation of the United Nations Security 
Council. It is therefore submitted that unilateral humanitarian intervention raises a 
presumption of unlawfulness under international law. The prohibition of force under Article 2 
(4) does not refer only to the use of force in war, but also any form of armed intervention, 
including unilateral intervention. Since the decision to use force against another state rests 
with the intervening state or states, the motives may be geopolitical and not necessarily be 
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humanitarian.  Besides, since the intervening states determine the objectives and the most 
effective method to be used to achieve these objectives, the potential for abuse and 
disproportionate use of force is heightened.  
An example is NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999. NATO 
used force against a sovereign state that posed no danger to the organisation, without United 
Nations Security Council authorisation. The use of force to “save lives usually involves 
taking lives, including innocent ones.”28 Images of NATO’s aerial bombardment of the 
country were witnessed on television.29 The indiscriminate bombing killed civilians.30 Human 
Rights Watch put the death toll from NATO air strikes at 500 civilians.31  NATO planes were 
flying too high and too fast to protect civilians on the ground.32 The air strikes destroyed the 
infrastructure of the country, including bridges, government buildings, a Serbian television 
station accused of spreading pro-government propaganda killing 16 civilians, and even the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade,33 none of which posed a military threat.  Human Rights Watch 
reported that NATO’s bombing had violated international humanitarian law and Amnesty 
International accused NATO of war crimes.34 NATO’s aerial bombardment did not 
distinguish between friend and foe.  The indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in 
this instance demonstrates the dangers inherent in armed unilateral interventions. 
The chapter concludes that despite the limitations on the concept and other challenges, state 
sovereignty remains a cardinal principle of international law, and the foundation of interstate 
relations, which provides protection to weaker states from unilateral forcible action by 
powerful states. Any use of force, including humanitarian intervention, constitutes a violation 
of the prohibition of the use of force, unless it is conducted with United Nations Security 
Council authorisation or in individual or collective self-defence in response to an armed 
attack. Respect for sovereignty and non-intervention is therefore fundamental in inter-state 
relations. However, absolute sovereignty cannot apply in the contemporary international 
order because of worldwide concerns about human rights. Untrammelled adherence to 
traditional sovereignty and non-intervention would constitute an impediment to the 
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enforcement of international humanitarian law35 and international human rights law.  
Therefore, if a state subjects the citizens to gross human rights abuses, or it unable or 
unwilling to avert of halt such abuses, it is morally legitimate for other states to violate its 
sovereignty in order to protect the victims of abuse.  
To pre-empt powerful states from taking unilateral action in defence of victims of human 
rights abuse, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should exercise 
their prerogative of the veto in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations, in order to avoid the paralyses that characterized the Council during the Cold 
War. Under Article 24 of the Charter, Member States of the UN have conferred on the 
Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and have agreed that when the Security Council discharges this responsibility it acts 
on their behalf. Therefore, the exercise of the veto should be done in the interest of the 
international community, and not in the national interests of the permanent members of the 
Council. In particular, the Security Council should implement the enforcement mechanism 
provided under the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and reaction to gross abuses of human rights effectively, in order to avoid giving a pretext to 
powerful states to take unilateral forcible action. 
2.1.2. The Security Council during the Cold War 
This section discusses the rivalry between the West and East blocks during the Cold War and 
its impact on the Security Council’s capacity to implement enforcement measures in relation 
to international human rights. During the Cold War period 1945-1989, the world was split 
between two hostile blocks, the Capitalist West and the Communist (Soviet) East. These two 
power blocks “sought to avoid intervention in internal and international armed conflicts in 
order to avoid a larger confrontation.”36 The hostility between these two blocks impeded the 
ability of the United Nations to implement the provisions in the Charter on securing 
international peace and security,37 primarily because of the use of the veto by the permanent 
members of the Security Council. The use of the veto made intervention unlikely to take 
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place at all, or if it did take place, it would be unilateral.38 Examples are the US’ intervention 
in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan.39 Under Article 27(3) 
decisions in the Security Council are made by the affirmative vote of nine members of the 
Council, provided that a permanent member does not cast a negative vote. A permanent 
member can thus block a vote on a resolution by exercising a negative vote.  The decades of 
adversarial relations between the great powers during the Cold War made it impossible for 
the United Nations to fulfil its original mission due to the large number of vetoes cast by the 
permanent members.40 As a consequence, during the Cold War the only Chapter VII 
resolution of note adopted by the Security Council was United Nations Resolution 84 41 
which recommended that Members of the United Nations should furnish such assistance to 
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack upon it by the forces 
from North Korea: This resolution passed only because of the absence 42 of the Soviet Union 
during the vote.43 The end of the Cold War brought to an end the ideological and superpower 
differences and raised hopes that a new era of cooperation in the Security Council had 
dawned. There was the hope that a new opportunity had arisen for the realisation of the 
objectives of the United Nations Charter of maintaining international peace and security, and 
of securing justice and human rights. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the 
main “proponent of non-interference in internal affairs, at the end of the Cold-War, a changed 
attitude towards human rights was evident.”44 In the words of UN Secretary-General Javier 
Perez de Cuellar: 
We are witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards 
the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail 
over frontiers and legal documents.45 
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With the end of the Cold War, international attitudes towards humanitarian intervention have 
softened, and the use of force in the face of humanitarian crises has become acceptable to the 
international community and in international law.46 Thus, the beginning of the 1990s saw a 
“flurry of optimism regarding the new found scope of the international community to deal 
with humanitarian issues.”47 This era ushered in new ideas about state sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention, and “a new kind of international law and spirit, made possible in 
the changed conditions of a world no longer structured around the old uncertainties of a 
struggle between communism and capitalism.”48 The end of the Cold War made humanitarian 
intervention a widely accepted diplomatic norm,49 with the frequent use of human rights 
concerns as grounds for intervention.50  An example is the Security Council authorised 
intervention in Libya under Resolution 1973 (2011), to protect the population from mass 
killing perpetrated by the Libyan government.51 A new practice of humanitarian intervention 
emerged during this period with emphasis on the need to override state sovereignty to rescue 
victims of atrocious human rights abuses in a state “unable or unwilling to protect or succour 
them.”52 A willingness to intervene militarily in circumstances that “shock the conscience of 
mankind”53  was ushered in during the 1990s, and a ‘new moral order’ emerged in which 
individual human rights trumped state sovereignty.54 
The post-Cold War period has witnessed unprecedented worldwide concerns about human 
rights, resulting in the softening of international attitudes towards the trans-boundary use of 
force in the protection of populations from gross human rights abuses. The first test was the 
reaction of the international community to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.55  The 
Security Council had until Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, not made use of the 
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most coercive measures – action by military force foreseen in Article 42, but “In the situation 
between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council chose to authorise Member States to take measures on 
its behalf.” 56 The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 678, which authorised 
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait to use ‘all necessary means” to 
restore international peace and order. Thus, the end of the Cold War liberated the United 
Nations “to play the security role its founders intended.”57  Subsequently, humanitarian 
intervention has been a common occurrence in the post-Cold War era, and there have been 
instances of humanitarian intervention almost on an annual basis during this period. 
Examples of post-Cold War humanitarian interventions include ECOWAS’ intervention in 
Liberia in 199058; United Nations Security Council sanctioned humanitarian interventions in 
Kurdistan (Northern Iraq) in 199159; in Somalia in 199260;  in Haiti in 199461; NATO’s 
intervention in Bosnia in 1995; NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999;  NATO’s 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001; United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003; France’s 
intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2010; NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011; and France’s 
intervention in Mali in 2013. 
 On the other hand, humanitarian interventions were few during the Cold War. Armed 
interventions (examples of which are given below) during this period could have qualified as 
humanitarian, but instead the intervening states justified their actions on the basis of self-
defence. Even though undertaken to halt gross human rights abuses, and humanitarian claims 
would have been appropriate,62 the intervening states “took good care not to invoke the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention and preferred to ground the lawfulness of their actions 
on sounder arguments.”63 “Although they bowed in the direction of humanitarianism, the 
interventionist leaders involved in these episodes justified their actions on conventional 
grounds of self-defence.”64  For example on 25 March, 1971, the Pakistani army embarked on 
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military suppression of East Pakistani nationalists who were demanding regional autonomy.65  
Out of concern for the atrocities inflicted on East Pakistan Bengali Hindus and Bengali 
nationalists, India sought the intervention of the international community to take urgent and 
constructive steps to prevail on the Government of Pakistan to put an end to what amounted 
to pre-planned carnage and systematic genocide.66 The killings have been described as 
“crimes against humanity” since the violence was perpetrated againstBengalis and non-
Bengalis.67  Inaction of the United Nations and the international community compelled India 
to intervene to end the carnage.68 India’s intervention has been described as one of the 
clearest examples of humanitarian intervention in history.69 However, India did not appeal to 
the concept of humanitarian intervention, but rather sought justification in self-defence under 
Article 51, as a response to a Pakistan armed attack.70 Similarly, Tanzania intervened in 
Uganda in 1979 to oust Idi Amin’s regime, which had perpetrated mass killings of the 
population.71  Despite grave human rights abuses and the mass slaughter of Ugandans by the 
Amin crime, “at no time did Tanzania advance the claim that its military action was 
humanitarian.”72 Rather, Tanzania defended its action on grounds of self-defence, not for 
humanitarian reasons.73  In another example, in 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ousted 
the Khmer Rouge government which was perpetrating systematic mass torture and murder of 
civilians.74 However, Vietnam did not invoke humanitarian intervention, but declared that the 
reason for the intervention was self-defence in response to border clashes between the two 
states.75 
There is no doubt that the interventions of India, Tanzania and Vietnam in East Pakistan, 
Uganda, and Cambodia respectively were motivated by humanitarian concerns among others. 
                                                          
65 S. Cordera, India’s response to the 1971 East Pakistan crisis: hidden and open reasons for intervention,  
Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 17, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 45-62. 
66Government of India, Bangladesh Documents, 1, p. 672 (1971). 
67 S. Bose, ‘The question of genocide and the quest for justice in the 1971 war’, Journal of Genocide Research,  
    Vol. 13, No. 4, (2011), pp. 393-419. 
68 T. E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Intervention by Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 Military Law Review,  
at 160   (1978). 
69 J.P.L., Fonteyne, The Customary International law of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current validity Under  
    the U.N. Charter, In The Use of force in International Law, T. Gazzini and N. Tsagourias, eds.,  Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd., (2012), p. 478. 
70ICISSSupplementary Volume, p. 55.  Also, T. E. Behuniak, The Law of Unilateral Intervention by Armed   
    Force: A Legal Survey, 79 Military Law Review, at 160 (1978). 
71 N. Ronzitti, note 63, p. 590. 
72ICISSSupplementary Volume, p. 62. 
73 UN Document, S/PV.2108, January 11, 1979, p. 2. Also, Ronzitti, note 63 supra, p. 103. 
74ICISS Supplementary Volume,  p. 58 
75 Ibid. 
130 
 
Yet, none of these states appealed to humanitarian intervention.  One reason is possibly 
because of the dubious legitimacy of the interventions.76 Another explanation is that in the 
pre-Cold War era international attitude towards the use of force to protect victims of gross 
human rights abuses was inflexible, and there was no international endorsement, express or 
tacit, of humanitarian intervention. If these interventions had occurred in the post-Cold War 
era, it is most likely that the intervening states would have rightly appealed to humanitarian 
intervention.  
2.1.3. Change in international attitudes towards humanitarian intervention 
In the post-Cold War era there has been a change in the attitude of the international 
community towards the use of force to protect victims of excessive human rights abuses.  
Even when armed interventions take place outside the framework of the United Nations 
Charter, the UN Security Council has given post-intervention approval to the operation. For 
example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in Liberia 
in 1990, through ECOMOG, the Ceasefire Monitoring Group of the organisation, and 
intervened again in Sierra Leone in 1998 in the face of UN Security Council’s inaction.77. 
The interventions by ECOWAS have been described as “the first true blow to the 
constitutional framework of the international system established in 1945 predicated on the 
ultimate control of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council.”78  Even though 
“there was no legal basis for the ECOWAS intervention under the UN Charter, it was 
supported by the United Nations and the whole of the international community.”79  The 
Security Council commended the organisation in Resolution 788 for its part in restoring 
“peace, security and stability in Liberia”.80  Another example is NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999. It has been suggested that in the light of the international support for 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, it was ‘a potential harbinger of future legality.’81 If 
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the UN Security Council fails to act, and where the intervention is for a popular cause, the 
UN would not complain about the usurpation of its powers, but rather praise the interveners.82  
Under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security rest with the UN Security Council. In the face of UN 
Security Council inaction, there is justification under Article 1(1) of the UN Charter for 
member states of the UN to take action.  Article 1(1) imposes a duty on member states of the 
UN to maintain international peace and security. In a situation where the Security Council is 
unable or unwilling to discharge its responsibility, the prohibition on the use of force 
enshrined in Article 2(4) is suspended.83 
2.2. Part I - The Universalisation or Internationalization of Human Rights 
The main purpose of this section is to discuss the universality of human rights. The objective 
is to emphasise the importance of human rights in the subsequent discussions on sovereignty, 
non-intervention, and humanitarian intervention. The importance of human rights is that they 
have normally been used as grounds for the violation of the sovereignty of states through 
humanitarian intervention. The focus will be on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948, (UDHR), proclaimed on 10 December 1948 as a “common standard of achievements 
for all peoples and all nations,”84 and described as the “foundational human rights document 
of our time.”85 The UDHR set out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be 
universally protected.86 This part also discusses the nature of human rights, and gives a brief 
history of human rights. The aim is to investigate the widely held belief that human rights are 
universal, as the name of UDHR infers.87 
Part I also explores the role that the worldwide recognition and protection of human rights 
have played in the increase in humanitarian interventions and the consequential redefinition 
of state sovereignty since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations Charter was the first 
major document relating to the internationalisation of human rights.88 The Charter committed 
the United Nations to promoting universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.89 
UDHR reinforced the principle introduced by the United Nations Charter, that human rights 
cannot be located exclusively within the sovereignty of states.90  Gross human rights 
violations within one state may have adverse external effects, especially where a large 
number of victims in the perpetrating state move across international borders, creating a 
refugee or humanitarian crisis in other states.91 Besides, human rights violations could lead to 
civil war, which may pose a threat to international peace and security, prompting other states 
to intervene in the perpetrating state.92 Therefore, the international community has legitimate 
concerns about the manner in which a state treats its own nationals.93 Abuse by a state of the 
human rights of its nationals is no longer the exclusive business of the state, because of 
worldwide recognition that respect for human rights transcends international frontiers. 
Other human rights documents that have followed in the wake of UDHR, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966), the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICRED 1965), and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), etc. were 
constructed on the foundation of the UDHR. 94 The UDHR is the first international legal 
instrument that “imposed an unitary and universal conception regarding the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and ipso facto, of the ‘Dignitashumana’ (dignity of the human 
person).”95  Even though the UDHR is a declaration and not a legally binding document, its 
principles have influenced international attitudes towards human rights. International 
concerns for human rights have had a correlation with the softening of international attitudes 
towards humanitarian intervention. International concerns for human rights have been 
influenced by the principles enshrined in the UDHR.   
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2.2.1. The nature of human rights 
The purpose of this section is to explain the concept of human rights in relation to 
sovereignty, with the aim of establishing that human rights are an entitlement of all human 
beings, simply for being human beings, and they are therefore not dependent on the 
magnanimity of the state or sovereign. Human rights are widely considered to be the 
fundamental rights of a person necessary for a life with human dignity.96 They are the 
cornerstone underpinning the rule of law and state sovereignty and are necessary to ensure 
that every person can live with dignity without discrimination based on gender, race, 
religious, or other status.97 These rights, referred to by important human rights documents, 
imply the dignity inherent in a human being. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
defines dignity as “the fact of being given honour and respect by people.”98  The UDHR 
recognises in its preamble the “inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family.”99  Article 1 states: “All human beings are born free and in 
dignity and rights…and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”100  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognises in its preamble the 
“inherent dignity and inalienable rights of members of the human family,”101 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also recognizes 
the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”102  
In the light of the worldwide recognition of human rights, the Westpahlian concept of 
sovereignty has already been breached by the necessity of humanitarian intervention where a 
state subjects its population to gross human rights abuses.103 
Every human being has dignity and human rights, not because of his/her race, ethnicity, 
nationality, cultural or religious background, but solely because he/she is a human 
being104“The idea that human beings have rights as humans is a staple of contemporary world 
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politics.”105 Human rights are inalienable rights: “one cannot stop being a human being, no 
matter how badly one behaves or how barbarously one is treated.”106  Even though a state 
may by legislation deny its people human rights, these rights continue to attach to the people, 
because human rights are inherent in a human being and cannot be destroyed. Thus, notions 
of law and justice, the right not be deprived of one’s life or property unlawfully, freedom 
from oppressive governance, and the right to participate in the affairs of one’s society exist in 
every human society.  For example relating to Africa, Viljoen has observed that “there is little 
doubt that ‘human rights existed in traditional pre-colonial Africa…and there clearly were 
established ways and means of marshalling custom and wise leadership that led to effective 
and legitimate dispute resolution.”107 For example, in the culture of the Ashanti of Ghana, my 
ethnic group, there is a saying that literally states: “listen to it twice,” which literally 
translated means, listen to both sides of a story before you judge. This ensures that a person is 
entitled to a fair trial, and therefore, no one may be deprived of life, property, or freedom 
without being heard by an assembly of elders. Another example can be found in Botswana 
where I lived for over twenty five years. There, the culture is that a traditional ruler does not 
take a decision unless the people have had their say at a kgotla (meeting of the people), 
thereby ensuring the participation of the people in the affairs of the community. Therefore, it 
is argued that notions of fairness, justice, and the desire for freedom from arbitrary or 
oppressive rule are innate in human beings. Consequently, the authority of a government in 
every society should depend on the consent of the population, and government has a duty to 
protect the human rights of its populations, and not to subject them to oppressive or arbitrary 
rule.  
2.2.2. A brief history of human rights 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the origins of international human rights. A detailed 
discussion of the origins of international human rights is beyond the scope of the thesis. The 
purpose is to provide a basic introduction of international human rights in a historical context. 
The section firstly discusses human rights instruments that preceded the United Nations and 
the UDHR with aim of establishing the concerns for human rights has existed for a long time 
in human history.  Sarkin argues that:  
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While it is commonly held that international protections against human rights 
violations were activated in the post-World War II era, they actually were 
accessible much earlier. Without having to resort to natural law or other schools of 
thought that see such protection as having been available from ancient times, it can 
be shown that a system to protect individuals had been available from at least the 
nineteenth century. While it could be argued that individuals were unable to access 
this system to protect their rights at the time, there were indeed measures 
protecting minorities, protecting people against slavery…long before the 1940s.108 
As Sarkin argues recognition of human rights existed in ancient times before the advent of 
the United Nations and subsequent human rights instruments. Prior to the United Nations, 
measures existed such as those protecting minorities and people from slavery. Indeed, efforts 
at providing human rights protection preceded the establishment of the United Nations in 
1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, as discussed below.   
2.2.3. Other human rights instruments that preceded the United Nations 
As observed earlier, international recognition of human rights did not only emerge in the 
20thcentury following the formation of the United Nations and the adoption of the UDHR109. 
Rather, the recognition of international human rights has gradually evolved over centuries. 
Thus, other instruments, in the area of international human rights preceded UDHR, which 
demonstrates the importance that human beings have over a long period of time attached to 
human rights.  In 1929 the International Law Institute (New York) developed and published 
the “International Declaration of Human Rights.”110 Article 1 of the Declaration declared that  
it is the obligation of every state to recognize the equal right of every individual to 
life, liberty, property, and to grant to those on its territory full protection of this 
right, without distinction of nationality, sex, race, language or religion.111 
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It is clear from the foregoing that it has been a long held belief that human rights are the 
entitlement of every human being without discrimination.  Even though this Declaration does 
not have its roots in ancient times as argued by Sarkin, the awareness of the importance and 
inalienability of human rights existed before the formation of the UN and the UDHR. The 
rights provided in Article 1 of the Declaration have been duplicated in the UDHR, the 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and other human rights instruments, and this 
affirms the universal nature of human rights and the inherent dignity of all members of the 
human family as the Preamble of the UDHR postulates.  Another human rights instrument 
preceding the UDHR was the 1939 League of Human Rights.112 Article 1 of this instrument 
provided that: 
…human rights apply without distinction of sex, race, nation, religion or opinion. 
These inalienable and imprescriptible rights are attached to the human person; they 
should be respected at all times, in all places and guaranteed against all forms of 
political and social oppression. The international protection of human rights should 
be universally organized or secured, so that no state can refuse the exercise of 
these rights of a single human being living on its territory.”113 
This provision affirms the universal and inalienable nature of human rights. It recognises that 
human rights attach to a human being by virtue of being human, regardless of nationality, 
race, or religion, and no state has the right to deny any person these rights.  It advocates 
efforts at securing international and universal protection of human rights. This is a precursor 
of R2P, in that it imposes a duty, by implication, on a state to protect the human rights of its 
people. A further antecedent of the UDHR can be found in Jacques Maritain’s “Declaration 
on Human Rights and Natural Law” in 1942.114 He stated that “the value of the person, 
his/her liberty, his/her rights depend on the order of sacred things, bearing the imprint of the 
Father of (human) beings…”115 Maritain implied that human rights are given to all human 
beings by God and by extension by natural law. What Maritain means by this statement is 
that human rights are innate in human beings and therefore inalienable. The statement also 
emphasises the universal nature of human rights and the imperative for all human beings to 
enjoy them without discrimination. The other human rights antecedent of UDHR was the 
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work of Professor Rene Cassin, the French representative of the Drafting Committee of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights.116  In 1947 he presented to the UN General Assembly of 
the UN the “Project of International Declaration of Human Rights.”117 He stated in Article 20 
of his Project that “the individual freedom of conscience, faith and thought is a sacred and 
absolute right.”118 All these instruments conveyed a message of the importance which the 
international community attaches to human rights. Even though there was no enforcement 
mechanism for ensuring the protection of these rights, these instruments are relevant because 
of their emphasis on the need to safeguard international respect for human rights. They affirm 
the commitment of the international community in the contemporary era to promote and 
protect human rights, which has led to the new concept of R2P. 
2.2.4. The origins of current international human rights 
The roots of current international human rights can be found in the discourse on concepts 
such as liberty over the centuries by philosophers such as John Locke (1632-1704), Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804.119  These philosophers of the 
18thcentury and 19th century connected human rights to natural rights,120 and placed emphasis 
on ‘natural rights’- rights that should be enjoyed by all human being, and developed a body 
of basic rights to be accorded to mankind.121 Their writings “served as a departure for the 
thinking up to that time, in which, to put it crudely, the people were there for those in power, 
rather than the other way round.”122  The writings of these philosophers ran counter to the 
understanding of where sovereign power rested in a society during their time. Whereas at that 
time power rested in the ruler who exercised it without taking into account the interest of the 
people, these philosophers held the view  that on the contrary, the power of the ruler was 
based on the consent of the people, and therefore power vested in the people. This was a 
precursor to “popular sovereignty,” the notion that sovereignty rested with the governed and 
not the ruler. 
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In the discussion of human rights, reference can be made to the Magna CartaLibertatum 
(Great Charter for the Liberties) of 1215.123 Abuses by King John led to a revolt by rebellious 
barons who forced him to affix his seal to the Magna Carta, in recognition of the rights of 
noblemen and common men.124  The Magna Carta made a substantial contribution to current 
international human rights, because it contained a number of rights which are now reflected 
broadly in international human rights, including the rights of equality before the law, (the 
Magna Carta established that no one, including the king was above the law), a right to 
property, and religious freedom.125  Similar rights can be found in the UDHR, namely: all are 
equal before the law (Article 7); everyone has the right to own property (Article 17) and; 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18). The most 
pertinent provisions of Magna Carta relating to human rights were Articles 39 and 40, which 
stated: 
Article 39: No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will 
we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by lawful 
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. 
Article 40: To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice126 
The rights provided in the Magna Carta meant that as the king was not above the law, his 
authority derived from the consent of the people and therefore, he was obliged to respect the 
rights of the governed. Consequently, he had no power to deprive a subject of his property or 
any other entitlement, except after a fair hearing. The Magna Carta rights can be found in the 
bill of rights in modern constitutions, and has inspired and influenced action by other peoples 
in defence of liberty. Thus, the United States Declaration of Independence and the Bill of 
Rights contained various rights including liberty and equality to be enjoyed by all citizens.127 
During the American Revolution, the colonies believed that they were entitled to the same 
rights as Englishmen, namely, the rights guaranteed in Magna Carta.128 The Fifth 
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Amendment to the US Constitution, that “no one shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law,” originated from the Magna Carta guarantee of 
proceedings according to “the law of the land.”129 Similarly, the French Declaration of the 
Right of Man was influenced by the Magna Carta.130  These rights initially recognised in 
only a few states with advanced political systems are now universally recognised and 
promoted as rights to which every human being is entitled without discrimination.  
International recognition and promotion of human rights took centre stage of international 
discourse after the creation of the United Nations and, in particular following the adoption of 
the UDHR in 1948. Human rights have not always had the worldwide recognition and 
protection they have in the contemporary international order, for: 
Until World War II, most legal scholars and governments affirmed the general 
proposition, albeit not in so many words, that international law did not impede the 
natural right of each equal sovereign to be monstrous to his or her subjects. 131 
Prior to World War II, human rights were of no concern to the international community, and 
the international community had no interest in the manner in which a state treated its 
nationals within its sovereign territory. The general attitude was that what a state did to its 
people in its territory was its own business.  The attitude of the sovereign was that he or she 
had the right to treat the people in any atrocious manner. The UN Charter and the UDHR 
changed international attitudes to human rights. As articulated by Riesman: 
The basic proposition of the contemporary international human rights law is that a 
government may no longer do anything simply because it is effective and promises 
to achieve its purpose or enhance its power vis-à-vis its own population as long as 
it is doing it only to its citizens and in its own territory.132 
Human rights, under the contemporary international order brought by the UN Charter and the 
UDHR, have become a matter of concern to the international community. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta/ [Accessed 20 April 2014]. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 T. J. Farer and F. Gaer, The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning, in United Nations, Divided   
     World:  The UN’s Role in International Relations, (A. Roberts an B. Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993), p. 240 
132 M. Riesman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs,  
      72 Iowa Law Review, (1987), pp. 391-392. 
140 
 
excessiveabuse of the human rights of a people by their own government in its territory 
cannot be accepted as that government’s own business and may lead to external armed 
intervention if peaceful efforts fail. Thus, human rights have become internationalised and a 
state has to answer to the international community for the manner it treats its population.133  
A state’s awareness that the gross abuses of the human rights of its population may lead to 
external military intervention will encourage the state to refrain from abusing these rights.  
Worldwide recognition and promotion of international human rights in the contemporary 
order has led to a softening of international attitudes towards military action for the protection 
of victims of excessive human rights abuses. Human rights are in the contemporary era a 
matter of international concern, and are considered to have precedence over sovereignty.  
The brief historical background of human rights demonstrates that humanity’s concern for 
human rights has developed over the years and preceded the advent of the United Nations 
Charter and the UDHR, as Sarkin has observed.134 Human rights have become a central 
matter of international concern since the creation of the United Nations Charter in 1945 and 
in particular since the adoption of the UDHR in 1948.  Prior to the UDHR, human rights were 
considered as a matter within the internal affairs of states and not of international concern.135 
For example, the Commission on Human Rights stated in 1947 that it “recognizes that it has 
no power to take any action in regard to complaints concerning human rights.”136 However, 
since 1948, under the influence of the UDHR and other human rights instruments, such as the 
International Convention Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1996), human rights are not the 
exclusive business of the state. Whereas in the past sovereignty vested in the government or 
the state, in the contemporary era, the people are at the centre of the concept of sovereignty 
and the state has a responsibility to protect the human rights of its nationals. If it fails in this 
duty, the international community has a responsibility to come to the assistance of the victims 
of abuses. Sovereignty is therefore no longer a shield for a state to violate the human rights of 
its nationals with impunity. 
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2.2.5. The UDHR and the universalisation of human rights 
The objective of this section is to investigate whether human rights can be universal in the 
light of the diverse political, social, cultural and religious diversities of different countries. 
The section discusses the UDHR and the role, if any, it has played in the universalisation of 
human rights. The basic proposition concerning the universality of human rights is reflected 
in the UN Charter “and the need to protect the basic rights of all peoples by some universally 
acceptable parameter”137 influenced the drafters of the Charter in 1945. The Charter 
expressed the determination of the Peoples of the United Nations: 
to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. 
138 
The UN Charter expressed in general terms the rights that all members of the human family 
were entitled to, without specifying these rights in detail. The (UDHR) went further and set 
out in detail these rights. The purpose of the UDHR was to emphasise the importance of 
human rights following Nazi atrocities during World War II.139 Article 1 articulates the 
“morality of human rights,” consisting of various rights recognised by the vast majority of 
countries of the world as human rights.140  Each of the human rights in the UDHR specifies 
an imperative of what is forbidden or required, which imperative serves as the normative 
ground for human rights.141  Examples of the most important rights to which human beings 
are entitled are: equality in dignity and rights;142 the right to life, liberty, and security of the 
person;143 the right not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment 
and; the right to a fair trial,144 etc. These rights are universal, and every human being is 
entitled to their enjoyment without discrimination. The UN Charter has elevated human rights 
unto the international plane, and not within the exclusive jurisdiction of states.145 The 
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Security Council has broadened the interpretation of threats to international peace and 
security to include domestic abuse of human rights146 Therefore, excessive abuse of human 
rights by a state may lead to the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of 
the Charter.147 
The Declaration is not a legally binding instrument. It was rather a “common standard of 
achievement”,148 which every nation should strive to attain. However, over the years, the 
UDHR has “increasingly been regarded within UN circles and elsewhere as a statement of 
rules and principles having the status of international law.”149 The Declaration was “drafted 
by representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the 
world”.150 It was adopted when the United Nations consisted of only 58 Member States, with 
eight nations abstaining from the vote.151 The fact that no negative vote was cast and the 
incorporation of the principles of the Declaration into the constitutions152 of many countries 
in the world affirms the universality of the rights provided in the Declaration. 
The UDHR has been described as the foundation of contemporary international human rights 
standards153 and the ‘mother’ of all human rights instruments.154  Other international and 
regional human rights instruments such as International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, (ICCPR 1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR 1966), European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), that have followed in its wake make reference 
to the UDHR in their preambles. The UDHR is thus an authoritative statement of the meaning 
of human rights for the purposes of international relations because it effectively codifies the 
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highest standards of human rights.155 Furthermore, treaties and conventions outlawing racial 
discrimination, discrimination against women, torture and providing for the protection of the 
child were adopted based on the foundation of the UDHR thereby demonstrating the 
extensive influence of the UDHR on international human rights. 
Further demonstration of the influence of the UDHR can be found in the recommendations of 
the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights,156 in which representatives of 171 
States participated. The high number of states participating in the Conference (about 90% of 
UN membership) affirms the interest and concern of the international community in human 
rights and the universalisation of human rights. The Conference adopted by consensus the 
Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights, 
presenting to the international community a common plan for the strengthening of human 
rights around the world.157 The Conference “reaffirmed the principles that had evolved during 
the past 45 years and further strengthened the foundation for additional progress in the area of 
human rights.”158 The Vienna Declaration also made recommendations for strengthening and 
harmonising the monitoring capacity of the United Nations system and called for the 
establishment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights by the General Assembly which 
created the post on 20 December 1993.159  In his final address to the conference, Ibrahima Fall 
stated that: 
In adopting the Vienna Declaration the Member States of the United Nations have 
solemnly pledged to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to 
undertake individually and collectively actions and programmes to make the 
enjoyment of human rights a reality for the human being.160 
The statement expresses the commitment of the international community to the promotion of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and underlines the universality of human rights. 
Member state of the UN thereby made a commitment to take steps to ensure the protection of 
human rights within their territories. The 2005 World Summit Outcome also underlined the 
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influence of the UDHR on the universalisation of human rights.161  More than 150 heads of 
state and government - “presidents, prime ministers, and princes” - attended the summit 
which was convened to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations.162 On 
human rights, the Summit Document stated: 
We reaffirm the solemn commitment of our States to fulfil their obligations to 
promote universal respect for and the observance and protection of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments relating to human 
rights and international law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is 
beyond question.163 
This statement affirms the commitment that Member States of the UN have made under 
Article 1(3) of the UN Charter to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, in 
addition to commitments under the UDHR. The World Summit Outcome Document further 
reaffirmed the universality of human rights in the following words: 
We reaffirm that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing and that all human rights must be treated in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, have a duty to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.164 
The statement recognises that there are many differences among the Member States of the 
UN arising from political, economic and cultural backgrounds.  However human rights are 
universal and therefore, these differences should not be permitted to stand in the way of 
promoting and protecting them.  There should be no room for the abuse of human rights 
based on cultural political or religious differences. Human rights are the birthright of every 
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human being and they are considered to be universal rights, because “all members of the 
species Homo sapiens are …holders of human rights.”165Universalisation of human rights 
means that individuals, whether in the international system or inside States themselves, are 
rights holders independent of States.166 Therefore, enjoyment of human rights by the citizens 
of a state should not depend on the benevolence or magnanimity of the state, since it is a legal 
entitlement. Despite diverse historical, cultural and religious, political and economic 
backgrounds, all human beings desire to be treated with dignity and to enjoy basic human 
rights. In the words of Habermas: 
Notwithstanding their European origins….In Asia, Africa, and South America, 
human rights now constitute the only language in which opponents and victims of 
murderous regimes and civil wars can raise their voices against violence, 
repression, and persecution, against injuries to their humanity.167 
Put in another way, human rights are universal and inherent in all human beings. International 
recognition and the determination of the international community to strive to promote respect 
for human rights168 serve as a medium of protection for victims of violence, persecution and 
tyranny, by placing offending states under international scrutiny. In resistance to human 
rights abuses, victims of violence, persecution, and repression everywhere can raise their 
voices, which will resonate on the international plane, to motivate the international 
community to react in their defence. There are rights that all human beings are entitled to 
regardless of where they live. The universal recognition of these rights enables the 
international community to judge the manner in which states treat their citizens. The 
recognition of the principle of universality of human rights means that the conduct of states 
relating to the human rights of its people can be subjected to international scrutiny.  It also 
means that if a state grossly abuses the human rights of its people, it provides legal or 
legitimate grounds for external armed intervention to protect the victims of abuse. The 
imperative to take action to protect people from human rights abuses has been brought about 
by the acceptance of the importance of human rights enshrined in the UDHR  
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2.2.6. The influence of the UDHR on Constitutionalism 
This section discusses the reflection of the rights provided by the UDHR in the constitutions 
of many countries of the world, and the substantial influence of the UDHR has had on 
constitutionalism.169 The UDHR has universalised human rights “through the protection of a 
constitutional ideology, accepted by a few countries, into a standard of constitutionalism for 
all countries.”170  In Africa in particular, the UDHR has been liberally referenced and 
frequently quoted in independence era constitutions.171 Examples are: Benin, 1990, Preamble; 
Botswana, 1966 (Rev. 2005), Chapter II; Burkina Faso, 1991 (Rev 2012) Title I; Cameroon, 
1972 (Rev. 2008), Gambia, 1996 (Rev 2004) Chapter IV and; Ghana, 1992 (Rev. 1996). 
A constitution has been defined as “the most important legal document for a nation that 
subscribes to the rule of law”, which defines the relationship between the citizens and their 
government.172 It has also been defined as an instrument to articulate and protect universal 
human rights norms.173 Constitutionalism does not lend itself to a definitive meaning but may 
be defined by its characteristics.  It has been defined by:  
[…] its common elements as constituted through many variations in different 
constitutions. It declares the sovereignty of the people and derives its authority 
from the will of the people. It prescribes a blueprint for representative government 
responsible and accountable to the people through universal suffrage at periodic 
elections. Government authority is to be exercised only in accordance with law 
established pursuant to constitutional processes and consistent with constitutional 
prescriptions and limitations. Government is for the people, but is limited by a bill 
of individual rights. It is in this last respect that the Universal Declaration has had 
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the greatest influence – being drawn upon, emulated or directly incorporated into 
the national constitutions as a bill of rights limiting government power.174 
Constitutionalism seeks to guarantee human rights in countries governed on the basis of 
constitutions. A constitution imposes limitations on government, and protects the citizens 
from abusive and arbitrary government action. The government derives its authority from the 
people and the authority is to be exercised in accordance with prescribed laws and 
procedures. To ensure that human rights are observed, the constitution normally limits the 
power of government by constitutional provisions in the form of a bill of rights or 
fundamental freedoms. This creates awareness in the people of their rights and enables civil 
society to serve as a watchdog of the conduct of the government in respect of human rights.  
Even though the UDHR has had a profound influence on the constitutions of many countries, 
it has been argued that constitutional provisions reflecting UDHR may not necessarily 
guarantee the enjoyment of these rights by the people which raises the question of the 
significance of the influence of the UDHR on constitutionalism. One school of the thought 
represented by Dick Howard is that constitutional provisions may operate as mere window 
dressing rather than providing actual human rights protection.175 Howard argues that in some 
instances constitutions have been reduced to “worthless scraps of paper” or “convenient 
screens” that shield dictators.176 In other words, the constitution of a state may provide a bill 
of rights. To the outside world the impression is that human rights are respected and protected 
in that state, whilst, in practice, human rights of the people are not protected or respected. For 
example, even though many African countries’ constitutions contain a bill of rights, Sarkin 
cites Amnesty International that, human rights violations continue to be a persistent problem 
in Africa, and some states do not tolerate dissent while others restrict freedom of 
expression.177 The constitutional provisions in such a situation are calculated to mask the 
manner in which the state treats its people, and serves as a convenient screen for the abuse of 
human rights.  Authoritarian rulers provide a bill of rights in the constitutions of their 
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countries, with the goal of deceiving national and international audiences.178 These 
“governments might accept the validity of human rights norms but still continue to torture 
prisoners, or detain people without trial and so on.”179 The countries that perpetrate odious 
human rights abuses “offer robust rights protection in their constitutions.”180 For example, 
even though Afghanistan has the lowest literacy rate in the world, its constitution provides a 
right to education, and North Korea’s constitution guarantees freedom of expression.181 
Constitutional provisions may not necessarily provide protection for human rights. However, 
the existence of a bill of rights in the constitution makes the people aware of the rights that 
they are entitled to, and of any excessive breach of these rights. This makes the government 
more open to pressure from the nationals who are “sympathetic to international human 
rights.”182 Thus, for example, in a state where democratic elections take place, it could lead to 
the abusive government being voted out of power. Furthermore, the existence of a bill of 
rights in the constitution of a state exposes it to international scrutiny as to whether these 
rights are observed, and this may encourage the state to refrain from abusing the human rights 
of the people.  
The other school of thought is that these arrangements “have facilitated improvements in 
rights practices on the ground.”183 Rosenthal argues that regimes are unlikely to abuse human 
rights that are guaranteed in a constitution.184Elster shares this view with the observation that 
guarantees of human rights in a constitution can pressurise a government to accede to 
demands for the protection of those rights.185  In the words of James Madison, “political 
truths declared in that solemn manner…become incorporated with the national sentiment, and 
counteract the impulses of interest and passion.”186  In other words, rights that are guaranteed 
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in a constitution become ingrained in the minds and consciousness of the people, and the 
government cannot abuse these rights as it pleases.  Sartori argues that constitutional 
provisions on human rights serve as standards by which the public and the international 
community can judge the conduct of the government.187 
It is submitted that constitutional provisions on human rights engender awareness in the 
population of their human rights. This ensures that government will not abuse the human 
rights of the population. There may be exceptions as already observed, in the case of 
Afghanistan and North Korea, but a bill of rights in a constitution creates a legitimate 
expectation both nationally and internationally that human rights will be observed. In 
countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, Namibia, etc.188 government respects the 
human rights of its people, failing which it risks being voted out of power. The people have 
the right to challenge in the courts the infringement of their rights and freedoms. In a state 
where the government rules in accordance with constitutional processes, constitutional 
prescriptions, and limitations, human rights of the people are respected.  A factor that may 
trigger external armed intervention or humanitarian intervention in a state is the gross abuse 
of the human rights of the citizens. Thus, a state that respects the human rights of its citizens 
does not open itself to external armed intervention in the name of human rights.  
2.2.7. Questions about the universality of human rights 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the question whether human rights are or should be 
universal in the light of the differences in the political, cultural, and religious background of 
the various countries of the world. If human rights are not universal, then there should be no 
justification for armed intervention in the name of human rights. The UDHR conveys the 
notion of universality in its name189 with the assumption that human rights are universal. 
However, even though the UDHR was “drafted by representatives with different legal and 
cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world”,190 it was adopted when the United 
Nations consisted of only 58 Member States, with eight nations abstaining from the 
vote.191Currently, there are 193 members, South Sudan being the latest.192  The 135 nations 
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that became members of the UN after the adoption of the declaration have different historical, 
cultural, and religious backgrounds, which ought to be taken into account in the discussion on 
the universality of UDHR.193  These states did not participate in the discussion and adoption 
of the Declaration. It is probable that in the light of their backgrounds, and being the 
majority, they could have influenced the contents of the Declaration in terms of the 
universality of the rights contained therein. However, it can be argued that as human rights 
are innate in a human being, they are universal regardless of their backgrounds, and therefore, 
even though the contributions that these states would have made cannot be determined with 
certainty, it can be assumed that if they had participated in the discussions, they would have 
gone along with the original members who voted to adopt the Declaration. As observed by 
Donnelly, countries that later achieved their independence and became members of the UN 
were at least “enthusiastic in their embrace of the Declaration as those who voted for it in 
1948.”194 
Each culture has its own values and practices. What one culture considers as normal and 
acceptable may be bizarre and abhorrent in another. So, for example, the right to freedom of 
religion may be a legal right in one system, e.g. Canada, but not in another.195 Gay rights are 
regarded as human rights in the West, but in most African cultures, e.g. Ghana, Uganda, 
Kenya, Nigeria and Cameroon etc., homosexuality is considered to be an abhorrent practice 
and, therefore outlawed.196 “Islamic governments from Afghanistan to Sudan have claimed 
cultural and religious immunity from human rights standards.”197 Restrictions on the 
activities of women in the Islamic world are justified on the grounds of morality.198 For 
example, women are not allowed to drive cars in Saudi Arabia. Capital punishment, which is 
considered to be inhumane, has been abolished in some countries like South Africa and 
Namibia,199 but the death penalty is still exists in Nigeria and Egypt.200 In some states in the 
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U.S.A, such as Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Texas, Utah, Wyoming etc., the death 
penalty is on the statute books, and sentences are routinely carried out.201 In West Africa, 
specifically in Liberia, Mali, Benin and Niger, pre-trial detainees are kept for long periods in 
prison arbitrarily “under terrible conditions,”202 while the prohibition on torture and inhuman 
treatment is guaranteed in other countries. These examples show that human rights are not 
necessarily universal, to the extent that even though innate in a human being, the enjoyment 
of these rights is not uniform in every country, because what is a human right in one country 
may not be a human right in another. Furthermore, human rights may be considered to be 
values of the West by the peoples who were victims of the dehumanisation of colonialism, for 
if the ‘civilised’ colonisers were aware of rights and freedoms, it is difficult for the colonised 
peoples to understand why they were denied these rights. Thus, to the colonised peoples, the 
notions of rights and freedoms may be viewed as complicit with the legacy of oppression,203 
and essentially the values of the oppressor, and can therefore not be universal. 
It is clear then that what is a human right in one country may not be considered as a human 
right in another, and therefore, it can be argued that human rights are not universal. As 
observed by Tharoor: 
The growing consensus in the West that human rights are universal has been 
fiercely opposed bycritics in other parts of the world. At the very least, the idea 
may well pose as many questions as it answers. Beyond the more general, 
philosophical question of whether anything in our pluri-cultural, multipolar world 
is truly universal, the issue of whether human rights is an essentially Western 
concept – ignoring the very different cultural, economic, and political realities of 
the other parts of the world - cannot be ignored.204 
It is therefore argued that, with the diverse differences in cultural and religious practices, 
many states which became members of the UN after 1948, would probably, not have 
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accepted all the human rights provisions in the UDHR, as being applicable in their territories. 
Since the conception of human rights differs from state to state in the light of their different 
backgrounds, the question is raised about the legality or legitimacy of the use of force by one 
country or group of states in another, in the name of abuse of human rights in the latter.  It is 
argued that even though unilateral humanitarian intervention is unlawful under international 
law, it is legitimate on moral grounds in situations of egregious abuses of human rights. 
Every human being is endowed with certain natural rights inherent in his/her status as a 
human being. Therefore, in this sense, human rights are universal. The desire to be treated 
with dignity is innate in the human psyche regardless of nationality, religion, culture, or 
history, and given a choice, no human being will choose to be tortured, deprived of his/her 
life, liberty or property without due process. Thus, if a state grossly abuses the human rights 
of its citizens, it provides legitimate grounds for the sovereignty of the state to be overridden 
in the name of human rights. Human rights are no longer considered to be solely the business 
of a state or within the exclusive preserve of a state, because the international community has 
an interest in the manner in which a state treats its people.  Human rights are therefore 
universal rights, and cannot be abused with impunity by any state. 
2.3. Part II - State sovereignty and non-intervention in the United Nations 
System 
Part II provides a brief background of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in the 
context of the change in the understanding of sovereignty since the end of the Cold-War. 
Traditional sovereignty conferred on a state the right to organise its internal affairs as it 
pleased free from intervention by external powers. Thus, how a state treated its national was 
its own business. However, since the end of the Cold War, the new understanding of 
sovereignty is that the basis of governmental power is the people or put another way, the 
government derives its power from the people.  Sovereignty is therefore the peoples’ 
sovereignty, and not the sovereign’s sovereignty. Thus, the government owes a duty to the 
people to protect them, and not to deny them their human rights or fundamental freedoms. 
This part discusses the redefinition of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention 
after the Cold War.  
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Westphalian sovereignty means that a state has the freedom to determine its own destiny and 
its relations within the community of states.205 The basic principle that one state has no right 
to interfere in the domestic affairs of another is the result of the equality and sovereignty of 
states, enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. However, the concept of sovereignty as 
envisaged by Article 2(7) has been redefined by world events since 1990. The redefinition 
has come about as a consequence of a combination of factors, most important of which is that 
power has shifted from the state to the people with the result that the people are the source of 
power and legitimacy and authority.206 Other factors that have contributed to the redefinition 
of sovereignty include globalisation and concerns about human rights, especially by powerful 
states. In this light, the actions of the state are restricted particularly regarding human rights, 
and the recognition of the sovereignty the state by the international community is conditional 
upon the observance of obligations regarding compliance with human rights.207 The 
consequence of concerns for human rights have led to the adoption of the doctrine of 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which defines sovereignty in terms of a state’s 
responsibility to protect and not to terrorise its people.208 This new doctrine endorses the use 
of force by the international community to override the sovereignty of a state to protect 
people suffering serious harm, as a result of repression or internal war and where the state is 
unable or unwilling to halt or avert their suffering.209 The concept of sovereignty and its 
corollary principle of non-intervention have therefore been compromised by the willingness 
of the international community to use force in defence of victims of excessive human rights 
abuse. 
The basic elements of the modern concept of statehood and state sovereignty derived from 
the Westphalian model, which dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia or the ‘Peace of 
Westphalia’ in 1648. 210 The Peace of Westphalia put in place the framework for the 
emergence of independent, territorially defined states, with one specific authority in that 
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territory, and a prohibition on outside interference.211 The main legacy of Westphalia is the 
establishment of this dual aspect of sovereignty, namely, internal sovereignty consisting of 
the supremacy of a specific authority within a state, and external sovereignty consisting of the 
recognition of the state’s independence and non-interference in its affairs by other states.212  
With the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, “non-interference in the international 
affairs of the most repressive governments was the golden rule of international 
diplomacy.”213 The Peace of Westphalia established the rules regulating relations between 
states and made international security dependent on the principles of the “integrity and 
inviolability of territorial borders.214  Thus, under the Westphalian system, sovereignty 
centred on the state, and the inviolability of its territory at the expense of the protection of 
human rights. The state had the legal right to conduct affairs within its territory as it deemed 
fit.  Supreme authority rested with the state. It had the power to treat its population in any 
manner it chose to, and no external actors could question its authority or intervene on behalf 
of the people. As articulated by Sarkin: 
Traditional notions of sovereignty cabin the domestic affairs of a state within the 
purview of that state, regardless of its misconduct – no matter how atrocious – 
towards its people.215 
 “Nations states inherited the pedigree of sovereignty and unassailable position above the law 
that has since been frozen in the structure of international relations.”216  In other words, states 
have claimed entitlement to traditional Westphalian sovereignty, which underpins 
international relations between states, and confers on a state the competence and 
independence to decide matters within its domestic jurisdiction free from external dictates 
and interference, even if it subjects its people to egregious human rights abuses.  
The traditional notion of sovereignty, the Westphalian legacy, which is reflected in the 
contemporary international order meant that: 
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If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that other states have a duty to 
respect that right by, among other things, refraining from intervention in its 
domestic affairs…The function of the principle of non-intervention in international 
relations might be said, then, to be one of protecting the principle of 
sovereignty.217 
The statement implies that sovereignty involves reciprocal respect among states. Thus 
recognition of the sovereignty of a state places a corresponding duty on other states to respect 
that sovereignty. Respect for the state’s sovereignty means that its territorial integrity is 
inviolable in the sense other states have a duty to refrain from interfering in its domestic 
affairs.  It might be said then that the principle of non-intervention serves the primary function 
of protecting the concept of sovereignty. Under Westphalian sovereignty states had a right to 
govern themselves however they chose, free from outside interference or intervention.218  This 
is what is commonly referred to as “traditional” meaning of sovereignty. 219Sovereignty, the 
concept of “the independent and unfettered power of a state in its jurisdiction lies at the heart 
of customary international law and the UN Charter.”220  Sovereignty means the competence, 
independence, and legal equality of states221. It encompasses all matters in which a state under 
international law has the right to decide and act without external interference, and constitutes 
the foundation of interstate relations and the contemporary world order.222 In other words, 
sovereignty is a prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, 
under the Westphalian model, sovereignty was protected by the principle of non-intervention 
in the sense that every state had the right to conduct its internal affairs and foreign policy freely 
without interference or dictates of external actors. Therefore, the manner in which a sovereign 
state conducted its affairs within its territory was its own business, and no other state had a 
right to interfere in its internal affairs.  
However, the notion that the Peace of Westphalia gave nation states sovereignty and 
“unassailable position above the law” may not be entirely correct. While it is true that the 
current international order recognises the importance of sovereignty in the maintenance of 
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international peace and security, sovereignty does not confer on states “unassailable position 
above the law” in the light of worldwide recognition of human rights and the interdependence 
of states. In the contemporary international order, sovereignty is not absolute, and no state is 
above the law, for the manner in which a state treats its nationals is of concern to other states. 
Therefore if a state subjects its nationals to excessive human rights abuses, its sovereignty may 
be overridden by external armed intervention to halt the abuses.223 
The Treaty of Westphalia introduced the concept of statehood and the concept of state 
sovereignty. It established that a state or a sovereign enjoyed exclusive authority within a 
defined territory and states could decide their own domestic policies including how they 
treated their nationals, without outside interference. The attributes of a state were codified by 
the Montevideo Convention of 1933 as consisting of the following:224 (a) a defined territory; 
(b) a permanent population; (c) ability to exercise exclusive authority over its territorial 
boundaries; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.225  All states are 
juridically equal,226 and no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another state.227 The United Nations Charter adopted this model. Thus, Article 2 of the Charter 
affirms that “the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.” 228 The United Nations was created at the end of World War II to “save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”,229 and to ensure that the horrors of the war will not be 
repeated. Accordingly, the Charter “was worded through the perspective of a rear-view mirror, 
with the intention of preventing catastrophes of the likes brought about during the two world 
wars.”230 Motivated by this objective, the Charter stated that one of its primary purposes was 
“…to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind.”231 Thus, the main purpose of the Charter was to lay a 
foundation for an international order based on the one hand on the “century old rejection of the 
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use of force and on the other hand…on the sacrosanct notion of state sovereignty deriving from 
the Peace of Westphalia 1648.”232 
Sovereignty is therefore recognised by the Charter as necessary for the preservation of 
international peace and stability in international relations.233 The equality of states enshrined in 
the concept of state sovereignty and its corollary principle of non-intervention, has been 
described as a “…final defence against the rules of an unjust world,”234 because it serves as a 
shield to protect weaker states from the pressure of more powerful states,235 in the sense that 
respect for the sovereignty of a state imposes a duty on other states to refrain from interfering 
in the affairs of the state. Thus, other countries, no matter how powerful, have no right to 
interference in the affairs of other countries. However, even though in theory sovereignty and 
the principle of non-intervention place a duty on states to respect the territorial integrity of 
other states, the concept of sovereignty has routinely been violated by powerful countries,236 
and therefore, in practice, respect for sovereignty has not guaranteed that powerful states will 
not intervene in the domestic affairs of weaker states. Examples of intervention by powerful 
states in weaker states include the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and its 
allies in 2003, and NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia in 1995 leading to its dismemberment. It is a 
trend that is likely to be repeated, because powerful countries can and will intervene in any 
country without restraint when it suits them. An illustration can be found in the address of the 
President of the United States before the United Nations General Assembly, in which he 
warned “I lead the strongest military that the world has ever known, and will never hesitate to 
protect my country or our allies, unilaterally and by force if necessary.”237 This assertion flies 
in the face of respect for international law, and “is not about the assertion of US power, so 
much as the expression of US exceptionalism.”238 Put bluntly, this means that the United States 
can do anything it pleases. This position undermines the integrity of the United Nations 
Security Council and international law, and would encourage other powerful countries to do 
likewise. It does not provide weaker states with the assurance that sovereignty is a shield to 
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protect them from unlawful armed intervention, and poses a great threat to international peace 
and security. 
Intervention involves the use of force. Intervention is prohibited by international law if “it is 
‘dictatorial,’ i.e. if it is accompanied by the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion.”239  The United Nations Charter expresses objection to intervention through Article 
2(4), which affirms clearly that: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
Article 2(4) explicitly expresses the inviolability of the sovereignty of all member States and 
“outlaws war as an instrument of policy.”240  The drafters of the Charter should not have 
placed a blanket prohibition on the use of force at a time when the world had just emerged for 
the Holocaust. There are situations where it is absolutely necessary to use force in defence of 
victims of genocide, for example. International action during the Rwanda genocide would 
have saved tens of thousands of innocent lives. The widespread recognition of human rights 
has created a permissive attitude towards humanitarian intervention,241 and it has become 
more difficult for states to get away with mass murder.242  Weiss is of the view that defectors 
from agreed norms, and commitments relating to human rights “should be identified and 
incentives and disincentives (including the use of force to bring the noncompliant back into 
line) should be available to punish them.”243 In other words, if a state abuses the human rights 
of its nationals in total disregard of international human rights standards, force should be used 
to halt the abuses.  
On the other hand, it may be argued that the prohibition of force was enshrined in the Charter 
with deliberation, because the drafters foresaw that the use of force without restraint 
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wouldencourage powerful states to use force against weaker states who are their equals in 
international law. For example, a powerful state can use the pretext of protecting human 
rights, and apply force in the territory of a weaker state in advancement of its national or 
strategic interests.  Conversely, a state may not intervene militarily in a powerful country, 
even on humanitarian grounds, because the latter will vigorously resist and repel the 
intervention at unacceptable cost to the intervening state. Thus, powerful states such as 
Russia and China will be immune from armed intervention, no matter what they do to their 
peoples. 244 The Security Council is often unable to take any intervention action against that 
abuse the human rights of its people, unless the state is “distinctly small and powerless.”245 
Therefore, the prohibition of the use of force was meant, primarily, to protect international 
peace and security, and secondly, to provide protection for weaker states against interventions 
in their territories by more powerful states.   
The Charter permits only one exception to the use of force (apart from UN Security Council 
authorised interventions), and that is, the use of lawful force by a state in response to 
unlawful force246 under Article 51.  Article 51 permits a state to use force in self-defence in 
response to an armed attack. Article 51 is a safeguard when the collective security 
mechanism fails, and “provides a means of defence requiring no Security Council 
approval.”247  However, the prohibition of the use of force is so absolute that even the 
exercise of the lawful right of self-defence under Article 51 is to be under the supervision of 
the Security Council. Where a state has taken action in self-defence, measures taken must be 
discontinued as soon as the Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. This is because the Security Council is the only organ of the 
United Nations with the authority to determine what constitutes an aggressive action and the 
appropriate action in response.248 The blanket ban on the use of force demonstrates the rigid 
stance of the Charter on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the 
importance it attaches to the protection of the sovereignty of states.  On the other hand this 
may encourage some states conscious of the protection given by sovereignty and non-
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intervention to abuse the human rights of their nationals. The Charter goes further in its 
affirmation of the principle of non-intervention in Article 2(7), stating that: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state. 
The article prohibits the United Nations itself from intervening in matters essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state except in the application of enforcement measures 
under Article VII.249 In Article 2(7), the United Nations “compromises its own decision 
making power and values with the inviolability of the integrity of its Member States.”250 
There is nothing wrong with Article 2(7), because it leaves room for occasions where the UN 
may intervene in the affairs of a state, where there are threats to international peace and 
security. Therefore, the prohibition on the UN is not absolute. However, it is argued that apart 
from interfering in a state where there are threats to international peace and security, and in 
relation to the other domestic matters that it has elevated unto the international plane,251 the 
UN should have no business meddling in the domestic affairs of any state. The principle of 
non-intervention is considered to be the cornerstone of the concept of state sovereignty that 
underpins the system of relations among states.252 Article 2(7) demonstrates the degree of 
reverence that the Charter has for sovereignty and the inviolability of the territories of its 
Member States, and the article was therefore “introduced to protect the jurisdictional 
autonomy of states as members of the UN.”253 
The principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign states has been reinforced by 
United Nations resolutions and declarations. The 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention254 prohibits all forms of intervention directly or indirectly, for whatever reason, 
in the domestic or external affairs of other states.255 The declaration prohibits States from the 
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threat or use of force to violate the territories of other States.256 Article 1 of the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law,257 General Assembly Resolution 2625/1970 
(the Friendly Relations Resolution) also affirms that “All States enjoy sovereign equality. 
They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, 
notwithstanding differences in economic, social, political or other nature.” The International 
Court of Justice has endorsed this principle with the observation that, ‘Between independent 
States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international 
relations’258; and “the principle on which the whole of international law rests.”259 In the Corfu 
Channel Case, the Court observed that260: 
The alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as 
has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such cannot, whatever be the 
present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. 
Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take 
here; for from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful 
States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international 
justice itself.261 
As the statement of the International Court of Justice indicates, coercive interventions are 
unlawful and have no place in international law, because the interventions involve strong 
states intervening in weaker states that are their equal counterparts with the pretext of 
protecting human rights. Prior to 1945, powerful states asserted a right of humanitarian 
intervention262 that entitled them to intervene in other states with the pretext of protecting 
human rights. The International Court of Justice by this statement repudiates the right of 
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intervention. The right of intervention belonged to a bygone era, and is not applicable in the 
contemporary era in the light of the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. As observed earlier, Article 2(4) was meant to provide protection for weaker 
states against their more powerful counterparts. The drafters of the UN Charter were 
conscious of the fact that the use of force without restraint will undermine peace and stability 
in international relations. Roth shares the view that the current international order’s efficacy 
rests on its ability to reconcile “the long-term policy interests of its participants, strong and 
weak by means of the principle of sovereign equality,”263 which recognises the principle of 
non-intervention. Expressing agreement, Krieg argues that under the contemporary 
international system, “which is still bound to a state system of the Westphalian era, the 
sovereignty of states is at least de jure sacred.”264 On the other hand, Sarkin argues that, 
while sovereignty “has not been discarded entirely, it has in recent years eroded.”265 
The proposition of the unassailability of sovereignty is questionable. It rests solely on the 
premise that interventions are in breach of the concept of sovereign equality of states and the 
principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations Article 2(7). This line of argument posits, therefore, that interventions must 
be discouraged if the United Nations Charter is not to be undermined, because they serve as 
precedents for other states to follow, resulting in anarchy in the international order. Indeed, 
Roth has argued that the right to non-intervention must be accorded to even states ruled by 
“ruthless governments because “what appears ‘disproportionate’ to someone else’s cause, 
however just, frequently appears exigent in the service of one’s own.”266  In other words, 
what appears unjust and disproportionate in someone’s judgement may be just and necessary 
for the attainment of another’s political objectives, and what one country considers to be 
excessive abuse of human rights may not be seen in the same light by the perpetrating state.  
However, even Roth concedes that the duty to refrain from coercive intervention must be 
limited by the existence of clearly universal standards, and this duty can legitimately be 
“overcome in some class of unambiguously catastrophic cases,”267  though he adds a caveat 
that caution should be exercised to ensure that the “exceptions should not be allowed to 
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swallow the rule.”268 That is, in situations where there is no doubt about the catastrophic scale 
of human rights abuses, the duty to refrain from armed intervention falls away, but the 
principle of non-intervention is not to be discarded altogether because of these exceptional 
cases. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that sovereignty can and must be justified,269 since 
sovereignty is “not merely limited by human rights, but should be seen to exist only in 
function of humanity.”270 Where there is conflict between human rights and sovereignty, it 
should be resolved in favour of humanity.271  Sovereignty has therefore been humanized, 
which implies the state’s responsibility for the protection of basic human rights, the state’s 
accountability, and a reassessment of humanitarian intervention which requires that, under 
very strict conditions, the Security Council has a duty to authorise “proportionate 
humanitarian action to prevent or combat genocide or massive and widespread crimes against 
humanity.”272 
It is argued that the principle of non-intervention can be an impediment to necessary, and 
prompt action in defence of victims of atrocities. Broadly speaking, armed intervention can 
be a noble undertaking because the ostensible motive is to alleviate or halt the suffering of 
defenceless people.  Thus, if the principle of non-intervention is rigidly adhered to without 
exception as provided by Article 2(7) of the Charter, then no alternatives remain for the 
international community to protect victims of gross human rights abuses when peaceful 
methods fail. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to take measures to maintain 
international peace and security, including the protection of the human rights of vulnerable 
people under Chapter VII. However, if the Council fails or is unable to react to excessive 
human rights abuses in a state, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, or war crimes in 
accordance with its mandate under Chapter VII, then self-help or unilateral interventions by 
more powerful states become justified, because the world cannot stand by while mass 
slaughter of people on ethnic, religious, or racial grounds takes place. Sovereignty is neither 
de jure or de facto sacred when it comes to protecting victims of excessive human rights 
abuses. Armstrong shares this view with the observation that: 
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The argument that the freedom of a dictator to murder, oppress and steal from his 
fellow citizens is his legal right under a strict application of the principle of non-
intervention is no less a part of the normative framework of ‘old’ international law 
than the right to imperial conquest or the mission to ‘civilise’.273 
Just as colonialism, the rule of European states over many African and Asian states without 
their consent cannot be justified, so can there be no justification for a tyrant’s right to 
terrorise his fellow citizens. Both are not justifiable and cannot be permitted in the 
contemporary international order. Therefore, if the Security Council fails or is unable to react 
to excessive human rights abuses pursuant to the discharge of its responsibilities under 
Chapter VII, any state or organisation with the capability may have the moral justification to 
intervene in affected state with the expectation that the action will receive post-intervention 
endorsement of the Security Council. An example is the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 
1990. Sovereignty and non-intervention should not be preserved at the expense of human 
lives.  
2.4. Post-Cold War challenges to state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention 
This section discusses events in international politics that have redefined the concept of state 
sovereignty with the inevitable impact on the principle of non-intervention. During the Cold 
War, international frontiers were regarded as inviolable and sacrosanct with the concept of 
non-interference in internal affairs, often overriding collective efforts to assist victims of 
gross human rights abuses in their own countries.274 The traditional concept of sovereignty, 
with its notion of monopoly of power by the nation state and the exclusion of external actors, 
is facing challenges in the contemporary globalised and borderless world,275 in which, in the 
words of Kofi Annan, threats are “problems without passports.”276 No longer can a state 
claim to have a monopoly over matters that take place within its territory, especially where 
human rights are concerned.277  In an interdependent world, what happens in one country has 
ramifications beyond its borders.278 The absolute rights that sovereigns have traditionally 
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enjoyed are being challenged by the “demands of human rights and notions of sovereign 
responsibilities.” 279 In the face of these challenges, if a state subjects its inhabitants to gross 
human rights abuses, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty will not prevent external actors 
from taking action to protect the victims of abuse. 280 
The challenges to state sovereignty have taken various forms, namely: 
i. Broadening ‘threat to international peace and security’ 
This subsection discusses the challenge posed to traditional sovereignty by the expansion of 
the meaning of what constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security.’281 The focus of 
the UN Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security was originally on the 
external use of force by one state against another in committing an act of aggression.282  
Thus, an act of aggression is considered to be a threat to international peace and security, and 
therefore, when it occurs the Security Council is empowered to take enforcement action to 
override the sovereignty of the offending state to halt or reverse the aggression. The United 
Nations Security Council has the discretion to determine which events constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, and the practice of the Council demonstrates that gross 
abuse of human rights within a state is considered as a threat to international peace and 
security. It has been argued that the Security Council can classify any event as a threat to 
international peace and security subject not to any constraints of law, but only to the political 
vetoes of its permanent members.283  Notwithstanding the reasons, however, the Security 
Council may determine both what constitutes threats to international peace and security, and 
the actions to be taken to remedy such situations.284 
Examples of Security Council practice broadening the scope of what constitutes threats to 
international peace and security are: (i) In 1990, the Security Council determined that the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population, especially the Kurds in Northern Iraq by the forces 
of Saddam Hussein posed a threat to international peace and security;285  (ii) In 1997, the 
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Council determined that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constituted a threat to international peace and security;286 (iii) In 
1994, the Security Council determined that the systematic violations of civil liberty and the 
desperate plight of refugees in Haiti constituted a threat to peace and security in the region;287  
(iv) Similarly in 1994, the Security Council determined that the systematic and widespread 
killings of the civilian population in Rwanda constituted a threat to peace and security in the 
region.  In all these cases, the Security authorised enforcement measures under Chapter VII 
on the basis of human suffering and the gross abuse of human rights in those countries, 
thereby broadening the meaning of what constitutes a threat to peace and security to include 
gross human rights abuses. Consequently, the sovereignty of a country may be overridden, 
not only in the case of aggression by the state, but also where egregious human rights occur 
in the state. 
 Previously, wars, including the World War I and World War II, were waged by states across 
borders.288 At the end of the Cold War, however, the international community was faced with 
a new kind of conflict.289 While in the past wars were waged between armies, and casualties 
were predominantly soldiers, the post-Cold War era witnessed “many developing nations 
degenerating into situations of civil conflict.”290 These conflicts were in the form of internal 
wars “fought locally (in neighborhoods, villages, and other sub-national units).”291 The 
“focus of these wars no longer coincide with state borders; …non-state actors are playing an 
increasing role…instead of combatants being the main victims, civilians are increasingly 
paying the lion’s share of the costs.”292 A requirement of sovereignty is that a State must have 
the capacity to control its domestic as well as international affairs.293 However, in a situation 
of internal conflict, there is often no functioning government. Law and order break down, 
resulting in anarchy, leading to the gross abuse of the human rights of the local population. 
These conflicts, though internal, have ramifications for neighbouring countries, because the 
political dimensions of internal disorder and suffering often result in wider international 
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disorder.294 Intrastate violence can result in international destabilisation from the spill over 
effects of conflict.295 For example, civil wars and factional fighting in Syria, Libya, and 
Yemen are generating record levels of population displacement,296 internally and across 
international frontiers, as illustrated by the current refugee crisis in Europe. As Kofi Annan, 
former Secretary-General of the UN, put it:  
Wars since 1990 have been mainly internal. They have been brutal, claiming more 
than 5 million lives. They have violated, not so much borders, as people…In the 
wake of these conflicts, a new understanding of security is evolving. Once 
synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of 
security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and 
individuals from internal violence.297 
Therefore, since the end of the Cold War, the definition of ‘threat to international peace and 
security’ under Chapter VII has been given a broad interpretation to override the principle of 
non-intervention.298 Thus human rights abuses and the repression of populations are 
considered as factors that threaten international peace and security. For example, UN 
Resolution 688,299 referring to the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter 
for the maintenance ofinternational peace and security, recalling Article 2(7), expressed grave 
concern about the “repression of the Iraqi population…which has led to a massive flow of 
refugees towards and across international frontiers…which threaten international peace and 
security in the region…,” and condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population 
including those in Kurdish areas.  Francis Deng, the then Representative of the Secretary-
General on Internally Displaced Persons, was of the view that where human rights and 
humanitarian matters are involved, “…no state can say: ‘This is an internal matter and it does 
not matter how I manage my situation, it’s none of your concern.’ The world is watching 
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closely, and if necessary, would get involved.”300 Thus, during the 1990s, the Security 
Council stretched the application of threats to international peace and security to “facilitate 
interventions in situations where the threat to international peace and security was 
minimal.”301  For example, in 1994, the Security Council under Resolution 940, ordered 
intervention in Haiti to restore the democratically elected President. 302 
The expansion of what constitutes threats to international peace and security has been 
questioned. The Danish Institute of International Affairs (DIIA) argues that: 
It was hardly the intention of the framers of the Charter that internal conflicts and 
human rights violations should be regarded as a threat to international peace. There 
is no evidence that they might have envisaged a competence for the Security 
Council under Chapter VII to take action to cope with situations of humanitarian 
emergency within a state resulting from civil war or systematic repression. 
This argument is not plausible, because as already observed, the abuse of human rights of its 
citizens by a state or civil strife is not solely the business of the state. For example, civil war 
can lead to massive flight of refugees across international frontiers, which may be 
burdensome to the receive receiving. This may compel this state to take remedial military 
action against the affected state, leading to a threat to international peace. Therefore, the 
Security Council under Chapter VII is empowered to take action in states ravaged by civil 
war, or where there is systematic repression. 
ii. The redefinition of Sovereignty 
The purpose of this sub-section is to discuss the challenge posed to state sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention by the redefinition of traditional sovereignty. The United 
Nations Charter commits the organisation to two conflicting ideals. On the one hand, the UN 
commits itself to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights for all, 
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.303 On the other hand, the organisation 
and its Members undertake to sanctify state sovereignty by making it inviolable with a 
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prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs of states304 and a prohibition on the use of 
force.305 Thus, the Charter affirms both the primacy of human rights and the essentiality of 
state sovereignty.306 The Charter’s provisions are therefore contradictory and ambiguous, and 
provide no guidance as to how to reconcile these two ideals, namely, the importance of 
human rights and the reverence for state sovereignty.307 In response to the argument that the 
Charter is ill-suited as a guide in a world of ethnic wars and intra-state violence, Kofi Annan, 
then Secretary-General of the UN, stated:  
[…] I believe that they are wrong. The Charter is a living document whose high 
principles still define the aspirations of peoples everywhere…Nothing in the 
Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders…It is not the 
deficiencies of the Charter which have brought us to this juncture, but our 
difficulties in applying its principles to a new era; an era when strictly traditional 
notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the aspirations of people 
everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms.308 
Annan suggests that human rights transcend borders, and therefore, the time has come for a 
people-centred notion of sovereignty to take precedence over traditional state-centred notion 
of sovereignty, in the interest of promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Human 
security, which includes the guarantee of fundamental human rights, must be given the same 
importance as the traditional notions of security based on the defence of borders in the light 
of threats confronting individuals.309  Human security involves freedom from “pervasive 
threats to people’s safety and lives,” hence humanitarian intervention enters when mass 
murder or displacement takes place.310  Accordingly, there have been calls for a redefinition 
of sovereignty in the light of international concerns about human rights. Kochler is of the 
view that:  
The concept of ‘national sovereignty’ must be redefined in the light of a general 
system of norms that is based on the universal validity of human rights.  As norms 
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of jus cogens, human rights are at the roots of national legal systems as well as the 
international legal order, and thus transcend the confines of traditional state-
centred international law.311 
Human rights are universal, and transcend national boundaries. The respect for human rights 
should take precedence over state sovereignty. In other words, while a state has the right to 
conduct its domestic affairs free from outside interference, this should be conditional on the 
protection of the human rights of its population, because the legitimate expression of the will 
of a sovereign people that entrusts power to state (government) entails the protection of their 
rights.312 Therefore, sovereignty should be redefined as people-centred instead of the 
traditional state-centred sovereignty. Human rights are peremptory norms of international law 
from which no derogation is permitted, and should therefore take precedence over the 
reverence for sovereignty. Kofi Annan has articulated this redefinition as the two concepts of 
sovereignty, namely, ‘the peoples’ sovereignty and the sovereign’s sovereignty.”313  He 
states: 
State sovereignty, in its basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of 
globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to 
be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time 
individual sovereignty-by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each 
individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties 
has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. 
When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to 
protect individual human beings, not those who abuse them.314 
To buttress this view, in Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali affirmed the new notion 
of sovereignty. In his words: 
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory 
was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand 
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this and to find a balance between the needs of good governance and the 
requirements of an ever more interdependent world.315 
Annan and Boutros-Ghali affirmed that the worldwide recognition of human rights means 
that the time of absolute and state-centred sovereignty has passed. States derive their 
authority from their people, and therefore the responsibility of the state is to serve the 
interests of the people. Sovereignty should accordingly be viewed as the people’s sovereignty 
or popular sovereignty. The ‘peoples’ sovereignty’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ espoused by 
Annan considers the basis of sovereignty as respect for the popular will and governance 
based on standards of democracy and human rights. Popular sovereignty has been defined as 
“a doctrine in political theory that government is created by and subject to the will of the 
people.”316  It has also been defined as a political term “that simply means that the ‘people are 
the rulers.’”317  Popular sovereignty, therefore, means that the human rights of the inhabitants 
of a state stand higher than the sovereignty of the state.318  The concept of absolute 
sovereignty espoused by early philosophers, like Hobbes, in which the concept was devoted 
to the interests of the sovereign, is no longer applicable.319 The same applies to Westphalian 
sovereignty, which vested absolute power in the nation-state.320 In the contemporary 
international order, government derives its authority from the will of the people, and it is 
accountable to the people through periodic elections. Popular sovereignty is articulated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as follows:  
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent voting 
procedures.321 
In an interview in 1997, Kofi Annan further emphasised the challenge to the traditional 
concept of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention thus: 
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I agree that the era of absolute sovereignty, as asserted in the past, cannot be 
sustained in contemporary conditions. In the years since the founding of the United 
Nations, we have lived in an interdependent world, a world in which no state has 
complete control over its destiny. State sovereignty retains its validity as a defining 
principle of international society and a governing rule in international relations, but 
the concept has evolved. No longer an absolute barrier to the outside world, it 
must, in extreme circumstances, give way to the overriding moral imperative to 
alleviate human suffering, including systematic violations of human rights…322 
In the words of Annan, sovereignty remains a fundamental principle in international relations. 
Nevertheless, when gross human rights are perpetrated by a state, its sovereignty should be 
overridden to provide assistance to vulnerable victims. In other words, where human rights 
are concerned, states can no longer claim to have negative rights, i.e., the right not to be 
interfered with.323 
Popular sovereignty is associated with the concept of “sovereignty as a responsibility,” 
“explicitly associated with the work of Francis Deng, the then Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and his collaborator, Roberta Cohen324. 
They faced the challenge of “how to work around the denial of assistance by sovereign 
authorities and;” 325 the challenge of “how to find a way to navigate around the potential 
denial of humanitarian assistance by sovereigns.”326  First raised by Cohen in 1991, the 
concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” meant that sovereignty carries with it the 
responsibility on the part of governments to protect its citizens,” 327 and stipulates that when 
states are unable to provide protection to their people from serious harm, they are expected to 
call for external assistance and accept such assistance. If they refuse and their people 
continue to suffer, the international community will intervene.  The principle was articulated 
by Deng as follows:  
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Sovereignty as responsibility meant that the state has to take care of its citizens, 
and if – it needed support – call on the sub-regional, regional or continental 
organizations, or ultimately the international community. But if it did not do that, 
and its peoples were suffering and dying, the world would not watch and do 
nothing. They would find a way of getting involved.328 
State sovereignty involves accountability, firstly, to the population in the state and secondly, 
to the international community, to ensure adherence to observance of human rights. 329 
Therefore, when a state inflicts egregious human rights abuses on its people, its sovereignty 
falls into abeyance and other states may intervene to protect the people. Sovereignty is no 
longer considered to be sacrosanct.330 As Ramesh Thakur, a member of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), put it, the unqualified concept of 
state sovereignty which gave a state immunity from accountability for the brutal treatment of 
its population, ‘has gone with the wind.”331 
The foregoing challenge to state sovereignty and non-intervention gained wide acceptance in 
the 1990s.332 The end of the Cold War saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rivalry 
between the East and the West. The Council was thus liberated from the paralysis that 
characterised its operations during the Cold War.333 It found a new capacity to discharge its 
responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security, and in particular, with regard 
to human rights issues. Concerns for human rights spread worldwide, and this gave rise to the 
norm of protecting human rights at the expense of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
intervention. Thus, the end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the number of 
humanitarian interventions, both collective and unilateral.334 Egregious violations of human 
rights have provided the grounds for overriding sovereignty through unilateral humanitarian 
interventions,335 Article 2(4) notwithstanding. An example is the NATO bombing campaign 
against Yugoslavia without United Nations Security Council authorisation in 1999.   
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Thus international recognition of human rights has eroded traditional sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is no longer centred on the interest of the state, but rather on the protection of the 
fundamental human rights of the people. This has led to the formulation of the concept of 
popular sovereignty which considers the basis of sovereignty as respect for the popular will 
and governance based on standards of democracy and human rights. Arising out of popular 
sovereignty is the concept of sovereignty as a responsibility, which postulates that a state has 
the primary responsibility to protect its citizens from harm. If it is unable to do so, it should 
request external aid. If it fails or refuses to request external aid, or deliberately rejects such 
assistance, the international community will not just stand by, but will react to protect the 
suffering people. 
iii. The challenge posed by failed states 
This sub-section discusses the challenge to state sovereignty and non-intervention posed by 
failed states arising from the fact that a failed state is exposed to intervention by external 
actors in defence of victims of excessive human rights abuses. As asserted by Holsti, “…the 
major problem of contemporary society of states is no longer aggression, conquest and the 
obliteration of states. It is rather, the collapse of states…” 336 Failed states pose a challenge to 
international peace and security, because such states are unable to exercise effective authority 
over their territories and populations.337 A failed state lacks political capacity to control its 
domestic affairs, an essential characteristic of a sovereign state. The ability of a state to 
exercise effective control over events in its territory is necessary for the maintenance of 
domestic law and order, but a failed state loses the monopoly on the use of force, and is 
unable to guarantee peace and stability.338 The absence of law and order can lead to anarchy 
and civil war without regard to humanitarian law. The result of this is the displacement of the 
population and mass exodus of refugees, which may have adverse implications for other 
countries.339 Examples of failed states are Somalia, Libya and Afghanistan, where there exist 
no effective central governments, and non-state actors like warlords rule. These warlords 
challenge territorial sovereignty because of the lack of effective central government control. 
State failure which leads to internal disorder poses a threat to international peace and 
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security, and may lead to action overriding sovereignty, as happened in Somalia where the 
Security Council authorised a Chapter VII intervention. The downfall of SiadBarre led to a 
breakdown of law and order and political chaos. On 3 December 1992, the United Nations 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794 (1992), authorising “the use of all 
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia.”  
Resolution 794 was a good example of the Security Council exercising the exclusive right to 
authorise the use of force.340  Egregious violations of human rights in a state arising from 
state failure may amount to a threat to peace, justifying intervention by the UN Security 
Council on humanitarian grounds. In such a situation, the principle of “reserved domain” or 
the prohibition on interference in the domestic affairs of states extended to states under 
Article 2(7) of the Charter falls into abeyance.341 
If rulers bent on abusing the human rights of their fellow citizens know that the Security 
Council will take enforcement action against them, which will serve as a deterrent for them to 
reconsider their actions. If the Security Council fails to take enforcement measures, then there 
is the danger that the international community will find alternative means to address 
excessive abuses of human rights.342  States will be compelled to intervene more and more 
often, leading to the development of a rule of customary international law, making 
humanitarian intervention lawful.343 In other words, powerful countries will continue to 
intervene by armed force in other countries regardless of the prohibition in Article 2(4), until 
the UN Security Council is able to take regular enforcement action under Chapter VII, 
particularly in averting or halting gross human rights abuses. Therefore, in order to prevent 
the subversion of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention through unilateral 
interventions by powerful states, it is imperative that the Security Council does not abdicate 
its role as the guarantor of international peace and security, for if it fails to do so, there is the 
danger that others could seek to take its place.344 
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Therefore the traditional definition of sovereignty that says that a state has immunity from 
accountability for the brutal treatment of its citizens is outdated, in the light of human rights, 
globalization, and the interdependence of states. The concept has undergone an evolution 
from the traditional Westphalian concept of the supremacy of the state to the concept of 
sovereignty with the people at the centre, or what has been described as popular sovereignty. 
The state has the primary responsibility to protect its people. If it fails or it is unwilling to do 
so, it creates the conditions for its sovereignty to be subverted by external actors through 
interventions. Article 2(4) paces a general prohibition on the use of force except when it is 
authorized by the Security Council, or where the force is used in individual or collective self-
defence. Therefore, when it becomes necessary to conduct humanitarian intervention to 
protect the victims of human rights abuses, the right authority should be the United Nations 
Security Council. An intervention without the mandate of the United Nations Security 
Council undermines the international order, and sets a dangerous precedent for others to 
follow. However, until the Security Council is able to exercise its function of maintaining 
international peace and security in the sphere of human rights by taking timely and effective 
action, the potential for unilateral armed intervention by powerful states cannot be ruled out. 
For example, if a permanent member of the Security Council vetoes or threatens to veto an 
intervention, thus leaving the Council deadlocked, it is morally legitimate for a country or 
coalition to act independently, as NATO did in Kosovo.345 
2.5. Part III - The effect of the United Nations Charter on humanitarian 
intervention in the post-Cold War era 
The purpose of Part III is to discuss the debate on the legality of humanitarian intervention 
since the beginning of the 1990s. Humanitarian intervention involves the violation of the 
sovereignty of one state by another state, or group of states, or an organisation without the 
consent of the affected state. It is unilateral when it occurs without the authorisation of the 
Security Council, though with the stated purpose of averting or halting gross human rights 
abuses in the perpetrating state. This part also discusses the question whether the mandate of 
the United Nations Security Council is an absolute prerequisite to justify an intervention. The 
section concludes that interventions conducted without the authorisation of the Security 
Council are inherently dangerous: firstly, because they set a precedent for other states to 
follow, thereby undermining the collective security system established by the United Nations 
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Charter; secondly, they are not conducted with internationally recognised standards or 
operational guidelines and therefore; thirdly, they are accompanied by abuse of raw military 
power and indiscriminate and disproportionate application of force. Even though powerful 
states have unilaterally intervened in other states, (examples being the 1999 NATO 
intervention in Yugoslavia and the intervention by the United States and allies in Iraq in 
2003), unilateral military intervention is outlawed by the United Nations Charter Article 2(4), 
and states that undertake unilateral interventions risk international condemnation. 
2.5.1. The dilemma – how to reconcile the primacy of human rights with the 
reverence for state sovereignty 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the tensions created by provisions in the United 
Nations Charter between the primacy of human rights346 and the inviolability of the territories 
of sovereign states.347 The tensions created by these two ideals caused paralysis348 in 
responses by the international community to humanitarian crises. Sovereignty and human 
rights are seen as fundamentally opposed: the rights of the state against the rights of the 
individual.349 This has generated debate about how to reconcile two fundamental principles 
which underpin the UN Charter, namely: on the one hand, the supreme sovereign authority of 
the state which entitles the state to make decisions within its territory without interference by 
other states, and the freedom from the threat or use of force against it and; on the other hand, 
the obligation of member states of the UN to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
as stipulated in the Preamble to the Charter.350 The debate on humanitarian intervention thus 
revolves around the concept of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. The tension 
between these two principles has been exacerbated by the claim of powerful states to a claim 
of the right to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of another state with or without the 
consent of the state or United Nations authorization.351 The legality of such a claim to this 
right is naturally questioned generally by weaker states vulnerable to military interventions, 
as a breach of the concept of state sovereignty. The dilemma is how to reconcile the 
prohibition on intervention by a state or group of states in the territorial sovereignty of 
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another state on the one hand, and on the other hand, the imperative to bring to an end the 
inhumane treatment or human suffering inflicted by a government on its own nationals.352 
The inability of the international community to “reconcile these two compelling interests” has 
been described as a tragedy by Kofi Annan.353 The dilemma is illustrated by the reaction of 
the international community to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999. In the case of Rwanda, there was inaction on the part of the international 
community in the face of genocide. If there had been action on the part of the international 
community, “approximately 125,000 lives could have been spared.”354  On the one hand, in 
the context of the inaction of the international community in Rwanda in 1994, he asked 
whether the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force should be 
observed strictly in the face of mass killings. In the words of Kofi Annan:  
If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States 
had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive 
prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and 
allowed the horror to unfold? 355 
On the other hand, in the context of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo without Security 
Council authorisation, he wonders whether permitting self-help by powerful states to 
intervene in other states unilaterally will not set precedents for other states to follow, thereby 
undermining the UN collective security system set up after World War II. He asks 
rhetorically:  
Is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, 
security system created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous 
precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might 
invoke these precedents, and in what circumstances?356 
While sovereignty remains fundamental in the conduct of international relations, there should 
be no doubt about what course of action that the international community should adopt in the 
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face of horrendous mass killings, such as occurred in Rwanda. Therefore, even in the absence 
of Security Council authorisation, armed intervention should be justifiable on moral and 
humanitarian grounds if potential victims of such horror are not to suffer irreversible harm.  
In the worlds of the ICISS, “the Commission believes that the Charter’s strong bias against 
military intervention is not to be regarded as absolute when decisive action is required on 
human protection grounds.”357 
2.5.2. Unilateral humanitarian intervention 
This section discusses the legality of humanitarian intervention with a focus on unilateral 
intervention, because such an intervention occurs without United Nations Security Council 
authorisation, and therefore raises a presumption of illegality. The section distinguishes 
collective humanitarian intervention from unilateral humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian 
intervention may be collective or unilateral. It is collective when it involves military action 
by a state or group of states authorised by the United Nations Security Council. Collective 
humanitarian interventions are usually viewed with greater approval than unilateral 
interventions because collective interventions tend to operate from a presumption of 
neutrality.358  In other words, because collective interventions have Security Council, it is 
presumed the no particular country has a special interest relating to it. Unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, however, involves military action taken in violation of the 
sovereignty of one state by another state, or group of states, or an organisation with the stated 
objective of averting or halting gross human rights abuses in the perpetrating state. It occurs 
without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council, and therefore, the 
possibility that it is carried out to serve the interests of the intervening states cannot be 
discounted. Unilateral intervention does not only describe a military intervention by an 
individual state, but also multilateral intervention by a group of states or even an 
organisation, without Security Council authorisation. Unilateral military intervention is 
therefore conducted in total disregard of the monopoly conferred on the United Nations 
Security Council by the Charter to authorise the use of force in the maintenance of 
international peace and security.359 The section also provides a brief discussion on the 
definition of humanitarian intervention. As has been previously observed, there is no 
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universally acceptable definition of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. As Franck and 
Rodley put it, a usable general definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ would be extremely 
difficult to formulate and virtually impossible to apply….”360  Adam Roberts has defined it 
as:  
coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another 
state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing 
widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants.361 
Humanitarian intervention involves the use of force in the territory of one state by another or 
group of without the consent of the target state. The absence of the consent of the target state 
distinguishes humanitarian intervention from intervention at the invitation of the affected 
state.362  Thus the absence of the state in which the intervention takes place is a crucial 
element.363 
Franck and Rodley define humanitarian intervention as the:  
Theory of intervention on the ground of humanity is properly that which 
recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military 
force over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to 
laws of humanity.364 
This definition does not make explicit reference to the absence of the consent of the target 
state, but assumes that there is a droitd’ingerence: “the right to intervene” or the right of 
“humanitarian intervention.” This was an idea which was popularized by French physician 
Bernard Kouchner, had resonance in the militarily powerful West, but “commanded only 
negative traction in the Global South, and simply could not generate the necessary consensus 
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for action.”365 The International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case366 made it plain 
that the right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force cannot find a place in 
international law. Further, in the light of Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, no right of 
humanitarian intervention is vested in any state.  To insist on such a right would defeat the 
purposes of humanitarian intervention, for as the ICISS observes, “…the debate about 
intervention for human protection purposes should focus not on “the right to intervene” but 
on the responsibility to protect.”367 
Sarkin, however, argues that there is indeed the right of humanitarian intervention and the 
“right to exercise humanitarian intervention can be found in treaty law, including the 
Genocide Convention, international customary law and the UN Charter…”368 He argues that 
under the Charter (Article 52), regional organisations have the authority to respond to 
situations that threaten regional peace and security with the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council.369 Regional structures or other willing partners may intervene in “certain absences 
of Security Council action” (Article 53).370 He cites the example of ECOWAS’ intervention 
in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in 1998, both of which were without UN Security 
Council authorisation. These set dangerous precedents, yet they received post-action Security 
Council praise in Resolution 788.371  In support of his argument, Sarkin states that in urgent 
situations, the AU Executive Council is prepared to sanction action with approval being 
sought “after the fact”, he quotes the Executive Council of the AU:  
That since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the 
scenes of conflicts and may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper 
appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations, it is 
imperativethat Regional Organisations, in areas of proximity to conflicts, are 
empowered to take actions in this regard.372 
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Adam Roberts, on the other hand, argues that: 
It may be useful to think of humanitarian intervention not as right but as an 
occasional and exceptional necessity. It could even be conceived of as duty, or at 
least as deriving from the duty to uphold human rights and humanitarian law. 
It is submitted that there is no right of humanitarian intervention. There may be situations that 
require intervention to alleviate human suffering, but should be considered as legitimate on 
moral grounds. Post-action approval by the Security Council of unilateral armed intervention 
does not necessarily confer a retrospective right of intervention on the intervening states. 
Rather, the approval is granted on grounds that, even though the intervention was unlawful, it 
was legitimate because it was undertaken for a popular cause, namely, saving lives in the face 
of UN inaction. In the words of Ben Kioko, legal counsel of the AU:  
It would appear that the UN Security Council has never complained about its 
powers being usurped because the interventions were in support of popular causes 
and were carried out partly because the UN Security Council had not taken action 
or was unlikely to do so at the time.373 
An example was NATO’s intervention in 1999, following UN Security inaction. The 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK) concluded in its report that, “the 
NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate,374 on moral grounds. Therefore, the 
post-intervention approval of armed intervention does not divest it of illegality. 
Murphy has given a broad definition of humanitarian intervention to “capture the myriad of 
conditions that might arise where human rights on a large scale are in jeopardy” arising from 
the actions of both state and non-sate actors, as the: 375 
[…] threat or use of force by a state, or group of states, or organization primarily 
for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread 
deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.376 
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Murphy’s definition may be broad, however, what is missing from the definition is that it 
fails to mention the absence of the consent of the target state. The absence of the target state’s 
consent distinguishes humanitarian intervention from other interventions, such as intervention 
at the request of the legitimate government of the affected state. Armed intervention is not 
considered as the right of the intervening state, but the purpose is in fulfilment of the dictates 
of the responsibility to protect. 377 Adnan Hehirdefines humanitarian intervention as: 
Military action taken by a state, group of states or non-state actor, in the territory 
of another state, without the state’s consent, which is justified, to some extent, by a 
humanitarian concern for the citizens of the host state.378 
This definition makes reference to intervention in the absence of the consent of the target 
state for the purposes of protecting suffering people, and therefore, differentiates 
humanitarian intervention from other forms of intervention. The definition does not claim a 
right of humanitarian intervention, but justifies it on the basis of humanitarian concern for the 
suffering people of the target state.   
From the foregoing, this section provides a composite definition of humanitarian intervention 
as follows: the use of armed force by one state or group of states in the territory of another 
state, without the consent of the target state and without United Nations Security Council 
authorisation for the purpose of ending gross human rights abuses of the nationals of the 
target state, perpetrated by the government of that target state or non-state actors, which the 
state is unwilling or unable to aver or halt. This definition distinguishes humanitarian 
intervention from intervention by a state in another to protect its nationals residing in the 
target state, or the use of force to assist humanitarian relief or peacekeeping operations, or 
intervention in a state at the invitation of the legitimate authorities.  
2.5.3. Legality versus legitimacy of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
This section discusses the debate on the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. The 
purpose is to discuss opposing arguments in favour of and in opposition to the legality of 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, and to examine the assertion that unilateral humanitarian 
intervention, though illegal, may be justified as being legitimate on moral grounds. The use 
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of force authorised by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII or Chapter 
VIII,379 and the use of force in individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 do not 
raise issues of legality, since these are lawful under the Charter. However, the use of force 
that does not fall under these exceptions amounts to a unilateral intervention, and is therefore 
in violation of the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4), and accordingly raises a 
presumption of illegality.  The section discusses the arguments.  
A. Arguments opposing unilateral humanitarian intervention 
i. Under the UN Charter, etc. 
This section discusses the reasons for the illegality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
The root of the question of legality of humanitarian intervention goes back to the Kellog-
Briand Pact,380 a multilateral agreement in which the parties agreed to “condemn recourse to 
war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it, as an instrument of 
national policy,”381 and to the “settlement or solution of all disputes and conflicts…by pacific 
means”382 with the exception of wars waged in self-defence or pursuant to obligations arising 
from the League of Nations Covenant.383 This principle is reflected in the United Nations 
Charter in Article 2(4), on the prohibition of the use of force and Article 2(7) on non-
interference in the domestic affairs of states. Subsequent resolutions also affirm this principle. 
Article 2(4) states that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
The drafters of the Charter wanted to ensure that states will not resort to self-help in resolving 
interstate disputes, hence the prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) and the 
principle of non-intervention in Article 2(7). To this end, there was no provision for states to 
take either individual or collective action in the interest of human rights. In the words of 
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Higgins, “the Charter could have allowed sanctions for gross human rights violations, but 
deliberately did not do so.”384Chesterman concurs that the dominant legal opinion on Article 
2(4) is that it leaves no room for humanitarian intervention385 Therefore, it is submitted that 
there is no legal basis for a claim of the right of humanitarian intervention by an individual or 
group of states. Nevertheless, the world cannot just stand by and watch mass suffering, 
simply because intervention and use of force are prohibited by the UN Charter, in the face of 
Security Council inaction. Therefore, intervention undertaken to protect victims of excessive 
human rights abuses, is legitimate on moral grounds even if it is illegal under international 
law. ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone and NATO’s intervention are 
examples.  
Indeed to pre-empt self-help, Article 24(1) makes it clear that the Members of the United 
Nations: 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.   
Besides, Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) of the Charter, UN General Assembly Resolution 
2131386 considers armed intervention to be synonymous with aggression.387 The Declaration 
prohibits intervention directly or indirectly and for whatever reason in the internal and 
external affairs of other states.388 Similarly, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625389 
imposes a duty on states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the political 
independence of territorial integrity of any state, and to settle international disputes by 
peaceful means.390 Under the Charter, the only situations where the use of force is 
permissible are Security Council action under Chapter VII and Article 51 in individual or 
collective self-defence. Therefore, there is no international law principle that makes 
humanitarian intervention lawful. As articulated by Hehir, “On the balance it seems fair to 
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conclude that the dominant view on the legal status of unilateral humanitarian intervention is 
that it is illegal.”391 However, the importance accorded to human rights in the post-Cold War 
era dictates that in the quest to protect human rights, the international community should not 
dwell on legality alone to justify interventions. Focusing solely on the legality of 
humanitarian intervention minimises the moral dimension of humanitarian intervention, 
which is equally important. For example, according to Rengger, the invasion of Iraq by the 
United States and its allies in 2003 was criticised solely on grounds of legality. He observes: 
what was perhaps oddest, at least to my eye, was that the general discussion both 
among politicians and in the media …was almost exclusively focused on whether 
or not the war was ‘legal’. At no point that I am aware of, did anyone seriously 
discuss the surely related question that even if it was legal, was it morally 
justified?392 
In other words, even if an intervention is illegal or otherwise, this should have no effect on its 
moral legitimacy. Even when an intervention is illegal, it may be legitimate on purely moral 
grounds, if the purpose is to alleviate or stop horrendous human suffering as occurred in 
Rwanda. An example of an illegal but legitimate intervention can be found in NATO’s 
bombing in Kosovo in 1999.393 
ii. Potential for abuse 
In addition to being illegal, unilateral humanitarian intervention is criticised on other grounds. 
The first criticism concerns the potential for abuse of humanitarian intervention for ulterior 
motives, because the choice whether to intervene or not may include considerations unrelated 
to humanitarian concerns.394 As observed by one writer: 
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Perhaps the most compelling argument against a right of humanitarian intervention 
is that it might be used as a pretext for military intervention actually motivated by 
other, less noble, objectives.395 
The potential for abuse of humanitarian intervention always exists, since powerful states may 
use it as a pretext to advance objectives other than humanitarian. However, various factors 
motivate a state to intervene in another. The state may intervene on grounds of morality, in 
defence of human rights. Intervention to advance legitimate national interests may also be a 
motivating factor, “either because acting can mitigate the direct and negative impact of a 
particular humanitarian disaster on national security or on the economy,”396 or a combination 
of factors.  Humanitarian intervention entails costs in lives and finances to the intervening 
state and therefore, a state may intervene not only in the interest of human rights, but on the 
basis of other motives such as it national or geopolitical interests. This explains the selectivity 
in interventions. For example, NATO intervened in Kosovo, but not in Rwanda. As long as 
the overriding motive is to alleviate human suffering, it cannot be said that the intervention is 
motivated by less noble objectives.  Legality should not be the only ground for the 
justification of humanitarian intervention, because this obscures the moral aspect, which is 
relevant in determining its legitimacy.397 
An argument proffered, which is similar to the foregoing, is that: 
The most common criticism levelled at the right of humanitarian intervention is 
that its incorporation into the system of the law of nations would enhance the 
opportunities for the abusive use of force.398 
This argument also raises the issue of abuse of humanitarian intervention. This is a legitimate 
concern. However, it submitted that in the face of excessive human rights abuses, including 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or war crimes, it is preferable to have an armed intervention, even 
if it illegal which may be legitimised on moral grounds, than inaction.  
B. Arguments in support of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
                                                          
395 B.S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 William and Mary Law Review, (2000), 1683 at  
      1727. 
396 Weiss, note 18, p. 7. 
397Hehir, note 27, p. 97. 
398  D. Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19 Michigan Journal of  
International Law, (1998), 1005 at 1020. 
188 
 
This section discusses the grounds on which humanitarian intervention, though unlawful may 
be legitimate on moral grounds. Some of the reasons advanced in support of the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention are discussed as follows: 
i. Humanitarian intervention as a means to defend suffering  masses 
It has been argued by Teson that humanitarian intervention is justified, because it involves 
the use of force in defence of people who are suffering from excessive and unjustified 
violence at the hands of their own government.399Lauterpacht approved of unilateral 
intervention “in cases in which a State maltreats its subjects in a manner which shocks the 
conscience of mankind.”400  The Preamble of the UN Charter, together with Articles 1 and 
55, reaffirms the United Nations’ commitment to the promotion of universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental human freedoms. It has been argued, therefore, 
that, these provisions create a positive obligation on states to take action in defence of human 
rights;401 if the Security Council is unable to act in the face of egregious human rights abuses 
then, in the words of Waldock, other actors should step in, because: 
To give up the right of self-help without obtaining any other adequate means of 
redress would simply have played into the hands of law-breakers.402 
This statement seems to be in support of the right of intervention, discussed previously. Thus 
in the event of UN Security Council inaction, the other states have a right to step in to do 
what the Security Council will not or cannot do. To those who support unilateral 
humanitarian intervention, the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention should be 
considered in the light of international human rights norms, which impose obligations on 
states to respect the human rights of their nationals in accordance with international 
standards.403  The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 among other international 
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human rights instruments have created obligations on states to respect the human rights of 
citizens. If a state fails to maintain the minimum international human rights standards, “its 
sovereignty is temporarily suspended,” and it cannot claim immunity from outside 
intervention, because “sovereignty cannot completely shield internal violations of human 
rights that contradict international obligations.” 404 This position appears to suggest that 
humanitarian intervention in such circumstances is legal. However, this is open to debate.  
Adam Roberts argues that:  
Answers to the question of whether in a particular instance humanitarian 
intervention is viewed as illegal or illegal are likely to depend on the circumstances 
of the case and on the perspectives of the states and individuals addressing the 
matter: in other words they are not likely to be uniform. In principle, it is wrong to 
expect international law to provide one-word answers in advance to cases in which 
powerful legal and moral considerations have to be balanced against each other.405 
This argument suggests a subjective evaluation of what is legal or illegal and is therefore 
inherently dangerous, because it is left to an intervening state to determine the legality of its 
action. It infers that any state can interfere in another, and claim legality for its action. In such 
a scenario, it can be argued that any state can choose to disregard international law and claim 
legality for its actions by its own definition of legality. Exceptions may be made for 
humanitarian intervention on legitimate moral grounds in the face of clear perpetration of 
atrocities. However, there should be international agreement on when an intervention is legal 
under international law, in the light of the UN Charter. It is submitted that sovereignty is 
contingent on a state’s respect for human rights of the citizens. Therefore, where a state 
subjects its citizens to gross human rights abuses or it is unwilling or unable to avert or stop 
the abuse, then unilateral intervention becomes legitimate on moral or ethical grounds in the 
name of humanity. However if the action is taken outside the framework of the UN Charter, 
then it is illegal. Post-intervention approval of the Security Council only confers legitimacy, 
but not legality on the operation. The argument on intervention based on human rights is that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention is morally defensible in the context of protecting human 
rights.  
In order to be morally defensible, it has to comply with certain criteria, namely: 
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[...] right authority, right intention, last resort, reasonable prospects, and 
proportionate means…Any AHI must be conducted under a unified command 
authority that acts with careful deliberation and circumspection…The immediate 
intended action must be the humanitarian one of protection or rescue. The 
intervention must be a last resort, all other measures having been tried or seen to 
be clearly hopeless. In retrospect, the intervention must have a reasonably high 
probability of success. The intervention must be no more destructive than 
absolutely necessary to achieve its goal: and overall, it must be the case that more 
good than harm will have been achieved by the intervention (i.e., more harm will 
have been prevented than caused by the intervention.406 
It is submitted that the international community cannot always just be a passive observer, 
wringing its hands in helplessness in the face of atrocities, such as mass slaughter of the 
innocent, ethnic cleansing or war crimes, if the UN Security Council is unable to take action 
in defence of vulnerable people.  Therefore, there will be situations when, on moral grounds, 
armed intervention would be legitimate, even if unlawful, because it is better  to save lives at 
the risk of international opprobrium, than stand idly by while vulnerable people are 
slaughtered. However, in order to avoid the abuse of the concept, such an intervention the 
primary motive must be to alleviate human suffering; the use of force should be resorted to 
after all peaceful means have been exhausted and; only the force necessary to accomplish the 
objective of the intervention should be used. This will ensure that powerful states do not use 
humanitarian intervention as pretext for waging war in advancement of their interests. 
ii.  Effect of frequent violations of Article 2(4) 
The purpose of this subsection is to discuss the effect of the frequent violations of Article 
2(4) on the prohibition of the use of force as justification for humanitarian intervention.  
Thomas Franck has argued that Article 2(4) is dead, because the provision has been 
constantly violated.407 In his judgment, “The prohibition against the use of force in relations 
between states has been eroded beyond recognition.”408 Based on Franck’s argument, the 
frequent breach of Article 2(4) means that the article is no longer relevant, and therefore, 
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there are no restraints on the use of force in interstate relations. Indeed, there has been a 
litany of violations of Article 2(4) by powerful states. On 16 December 1998, the United 
States’ military forces launched cruise missiles against Iraq (Operation Desert Fox) in 
response to Iraq’s failure to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, as well as its 
interference with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors, without Security Council 
authorisation.409 On 20 August 1998, American cruise missiles pounded sites in Afghanistan 
and Sudan in what the US President Clinton called a “long, ongoing struggle between 
freedom and fanaticism”, without UN Security Council authorization.410 On 20 December 
1989, the US launched ‘Operation Just Cause’, a full-scale military invasion of Panama, with 
24,000 troops armed with high-tech weaponry, in order to bring its president, Manuel 
Noriega, to justice for drug trafficking.  
It is submitted that the conduct of a few states cannot render nugatory Article 2(4), a juscogen 
or a peremptory principle of international law that admits of no derogation. What it means is 
that those countries that violate Article 2(4) do so illegally, and repeated violations do not 
render irrelevant the prohibition of the use of force.  Just as a frequent breach of municipal 
criminal law does not make criminal conduct legal, the frequent violations of Article 2(4) do 
not render the Article irrelevant. Disregard for Article 2(4) undermines the international order 
which is necessary for international peace and security. Thomas Franck acknowledges the 
indispensability of Article 2(4) with the acknowledgement that the demise of Article 2(4) 
raises a serious question for the nations, with the observation that: “Having violated it, 
ignored it, run roughshod over it, and explained it away, can they now live without it?”411 
The vast majority of countries consider Article 2(4) to be at the centre of the United Nations 
collective security system and the bedrock of peaceful relations among states. The prohibition 
of the use of force may be violated by powerful countries when it is in their interest, but it 
remains crucial principle in interstate relations.  
iii. Treaty versus the UN Charter 
This section investigate whether treaty provisions confers a legality on unilateral intervention 
conducted by signatories.412 The argument has been made by proponents of unilateral 
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humanitarian intervention that some treaties permit humanitarian intervention. An example is 
the Genocide Convention.413 The Genocide Convention makes genocide a crime and 
authorises signatories to “undertake efforts to prevent and punish acts of genocide.”414 The 
International Court of Justice stated that “the principles underlying the Convention are 
principles which are recognized as binding on States, even without any conventional 
obligation…such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law…”415 
This has been interpreted to provide legal justification for humanitarian 
intervention.416Schweisfurth has argued that, in the face of excessive human rights abuses, a 
state has to weigh the obligations to protect human rights against the obligation to refrain 
from using force: if in the judgment of the state the obligation to protect human rights 
outweighs the obligation to refrain from using force, then the state may intervene to halt 
human rights abuses.417  In the face of genocide, there is a moral imperative for external 
intervention to protect vulnerable people, even at the risk of violating the principle on the 
prohibition of the use of force.  
However, others disagree with this view.  Ronzitti, for example, argues that:  
while it is quite sure that the obligation to refrain from the use of force is embodied 
in a peremptory norm of international law, it is not at all sure that the duty to 
promote human rights is set forth in a jus cogens rule.418 
In other words, there is no rule of international law that imposes a duty on states to take up 
arms in defence of human rights. This argument is indefensible, because it means that victims 
of gross human rights abuses have no protection. While there may be no right of 
humanitarian intervention, every state has a moral duty to come to the assistance of victims of 
genocide and war crimes, for example. In the Barcelona Traction Case the International 
Court of Justice recommended that the remedy for a violation of the Convention was not to 
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wage war, but to bring the offenders to court.419 However the ICJ has stated in the same 
Barcelona Traction Case that, because of the importance of human rights, “all states can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection.”420  Therefore in the face of egregious human 
rights abuses, unilateral humanitarian intervention, even if illegal, may be justified on moral 
grounds. 
2.6. Conclusion 
During the Cold War period from 1945-1989, the world was split between two hostile blocks, 
the Capitalist West and the Communist (Soviet) East. The hostility between these two power 
blocks impeded the ability of the United Nations to implement the provisions in the Charter 
on securing international peace and security primarily because of the use of the veto by the 
permanent members of the Security Council. The end of the Cold War brought to an end the 
ideological and superpower differences, and revived hopes of a new era of cooperation in the 
Security Council. Thus, the beginning of the 1990s witnessed optimism regarding the new 
found scope of the international community to deal with humanitarian issues. This era 
ushered in new ideas about state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, and a new kind 
of international law and spirit, made possible in the changed conditions of a world no longer 
held hostage by the struggle between communism and capitalism. The end of the Cold War 
made humanitarian intervention a widely accepted norm, with the frequent use of human 
rights concerns as grounds for intervention.  
2.6.1. Universalisation of human rights 
Interest in the protection of human rights preceded the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, prior to World War II, human 
rights were of no concern to the international community and the international community 
had no interest in the manner in which a state treated its nationals within its sovereign 
territory. The general attitude was that what a state did to its people in its territory was a 
national concern.  The attitude of the sovereign was that it had the right to treat its people in 
any manner, and no external power had the authority to judge the sovereign or intervene on 
behalf of the suffering people.  The UN Charter and the UDHR changed international 
attitudes to human rights. The United Nations Charter was the first major document relating 
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to the internationalisation of human rights. The Charter committed the United Nations to 
promoting universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. UDHR set out specific human 
rights including the right to life, freedom of expression, and freedom from torture and 
inhumane punishment. The UDHR reinforced the principle introduced by the United Nations 
Charter, that human rights cannot be located exclusively within the sovereignty of states. 
Gross human rights violations within one state may have adverse external effects, especially 
where a large number of victims in the perpetrating state move across international borders, 
creating a refugee or humanitarian crisis in other states. Besides, human rights violations 
could lead to civil war, which may pose a threat to international peace and security, 
prompting other states to intervene in the perpetrating state. Therefore in the post-Cold War 
era, the international community has legitimate concerns about the manner in which a state 
treats its own nationals. Abuse by a state of the human rights of its nationals is no longer the 
exclusive business of the state, because of worldwide recognition that respect for human 
rights transcends international frontiers.  
Human rights are rights that a human being is entitled simply for being a human being. Every 
human being is endowed with certain natural rights inherent in his/her status as a human 
being. The desire to be treated with dignity is innate in the human psyche regardless of 
nationality, religion, culture or history. Given a choice, no human being will choose to be 
tortured, deprived of his/her life, liberty or property without due process. In this sense, human 
rights are universal and therefore the universality of human rights is what provides moral 
grounds for armed intervention to protect victims of gross abuse of their rights. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights has played a great role in the universalisation of human rights. 
For example, the principles of the Declaration have been incorporated into the constitutions 
of a large number of countries.  
As a consequence, of the role of the UDHR, there is international awareness of the 
importance of human rights which has in turn changed international attitudes towards the use 
of force to protect victims of human rights abuse. Even though unilateral humanitarian 
intervention is unlawful under international law, it is considered to be legitimate on moral 
grounds in situations of egregious abuses of human rights. Thus, even in situations where 
armed intervention has taken place outside the framework of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council has granted post-intervention approval to the operation, as it did in the cases of 
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ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
The sovereignty of a state that subjects its nationals to gross human rights abuses may be 
overridden in the name of human rights, because human rights are no longer considered to be 
solely the business of a state or within the exclusive preserve of a state. The international 
community has an interest in the manner in which a state treats its people, and therefore, 
human rights means cannot be abused with impunity by any state. 
2.6.2. Sovereignty in the post-Cold War era 
The basic elements of the modern concept of statehood and state sovereignty derived from 
the Westphalian model, which dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia or the ‘Peace of 
Westphalia’ in 1648. Under Westphalian sovereignty, states had a right to govern themselves 
however they chose, free from outside interference or intervention. Sovereignty covers all 
matters in which a state under international law has the right to decide and act without 
external interference. Thus under the Westphalian model, sovereignty was protected by the 
principle of non-intervention in the sense that every state had the right to conduct its internal 
affairs and foreign policy freely without interference or dictates of external actors. Therefore, 
the manner in which a sovereign state conducted its affairs within its territory was its own 
business, and no other state had a right to interfere in its internal affairs. The basic principle 
that one state has no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of another is enshrined in Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter. The equality of states enshrined in the concept of state sovereignty 
and its corollary principle of non-intervention are considered as a shield to protect weaker 
states from the pressure of more powerful states.  
During the Cold War, international frontiers were regarded as inviolable and sacrosanct with 
the concept of non-interference in internal affairs often overriding collective efforts to assist 
victims of gross human rights abuses in their own countries. However, the traditional concept 
of sovereignty with its notion of monopoly of power by the nation state to the exclusion of 
external actors is faced with challenges in the contemporary globalised world. States can no 
claim to have a monopoly over matters that take place within their borders, especially where 
human rights are concerned. As a result of the interdependence of states in the contemporary 
international order, what happens in one country has ramifications beyond its borders and 
therefore absolute rights that sovereigns have traditionally enjoyed are being challenged by 
the international concerns for human rights. Thus, if a state subjects its inhabitants to gross 
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human rights abuses, the Westphalian concept of sovereignty will not prevent external actors 
from taking action to protect the victims of abuse.  
2.6.3. Redefinition of sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty as envisaged by Article 2(7) has been redefined by world events 
since 1990. The redefinition has come about as a consequence of a combination of factors. 
These include globalisation and concerns about human rights, especially by powerful states. 
The consequence of concerns for human rights have led to the adoption of the doctrine of 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), which defines sovereignty in terms of a state’s 
responsibility to protect, and not to terrorise its people. This new doctrine endorses the use of 
force by the international community to override the sovereignty of a state to protect people 
suffering serious harm as a result of repression or internal war, and where the state is unable 
or unwilling to halt or avert their suffering. The concept of sovereignty and its corollary 
principle of non-intervention have therefore been compromised by the willingness of the 
international community to use force in defence of victims of excessive human rights abuse. 
In the post-Cold War era, the worldwide recognition of human rights means that the time of 
absolute and state-centred sovereignty has passed. States derive their authority from their 
people, and therefore the responsibility of the state is to serve the interests of the people. 
Sovereignty should accordingly be viewed as the people’s sovereignty or popular 
sovereignty. The peoples’ sovereignty considers the basis of sovereignty as respect for the 
popular will and governance based on standards of democracy and human rights. Popular 
sovereignty means that the government is subject to the will of the people and therefore the 
human rights of the inhabitants of a state stand higher than the sovereignty of the state. 
Popular sovereignty is associated with the concept of “sovereignty as a responsibility”.  This 
means that sovereignty carries with it the responsibility on the part of governments to protect 
its citizens. Sovereignty as responsibility stipulates that when states are unable to provide 
protection to their people from serious harm, they are expected to call for external assistance 
and accept such assistance. If they refuse and their people continue to suffer, the international 
community will intervene.  While it may be argued that this definition would deny statehood 
to most of Africa, it has to be acknowledged that the traditional concept of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty has undergone an evolution from the traditional Westphalian concept 
of the supremacy of the state, to the concept of sovereignty with the people at the centre.  In 
197 
 
the current international order therefore, sovereignty is no longer a barrier to humanitarian 
intervention where a state perpetrates egregious human rights abuses on its citizens.  
2.6.4. Humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era 
There is tension created by provisions in the United Nations Charter between the primacy of 
human rights and the inviolability of the territories of sovereign states. This has generated 
debate about how to reconcile two fundamental principles which underpin the UN Charter, 
namely; on the one hand, the supreme sovereign authority of the state which entitles the state 
to make decisions within its territory without interference by other states, and the freedom 
from the threat or use of force against it; and on the other hand, the obligation of member 
states of the UN to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as stipulated in the 
Preamble to the Charter.  
Humanitarian intervention involves the use of force in the territory of one state by another or 
a group of states without the consent of the target state. The absence of the consent of the 
target state therefor distinguishes humanitarian intervention from intervention at the 
invitation of the affected state. Humanitarian intervention may be collective or unilateral. It is 
collective when it involves military action by a state or group of states authorised by the 
United Nations Security Council. The use of force authorised by the United Nations Security 
Council under Chapter VII or Chapter VIII, and the use of force in individual or collective 
self-defence under Article 51 do not raise issues of legality, since these are lawful under the 
Charter.  
Unilateral humanitarian intervention, however, involves military action taken in violation of 
the sovereignty of one state by another state, group of states or an organisation without the 
consent of the target state, with the stated objective of averting or halting gross human rights 
abuses in the perpetrating state. It occurs without the authorisation of the United Nations 
Security Council. Unilateral intervention does not only describe a military intervention by an 
individual state, but also multilateral intervention by a group of states or even an 
organisation, without Security Council authorisation.  Unilateral military intervention is 
therefore conducted in total disregard of the prohibition of the use of force under article 2(4) 
and Article 2(7) on non-interference in the domestic affairs of the UN Charter. For this 
reason, unilateral humanitarian intervention is considered to be unlawful under international 
law. This is one of the grounds for opposition to unilateral intervention. However, the focus 
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on the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention should not obscure the moral reasons 
which motivate intervention, because even though an intervention may be illegal, on moral 
grounds it may have legitimacy, as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo illustrates. 
In addition to being illegal, unilateral humanitarian intervention is opposed because of 
concerns about the potential for abuse of humanitarian intervention for ulterior motives. It is 
argued, however, that even though the potential for abuse of humanitarian intervention 
always exists since powerful states may use it as a pretext to advance objectives other than 
humanitarian, the fact that various factors motivate a state to intervene in another should not 
be discounted. The state may intervene on grounds of morality, in defence of human rights, or 
in advancement of legitimate national interests, or it may be motivated by a combination of 
factors.  Humanitarian intervention entails costs in lives and finances to the intervening state, 
and therefore, even though a state may intervene in another to protect human rights, a state 
may not intervene in another in defence of human rights if it does not expect some advantage 
from the intervention. This explains the selectivity in interventions. For example, NATO 
intervened in Kosovo, but not in Rwanda. Therefore, as long as the overriding motive is to 
alleviate human suffering, other motives are irrelevant. 
In support of unilateral humanitarian intervention, it is argued that humanitarian intervention 
is a means to defend suffering masses. The Security Council has the responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. In the event of UN Security Council 
inaction, the international community has a moral duty to step in to do what the Security 
Council will not or cannot do. The legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention should 
therefore be considered in the light of international human rights norms, which impose 
obligations on states to respect the human rights of their nationals in accordance with 
international standards. For example the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 
among other international human rights instruments, have created obligations on states to 
respect the human rights of citizens. If a state fails to maintain the minimum international 
human rights standards, its sovereignty may be violated, because sovereignty cannot 
completely provide immunity for internal violations of human rights that contradict 
international obligations. 
While sovereignty remains fundamental in the conduct of international relations, there should 
be no doubt about what course of action that the international community should adopt in the 
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face of horrendous mass killings, such as occurred in Rwanda. Therefore, even in the absence 
of Security Council authorisation, unilateral armed intervention should be justifiable on moral 
and humanitarian grounds if potential victims of such horror are not to suffer irreversible 
harm.
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CHAPTER 3 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
3.1. Introduction 
The chapter discusses the evolution and development of the concept of the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P), for purposes of investigating how best to apply the concept in the face of 
humanitarian crises, in order to address concerns about its implementation. In the 1990s, the 
international community was faced with several humanitarian crises in several countries, 
including Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1993-1995), Haiti (1994-
1997), and Kosovo (1999). In the face of these crises, particularly the genocide in Rwanda 
during which over 800,000 Tutsis and a smaller number of Hutus were killed in just a 
hundred days, and the Srebrenica massacre where 7000 Bosnian Muslims perished, the 
international community, failed to respond effectively.1 The attitude of the international 
community as Kofi Annan put it in his 1998 speech to the DitchleyFoundation, was, “so long 
as the conflict rages within the borders of a single State, the old orthodoxy would require us 
to let it rage.”2  The old orthodoxy espoused the inviolability of state sovereignty and non-
intervention. The crises in the 1990s and the inability of the Security Council to react 
triggered debates as to whether the international community should continue to adhere 
unconditionally to the principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter, or whether the time had come to take a different course.3 
At the centreof the debates was how the international community should react when the 
fundamental human rights of populations are grossly and systematically violated within the 
boundaries of sovereign states, and this heightened the need for a reappraisal of armed 
humanitarian intervention. These debates culminated in the establishment of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 by the Government of 
Canada, with the mandate “to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling 
intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty.”4 The ICISS came up with the 
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concept of R2P, which articulated the basic principles that sovereignty implies responsibility 
and this responsibility primarily lies on the state to protect its people, but where the state is 
unwilling or unable to discharge this responsibility, its sovereignty has to yield to the broader 
international community’s residual responsibility to protect the vulnerable population.5 R2P 
was unanimously adopted by the 2005 World Summit of more than 170 world leaders6 as the 
roadmap for responding to mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity.7 This was the largest gathering of world leaders at the UN,8 and 
the unanimous adoption of R2P demonstrated the importance that the world community 
attaches to the protection of victims of atrocities. The significance is that the head of states 
and governments who gathered at the summit made it clear that the perpetration of any of the 
specific four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity 
constituted a just cause for the application of R2P. However, the world leaders emphasised 
the use of peaceful and diplomatic means in resolving humanitarian crises, and recommended 
the use of force only when the state authorities manifestly failed to protect their population 
from the four crimes. 
The chapter argues that the principle of a state’s responsibility to protect its nationals predates 
the formulation of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) formulated by the 
ICISS, because, prior to the formulation of R2P, it was recognised by states that they could 
not treat their nationals in any manner they chose,and therefore, R2P is founded on an 
existing body of law, and not on new theories,9 and should be “best understood as a 
reaffirmation and codification of already existing norms.”10  Furthermore, the idea that states 
have a duty to protect the welfare of their citizens has a foundation in human rights law, and 
is a restatement of already existing responsibility of states and the international 
community11to ensure that human rights are respected within their boundaries.12  Thus, the 
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powers of sovereigns have always been limited, and therefore, the Westphalian traditional 
notion of unfettered supremacy of state sovereignty and the right of non-intervention were 
debunked even before the formulation of R2P. Sovereignty has never been absolute, and 
therefore, any claim that the ICISS introduced a new concept calculated to derogate 
traditional sovereignty is unwarranted, because limits on sovereignty, dictated by respect for 
the human rights of citizens, were already recognised before the formulation of R2P by the 
ICISS. As observed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the responsibility of a state to 
protect its population derives from the nature of state sovereignty itself, and from the “pre-
existing and continuing legal obligations of States, not just from the relatively recent 
enunciation and acceptance of the responsibility to protect.”13 
However, what is novel about the work of the ICISS was that it sought to develop 
international consensus on the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection 
purposes and sovereignty.14 The Commission did this by placing emphasis on the following: 
the state’s primary responsibility to protect its own people; the international community’s 
residual responsibility to protect the people when the state is unwilling or unable to discharge 
this responsibility, and, recommending the use of coercive military force among other 
measures to react to mass atrocities.15  The novelty of the Commission’s proposals was that it 
introduced the principles that the primary responsibility for the protection of its population 
lies with the state itself; but where the state is unable or unwilling to protect its people, then 
the international community should not stand idly by, but exercise its responsibility to protect 
victims of excessive human rights violations, through the use of force, should non-coercive 
measures prove inadequate; and furthermore, in order to ensure that the conflict that gave rise 
to the intervention does not reoccur, the interveners had a responsibility to address the root 
causes of the conflict and also stay long enough to contribute to the reconstruction of the 
affected state.  
To further buttress the argument that the notion that sovereigns have the responsibility to 
protect their populations is not an entirely new idea, reference is made to human rights 
espoused in instruments such as the UN Charter 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human 
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Rights 1948, the Genocide Convention 1948, the Geneva Conventions 1949, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Political Rights (ICESR) 1966, as well as the writings of early modern 
European political theorists such as Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel, John Locke, and Jean 
Jacques Rousseau to demonstrate that they shared the view that sovereigns had a 
responsibility to protect the safety of their people despite the fact that they were advocates of 
absolute sovereignty.16 The point is that the idea of sovereignty as a responsibility has 
historical roots going back to a time when human rights did not have the same prominence 
they do now, and therefore, in the contemporary international order with the widespread 
recognition of human rights, the principles espoused by R2P ought to be embraced and 
should not be seen as a licence for powerful countries to intervene in the affairs of weaker 
states.The rights contained in the human rights instrumentsand the ideas of the early modern 
European philosophers laid the groundwork for the formulation of R2P by the ICISS, and 
possibly played a role in the unanimous endorsement of R2P by world leaders at the 2005 
World Summit.  
The chapter gives a brief account of Africa’s notion of sovereign responsibility and the 
connection with R2P. Failure of the international community to halt the Rwandan genocide 
persuaded African countries that if future atrocities on the continent were to be avoided, then 
there was the need for a security mechanism that laid down what was to be done to prevent or 
halt gross violations of human rights. Thus, Africa’s regime for peace and security was 
developed from the mid-1990s when Africa was faced with many of the issues later raised in 
connection with R2P17such as armed conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Algeria and Lesotho; and 
regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa, in particular the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, 
and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development had to find ways to resolve these 
conflicts themselves, which were manifested in military intervention.18 An example was the 
military intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990, through ECOMOG, the Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group of the organisation, and again in Sierra Leone in 1998 in the face of UN 
Security Council’s inaction.19 Therefore, before the establishment of the ICISS and the 
formulation of R2P, Africa had already established the principle that, in the face of egregious 
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violation of human rights, it was legitimate to intervene in the affected state to protect 
vulnerable populations by military force in order to redress grave humanitarian crises.20 Thus, 
even though R2P may have been considered by others as a tool for powerful countries to 
meddle in the affairs of weak countries in the name of human rights, Africa appreciated R2P 
as an endorsement of its existing security mechanism, and this prepared the way for the 
unanimous endorsement of the concept at the 2005 World Summit. 
The chapter further discusses the impact of the conceptualization of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen on the evolution of R2P;21  for although 
the ICISS developed R2P, the Commission’s recommendations followed a path laid out by 
Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen.22  The R2P Report was built on Deng’s earlier work, which 
declared sovereignty as a responsibility primarily resting on a state with a residual 
international responsibility to protect where the state is unwilling or unable to discharge that 
responsibility.23 The idea of international responsibility to take enforcement action to protect 
human rights inside the territories of states emerged from their concept that a state has a 
responsibility to protect internally displaced persons.24 Their concept of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” meant that sovereignty carries with it the responsibility on the part of 
governments to protect its citizens, and stipulates that when states are unable to provide 
protection to their people from serious harm, they are expected to call for external assistance 
and accept such assistance. 25 If they refuse and their people continue to suffer, the 
international community will intervene.26 Their idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” was 
the “direct precursor of ICISS’s responsibility to protect.”27 
The chapter discusses humanitarian crises during the 1990s, which triggered debates about 
how the international community should react to gross human rights abuses within the 
boundaries of sovereign states, and the need for a reappraisal of armed humanitarian 
intervention culminating in the establishment of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 and the articulation of the concept of 
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R2P.The international community’s failure to respond effectively to the humanitarian crises 
in several countries in the 1990s generated debates as to whether human rights should trump 
sovereignty in the face of egregious human rights abuses, and this culminated in the 
establishment of the ICISS, with the mandate to find a balance between sovereignty and 
human rights.The chapter investigates international action or inaction in the face of 
humanitarian crises during the 1990s in Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Rwanda 
(1994), Bosnia (1993-1995), Haiti (1994-1997), and Kosovo (1999). The atrocities 
committed during these crises provided the immediate impetus for the need to develop a 
mechanism which would ensure the prevention of mass atrocities and the protection of 
victims; hence, these crises can be said to have played defining roles as stimuli for the 
formulation of R2P.The chapter argues that these crises played a critical role, and brought the 
idea of international intervention in conflicts within state borders to the centre of international 
legal and political discourses. The atrocities committed during these crises galvanised 
international determination that sovereignty should never again be a barrier to international 
coercive action to halt gross human rights abuses within the territory of a state. Iyi concurs 
that the failure of the international community to respond to these humanitarian crises 
brought the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention “on the front burner.”28 The 
1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo which was conducted without United Nations Security 
Council authorization, brought the controversy to a climax,29 because it set a dangerous 
precedent in bypassing the Security Council, and also because the intervention caused more 
harm than it averted,30 by killing a large number of civilians and destroying the infrastructure 
of Serbia.31 There was serious disagreement among members of the Security Council, 
centring on the disregard for the existing international order, which is based on the 
inviolability of state sovereignty, issues of legal justification, and the manner in which the 
intervention was carried out.32 The Kosovo intervention and the perpetration of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity within other states’ borders in the 
1990s caused former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan to pose a 
challenge to the international community in his Millennium Report, to find a balance between 
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respect for sovereignty and the need to the protect human rights.33 In response to this 
challenge, the Canadian Government established the ICISS with the mandate to build a 
broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection 
purposes and sovereignty.34  The ICISS formulated the concept of R2P, with the theme that a 
state’s sovereignty is to be respected, but where a state fails to discharge its primary 
responsibility to protect its nationals, its sovereignty yields to the international community’s 
responsibility to protect in furtherance of its mandate to find a balance between respect for 
sovereignty, and the imperative to protect victims of internal mass atrocities. 
The chapter discusses the establishment of the ICISS and the basic principles of R2P 
articulated in the ICISS Report, that: “State responsibility entails responsibility and the 
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself; where a 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of 
non- intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”35 This is due to the 
worldwide recognition of human rights and the acknowledgement by the international 
community that the manner in which a state treats its citizens is not the sole business of the 
state, but also a matter of concern to the international community. The chapter discusses the 
idea of state sovereignty as responsibility and the residual responsibility of the wider 
international community to protect, because intrastate conflicts generated by gross human 
rights abuse can have regional and international implications, and therefore, the international 
community also has an interest in the manner a state treats its nationals.  
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the three dimensions of R2P, namely: the responsibility to 
prevent - to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-
made crisis putting populations at risk; the responsibility to react - to respond to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures 
like sanctions and international prosecution and in extreme cases military intervention, and; 
the responsibility to rebuild - to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconsideration, addressing the causes of the 
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harm the intervention was designed to halt.36The responsibility to prevent is an extremely 
important aspect of R2P, for if conflict can be prevented, then the controversial principle of 
humanitarian intervention would not arise, and it would not be necessary to rebuild shattered 
societies at great cost in finances and lives. Therefore, the ICISS Report singles out 
prevention as the most important dimension of the responsibility to protect.37 Similarly, the 
responsibility to rebuild is important for the reconstruction of societies that have been 
destroyed by violent conflict.The responsibility to rebuild a state involves not only the 
rebuilding of the institutions of the state destroyed by conflict and the intervention itself, but 
also the resolution of the issues that gave rise to the conflict and the intervention, if the 
conflict is not to ignite again. The responsibility to rebuild arises after a military intervention. 
Conflict within the state has causes, and the conflict usually leads to deaths and widespread 
destruction of the state’s infrastructure, economy, and legal system. Interveners should devise 
a post intervention strategy, because failure to take effective steps to address the causes of the 
conflict and to participate in the reconstruction of the state can lead to total anarchy and state 
failure after the intervention, as the example of NATO’s intervention, in Libya demonstrates.  
However, the chapter focuses on the responsibility to react and in particular the military 
dimension that is the most controversial aspect of R2P,38 because military intervention entails 
the violation of the target state’s sovereignty with deadly force which may cause deaths and 
destruction; thus, it requires detailed discussion with the aim of examining how best this 
dimension may be implemented. The importance of the military dimension is reflected in the 
ICISS report as follows: “By far the most controversial form of…intervention is military, and 
a great part of our report necessarily focuses on that.”39 In the words of the ICISS Report, 
“responsibility to protect” implies above all else a responsibility to react to situations of 
compelling need for human protection.40 This is the main underlying justification advanced 
by the ICISS for military intervention.41 The ICISS report itself demonstrates a clear bias in 
favour of the military option over other options, such as economic and political sanctions.42 
The importance of the military aspect of R2P is reinforced by the fact that the responsibility 
to rebuild, to provide full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation is 
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required “particularly after a military intervention,”43 which presupposes that the 
responsibility to rebuild arises only as a consequence of military action. A study of the ICISS 
report shows that under the heading “The responsibility to react,”44 the military option is 
accorded more detailed treatment from pages 31 to 37 inclusive, i.e. seven pages, while other 
options such as economic and political sanctions are dealt with only from pages 29 to 31, i.e. 
about two and a quarter pages,45 thereby demonstrating the importance the Commission 
attached to this aspect of R2P. The centrality of the military dimension to the debate on R2P 
makes it a necessary focus of detailed discussion.  As already observed, military intervention 
involves the violation of the sovereignty of a state, and therefore, much of the misgivings 
about the concept are about the military aspect, because the targets of military interventions 
may view R2P as a mechanism devised by powerful states to interfere in their internal affairs. 
Therefore, it is imperative to focus on how best this aspect may be implemented in order to 
allay the apprehensions of potential target states. 
The chapter discusses the links between the ICISS Report and the formal acceptance of R2P 
by the international community at the United Nations Sixtieth Anniversary World Summit in 
September 2005. The chapter examines the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change,46 as it relates to R2P, particularly the Panel’s addition of serious 
breaches of international humanitarian law to the just cause threshold and the rejection of the 
limits on the use of vetoes by the five permanent of the Security Council proposed in the 
ICISS Report.47 The inclusion of breaches humanitarian law is nebulous as to the situations 
where R2P is applicable, and therefore, as finally adopted by the World Summit, there is the 
necessity to be specific as to the crimes that may trigger military intervention. The Panel 
rejected the limits placed on the use of the veto unless the vital national interest of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council were at stake because it is very unlikely that the 
veto holders would have agreed to the 2005 World Summit Document with that proposal. 
Reference is also made to the African Union’s embrace of R2P in the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union.48 Furthermore, the chapter discusses the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document with the argument that R2P as currently understood is what the 2005 World 
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Summit endorsed, and not as originally envisaged in the ICISS Report; and therefore, it is the 
basis for the roadmap for implementing R2P,49 because the ICISS Report in its original form 
did not have international consensus, but the version adopted in the World Summit Document 
was endorsed by the largest gathering of world leaders at UN, and was therefore 
representative of the international community’s conception of R2P. To this end, the chapter 
discusses the World Summit’s refinement of the ICISS proposals on the responsibility to 
rebuild after a military intervention, limits to the use of the veto by the UN Security Council, 
criteria to guide decision-making about armed intervention, and the idea of the legitimacy of 
humanitarian interventions in the absence of Security Council authorisation.50 The 
requirement to rebuild after a military intervention does not seem to have been given much 
attention, because interveners appear to be interested only in the initial intervention itself 
without a post-intervention strategy and what happens thereafter. The responsibility to react 
or intervene goes hand in hand with responsibility to rebuild and address the causes of the 
conflict, otherwise the intervention would serve no useful purpose, as the current state of 
Libya illustrates.  NATO facilitated the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime and exited before a 
stable government replaced the ousted regime, leaving chaos in the wake of the intervention, 
and thereby causing more harm than the intervention was supposed to avert. Furthermore, 
authorisation of the Security Council is necessary if an intervention is to have legitimacy, and 
therefore, the World Summit Document recognised the Security Council as the sole body 
with the authority to give the mandate for military intervention for human protection 
purposes. In this context, the chapter discusses paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit 
Document on R2P, and the three core pillars of the concept put forward by the two 
paragraphs and articulated UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his report on Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect in January 2009, namely : (i) the primary responsibility of each 
state to protect its own population from the four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity and their incitement; (ii) the international 
community’s responsibility to undertake peaceful collective action to help states to exercise 
this responsibility, including concerted long-term capacity-building efforts and short-term 
preventive diplomacy; and (iii) the international community’s responsibility to be prepared to 
take collective action in a timely and decisive manner through the UN Security Council, in 
accordance with the UN Charter, if national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from these crimes. The discussion on the three pillars is important, because, 
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according to the UN Secretary-General’s report, they constitute the way forward for the 
implementation of R2P. The three pillars were summarised by the Secretary-General from the 
World Summit Outcome Document after concluding that they constituted the microcosm of 
the version of R2P that world leaders endorsed unanimously at the World Summit. He 
concludes in his report that the pillars provide support for the implementation of R2P. They 
are of equal importance, and the edifice of R2P will crumble without the support of these 
pillars.51 
3.1.1. Structure of the chapter 
The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses antecedents of sovereign responsibility in 
a historical context. The purpose is to illustrate that the idea of sovereign responsibility, that 
sovereignty entails both rights and responsibility, predates the concept of R2P.  The concept 
did not introduce an entirely new principle,52 and therefore, the responsibility of a state to 
promote the welfare of its nationals has always been inherent in the notion of sovereignty 
itself. This part discusses antecedents of sovereign responsibility, starting with the writings of 
early philosophers of absolute sovereignty such as Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel, John 
Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, who held the view that a sovereign owed a duty to obey 
divine and natural laws which included the responsibility to protect the safety of their people. 
The part also examines the African contribution to the evolution of R2P as well as the impact 
of Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen on the formulation of R2P by the ICISS. Part II discusses 
specific humanitarian crises in the 1990s, which played a defining role in the establishment of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 and the 
articulation of the principle of R2P. A discussion of international reaction is provided in 
relation to each of the humanitarian crises. To this end, this part discusses the humanitarian 
crises in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia.  Part III discusses 
the establishment of ICISS, the formulation of the concept of R2P, and the principles and 
dimensions of R2P set down in the ICISS report with a focus on the military aspect of the 
implementation of R2P. The R2P as adopted by the 2005 World Summit Document, 
paragraphs 138-140 in particular, and the three pillars put forward by the document, are 
discussed. This part concludes by examining why R2P has been applied in some instances but 
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not in others and further the manner in which R2P has been implemented in specific 
instances, in order to determine whether the concept was abused in these instances. 
3.2. Part I - Antecedents of Sovereign Responsibility 
The purpose of this part is to discuss antecedents of sovereign responsibility in order to put it 
in a historical context to set the stage for the discussion on R2P.The purpose is to illustrate 
that the idea of sovereign responsibility, which means that sovereignty entails both rights and 
responsibilities, predates R2P, and it is not an entirely new principle; and therefore, the 
responsibility of a state has always existed as it is inherent in the notion of sovereignty itself. 
It discusses the views of early philosophers on absolute sovereignty and provides a brief 
account of Africa’s contribution to the evolution of R2P as well as the impact of Deng and 
Cohen’s conceptualisation of “sovereignty as responsibility” on the formulation of R2P by 
the ICISS. The objective is to establish that the re-conceptualisation of sovereign 
responsibility by ICISS borrowed heavily from the pioneering work of Deng and Cohen, and 
further, that the notion of sovereignty as responsibility has its roots further back in history at 
times when human rights did not enjoy comparable recognition as they do in contemporary 
times; and therefore, R2P should be embraced in the contemporary era,  due the recognition 
that sovereignty entails both rights and responsibilities, and only states that protect the 
fundamental human rights of their nationals are “entitled to the full panoply of sovereign 
rights.” 53 Thus, a state that fails to protect the welfare of its citizens forfeits its right to non-
intervention, and, exposes its sovereignty to be violated in the name of human rights through 
external military intervention. 
3.2.1. Writings of philosopher of modern Europe 
This section discusses the writings of early European political theorists on sovereignty who 
subscribed to absolute sovereignty, and yet acknowledged the limitations on sovereignty 
imposed by natural and divine laws. They recognised that sovereign power was accompanied 
by responsibility to protect and promote the welfare of citizens, and therefore, if a sovereign 
disregarded this responsibility through tyrannical or oppressive rule, it provided a just cause 
for other sovereigns to intervene in his domain to protect the victims. The ICISS formulated 
R2P, but it would not be farfetched to claim that the views of these philosophers had some 
influence on the proposals of the Commission in the light of the similarities between the 
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proposals and the views of these theorists; and therefore, a discussion of the writings of these 
theorists is in order. The writings of philosophers of early modern Europe indicated that 
sovereignty entailed responsibilities.  As Glanville observes: 
Central to the theories of absolute sovereignty, therefore, was the interdependence 
of authority and responsibility. The authority of the sovereign was conceived to be 
limited by various divine, moral and juridical responsibilities and ideas of mutual 
obligations between ruler and subject. While sovereigns were not understood to be 
answerable to the people, they were certainly conceived to be responsible for the 
people and answerable to God. Moreover, rulers were also understood to be 
accountable to neighbouring princes for the performance of their sovereign 
responsibilities.54 
Glanville’s statement implies that early European political theorists conceived the notion of 
sovereignty as involving responsibilities. In theory, the sovereign’s power was absolute, but 
in practice, the sovereign’s power was limited by divine, moral, natural laws, and mutual 
obligations between ruler and subject. Subjects submitted to the authority of the ruler, and in 
turn, the ruler had the obligation to exercise authority with the welfare of the population in 
mind. The sovereign was not accountable to the people, but he was responsible for the 
welfare of the people. The sovereign was accountable to neighbouring princes to observe 
divine, natural, and moral laws, and if he failed in this duty, neighbouring princes could wage 
war on him to uphold divine and natural laws in his domain. The right to wage war in order to 
uphold natural law was considered to be the external corollary of the internal supreme power 
of the sovereign.55 Hugo Grotius, for example, justified war on a sovereign if he violated 
these laws by tyrannical and oppressive rule.56 In the mid-18th century,Vattel articulated the 
right of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, but he balanced this with the 
assertion that states that were tyrannical and oppressive should not benefit from the 
protection of the principle of non-intervention.57 Furthermore, the idea that a sovereign is 
responsible for the protection of the population is articulated in the theories about “popular 
sovereignty” espoused by John Locke and Jacques Rousseau and the American and French 
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revolutionaries.58 The early political theorists secularised St Aquinas’ doctrine “of lawful 
assistance to a people struggling against tyranny.”59 The writers justified intervention on the 
basis of the doctrines of natural law, natural rights, and just war out of concern for 
humanity.60 These natural rights were regarded as universal, conferred on all, simply for 
being human and obvious to all through the exercise of moral reasoning,61 and therefore, if a 
ruler was oppressive or tyrannical, foreign intervention was justified in the name of 
humanity.62 The views of these writers are reflected in the core principles of R2P that 
sovereignty entails not only rights, but also responsibilities and further that the welfare of 
nationals of a state is not the sole business of the state, but of the broad international 
community, and external intervention is justified to protect the victims of gross abuse of 
human rights. 
In essence, the idea that sovereignty involves responsibilities has deep historical roots and the 
views of the foregoing early European political theorists confirm the historical responsibility 
of the sovereign to protect his subjects, and the potential for external intervention as a 
consequence of the sovereign’s failure to discharge this responsibility. Despite their views 
that sovereignty was supreme, they maintained that a sovereign owed a duty to obey divine 
and natural laws, which included the responsibility to protect the safety of their people. It is 
submitted that, during the times of these philosophers, the protection of human rights had not 
gained widespread acceptance as they have now; yet they conceded that a sovereign’s power 
should not be exercised at the expense of the rights of the population. Therefore, in the post-
UN Charter era, when the recognition and promotion of human rights are duties imposed on 
member states of the UN, there is the need to strike a balance between the exercise of 
sovereign power and the protection of human rights. Therefore, where the excessive human 
rights abuses occur within a state, and the state is unwilling or unable to avert or halt it, there 
should be a mechanism to protect victims of these abuses.R2P was formulated by the ICISS 
as the concept to strike a balance between sovereignty and human rights protection in order to 
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address the thorny issue of mass atrocities, in advancement of its mandate to provide grounds 
for the legitimacy of military intervention for human protection purposes. 
3.2.2. Africa and the responsibility to protect 
This section gives a brief account of Africa’s connection with the principle of sovereignty as 
responsibility.Before the establishment of the ICISS and the formulation of R2P, Africa had 
already established the principle that, in the face of egregious violation of human rights, it 
was legitimate to intervene in the affected state to protect vulnerable populations by military 
force in order to redress grave humanitarian crises.63 Thus even though R2P may have been 
considered as a tool for powerful countries to meddle in the affairs of weak countries in the 
name of human rights, Africa appreciated R2P as an endorsement of its existing security 
mechanism, and therefore, a necessary tool to address the issue of mass atrocities.The 
inability of the OAU to prevent the atrocities in Uganda under Idi Amin’s rule during the 
1970s and horror of the Rwanda genocide in 1994 persuaded African states to develop a 
peace and security architecture in the mid-1990s to prevent mass atrocities, to protect 
victims64 after their struggle for independence and self-determination.  Having emerged from 
the oppression of colonialism and its attendant injustices, African states were expected to be 
at the forefront of the defence and promotion of human rights for their peoples. As a result, as 
early as the 1990s, African states exhibited a willingness to tolerate interference in the 
domestic affairs of states to end conflicts, and protect human rights if the intervention was 
conducted by other African states.65  In 1992, the Secretary-General of the OAU, SalimSalim, 
obviously with the idea of sovereign responsibility in mind, stated that “the doctrine of non-
interference precludes the possibility of accountability on the part of states” and argued that 
there was the need to “maintain a balance between national sovereignty and international 
responsibility.”66 He went further to express the need to reconsider sovereignty: “We should 
talk about the need for accountability of governments and of their national and international 
responsibilities. In the process, we shall be redefining sovereignty.”67  During the same year, 
Salim reminded Africans of the values of kinship, and argued that “We in Africa need to use 
our own cultural and social relationships to interpret the principle of non-intervention in such 
a way that we are enabled to apply it to our advantage in conflict prevention and 
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resolution.”68  In other words, sovereignty entails accountability of the state not only to its 
nationals, but also to the international community to ensure the protection by the state of its 
population. We Africans are one people, only separated by artificial borders. Therefore, each 
African is his brother’s keeper, and therefore, the plight of Africans in one state should be of 
concern to every African. In 1998, at a summit of the OAU, Nelson Mandela added his voice 
to the call for sovereign responsibility, declaring that: 
Africa has a right and a duty to intervene to root out tyranny” and “we must all 
accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of 
the continent the right and duty to intervene when behind those sovereign 
boundaries people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny.69 
Mandela’s statement shows that Africa was ahead of the formulation of R2P, and is 
anaffirmation of Africa’s belief that a state has the responsibility to protect its people from 
mass atrocities. If it fails in this duty, sovereignty should not be a barrier to international 
action in defence of victims of mass atrocities. Africa’s early embrace of the principle of 
sovereign responsibility is manifest in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, signed on 
11 July 2000 in Lome, Togo. The Act affirms the territorial integrity and independence of its 
Members States,70 and non-interference by any Member State in the internal Affairs of 
another.71 However, the Act vests in the organisation the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State…in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity.72  It is striking that these three crimes are among the four in R2P adopted 
by the 2005 World Summit. While recognising the sovereignty of member states, the Act also 
emphasises that sovereignty does not carry only rights but also responsibilities regarding the 
welfare of the populations of member states. This was the “first international treaty to provide 
such a right of intervention.”73 Furthermore, the African Union’s Common Position on UN 
reform, ‘The Ezulwini Consensus,74 while acknowledging the sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity of states, reiterates “the obligation of states to protect their citizens.”75 At 
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the regional level, the Economic Community of African States has arrogated to itself the right 
of intervention when a member state is unwilling or unable to protect citizens.76 Thus if a 
member state fails to discharge the responsibility to protect by committing or permitting the 
commission of gross human rights abuses in its territory, its sovereignty has to yield to the 
collective regional responsibility to intervene to protect the vulnerable population. The shift 
from “non-interference” to “non-indifference” has been characterised by the African Union 
as its acceptance of sovereignty as responsibility.77 Indeed, it has been asserted, and rightly 
so, that “in some respects, concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and RtoP emerged from 
Africa.”78 There is justified apprehension by militarily weak countries that R2P was contrived 
by the powerful countries in West to give them a pretext to intervene in their internal affairs. 
The fact that almost all military interventions in the name of human rights, for example in 
Libya, Northern Iraq, Haiti, and Kosovo have all been led by the United States, and its 
Western allies provide justification for this apprehension. However, Africa’s firm embrace of 
the concept illustrated by its own security mechanism, tempers the belief that R2P is an 
entirely Western idea, pitching the West against the rest of the world.  
3.2.3. Francis Deng and the idea of “Sovereignty as Responsibility” 
In the discussion on the evolution of R2P, the contribution of Francis Deng and his 
collaborator, Roberta Cohen cannot be discounted,79foreven though the ICISS developed 
R2P, the Commission’s recommendations followed a path laid out by Francis Deng and 
Roberta Cohen.80  The R2P Report was built on Deng’s earlier work which declared 
sovereignty as a responsibility primarily resting on a state with a residual international 
responsibility to protect where the state is unwilling or unable to discharge that 
responsibility,81 and therefore, it is argued that the ICISS borrowed heavily from the 
pioneering work of Deng and Cohen, a contribution which deserves acknowledgement. The 
immediate stimulus for the idea was the appointment of Francis M. Deng by then Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on 
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Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).82 Deng and his colleague faced the challenge of “how to 
work around the denial of assistance by sovereign authorities,” 83 the challenge of how to 
persuade state authorities to improve the protection given to IDPs, “and find a way to 
navigate around the potential denial of humanitarian assistance by sovereigns.”84 As Deng 
expressed it, IDPs are supposed to be under the protection of their own governments, yet their 
displacement is often brought about by their own governments.85 In order to overcome the 
denial of humanitarian assistance to IDPs, Deng and Cohen came up with the principle of 
“sovereignty as responsibility.”86 The concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” meant that 
sovereignty entails the responsibility of governments to protect their citizens,87 and that when 
states are unable to provide protection to their people from serious harm, they are expected to 
call for external assistance and accept such assistance.88 If they refuse and their people 
continue to suffer, the international community will intervene. The principle was articulated 
by Deng as follows:  
Sovereignty as responsibility meant that the state has to take care of its citizens, 
and if – it needed support – call on the sub-regional, regional or continental 
organizations, or ultimately the international community. But if it did not do that, 
and its peoples were suffering and dying, the world would not watch and do 
nothing. They would find a way of getting involved.89 
This statement is explicitly captured in the core principles of R2P formulated by the ICISS, 
that a state has the primary responsibility to protect its nationals, and where it fails, the duty 
to protect falls on the international community which illustrates further the major contribution 
of Deng to the emergence of R2P. Deng and his colleague Cohen had the responsibility of 
persuading governments to provide protection for internally displaced persons, and their 
guiding principle was that the primary responsibility for the protection of IDPs rested with 
the host government.90  If the state was unable to discharge this responsibility, it should ask 
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for and welcome international assistance.91 International assistance so provided would 
facilitate the state’s discharge of its sovereign responsibilities, thereby gaining recognition as 
a legitimate member of international community.92 The idea was that “sovereignty carries 
with it a responsibility on the part of governments to protect their citizens” and Deng 
reframed sovereignty as far from a right, and entailed benefits as well as responsibilities of 
the state towards its citizens and the international community.93 Thus, Deng advocated a shift 
of the meaning of sovereignty from the Westphalian model, under which the sovereign had 
the right to decide matters within its territory independent of external interference, to an idea 
of sovereignty entailing both rights and responsibilities. The implication was that failure to 
discharge this responsibility entailed international consequences, ranging from diplomacy to 
political pressure, sanctions, and as a last resort, military intervention.94  This concept was at 
variance with the notion of traditional sovereignty that a state could do whatever it wished 
within its territory without external consequences. The implication of the concept of 
sovereignty as responsibility was that sovereignty should be conditional on the protection of 
the human rights of its population by the state.  This idea pioneered by Deng and Cohen, 
though in relation to IDPs undoubtedly had influence on the formulation of R2P by the 
ICISS. This is demonstrated by the similarities between the idea of “sovereignty as 
responsibility” and the core principles of R2P, namely: that a state has a responsibility to 
protect its nationals, and: where it is unable or unwilling to do so the international community 
has a responsibility to protect vulnerable nationals. In both scenarios, where a state fails to 
discharge the responsibility to protect its nationals there is the potential of international 
consequences. The formulation of Deng and his colleagues finally became “a central 
conceptual underpinning of the responsibility to protect,”95 a view shared by W. Burke-White 
with the observation that Deng’s reframing of the Westphalian sovereignty of exclusive 
authority to the notion of sovereignty entailing both rights and duties laid the groundwork for 
R2P.96 The foregoing buttress the immensity of the contribution of Deng and his colleagues 
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to the awareness of the international community of the imperative to protect victims of mass 
atrocities, and doubtlessly helped in the broad acceptance of R2P by the 2005 World Summit. 
The basis of state responsibility towards their nationals can also be found in the protection of 
human rights espoused in human rights instruments such as the UN Charter 1945, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1984, and other international and regional 
human rights instruments such as the Genocide Convention 1948, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, (ICCPR) 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969, 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, that have followed in the wake 
of the UDHR affirm international concerns about how states treat their nationals. Many of the 
rights and obligations found in these human rights instruments are similar to those contained 
in R2P, and therefore, R2P cannot be appreciated and assessed if disconnected from these 
roots;97 for the worldwide recognition of human rights emanating from these international 
instruments contributed to the unanimous endorsement of R2P at the 2005 World Summit. 
3.3. Part II - International Humanitarian Crises in the 1990s 
The purpose of Part II is to discuss humanitarian crises during the 1990s which triggered 
debates about how the international community should react to gross human rights abuses 
within the boundaries of sovereign states and the need for a reconsideration of the concept of 
armed humanitarian intervention. The international community had to grapple with how to 
reconcile respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights of victims of gross 
human rights abuses, because the inviolability of state sovereignty had hitherto provided 
immunity to states that abused the human rights of their nationals because sovereignty served 
as barrier to external action.  In the 1990s, in the face of humanitarian crises in several 
countries, international community failed to react at all or effectively in defence of victims. 
The atrocities committed during these crises and the ineffective response of the international 
community led to debates about whether the international community should stick to the 
existing notion of difference to sovereignty and non-intervention, or to give preference to 
human rights over sovereignty. This part investigates international reaction and inaction in 
the face of humanitarian crises in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, and 
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Kosovo, because of the defining roles these crises played in the debates on humanitarian 
intervention, which culminated in the establishment of ICISS and the formulation of the 
concept of R2P.Thehorrendous atrocities committed during these crises directly led to the 
formulation of R2P, which placed the protection of human rights above respect for 
sovereignty, and thereby paved the way for the legitimate violation of a state’s sovereignty in 
the name of human rights.  
3.3.1. Northern Iraq 1991- 
This section discusses the humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq which followed the expulsion 
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, when the Kurds in Northern Iraq sought independence 
from the weakened Saddam Hussein regime.98 The Kurds had suffered years of oppression 
and other human right abuses at the hands of the regime. The most atrocious abuse was the 
al-Anneal campaign in which Saddam’s forces slaughtered an estimated 100,000 Kurdish 
villagers, most of them with chemical weapons, and reduced hundreds of villages to rubble.99 
The Kurds took advantage of the weakened state of the regime in an attempt to free 
themselves from years of oppression. It examines international reaction to the crisis and the 
role the crisis played in the establishment of ICISS and the formulation of R2P. President 
George Bush had during the war encouraged Iraqi citizens to “take matters into their own 
hands” and oust Saddam Hussein from power.100 In response, the defeat of the Iraqi army by 
coalition forces ignited the independence aspirations of Kurds in Northern Iraq,101 and the 
Shia Arabs in the southern marshlands, with the encouragement of the United States.102  
However, the Bush administration, after inciting the rebellion initially, decided not to assist 
the Kurds, because it considered their struggle as an internal conflict.103  The uprising by 
Kurdish forces to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein failed and the regime sent the 
Iraqi army into Kurdish villages to suppress the rebellion, and to teach the Kurds a lesson, 
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leading to a massive flight of refugees towards the border of Turkey.104 It is estimated that 
government soldiers killed as many as 20,000 Kurds, most of them civilians, during the 
operation to suppress the rebellion.105 By 5 April 1991, about 2 million Kurdish refugees had 
sought refuge in the areas between Iraq, and Turkey and Iran,106 at the mercy of advancing 
Iraqi troops.107 The displaced people were exposed to the extreme cold weather, and lack of 
food and water.108  Humanitarian organisations were under these war conditions, unable to 
gain access to provide aid to the refugees, and as a consequence, between 10,000 and 30,000 
Kurdish refugees died of exposure and starvationwithin a few weeks.109 This amounted to a 
serious humanitarian crisis that justified international military reaction. 
International reaction 
The section discusses international response to the crisis. In the face of excessive human 
suffering, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 688, demanding that Iraq allow 
immediate access to international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance 
in all parts of Iraq, and appealed to member state of the UN and regional organisations “to 
contribute to these humanitarian efforts.”110  Saddam’s efforts to put down the rebellion led to 
a massive flight of refugees, and as noted above, an estimated 30,000 died within a few 
weeks.  This was a humanitarian crisis of biblical proportions, and required the efforts of the 
entire international community to come to the aid of the victims. By authorising intervention 
in Northern Iraq under Resolution 688, the Security Council for the first time classified state 
repression as a threat to international peace and security when it caused massive flight of 
refugees.111 Western governments were initially unwilling to intervene, but were galvanised 
into action by televised images of dying Kurds.112 Even though the Security Council did not 
authorize intervention, President Bush stated on 16 April 1991 that “consistent with” 
Resolution 688 United States troops would enter Northern Iraq on the basis of overwhelming 
                                                          
104 A. Krieg, Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations, Springer,  
      (2012), p. 69. 
105D. MacDowall,A Modern History of the Kurds, I. B. Tauris: London, (1996), pp. 372-373. 
106P. V. Jakobsen, National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the  
Cold War? Sage Publications, London, (1996), p. 208. 
107Krieg, note 104 supra, p. 69. 
108Seybolt, note 102 supra, p. 48. 
109 M. A. Ryter, Motives for Humanitarian Intervention and the International Community, National Defence  
      College, Helsinki, (2003), p. 37.  
110 UNSC Resolution 688 (1991) 
111Seybolt, note 102 supra,p. 52. 
112Ibid. p. 49. 
222 
 
humanitarian concern for the refugees.113 He declared: “Some might argue that this is an 
intervention into the internal affairs of Iraq. But I think the humanitarian concern, the refugee 
concern, is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of understanding about this.”114 
Purporting to act under Resolution 688, the United States, France, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom launched Operation Provide Comfort, “the first humanitarian intervention in the 
post-cold war era.”115 To facilitate the delivery of aid to the refugees, the United States, 
United Kingdom, and France on 18 April 1991 began relief flights dropping aid supplies to 
refugees on the Iraq-Turkey border.116 These countries created “safe havens” in Northern Iraq 
which would later expand into a “no-fly zone” to protect refugees.117  The US and its allies 
provided no legal justification for the no-fly zones, and “many countries and observers have 
contested the actual legality of the enforcement effort.”118 Nevertheless, Operation Provide 
Comfort assisted displaced Kurds and saved the lives of “over 7000 Kurdish refugees.”119 
There was a real humanitarian crisis in Northern Iraq with the lives and welfare of a large 
number of people at stake. This intervention appears to have been motivated by altruism to 
assist the suffering Kurdish refugees.  However, it was also motivated by a sense of moral 
obligation, because the Kurds were encouraged to rebel against Saddam Hussein’s regime by 
President George Bush himself, and therefore, the US and its allies were making amends for 
his call to arms.  Whatever the motive, this was a situation where grave human rights abuses 
were being perpetrated by a state against its own population, and the international community 
could not stand idly by but take action, even if unauthorised, to protect the defenseless 
victims. Having incited the Kurds to rise up against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the US 
had a moral obligation to intervene militarily to alleviate their suffering. The moral obligation 
aside, it was the responsibility of the international community to react robustly in defense of 
vulnerable people against a state that had not only failed in its primary responsibility to 
protect the welfare of its own people, but had instead been the perpetrator of atrocities against 
them. The intervention of the US and its allies in Northern was a precursor of R2P. In 
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agreement, Seybold observes that the intervention “opened the door to subsequent 
humanitarian interventions.”120 
3.3.2. Somalia 
This section examines the events that led to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia following the 
end of President Said Barre’s rule in January 1991. The end of President Said Barre’s rule in 
Somalia created a power vacuum, and led to the deterioration of the political situation in the 
country as a result of clashes among different clans.121  The section discusses international 
reaction to the crisis and the impact of the crisis on future humanitarian interventions, 
because Somalia demonstrated the risks of humanitarian intervention to the interveners, 
particularly after the death of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu in October 1993.  The political 
chaos and civil war in Somalia was classified by the Security Council as constituting “a threat 
to international peace and security”,122 thereby paving the way for collective action. On 24 
April 1992, in response to the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the Security Council 
adopted resolution 751 which established UNOSOM I.The crisis in Somalia contributed to 
international consciousness that when intrastate conflict results in massive human suffering, 
external intervention to end the suffering is justified even without the consent of state 
authorities, and more so, where no government existed as was the case in Somalia. 
By the end of 1991, the warring clans had destroyed agricultural lands and livestock 
production in the country.123 The hostilities led to widespread death and destruction, and the 
mass displacement of the population, raising the need for emergency humanitarian 
assistance.124 Humanitarian aid channeled through NGOs was seized by local militias who 
sold the supplies to civilians.125 The population was threatened by severe famine, and it is 
estimated that by early 1992, 300,000 Somalis had perished of starvation, at least one and 
half million faced the same fate, while almost one million had become refugees in 
                                                          
120Ibid. p. 52. 
121 United Nations Operations in Somalia, (UNISOM I), available at  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unisom1backgr2.html [Accessed 06 June 2016]. 
122Security Council Resolution 733, (Implementing an Arms Embargo on Somalia) (S/Res/733). Adopted by the  
     Security Council on 23 January 1992. Available at: 
https://www/umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres733.html 
[Accessed 06 June 2016]. 
123Krieg, note 104,p. 72. 
124 Ibid. 
125UNOSOM I, note 121. 
224 
 
neighbouring countries.126 Scenes of starving and dying Somalis, beamed on television 
around the world, captured the attention of the international community.127   It dawned on the 
international community that the political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread 
banditry, looting, the extent of physical destruction, and the continuing conflict posed a threat 
to international peace and security in the Horn of Africa region.128 An intrastate conflict does 
not only impact the state affected, but has implications for international peace and security, 
because its spillover effects affect neighbouring countries and the broad international 
community. Therefore, every member of the international community has a responsibility to 
participate in steps aimed at bringing such crises to a peaceful resolution. 
International reaction 
UNOSOM I 
This section discusses international reaction to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Why? 
Despite the seriousness of the situation, no government acted to help the Somali people until 
the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accused political leaders of racism for 
acting in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not Somalia.129 The challenge prompted the 
Security Council to classify the political chaos and civil war in Somalia as constituting “a 
threat to international peace and security”,130 paving the way for collective action. On 24 
April 1992, in response to the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the Security Council 
adopted resolution 751 which established UNOSOM I, comprising 50 military observers and 
a 500-strong infantry to provide United Nations convoys with military escort.131 However, in 
the absence of a government capable of maintaining law and order, and the failure of various 
factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the mission experienced increased hijacking of 
vehicles, looting of convoys and warehouses, and repeated attacks on the personnel and 
equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.132 As a result of these reasons and 
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the small number of soldiers in the mission, UNOSOM I was unsuccessful in discharging its 
peacekeeping mandate.133 An intervention should have reasonable prospects of success, 
otherwise there is no justification for commencing it. Potential interveners should ensure that 
there are available resources to achieve the objective of the mission, or else the intervention 
may end up exacerbating the problems the intervention was meant to solve: or worse, it may 
result in a greater conflict than the one the intervention was meant to resolve.  
UNITAF 
This section discusses the authorisation of the use of force by the Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, following the failure of UNOSOM I. The use of force should 
be the last resort where possible, and UNOSOM I having failed because non-coercive 
measures had proved inadequate, force was the only alternative.In a letter to the Security 
Council on 24 November 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported on the 
deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors impeding 
UNOSOM I from implementing its mandate.134  He concluded that there was no alternative 
but to resort to the enforcement measures under Charter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.135 He argued that this was necessary, since “no government exists in Somalia that 
could request and allow such use of force.”136 On 3 December 1992, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 794 (1992), authorising the use “of all necessary means to 
establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia.”137 The resolution led to the establishment of UNITAF (United Task Force), a 
multinational force led by the United States to use all necessary means to establish a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations.138 On 4 June 1992, in his Address on 
Somalia, President George Bush stated: “The people of Somalia, especially the children of 
Somalia need our help. We’re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must 
give them hope. America must act.”139 On 9 December 1992, President Bush ordered the 
deployment of 28,000 American soldiers in Mogadishu in Operation Restore Hope with the 
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principal goal of establishing a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance.140  For 
the first time, the Security Council authorised military intervention strictly for humanitarian 
purposes under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.141 It has been observed that, for the first time, 
the Security Council had “explicitly authorized a substantial military intervention by member 
states to protect a population without an invitation from the government of the target 
state.”142  Military intervention for human protection purposes involves the violation of a 
state’s sovereignty, and therefore, unless the state authorities are the perpetrators of the 
atrocity, their consent should be sought. However, where no government exists, such consent 
should not be a condition for intervention, because there is no authority to grant the consent. 
Transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II 
This section discusses the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, 143and the withdrawal of 
the United States and the rest of UNOSOM II from Somalia. UNITAF was US-led, and 
consisted predominantly of American soldiers and after the loss they suffered on 3 October 
1993, the United States withdrew its soldiers from Somalia, resulting in a domino effect and 
the withdrawal of the rest of UNOSOM II.UNOSOM II was established by Security Council 
resolution 814 (1993)144 to facilitate a prompt and smooth transition from UNITAF to a UN-
led intervention. UNOSOM II was tasked to take necessary action including enforcement 
measures to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.  The 
transition failed to stem the factional fighting in Mogadishu which culminated in the killing 
of 24 Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu, on 5 June 1993.145  On 3 October 1993, during 
fighting in Mogadishu between US soldiers and Somali militia, 18 US soldiers were killed 
and 84 wounded.146 On 7 October 1993, the US withdrew its soldiers from Somalia.147 The 
withdrawal of the rest of UNOSOM II mission was completed by 28 March 1995, ending 
UNOSOM II.148 What had started as a humanitarian mission to alleviate the suffering of the 
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Somali people, “ended with a firefight during the Battle of Mogadishu.”149 Nevertheless, 
UNITAF and UNISOM II were beneficial to the Somali people because more than 250,000 
lives were saved as a result of these missions.150Definitely, the human losses suffered by the 
United States and the United Nations were bound to influence international action or inaction 
in the face of subsequent humanitarian crises, and in particular, the Rwandan tragedy. These 
losses were bound to result in the hesitation of the international community in intervening by 
force to protect suffering populations in other cases. This possibly played a role in the lack of 
response of the international community and especially the United States, to the Rwandan 
genocide, as will become evident in the discussion on Rwanda below. An intervening state 
has to take into account matters such as the risk to its military personnel apart from other 
national interests. Where a country suffers heavy casualties as the US did in Somalia, it is 
reasonable that it will hesitate to plunge into future interventions unless its vital national 
interests are at stake, even if such inaction leads to genocide. 
While it may be argued that a state may not intervene on behalf of a suffering people unless it 
stands to gain an advantage, whether strategic or economic, the example of the United States’ 
intervention in Somalia demonstrates that this is not always the case. In the case of Somalia, 
President Bush expressed concern for the suffering people of Somalia. The paramount 
objective of the intervention was therefore, humanitarian, i.e., to bring relief to suffering 
Somalis. With regard to Resolution 794 (1992), which authorised the use of force and the 
establishment of UNITAF, its importance is that it overrode state sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention and established that human suffering within the borders of a 
sovereign state constitutes a threat to international peace and security; and therefore, external 
armed intervention was justified. It also established that consent to intervene in a state is not 
required from the state where there is no functioning central government. The resolution also 
demonstrated the willingness of the international community to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of a state in the interest of human rights.  Intervention without the consent of the target 
state was appropriate in this instance, because there was no central government in Somalia. 
With the advent of R2P, the consent of the government of a target state of intervention may 
not always be a precondition, if the government is unable or unwilling to halt gross human 
rights abuses within the state.151 The events in Somalia contributed to the shaping of positive 
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international attitudes towards the emerging concept of R2P. As observed by Scheffer, in the 
light of the crisis in Somalia, “a new standard of intolerance for human misery and human 
atrocities has taken hold….Something quite significant has occurred to raise the 
consciousness of nations to the plight of peoples within sovereign borders.”152 Over the next 
few years after Somalia, the Security Council demonstrated its willingness to “authorize 
interventions in the affairs of sovereign states in response to internal crises,”153 with examples 
in Rwanda, and Kosovo. The international community accepted the reality that sovereignty 
should not be a barrier to international action to avert or halt atrocities committed during 
intrastate conflicts. 
3.3.3. Rwanda 
This section provides a discussion of the events that led to the genocide and an investigation 
of the consequences of the inaction or late action by the international community. The 
horrendous scale of the genocide laid bare the consequences of inaction. There is no doubt 
that if the international community had the will to avert the tragedy, and a sizeable well-
equipped military force had intervened in a timely manner, the genocide would not have cost 
so many lives. It brought the realisation to the international community that there was the 
need for the formulation of a mechanism to avert future mass killings or at least to protect the 
victims. In 1993, the three-year civil war between the two major ethnic groups in Rwanda, 
the Hutus represented by the government of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the rebel 
Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), was brought to end by the international community 
with the signing of the power-sharing agreement under the Arusha Accords.154  On 5 October 
1993, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established by Security 
Council Resolution 872 (1993) to supervise the implementation of the Accords and to ensure 
the security of the capital Kigali, rather than to engage in peace enforcement.155 The Accords 
has been described as “a veritable coup d’état by the RPF.”156 Wheeler states that the ‘peace 
process was doomed from the outset,’ because the Accords were unrealistic and unworkable 
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by giving more power to the rebels and small opposition parties at the expense of the 
government.157 The Arusha Accords did not satisfy the demands of both parties, and as 
observed by Lewicki, Saunders and Minton, “parties who do not think they got the best 
agreement possible, or who believe that they lost something in the deal, frequently try to get 
out of the agreement later or find other ways to recoup their losses.”158 In compliance with 
one of the elements of R2P, namely the responsibility to rebuild, efforts should be made to 
address the root causes of the conflict, otherwise, the conflict is bound to reignite. It appears 
that the Arusha Accords did not take this cardinal rule into account, leading to the outbreak of 
hostilities and the subsequent genocide.   
PresidentHabiyarimana was under pressure by the international community to implement the 
power-sharing Arusha Accords. However, to do so would mean the end of his 20-year, one-
party rule.159 Extremists in the military and government were bitterly opposed to the peace 
process and dismayed by the Arusha Accords.160 Soon after the signing of the Accords, 
extremists within Habyarimana’s government started to kill Tutsis in an attempt to derail the 
peace process.161A Hutu elite came to believe that Hutu salvation depended on Tutsi 
extermination.162 On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana’s private plane was shot down as 
it returned to Rwanda from a conference in Tanzania, killing him, Burundian President 
CyprienNtaryamira and their entourages.163 Those who committed this murder were not 
identified, but it has been suggested that it was most likely extremists among his supporters 
who referred to Habyarimana’s signing of the Arusha Accords as “an act of high treason”, 
who assassinated him.164 However, militant Hutus attributed the assassination of the 
President to Tutsi rebels. Within hours of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, units of the 
Rwandan army, and government-backed extremist militia (Interahamwe165 and 
Impuzamugambi)166 set up road blocks, and began the organized slaughter of about one 
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million Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, within a period of 100 days,167  between 6 April and 19 
July 1994. This was a horrendous atrocity and a crime against humanity, and was “executed 
with a brutality and sadism that defy imagination.”168 The Rwandan genocide met the 
threshold of an acute humanitarian emergency, because “…the survival of populations and 
entire ethnic groups was seriously compromised…,”169 and therefore, the international 
community should have reacted with force in a timely manner to save the victims. 
International reaction 
This section discusses consequences of international inaction in the face of the human 
tragedy that unfolded in Rwanda. If the international community had reacted at the beginning 
of the genocide, thousands of lives would have been saved. What makes the Rwandan 
genocide different from other mass atrocities is that the international community could have 
taken steps to minimise or avert the genocide,170 because it had prior knowledge that ethnic 
killing on a massive scale was about to be perpetrated; yet no action was taken to avert it until 
it was too late for nearly a million victims who lost their lives.  As stated in the report of the 
International Panel of Eminent Personalities: 
No controversy about the genocide is more vexing than whether the world knew it 
was coming yet failed to take decisive steps to prevent it…There can be not an iota 
of doubt that the international community knew the following: that something 
terrible was underway in Rwanda, that serious plans were afoot for even more 
appalling deeds, that these went far beyond routine thuggery, and that the world 
nevertheless stood by and did nothing.171 
The attitude of the United Nations in particular was inexplicable, because in the age of 
worldwide access to wireless communication, what was unfolding in Rwanda could not have 
been a secret. So, the United Nations Security Council and, by extension, the international 
community could not have claimed ignorance, and therefore if there was the political will to 
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take timely action, hundreds of thousands of lives would have been saved. Cables sent by 
Commander of UNAMIR, General Romeo Dellaire, to the UN Secretariat in the months 
before the genocide had warned of mass ethnic killing, and pleaded for permission to 
undertake military operations.172 Instead, the UN Secretariat ordered the peacekeepers to 
remain “impartial”.173 UNAMIR itself was subjected to attacks, possibly with the objective of 
driving the Mission out of Rwanda.174  This objective was to an extent accomplished because, 
on 7 April 1992, the Prime Minister of Rwanda, AgatheUwilingiyimana, and 10 Belgian 
peacekeepers of UNAMIR protecting her were killed, which prompted the Belgian 
Government to withdraw its battalion from UNAMIR.175 In its letter of withdrawal to the 
Secretary-General, the Government of Belgium stated that UNAMIR was “pointless and 
powerless in the face of the worsening situation,” because Belgian soldiers faced an 
“unacceptable risk…making continuation of the Belgian presence impossible.”176 When the 
violence erupted, the Secretary-General, in a report dated 20 April 1994 to the Security 
Council, recommended the withdrawal of UNAMIR, stating that UNAMIR personnel 
“cannot be left at risk indefinitely when there is no possibility of their performing the tasks 
for which they were dispatched.”177 On 21 April 1994, in the midst of press reports of some 
100,000 dead in Rwanda,178 the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR military 
personnel to 270.179 Consequently, when the genocide started, the Commander of UNAMIR, 
General Romeo Dallaire had to stand by passively watching hundreds of thousands of Tutsis 
being slaughtered.180 
Concerns about infringing Rwandan sovereignty was not the reason for the reluctance of the 
major powers to intervene in Rwanda, and as articulated by then Secretary-General of the 
UN, Kofi Annan: 
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Confronted by gross violations of human rights in Rwanda and elsewhere, the 
failure to intervene was driven more by the reluctance of Member States to pay the 
human and other costs of intervention…than by concerns about sovereignty.181 
What defies understanding is that in the face of horrendous killings, American officials 
shunned the use of the word ‘genocide’ to describe the slaughter for fear that using it would 
have obliged the United States to act under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention.182 
The United States opposed the idea of reinforcements, no matter where they were from.183 
Even if a belated intervention could have saved a “quarter of the ultimate Tutsi victims, that 
still means approximately, 125,000 innocent lives could have been spared.”184 As Barnett 
puts it: 
The fact of willful indifference continues to amaze. The Rwandan genocide is not 
only about the evil that is possible. It is also about the complacency exhibited by 
those who have the responsibility to confront that evil. 
In other words, the international community abdicated its responsibility to come to the 
assistance of helpless victims of horrendous mass atrocity. Finally, on 18 June 1994, three 
months after the eruption of the genocide and after hundreds of thousands have been killed, 
France announced that it was willing to establish a ‘humanitarian protected zone’ covering 
about one fifth of Rwandan territory as a safe haven for refugees.185 On 22 June 1994, 
Security Council by its Resolution 929 (1994) authorised the French initiative, Operation 
Turquoise, “to use all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives.” Operation 
Turquoise was launched on 22 June 1994 when 2500 French soldiers and 500 soldiers from 
African countries entered Rwanda.186  On 22 July 1994, the United States and the United 
Kingdom launched Operation Support Hope in support of humanitarian relief operations in 
Rwanda.187 This, however, came too late for the nearly one million dead victims. The United 
Nations failed in Rwanda. According to the UN Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the 
United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda: 
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The failure by the United Nations to prevent and subsequently to stop the genocide 
in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. The 
fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to 
developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a 
persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough 
assertiveness. This lack of political will affected the response of the Secretariat and 
decision-making by the Security Council, but was also evident in the recurrent 
difficulties to get the necessary troops for UNIMIR.188 
The lack of political will on the part of world leaders meant that adequate resources could not 
be marshalled to facilitate a timely intervention to save lives.  The attitude of the international 
community to the crisis was inexcusable because one would have expected that world leaders 
would have learnt a lesson from the horrors of the Holocaust, and therefore, taken steps to 
ensure that killings on a massive scale should not happen again. To put it bluntly, the world 
abandoned Rwanda. The international community was aware that mass killings were going 
on in Rwanda; yet the international community watched the genocide unfolding, but did little 
to halt or alleviate the suffering of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. If the acclaimed 
proponents of human rights, such as the United States, had the will to intervene at the outset 
of the genocide, thousands of lives would have been saved. As for the United States, despite 
the debacle in Somalia, as the self-proclaimed leader of the free world and the only country 
with the resources and military might to intervene, it did not have very good reasons to stand 
by. It is clear that the major western powers had no national interests in Rwanda. Respect for 
the sovereignty of Rwanda could not have been the restraining factor for the unwillingness of 
the international community to intervene, because in 1991, the United Nations had under 
similar circumstances, under Resolution 688, declared that the mass killing of Kurds in 
Northern Iraq by the forces of Saddam Hussein constituted a threat to international peace of 
security, thereby paving the way for intervention by the United States and its allies. Further, a 
year after the Rwandan genocide, following the massacre of Srebrenica, NATO unleashed an 
air campaign on 11 July 1995 to protect civilians.189 However, in the case of Rwanda, the 
major powers were reluctant to come to the defence of victims of massacre on a larger scale, 
and when they did it, came too late for nearly one million victims. The Rwanda genocide in 
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1994 was the most atrocious event which persuaded governments “that more needed to be 
done to prevent mass atrocities and protect vulnerable people.”190  The critical role that the 
genocide played in the development of the idea of international intervention in conflicts 
within state borders finds expression in the ICISS Report, that, “We want no more 
Rwandas…”191 The inaction of the UN in the case of Rwanda has been described as “the 
worst decision the United Nations ever made.”192  However, one positive outcome of the 
Rwandan genocide is that it strengthened international resolve that such a tragedy should 
never be allowed to happen again without robust international reaction, and thereby, served 
as a catalyst to the development of the concept of R2P.193 The Rwandan genocide led to the 
reassessment of the meaning, limits and obligations of sovereignty.194 In agreement, Weiss 
observes that the inaction of the international community in Rwanda was one of the 
“immediate stimuli” to the 2001 ICISS report, The Responsibility to Protect.195 The scale of 
the horror of the Rwanda genocide demonstrated the consequences of inaction by the 
international community in the face of mass killings, which led to the urgent need to devise a 
mechanism to avert or to react to future mass atrocities and the ultimate formulation of R2P. 
3.3.4. Bosnia  
This section discusses briefly the history of Yugoslavia, because the cause of the conflict 
originated from long standing ethnic tensions and animosities among the groups making up 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  It discusses international reaction and the contribution 
of the crisis to the formulation of R2P because like other humanitarian crises preceding the 
formulation of R2P, it brought awareness to the international community of the need to 
devise a way to protect victims of mass atrocities, thereby contributing to the emergence of 
R2P. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprising Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed after World War II with a population comprising a 
number of ethnic groups including: Orthodox Christian Serbs, Catholic Croats, Muslim 
Bosnians and Muslim ethnic Albanians.196 Throughout the history of the Balkans, there has 
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always been tension between these groups, but Yugoslavia’s President Josip Broz Tito 
managed to keep ethnic tensions under control with an iron fist.197 Following the death of 
President Tito the ethnic and religious divisions within the federation which Tito’s thirty-five 
year rule had concealed emerged, and the federation began to unravel.198  Yugoslavia 
descended into chaos, and the country spiraled out of control,199 as the republics and ethnic 
groups began to proclaim their independence.200 Conflict in a disintegrating state would mean 
that civilians would be caught in the crossfire of belligerent forces, leading to large scale 
human rights abuses of civilians.  
On 25 June 1991, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared unilateral independence 
from the Yugoslavia state.201 The proclamation of independence by the two republics had a 
profound effect on events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a multiethnic republic consisting of 
about 45 percent Muslim, 32 percent Serbs and 18 percent Croats;202  and on 15 October 
1991, Muslim and Croats representatives in Bosnia’s National Assembly approved a 
memorandum on the Bosnia sovereignty.203 On 3 March 1992, Bosnia proclaimed its formal 
independence after a referendum which was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs who wanted to 
remain part of Yugoslavia.204  The birth of these new states was accompanied by violence and 
as a result by the end of 1992, ethnic violence had resulted in the deaths of 6,000 to 10,000 
people, with another 10,000 wounded. 205  The violence also produced an estimated 100,000 
refugees and the displacement of about 100,000 Serbs and 250,000 Serbs.206 Bosnia, the most 
ethnically heterogeneous of Yugoslavia’s republics, suffered the worst fate.207 The republic 
became the focus of the deadliest warfare and introduced the term - ‘ethnic cleansing’, as the 
militaries of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Muslim Bosnians sought to purge areas 
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under their control of other ethnicities.208 These ethnic militaries used “murder, rape, torture, 
detention camps, forcible transfers, and deportation to reshape the makeup of the various 
parts of Yugoslavia.”209  Horrendous war crimes were committed by all sides, but Bosnian 
Muslims formed the largest number of the victims.210 The most well-known was the massacre 
at Srebrenica, a Bosnian city under UN protection.211  In July 1995, Serb General 
RatkoMladic took control of Srebrenica, separated women and children from the men and 
slaughtered an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys in the single largest massacre 
in Europe since World War II.212 For the part of the population that escaped death in the 
initial massacre, many were sent to one of 381 concentration or detention camps, in Bosnia, 
where they were subjected to inhumane living conditions.213 Women were taken to rape 
camps where they were raped and tortured for weeks and months until they became 
pregnant.214An estimated rapes 20,000 took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia.215 These 
atrocities affirm that there was a humanitarian emergency that required that the international 
community should have taken timely military action to avert it or halt it. 
International reaction 
Although the war was well documented in the international media, the UN and the major 
world powers treated the fighting as a conflict between equal warring parties, and therefore, 
no major steps were taken by the international community to end the killings,216 because the 
acknowledgment of the killings as genocide would have triggered the obligations of states 
party to the Genocide Convention to come to the assistance of the victims, a responsibility 
which apparently they were not prepared to shoulder.  Article I of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention217 enjoins parties to prevent and punish genocide. In order to avoid the 
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responsibility of responding to a genocide, the international community referred to the 
killings as “ethnic cleansing” rather than “genocide”218 Indeed, a distinguished genocide legal 
scholar has argued that there is a distinction between ethnic cleansing, and genocide because 
the intent of ethnic cleansing “is to drive out a population, while the intent of genocide is to 
destroy or kill the population.”219  This was a disingenuous argument put up to justify 
international inaction in the face of these atrocities, because perpetrators of ethnic cleansing 
and genocide have the same intent, i.e. the physical removal of a people from a particular 
geographical area. Ethnically cleansing a place of an ethnic group could equally involve mass 
murder or eviction of a group from a geographical location. Indeed, the ICISS report supports 
this argument with the affirmation that ethnic cleansing entails killing, forced expulsion, acts 
of terror or rape.220 Thus, ethnic cleansing and genocide aim at the same result. In the fog of 
war, it cannot be determined with certainty that a particular ethnic group was destroyed or 
driven out of a geographical area. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that under Article II (c) 
of the Genocide Convention, ethnic cleansing is an act of genocide. Article II (c) states that 
an act of genocide includes: “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”  In the context of Bosnia, what the 
Serbs did amounted to genocide, namely, killing Bosnian Muslim men and boys at 
Srebrenica, sending the survivors to concentration camps where they were subjected to 
inhumane living conditions, and sending women to rape camps. The international community 
initially reacted to the violence by delivering humanitarian aid, without active intervention to 
stop the violence.221 The United Nations focused on creating ‘safe havens’ or protected areas 
for displaced people to seek refuge.222  From 1993 to 1994, the United Nations, in order not 
to jeopardise the lives of UN personnel and civilians in the UN-supervised safe havens, was 
careful not to react robustly to Serbian aggression.223 However, after the Srebrenica massacre, 
NATO decided in August 1995 to react to Serbian aggression with an aerial bombing 
campaign which forced the Serbian leadership to agree to binding peace negotiations.224  The 
negotiations led to the signing of the Dayton Accords in Paris on 14 December 1995, which 
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ended the conflict in Bosnia.225NATO’s intervention made the Serbian government amenable 
to a negotiated settlement of the crisis. This shows that where the international community 
has the will, the use of force can bring to an end mass atrocities. 
The Bosnia and Rwanda genocides and represent two prominent failures of the United 
Nations to prevent or stop mass killings of innocent people. In both cases, the reason for the 
delay or failure to act in the face of horrendous tragedies was because of the international 
community’s reluctance to classify the killings as genocide. The distinction between ethnic 
cleansing and genocide was calculated to facilitate the avoidance of the moral responsibility 
to come to the aid of the victims of pogroms. The international community should have 
treated these acts as genocide and intervened earlier. If this had been done, many innocent 
lives would have been saved. In such a situation, only the timely use of force could bring 
relief to the suffering population. The failure of the international community to avert the 
massacre of Srebrenica, contributed to the debate on whether the sanctity of sovereignty 
should stand in the way of necessary action to defend suffering masses. The massacres 
contributed to the development of R2P in the sense that the realisation dawned on the 
international community that the protection of human rights should take precedence over 
respect for sovereignty, and therefore, in the face of mass atrocities, there should be the 
international will to intervene in the affected country in the name of human rights. 
3.3.5. Haiti 
This section discusses the events that led to the humanitarian crisis in 1994, international 
reaction to the crisis, and the contribution of the crisis to the emergence of R2P. The crisis led 
to mass flight of refugees and the killing of a large number of people, thereby creating an 
emergency humanitarian situation necessitating international reaction. The humanitarian 
intervention in Haiti was used as a tool not only for the protection of victims of abuses, but 
also for the promotion of democracy, in the sense that the overriding objective of the 
intervention was the restoration of a deposed government, and argued hereafter, this was an 
abuse of the concept of humanitarian intervention. The first democratically elected President 
of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown on 30 September 1991 by the military.226 
The Organisation of American States (OAS) condemned the overthrow, and called for 
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diplomatic and economic sanctions.227 The political persecution of the supporters of the 
former president led to the flight of an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 Haitians to the 
Dominican Republic and Florida,228 demonstrating that an intrastate conflict can have 
ramifications for neighbouring countries, and thereby threaten international peace and 
security. The refusal of the military regime to reinstate the deposed president led the UN 
Security Council to adopt Resolution 841 (1993), which imposed mandatory economic 
sanctions in 1993 under Chapter VII. The resolution stated that the incidence of humanitarian 
crises, including mass displacements of population, and the climate of fear of persecution and 
economic dislocation increased the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring states, 
and constituted unique and exceptional circumstances, the continuation of which threatened 
international peace and security in the region.229 This meant that there was an acute 
humanitarian emergency and in such a situation there was the need for international action to 
bring the crisis to an end through the use of force, if necessary, in order to end the mass 
human suffering.  
International reaction 
The failure of economic sanctions to persuade the military junta to reinstate Aristide resulted 
in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 940 (1994) under Chapter VII, which 
authorised a multinational force to use: 
All necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership…the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti…230 
Although there was a humanitarian crisis that required the use of all necessary means to bring 
it to an end, it is argued that the overriding objective of the intervention was the restoration of 
a deposed regime. The purpose of humanitarian intervention should not be for the 
reinstatement of a deposed government or restoration of democracy, because by its very 
definition, military intervention for human protection purposes involves the use of force to 
protect victims of human rights abuses and alleviate human suffering.  Since there was a 
military government in place in Haiti, the words of Resolution 940(1994) should have 
                                                          
227D. Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997, (1998), pp. 63-64. 
228ICISS Supplementary Volume, note 157, p. 102. 
229UNSC Resolution 841(1993). 
230UNSC Resolution 940 (1994). 
240 
 
demanded that the regime should stop the abuse of the nationals, failing which, an 
international force would intervene to protect them. However, the resolution left no 
ambiguity that its purpose was to facilitate the departure of the military junta, and the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti. This was an abuse of the 
concept of humanitarian intervention, because it amounted to an endorsement of regime 
change by the insistence on the departure of one government and the restoration of another. 
In the Haiti intervention, the Security Council the stretched the meaning of humanitarian 
intervention too far by including the defence and promotion of democracy, and this was 
tantamount to an abuse of the concept. An invasion was avoided when the military junta was 
convinced by an entourage led by former US President Jimmy Carter to return Aristide to 
power. Aristide reassumed office on 15 October 1994.231 The intervention was motivated by 
the desire to promote democracy and human rights concerns but received positive 
international reaction,232 and “fore-shadowed R2P interventions’ use of military force to quell 
human rights atrocities.”233 
However, it is submitted that it should not be the business of the UN or the international 
community to send military forces into a country for the reinstatement of a deposed head of 
state or to promote democracy. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss democracy. 
Suffice it to say that whatever the concept entails, it is not a one-size fits-all concept, but 
should take into account the peculiarities of a state’s cultural, social, and political 
consciousness, and cannot be imposed by external military force. Therefore, military 
intervention for human protection purposes should not be used as a pretext for the restoration 
of unpopular regimes; for if the Security Council is to authorise the restoration of deposed 
regimes each time there is an unconstitutional change of government in a country, then it 
becomes impossible to draw a line between interventions for purely human protection 
purposes and interventions for regime change as the example of Haiti illustrates. It is 
conceded that the ICISS Report observed that the overthrow of a democratic government is a 
grave matter which may require international action in the form of sanctions and other non-
coercive measures, and where there are wider regional security implications, the Security 
Council would be prepared to authorise the use of force. However, the Commission 
concluded that military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes should be restricted 
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exclusively to situations where large scale loss of civilian life or ethnic cleansing is taking 
place.234 Consequently, military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes should be 
applied only for the protection of human rights of victims of gross abuses, and therefore, the 
Haiti intervention amounted to an abuse of the concept of humanitarian intervention. 
3.3.6. Kosovo 
This section discusses the events that caused the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, NATO’s 
intervention in 1999, and the impact of the crisis on the establishment of ICISS, because it 
was the last major and most immediate intervention before the establishment of the ICISS. 
The following year in his Millennium Address to the UN General Assembly, then Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, challenged the international community to devise a mechanism to 
protect populations from mass atrocities.235 His challenge led to the establishment of the 
ICISS, which formulated the concept of R2P.  
Kosovo was an autonomous province inside Serbia, and had considerable political 
independence.236 In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic repealed Kosovo’s 
autonomy and instituted direct rule from Belgrade.237 This led to the declaration of 
independence by the Kosovo Assembly in July 1990.238 Historical, ethnic, and political 
animosity between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs erupted into violence in 1998 when several 
Kosovar Albanians239 separatists were killed by Serb police. The UN Security Council 
condemned the excessive use of force by the Serb police and the terrorist activities of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).240 Fighting continued, and in September 1998, the Security 
Council adopted UNSC Resolution 119 (1998), under Chapter VII, “Affirming that the 
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security in the 
region…,” and demanded a ceasefire and action to improve the humanitarian situation.241  
Military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes is justified in situations where 
large scale loss of civilian life or ethnic cleansing is taking place in order to come to the aid 
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of suffering masses, as exemplified in the case of Kosovo, particularly in the face of UN 
Security Council inaction.  
International reaction 
After diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the crisis, NATO intervened militarily with 
Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999 without UN Security Council authorisation and 
over the objections of Russia and China.242 It has been argued that NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo brought the controversy on humanitarian intervention “to its most intense head,”243 
because it was unilateral, and; therefore, set a dangerous precedent; and it was argued that the 
intervention caused “more carnage than it averted.”244 Consequently, “the moral, legal 
operational and political intervention came under sustained and sometimes vitriolic 
scrutiny.”245 Indeed, the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 has been described as 
perhaps the most influential on the formation of R2P, 246 because of the controversy it 
generated, and also because it was the last major intervention immediately before the 
formulation of R2P by the ICISS.247 It is submitted that, unlike the case of the Rwanda 
genocide, NATO was ready to intervene in Kosovo, even without the authorisation of the 
Security Council, not only for altruistic motives, but probably mainly because of the 
proximity of Kosovo to Europe. The motives were, therefore, based on the strategic and 
security interests of NATO. Relating to R2P, the significance of Kosovo is that it legitimised 
the use of force for protecting human rights even in the absence of UN Security Council 
authorisation.248 NATO’s intervention in Kosovo shows that an intervening state takes action 
not necessarily on grounds of human compassion, but its strategic and security concerns also 
play a role.  It also reveals the double standards in the application in the implementation of 
humanitarian intervention, because while NATO was eager to intervene in Kosovo, it was 
missing in action in the case of Rwanda. If Rwanda was situated in Europe, it is 
inconceivable that NATO would have remained impassive.  
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3.4. Part III - The Establishment of ICISS and the Concept of R2P 
This part discusses the establishment of the ICISS and the basic principles of R2P articulated 
in the ICISS Report, that: “State responsibility entails responsibility and the primary 
responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself; where a population is 
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and 
the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the international responsibility to protect.”249 This is because the responsibility to 
protect is not the sole responsibility of the affected state, but also of the broader international 
community, and therefore the international community cannot stand idly by in the face of 
mass atrocities if the affected state is unable or unwilling to protect its own people.This 
section of the chapter discusses the idea of sovereignty as responsibility and the residual 
responsibility of the wider international community to protect vulnerable populations if the 
affected state fails to discharge its responsibility to protect,because the responsibility to 
protect is not the sole responsibility of the affected state, but also of the broader international 
community. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the three dimensions of R2P, namely: the 
responsibility to prevent - to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict 
and other man-made crisis putting populations at risk; the responsibility to react - to respond 
to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include 
coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution and in extreme cases military 
intervention, and; the responsibility to rebuild - to provide, particularly after a military 
intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconsideration, addressing the 
causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt.250 
The part focuses on the military dimension of R2P, because the centrality of the military 
dimension is emphasised in the ICISS report itself in the assertion that: “By far the most 
controversial form of …intervention is military, and a great part of our report necessarily 
focuses on that.”251  In the words of the ICISS Report, “responsibility to protect” implies 
above all else a responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human 
protection.252 Even though the World Summit Document downplayed this aspect,253 it is 
submitted that the military intervention dimension appears to be the most critical aspect of the 
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concept, because ultimately, it remains an option, and therefore, it is this aspect that has been 
the focus of controversy and misgivings about R2P. The centrality of the military dimension 
to the debate on R2P makes it a necessary focus of detailed discussion. As noted elsewhere in 
the thesis, military intervention is a grave matter because it entails the use of force to violate 
the sovereignty of the affected state. It involves the use of deadly force that may cause death, 
even among the people the intervention seeks to protect, and may also lead to the destruction 
of the state’s infrastructure, economy, and political institutions. The gravity of the military 
dimension requires detailed discussion in order to determine how best to apply it when it 
becomes necessary to do so. 
The crises in the 1990s and the inability of the Security Council to react triggered a debate as 
to whether the international community should continue to adhere unconditionally to the 
principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or whether the time 
had come to take a different course. In his speech to the Ditchley Foundation in June 1998, 
Kofi Annan put it this way: 
We all applaud the policeman who intervenes to stop a fight, or the teacher who 
prevents big boys from bullying a smaller one. And medicine uses the word 
“intervention” to describe the act of the surgeon, who saves life by “intervening’ to 
remove malignant growth, or to repair damaged organs. Of course, the most 
intrusive methods of treatment are not always to be recommended. A wise doctor 
knows when to let nature take its course. But a doctor who never intervened would 
have few admirers, and probably fewer patients. So it is in international affairs. 
Why was the United Nations established, if not to act as a benign policeman or 
doctor? Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it 
when it has broken out, or - when neither of those things is possible - at least to 
contain it and prevent it from spreading…In other words, even national 
sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of Security Council’s overriding 
duty to preserve international peace and security.254 
The statement implies that, although military intervention has serious implications for 
sovereignty, there are situations where it becomes absolutely necessary to use force to protect 
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victims of excessive human rights abuses. In other words, drastic and unpleasant measures 
are sometimes necessary to stop the gross violations of the human rights of the citizens of a 
state by their own government. Annan’s view was that, in the face of gross human rights 
abuse within a state, the United Nations should not shy away from taking the necessary action 
to protect victims of abuse. Therefore, sovereignty can be overridden in order to take action 
to protect victims of gross human rights abuses. He implied that the time for radical changes 
to depart from the old orthodoxy of non-intervention had come, in the face of atrocities 
perpetrated by a state on its population. He went a step further and, in reference to a 
government’s responsibility to protect its nationals, argued that “the Charter protects the 
sovereignty of peoples. It was never meant as a licence for governments to trample on human 
rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power.”255 By 
implication, a state’s entitlement to the benefits and rights of sovereignty is tied to its respect 
for the human rights of the population. Sovereignty entails both rights and responsibilities, 
including the right of a state to the freedom to govern itself the way it deems fit, free from 
external interference. However,these right are subject to the state’s protection and promotion 
of the welfare of its nationals. If it subjects its nationals to gross violation of their 
fundamental rights, its sovereignty yields to the international community’s responsibility to 
protect. 
3.4.1. Establishment of ICISS 
The failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis prompted NATO, claiming that 
Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) which affirmed that “the deterioration of the 
situation in Kosovo…constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region…” 
amounted to Security Council authorisation for the use of force, to intervene militarily with 
Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999, over the objections of Russia and China and, 
therefore, without UN Security Council authorisation.256 Russia and China argued that the 
resolution did not grant authorization for military intervention. It has been argued that 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo brought the controversy on humanitarian intervention “to its 
most intense head,”257 because it was conducted without Security Council authorization, and 
therefore, set a dangerous precedent. However, in Africa, the Rwanda genocide in 1994 was 
the most atrocious event which persuaded governments “that more needed to be done to 
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prevent mass atrocities and protect vulnerable people.”258 Annan, aware of the divisive debate 
surrounding humanitarian intervention and in reaction to the Kosovo crisis articulated the 
dilemma confronting the international community, thus:  
We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defence of 
humanity and the defence of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. 
Alas, that does not tell us which principle must prevail when they conflict.259 
On the one hand, the international community has a duty to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.260  On the other hand, the 
Charter prohibits the threat or use of force except with the authorisation of the Security 
Council,261 or except in self-defence.262The dilemma was how to strike a balance between the 
principles of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of force without Security 
Council authorisation on the one hand, and on the other hand, the imperative to avert or halt 
mass slaughter of innocent people.  In his words: 
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of the international order is the 
use of force in the absence of a Security mandate, one might ask - not in the 
context of Kosovo - but in the context of Rwanda: If in those dark days and hours 
leading to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of 
the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such 
a coalition have stood aside and allow the horror to unfold? 
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when States and groups 
of States can take military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing 
international law, one might ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions 
undermining the imperfect, yet resilient security system created after the Second 
World, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear 
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criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents, and in what 
circumstances?263 
Put in another way this means that to have legitimacy, humanitarian intervention requires the 
authorisation of the Security Council. However, if the Security Council fails to act in the face 
of genocide, it should be legitimate for other actors to act even in the absence of Security 
authorisation. At the same time, to condone interventions that have not been sanctioned by 
the Security Council sets a dangerous precedent for other powerful state to follow, which 
may threaten international peace and security. Annan articulated this dilemma aptly. On the 
one hand, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force without the authorization of the Security 
Council. Therefore, in the face of Security Council inaction or authorisation, if any state that 
takes enforcement action, even in defence of helpless victims of gross human rights abuses, it 
amounts to a violation of the Charter, and undermines the international order. At the same 
time the world cannot just stand by passively in the face of mass atrocities, so what should 
the international community do when the Security Council fails to act? Evans and Sahnoun 
ask rhetorically, “But what if the Security Council fails to discharge its own responsibility to 
protect? …Which of the two evils is the worse: the damage to the international order if the 
Security Council is bypassed, or damage to that order if human beings are slaughtered while 
the Security Council stands by?”264 The answer to this ought to be in favour of action to 
protect vulnerable populations, even in the absence of Security Council authorisation 
because, on moral and ethical grounds, the world cannot just stand by while thousands of 
innocent people are being slaughtered. On the other hand, to permit enforcement measures by 
individual or group of states without Security authorisation sets a dangerous precedent for 
other states to follow at their discretion, thereby placing the international order into jeopardy. 
Annan impliedly challenged the international community to find agreement on when 
interventions should take place and by whose authorisation. If self-help or unilateral action by 
powerful states was to be avoided, then the time had come for the United Nations to take a 
central role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Otherwise, as he argued, if 
humanity “…cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a danger that it 
will look elsewhere for peace and justice.”265  In other words, the Security Council should 
actively take enforcement measures to protect human rights; otherwise, unilateral 
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humanitarian intervention would be legitimate when egregious human rights abuses occur. 
Potential interveners should seek the authorisation of the Security Council before taking 
action. On its part, the Security Council should be prepared to grant timely authorisation 
when requested, if the Council itself is unable to take enforcement action. Failure to do so 
may render the Council irrelevant, because it will be bypassed altogether when states or 
organisations with the will and capabilities decide to intervene in another state for human 
protection purposes in the face of Security Council inaction. 
In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, Annan, while acknowledging that 
the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention offered vital protection to small and weak 
states, challenged the international community to find a balance between respect for 
sovereignty and the need to protect human rights in the following words: 
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, 
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?266 
This statement, while acknowledging that the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention 
offered vital protection to small and weak states, challenged the international community to 
find a balance between respect for sovereignty and the need to the protect human rights. 
Annan’s objectives were to ensure that the failures of Rwanda, Kosovo, and Bosnia were not 
repeated and to further find “a new consensus within the international community over the 
legitimacy of action to protect civilians from mass atrocities.”267Military intervention 
generates apprehension among militarily weak countries because of the potential for powerful 
countries to use it as a pretext for interfering in their internal affairs. However, in the face of 
horrendous mass atrocities, Annan was urging the international community to place the 
protection of human rights above reverence of sovereignty, and to accept the principle that in 
the face of gross abuse of human rights in a state external military intervention to protect the 
population is legitimate. This challenge led to the establishment of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) by the Government of Canada 
“together with a group of major foundations,”268 with the mandate “to build a broader 
understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and 
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sovereignty.”269 In announcing the establishment of the ICISS, the Government of Canada 
stated that the ICISS was established “as a response to Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 
challenge to the international community to endeavor to build a new international consensus 
on how to respond in the face of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law.”270  The contribution of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the emergence of R2P 
cannot be downplayed. He was a strong proponent of the concept, and strongly challenged 
world leaders to rise to their responsibility to devise a mechanism to protect victims of mass 
atrocities, by placing human rights above sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 
He took human rights seriously, and redefined the balance between states and the people, 
vesting in the people the source of legitimacy and authority.271 He formulated the “two 
concepts of sovereignty” which defined states as instruments at the service of their people 
and not vice versa.272 This formulation “helped launch the debate on the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention,”273 and therefore, he made a valuable contribution to the evolution 
of the R2P principle that, where a state perpetrates gross human rights abuses against its own 
people, the use of force to protect the victims was justified. 
3.4.2. The concept of R2P  
This section deals with the basic principles of R2P, namely: the idea that sovereignty entails 
responsibility and the primary responsibility to protect the population of a state rests with the 
state authorities and; the residual responsibility to protect which falls on the broader 
international society where the state affected is unable or unwilling to avert or halt atrocities 
in the state, because the protection of human rights in a state is not the exclusive 
responsibility of the state, but also of the international community. The ICISS introduced the 
concept of R2P274 as a balance between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights. 
The importance of the work of the ICISS was its efforts to find international consensus 
regarding sovereignty, intervention, and human rights, through the formulation of the concept 
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of “responsibility to protect”275 The R2P was the outcome of the international community’s 
inability to protect victims of gross human rights abuses in the 1990s, and the growing 
worldwide awareness of “mass atrocities in various parts of the world.276  The legal 
foundations of the responsibility to protect as a guiding principle for the international 
community can be found: firstly, in obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty itself; 
secondly, in the responsibility of the UN Security Council under Article 24 of the UN Charter 
for the maintenance of international peace and security277 and; thirdly, in the developing 
practice of states, regional organisations and the Security Council itself.278 As has been 
observed, the US and its allies intervened in Kosovo to protect victims of human rights 
abuses, and ECOWAS intervened in Liberia for the same reason and in both Kosovo and 
Liberia. Although the interventions did not have prior Security Council authorisation both 
received the implied approval of the Council after the fact. As already discussed, historically 
and under international law state sovereignty involved the responsibility of a state to protect 
its population and their welfare. Furthermore, under Article 24, members state of the UN 
have conferred upon the Security Council the primary responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security on their behalf, and therefore, it is argued that this 
responsibility is shared and collective. At the core of the concept are the following 
principles:279 sovereignty as responsibility which lies primarily with the state, and; the 
residual responsibility of the international community. As noted, a state has a duty to protect 
the welfare of its nationals, and this duty is inherent in the concept of sovereignty itself. 
However, the manner a state treats in its nationals is not the sole business of the state, but is 
of concern to the international community, and therefore, the international community will 
intervene if the state fails to discharge this duty to protect its population from excessive 
human rights abuses. 
3.4.3. Sovereignty as responsibility 
This section examines the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility,’ which implies that the 
primary responsibility to protect the nationals rests upon the state, because sovereignty entails 
rights and responsibilities, and a state can claim the benefits of the concept only if it respects 
and protects the human rights of its nationals. The ICISS re-characterised sovereignty from 
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sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility,280 which implied that: it was the 
function of state authorities to protect the lives and safety of citizens and to promote their 
welfare; national authorities are responsible internally to the citizens and externally to the 
international community through the United Nations, and; agents of the state are accountable 
for their acts of commission and omission.281 This understanding of sovereignty is of central 
importance to the Commission’s approach to the question of intervention for human 
protection purposes, and the development of R2P.282 In order to achieve international 
consensus, the Commission emphasised the intrinsic value of sovereignty. In this light, the 
Commission’s report declared that sovereignty provided protection for weak states against 
powerful states; for “in a dangerous world marked by overwhelming inequalities of power 
and resources, sovereignty is for many states their best - and sometimes seemingly - their 
only line of defence.”283 The report went further, stating that sovereignty, for many states and 
peoples, is “a recognition of their equal worth and dignity, a protection of their unique 
identities and their national freedom, and an affirmation of their right to shape their own 
destiny.”284 Sovereignty implies that all states, big and small, are equal, and each has the right 
to govern itself in the manner it deems fit free from external dictates. State sovereignty has to 
be accorded respect in order to allay the fears of weak states that powerful states will use R2P 
as a pretext to meddle in their internal affairs, because respect for the sovereignty of every 
state is the only shield for the weak against the bullying of big and powerful countries for the 
advancement of their national and strategic interests. However, the Commission maintained 
that state sovereignty did not mean that a state has unlimited power to do what it wants with 
its people, and the Commission heard no such claim during its worldwide consultations.285 As 
an additional measure to achieve international consensus on its proposals, the Commission 
shifted the focus of the debate about intervention from “the right to intervene” to “the 
responsibility to protect,” in order to evaluate the intervention from the point of view of those 
seeking or needing support and their urgent needs, rather than those who may be considering 
intervention.286 Changing the terms of the debate from “right to intervene” to “responsibility 
to protect” helps to shift the focus of discussion where it belongs – on the requirements of 
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those who need or seek assistance.287 This was appropriate, because whereas “the right of 
humanitarian intervention” is intrinsically confrontational, ‘the responsibility to protect’ “is 
more of a linking concept that bridges the divide between intervention and sovereignty.288 
The responsibility to protect entails the principle that the state has a responsibility to protect 
its own nationals form gross human rights abuses, a principle which no state can challenge. 
Thus, if a state is unable to discharge this responsibility, it should ask for external help. If the 
state fails to ask for assistance or rejects assistance when offered, then there is justification, in 
the interest of the victims, for legitimate external military intervention conducted with UN 
Security mandate. The right of humanitarian intervention on the other hand, occurs without 
the mandate of the Security Council, and is undertaken from the point of view of the 
intervener, not necessarily borne out of a responsibility to protect, but rather based upon 
military might and the capability to intervene, even in situations where the affected state 
could have brought the humanitarian crisis under control with external help.  It is therefore, 
basically confrontational and it is bound to elicit resistance from the forces of the affected 
state. 
3.4.4. The State’s primary responsibility to protect 
This section discusses the state’s primary responsibility to protect is people. The 
Commission emphasized that the primary responsibility to protect its people rested with the 
state, and it is only when the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility that the 
responsibility of the international community is activated. Even though sovereignty “does 
still matter”,289 it has undergone a major transformation. Sovereignty, according the 
Commission, “implies a dual responsibility: externally – to respect the sovereignty of other 
states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the 
state.”290  As the ICISS report states, “the conditions under which sovereignty is exercised 
have changed dramatically and there are expectations and demands in relation to the way 
states treat their people.”291 Former UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar expressed this 
view in his 1991 report, in which he called for the reassessment of sovereignty and non-
intervention, affirming the emergence of “an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the 
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belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over 
frontiers and legal documents.”292 He acknowledged the importance of state sovereignty, 
but asserted that sovereignty “cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity.”293 He 
challenged the traditional notion of sovereignty during the Cold War, and asserted that it 
cannot be argued that sovereignty:  
…in this day and age includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching 
systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the 
name of controlling civil strife or insurrection.294 
Traditional sovereignty implied that states had the privileges of sovereignty and non-
interference regardless of how they treated their populations.295 However, it is unacceptable 
in the contemporary international order that a state had the right to suppress the population. In 
the contemporary world order, the welfare of the population of a state is paramount. As 
articulated by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his groundbreaking article in the 
Economist magazine: 
State Sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined…States are now 
widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice 
versa. At the same time individual sovereignty - by which I mean the fundamental 
freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent 
international treaties - has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading 
consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more 
than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not those 
who abuse them.296 
In order words, while under Westphalian sovereignty state sovereignty was supreme, the new 
understanding of sovereignty is that the interest of the population of a state takes precedence 
over state sovereignty and the international community has an interest in the manner in which 
a state treats its own citizens. Therefore, the treatment of the citizens by a state of its citizens 
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is no longer the exclusive business of that state.  Sovereignty now entails both rights and 
responsibilities, and a state is entitled to enjoy the benefits of sovereignty only if it discharges 
its responsibility to protect the human rights of its citizens.297 R2P, thus, re-characterised 
sovereignty as responsibility, linking it to human protection, and without rejecting the 
principle of non-intervention, addresses the issue from the perspective of the 
victims.298Breakey shares this view with the observation that: 
Sovereignty is no longer to be understood as a right to perform whatever domestic 
activities the state authority desires…the very reason for sovereignty is at base the 
protection of the people’s most fundamental rights from egregious acts of 
violence299 
The principle of sovereignty as responsibility and its implication to protect vulnerable people 
from egregious violations of human rights has a basis under the UN Charter.300 It has been 
argued that it has a basis on international law, because, “it epitomizes the humanitarian 
character and central purpose of international human rights, humanitarian law, refugee law 
and international criminal law,”301 and further that there is a responsibility “under 
international law to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity”, and therefore, the principle of sovereignty as responsibility “does 
challenge states to meet their existing responsibilities.”302 The responsibility of a state to 
protect its nationals is inherent in the concept of sovereignty, and this responsibility has, as 
discussed previously, been accepted by states though not always honoured in practice, as the 
spate of interventions for human protection purposes illustrate. Therefore, the formulation on 
R2P, is only a challenge to states to meet their existing responsibilities relating to the 
protection of their nationals.  
                                                          
297S. Patrick, ‘The Role of the US Government in Humanitarian Intervention’, 5 April 2004.  Cited in S. Elden,  
     ‘Contingency Sovereignty’, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of State Borders’ SAIS Review, 26(1), 2006, 
p. 15. 
298Thakur, note 273, p. 418. 
299H. Breakey, The Responsibility to Protect: Game Change. In Sampfordet. al., eds., Norms of Protection:  
      Responsibility to Protect: Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction. Geneva: United Nations University,   
      (2012), pp. 11-39. 
300UN Charter, Articles I & 55. Article 1 aims to promote and encourage respect for human rights  
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. Article 55 affirms  
      universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without  
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
301G. Zyberi, ‘Sharing the Responsibility to Protect: taking stock and moving forward’, in Zyberi, ed., An   
Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University Press, (2013), p. 512. 
302D. Fleck, ‘The law applicable to peace operations’, in A. Clapham and P. Gaeta, eds., The Oxford Handbook  
of International Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford University Press, (2014), p. 216. 
255 
 
3.4.5. The international responsibility to protect 
As already observed, the Commission’s report stated, “State sovereignty implies 
responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state 
itself.”303 However, a residual responsibility lies with the broader community of states.304 
Thus, according to the Commission’s report, “Where a population is suffering serious harm, 
as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is 
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.”305 Thus, a residual responsibility to protect is 
conferred on the international community where a state is unable or unwilling to fulfil its 
responsibility.306 This is a very important principle, in the sense that a duty is imposed on the 
international community to take action to avert or halt atrocities, only where the state 
authorities fail to do so. This will ensure that powerful states will not intervene in weak states 
at the earliest sign of a humanitarian crisis. State authorities are better placed to assess the 
potential for a humanitarian crisis and come up with the best way to handle it, unless they are 
the perpetrators or the crisis overwhelms them. As the Commission’s report states: 
The domestic authority is best placed to take action to prevent problems from 
turning into potential conflicts. When problems arise the domestic authority is best 
placed to understand them and to deal with them. When solutions are needed, it is 
the citizens of a particular state who have the greatest interest and the largest stake 
in the success of those solutions, in ensuring that the domestic authorities are fully 
accountable for their actions in addressing these problems, and in helping to ensure 
that past problems are not allowed to recur.307 
The passage sums up the Commission’s rationale for placing the primary responsibility to 
protect a state’s nationals on the state. The state authorities are best placed to deal with any 
internal humanitarian crisis. However, in the event that the state authorities are overwhelmed 
by a humanitarian crisis, they should ask for international assistance, or accept it when 
offered.  If the state fails to ask for assistance or rejects international assistance in the face of 
grave violations of human rights, then the international community should not just stand by in 
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the face of state inaction. However, the discharge of this responsibility by the international 
community in such situations should be motivated by the imperative to protect the vulnerable 
victims of human rights abuse, and not viewed as a right of intervention in the interests of the 
interveners. As Breakey puts it: “In this way R2P aims to displace the controversial ‘right of 
humanitarian intervention’, and refocuses attention on the needs of the vulnerable, rather than 
the entitlements of the interveners.”308 The residual responsibility to protect should not be a 
pretext for the advancement of the national or strategic agenda of the intervening state or 
states. The fallback responsibility309 of the international community is justified, and should be 
activated only in the face of the inability or unwillingness of state authorities to halt or avert a 
humanitarian calamity. The responsibility to protect its nationals is essentially that of the 
state, and therefore, its sovereignty should not be subverted by external intervention in the 
name of human rights, except in the exceptional situations where the state is manifestly 
unwilling or unable 310 to protect its people. 
3.4.6. The three dimensions of the responsibility to protect 
This section discusses the specific responsibilities which the responsibility to protect 
embraces because these are the responsibilities embodied in the concept formulated by 
ICISS. The report of the Commission outlined three specific responsibilities embraced by the 
responsibility to protect, namely: the responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to react and: 
the responsibility to rebuild. These responsibilities require detailed discussion in order to 
provide a clear understanding of the concept. 
1.   The responsibility to prevent 
This section deals with the responsibility to prevent which is meant to address both the root 
causes and direct causes of internal conflicts and other man-made crises putting populations 
at risk, in order to avert the eruption of events that may lead to human suffering,311 because if 
conflicts can be prevented, it obviates the need to resort to the controversial measure of 
militaryintervention. The section discusses the three essential conditions that have to be met 
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for effective prevention of conflict:312  (i) early warning and analysis; (ii) root causes 
prevention efforts; and (iii) direct prevention efforts.  
In the view of the Commission, prevention is the most important dimension of R2P and 
therefore, prevention options should be exhausted before intervention is contemplated.313 
Thus, the encouragement of sustained efforts to address the root causes of the problems that 
put populations at risk, and the effective use of direct prevention measures was a key 
objective of the Commission.314 The Commission stated that the exercise of the responsibility 
to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being 
considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied. Bellamy shares this view, 
with the observation that the first response to atrocities is peaceful means, while the use of 
force should be the option of last resort.315 Conflict prevention requires the cooperation and 
involvement of state authorities of the affected state. Hence, the Commission was of the view 
that prevention of deadly conflict and other man-made catastrophes, is primarily the 
responsibility of sovereign states and the communities and institutions within them, as the fair 
treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens provides a solid basis for conflict 
prevention.316 However, because the failure of prevention can have international 
ramifications, the support of the international community in the form of development 
assistance, support for the advancement of good governance, human rights or the rule of law, 
mediation efforts and other efforts to promote mediation and dialogue or reconciliation may 
be needed, and in some cases, may be indispensable.317  Similar to the primary responsibility 
to protect its people, which lies on the state, the primary responsibility to prevent atrocities 
lies on the state. However, as internal conflicts can have international ramifications, the 
responsibility to prevent is not the sole responsibility of the state, but also of the broader 
international community. Therefore, the international community has a responsibility to 
provide all the necessary assistance to the state to enhance its ability to discharge its 
responsibility to prevent.  
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Improving conflict prevention is urgent and essential, and therefore, sustained efforts to 
address the root cause of the problems that put populations at risk must be encouraged.318 To 
this end, the ICISS Report mentions three essential conditions that have to be met for 
effective prevention of conflict:319  (i) early warning and analysis, i.e., the capacity to predict 
violent conflicts, in order to  stop conflicts before they erupt; (ii) root causes prevention 
efforts, i.e. steps that need to be taken to address the root causes of conflicts before they break 
out, and; (iii) direct prevention efforts in the form of political and diplomatic initiatives 
needed to prevent internal conflicts. 
i.Early warning and analysis  
This sub-section discusses the importance of early warning, i.e. the capacity to predict violent 
conflicts or in the words of the ICISS Report, “the knowledge of the fragility of the situation 
and the risks associated with it,”320 in order to take effective preventive action to obviate the 
eruption of conflict. Early warning appears to be the most essential condition, because early 
warning makes it possible for action to be taken in a timely manner in order to ensure success 
in preventing a crisis from erupting. However, if action is not taken in a timely manner in 
response to an early warning of an impending humanitarian crisis, action may come too late 
to save the victims of mass atrocities.As the Commission noted in reference to the UN 
response to the Rwandan genocide, lack of early warning is an excuse, and the problem is not 
lack of warning but of timely response321 arising from weak analytic capacities which are 
exacerbated by the problem of securing accurate information to predict violent conflict.322 In 
order to fulfil its purpose, early warning must have three elements, namely: access to 
information, capabilities to analyse the information, and channels of communication to 
decision makers responsible for taking preventive measures.323 The task of securing accurate 
information in order to predict violent conflict is usually not conducted by state authorities, 
but by foreign agencies. Without the cooperation of state authorities, which may not be 
forthcoming, these foreign agencies cannot obtain accurate or reliable information. Even if 
accurate information is gathered, it may not be possible upon analysis to determine that 
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conflict will break out at all or when it will break out; nor can it be guaranteed that officials 
responsible for taking preventive action will do so in a timely manner.State authorities are 
more suitably positioned to provide accurate information towards efforts at conflict 
prevention, and they are reasonably suspicious of foreign agencies that seek to gather 
information as interference in their domestic affairs. They would, as a result, be unwilling to 
cooperate, and therefore, these external agencies are unlikely to gather accurate information. 
In such a situation, even if an analysis is conducted, it would rely on inaccurate information, 
and any recommendations made thereby will be flawed; and even in the event that suitable 
recommendations are made, the responses of officials responsible for taking action to avert 
the conflict may not reflect the urgency of the situation, thereby rendering any 
recommendation for action valueless. 
Preventive analysis that is critical for early action to prevent conflicts seldom takes place, and 
it if does at all, fails to take key factors into account, misses key warning signs, or misreads 
the problem, thereby missing the opportunity for early action, or leading to the application of 
wrong tools.324 This is not to diminish the critical role of early warning in averting impending 
conflict because early warning can lead to action to stop conflicts before they start. Therefore, 
there is an urgent need for the international community to establish a better early-warning 
system.The international community has responded to the need for mechanisms for conflict 
prevention, focused particularly on intra-state conflicts.325 For example, the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) established in 1993 a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management, 
and Settlement.326 Theorganisation established the mechanism “against the background of the 
history of many prolonged and destructive conflicts” in order to “bring to the process of 
dealing with conflicts in our continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action 
to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur.”327  To put 
it another way, the limited success at finding solutions to intrastate conflicts on the continent 
made the establishment of a preventive mechanism imperative. The Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also developed internal mechanisms aimed at 
preventing conflict in Europe.328NGOs have also been playing an important role in the 
context of early warning efforts, and in helping to shape domestic and international public 
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opinion to support preventive measures.329 NGOs on the ground in the affected country add 
to regional and international efforts by focusing domestic and international attention on issues 
that may trigger conflict in the state, in order to facilitate steps to address these issues, and 
thereby contribute to the prevention of intrastate conflicts, making the use of force for human 
protection purposes unnecessary. 
ii. Root causes prevention 
This section deals with steps that need to be taken to address the root causes of conflicts 
before they break out, because if internal economic and political deficiencies are not 
addressed, efforts aimed at averting conflict will not succeed.With regard to the root causes 
prevention efforts, the UN Security Council has stressed the urgent need to address the root 
causes of conflict, such as poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution of national 
resources.330 The Commission recommended that root causes prevention should address 
political deficiencies, including constitutional power sharing. It should also tackle economic 
deprivation, strengthen legal protections, and embark upon sectoral reforms to the military 
and other state security services,331 because these are the areas that generate dissatisfaction in 
a state, leading to conflict. Steps have to be taken to ensure that: minorities are represented in 
government; that their rights are respected; that every citizen has equal economic 
opportunities and; that the military and security services are representative of the 
demographics of the state.  If these issues are not addressed conflict in a state cannot be 
averted and it is bound to reignite even after a military intervention.Conflicts can break out in 
a state because of the monopoly on political and economic power by one segment of society, 
political oppression or the domination of the security services of a state by one ethnic group. 
The unfair allocation of national resources in a state in particular can lead to conflict. For 
example, resources in a state like oil, cocoa, timber, gold, etc. may be located in the 
geographical area inhabited by a particular ethnic group. The geographical area of this ethnic 
group may be denied a fair allocation of these resources in terms of the development, while a 
relatively poor part of the state is allocated a disproportionate part of national resources 
because the government is dominated by people from the latter area. Alternatively, people 
from a resource-rich part of the state may be aggrieved that they do not have a fair share of 
the national cake. The low-level insurgency in the oil-rich eastern part of Nigeria is a case in 
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point. Alternatively people belonging to the ethnic group dominating the government will get 
preferential treatment in the allocation of government jobs, especially recruitment into the 
army and other security services, making national elections a ‘do or die’ affair. Thus internal 
conflicts usually arise because of unfair treatment and unfair opportunities for all citizens in 
the allocation of national resources. Political repression can also lead to internal conflict. 
Thus, for example, if the political system is so rigged as to make the democratic change of 
government impossible, the population has the only option of resorting to arms to effect 
change. If states avoid these pitfalls, many conflicts leading to needless human suffering will 
be avoided. Therefore, in order to prevent conflict, pursuant to their responsibility to prevent, 
state authorities have to respect the human rights of citizens and also ensure a fair distribution 
of economic opportunities, fair distribution of national resources and promote a system of 
inclusive government that represents all the sectors of the society.  
iii. Direct efforts prevention 
The section deals with the direct prevention efforts in the form of political and diplomatic 
initiatives needed to prevent internal conflicts, because diplomatic and political pressure from 
the UN Secretary-General, for example, and regional organisation can persuade the affected 
state authorities to take steps to address the potential root causes of impending conflict. These 
have the same components like the root causes prevention, but different instruments in 
achieving them: - political and diplomatic, including the involvement of the UN Secretary-
General; economic, including promises of new funding or investment, or the threat of 
sanctions; legal involving offers of mediation or arbitration, and; military, involving 
consensual preventive deployment of the military, or the threat to use force.  These measures 
may be in the form of assistance, positive inducements, or in the negative form of threatened 
“punishments.”332 
The difficulty in preventing atrocities is that, firstly, it is not always possible to predict their 
occurrence, or whether the state concerned will take action to prevent them from occurring.333 
Secondly, preventive action may be interpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of the 
host, and may be resisted, or at the very least, the host state may refuse to cooperate or the 
host state may prospect of early warning as involving the collection of sensitive information 
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about the host state.334 Thirdly, it is not always easy for the international community to know 
the causes of atrocities or simmering animosities and whether they will lead to mass killings, 
and to come up with the most effective preventive and response mechanisms.335 The eruption 
of armed conflict in a state does not necessarily portend the commission of atrocities, which 
would necessitate preventive action. As expressed by Thakur, armed conflict is not a 
necessary or sufficient condition of atrocities, because “most (although not all) atrocities 
occur against the backdrop of armed conflict, but most armed conflicts do not lead to mass 
atrocities.”336 Examples can be found in the current situation in Ukraine, where there is armed 
conflict between government forces and rebels in the eastern part of the country, but mass 
atrocities are not taking place. Another example is the conflict between Morocco and the 
rebels of the Saharawi Arab Republic in Western Sahara. Another problem with taking 
preventive action is that a crisis can develop quickly, as was the case in the post-election 
violence in Kenya, and in some situations, even though a state may be identified as a state at 
risk of impending crisis, the crisis may not occur at all.337 Thus, the difficulty with taking 
preventive action to avert atrocities is exacerbated by uncertainties, because if it is not 
possible to predict accurately that conflict is about to erupt in a state, then it is impossible to 
take timely action to avert it.  
In addition to the Commission’s proposal on the involvement of the international community 
in conflict prevention, the basis of the international community’s responsibility to prevent 
exists in the Charter of the United Nations 1945. Under the Charter, member states have 
conferred on the Security Council “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”338 “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations,”339 which include “effective collective measures for the prevention…of 
threats to peace.”340 It is argued that member states share the responsibility for preventing 
threats to peace; for, as the Charter states, “All Members shall give the United Nations every 
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter…”341 The Security 
Council has determined that internal problems of peace and security, gross violations of 
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human rights, including genocide, constitute threats to international peace and security.342 
Therefore, member states of the UN have a duty to assist the Security Council in the 
prevention of threats to peace. Besides, resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council on the prevention of armed conflict support the responsibility to prevent under the 
Charter.343 For example, the General Assembly Resolution 337 reaffirmed “the primary 
responsibility of Member States for the prevention of armed conflict.”344 To reinforce this 
responsibility, Security Resolution 1366 affirmed that “conflict prevention is one of the 
primary responsibilities of Members States”, emphasising the “fundamental responsibility of 
Member States to prevent and end the impunity of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.”345 The resolution places the primary responsibility for conflict prevention on 
state authorities, the UN, and the international community.346 This resolution contains many 
of the elements of the responsibility to prevent which would later be “articulated by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.347 Therefore the 
responsibility of a state to prevent mass atrocities against its own people predated the 
formulation of R2P by the ICISS, and thus, the ICISS, only affirmed a preexisting state 
obligation, which a state is obliged to observe. 
The importance of conflict prevention is also reflected in the European Presidency statement 
of priorities to the 65th UN General Assembly, that, ‘…the EU will apply a “narrow but deep 
approach” to R2P-related policies and will particularly focus on its preventive pillar’.348  The 
“narrow but deep” approach was articulated in UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 
January 2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.  The report stated that the 
scope of R2P should be kept narrow in the sense that it should apply only to the four crimes 
stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, namely: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and to their prevention, as expanding R2P to include 
natural disasters and other crimes would undermine international support for R2P. At the 
same time, the implementation of the concept should be deep in the sense that it is not only 
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about the coercive measures, but includes other prevention and protection measures in 
response to mass atrocities.349R2P consists of a continuum of measures, from prevention, to 
reaction, to rebuilding, and not limited to the use of force. In the face of mass atrocities, and 
where circumstances permit, non-coercive measures should be applied, and the use of force 
should be the last resort.  The clear statement of the crimes that may trigger the application of 
R2P, namely, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, removes 
any ambiguity as to when military intervention for human protection purposes is applicable.  
The importance of conflict prevention cannot be underestimated, for if crises can be 
prevented, then the contentious issue of armed military intervention will not arise and 
therefore preventing atrocities is better than reacting to them, or incurring the expenses or 
building shattered societies. The prevention of atrocities is appealing, because as opposed to 
intervention, it is less problematic and less costly.350 Successful prevention will spare at-risk 
populations from the scourge of war, displacement, and death.”351 Hanne Cuyckens concurs 
that “effective prevention will definitely obviate any need to resort to the other two 
components of R2P,”352 i.e. the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. 
Atrocity prevention is challenging and encompasses not only the gathering of information, 
but also the proper analysis, and the communication to officials who are in a position to take 
action to prevent atrocities. For example, the Bosnia war and the Rwanda genocide were 
predicted in advance, but the warnings were issued to “institutions that were not specifically 
tasked with preventing atrocities.”353 Successful prevention of conflicts will help to avoid 
genocide and other mass atrocities, making rendering it unnecessary for precious resources to 
be expended on protection measures. Without conflict prevention, conflicts will always break 
out without warning, and there will be many Rwandas and Srebrenicas. In the words of the 
ICISS Report, without new energy and momentum being devoted to conflict prevention, “the 
world will continue to witness the needless slaughter of our fellow human beings, and 
reckless waste of precious resources on conflict rather than on social and economic 
development.”354  Thus, the importance of conflict prevention cannot be underestimated, 
because successful conflict prevention efforts would address the causes of conflict, thereby 
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obviating conflicts. Where there is no conflict, the possibility of mass atrocities is limited, 
thus making military intervention and the attendant expenditure in rebuilding a shattered state 
unnecessary, and thereby releasing the resources expended in these pursuits to be applied on 
the economic and social development of the state. 
2.   The responsibility to react 
This section discusses the second specific responsibility which the responsibility to protect 
entails, i.e. the responsibility to react or the responsibility to respond to situations of 
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures 
like sanctions, and international prosecution, and in extreme cases, military intervention.355 
The use of military force is an extreme and grave measure that entails the infringement of the 
sovereignty of a state, and therefore, if non-coercive military measures prove adequate in 
halting gross human rights abuses, then the latter measures are to be preferred. This refers to 
the international community’s residual responsibility to react where a state is unable or 
unwilling to halt gross abuses of human rights perpetrated within its territory and the 
measures that have to be taken to discharge this responsibility. To this end, the section 
discusses the following measures: measures short of the actual application of military force, 
and; the situations when military action for human protection purposes is warranted, with a 
focus on the military dimension, because as previously observed, the military dimension has 
been the subject of concern to militarily weak countries apprehensive that powerful countries 
may use the pretext of protecting human rights to interfere in their domestic affairs.Therefore, 
it is necessary to focus on how best the use of force may be applied in the face of mass 
atrocities. The responsibility to react imposes a responsibility on the broader international 
community “to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, 
which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international persecution, and in 
extreme cases military intervention.”356  Thus, where possible, non-coercive measures should 
be applied in the effort to halt gross human rights abuses, and the military option should be 
the last resort, and only if the former measures prove inadequate. 
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Measures short of military action      
This sub-section discusses measures that do not involve the actual application of military 
force in the resolution of a humanitarian crisis when preventive measures fail, because failure 
of prevention measures to avert a humanitarian crisis does not necessarily mean that military 
action should be taken; and therefore, before military action, other non-coercive measures 
should be attempted because of the gravity of the coercive military measure. The 
Commission’s Report provides a list of coercive measures short of military intervention that 
can be applied to put pressure on the affected state, before resorting to the use of military 
force.357  These include political, economic, and military sanctions. Such sanctions operate to 
persuade the affected state authorities to take or not to take a particular action or actions, by 
inhibiting the affected state’s capacity to interact with the outside world.358 Sanctions impose 
hardship and suffering on the population they are meant to assist without having much effect 
on the perpetrators of atrocities, and therefore, the perpetrators have no incentive to stop their 
actions.359 As was noted in the Commission’s Report, the hardships brought upon the 
population sanctions “tend to be greatly disproportionate to the likely impact of sanctions on 
the behavior of the principal players” and “…they develop holes and deteriorate further over 
time…when they are poorly monitored, as has been almost universally the case.”360 This may 
not be sufficient to persuade the affected state to change course, even though the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document which adopted ICISS’s R2P downplays the military aspect or 
R2P.361  Nevertheless, non-coercive measures are worth a trial prior to the application of 
military force, because the use of force has grave implications for the affected state in terms 
of deaths of its military personnel and nationals, damage to its infrastructure, and economy; 
and to the interveners, the cost of intervention may entail fatalities in its military personnel 
and finances. Therefore, the ICISS proposed non-military measures prior to military force, 
which include: economic measures, political and diplomatic measures, and non-coercive 
military measures.  
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i.   Economic measures 
Under this heading, the section discusses the economic measures that may be applied in 
reaction to atrocities within a state. These may consist of positive or negative inducements, 
because the two sets of inducements go together in the form of the proverbial carrot and stick. 
Positive inducements assure the affected state that it stands to get certain benefits if it halts 
gross human rights; but on the other hand, if it persists in perpetrating human rights abuses, 
then unpleasant consequences will follow. Positive incentives include giving better access of 
trade, access to external markets, development assistance, promises of new funding or 
investment, or the promise of more favourable trade terms.362 It is debatable whether state 
authorities or non-state actors within a state bent on committing atrocities can be swayed by 
such incentives to halt them, because the incentives are realisable in the long term, and 
therefore, the perpetrators may consider that there are no immediate personal benefits 
sufficient to make them change their actions. If the perpetrators of the abuses consider that 
the positive inducements on offer will not impact directly on their personal financial 
wellbeing, then these inducements will have no effect on their behaviour, and they will not be 
persuaded to end the atrocities.  
Negative inducements may target the foreign assets of a country, or a rebel movement or 
terrorist organisation or the foreign assets of foreign leaders and their immediate families.363 
Restrictions may also be placed on income-generating activities such as oil, and diamonds, 
and on access to petroleum products and the use of aviation bans.364  It is argued, that while 
some of these sanctions may affect the principal players, others such as restrictions on access 
to petroleum or targeting the foreign assets of a country are indiscriminate, and end up 
punishing the ordinary people. As per the Commission’s Report, these sanctions can “blunt” 
weapons causing more harm than good, in particular to civilian populations.365 In any case, it 
is debatable whether these measures can bring any change to the conduct of the perpetrators, 
because they can continue to leave opulent lives unaffected by these sanctions and 
restrictions. The proven ineffectiveness of non-coercive measures as discussed above 
strengthens the application of the military option, because the use of force is bound to get the 
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attention of the perpetrators, or at the very least, it will defeat them militarily in order to pave 
the way for assisting the vulnerable population. 
ii.   Political and diplomatic measures 
This topic discusses the measures in the political and diplomatic realm that can be brought to 
bear on a state where atrocities are taking place in order to persuade the state authorities to 
end them.  Diplomatic and political pressure exerted by a regional organisation or the UN 
may prove successful in persuading the affected state authorities to end mass atrocities, 
thereby rendering unnecessary the use of the military option which entails unpleasant 
consequences for the state. These measures include restrictions on diplomatic representation, 
such as the expulsion of staff, and restrictions on travel against specific leaders and their 
families to major international shopping destinations.366 It is difficult to understand how such 
measures can persuade perpetrators of atrocities to mend their ways. State authorities can 
easily find a way around restrictions on diplomatic representation or expulsion of diplomatic 
staff by using the diplomatic services of a friendly country, and it is unlikely that restrictions 
of travel to major shopping centres can affect the perpetrators of atrocities in these days of 
online shopping. For example, travel restrictions have been placed on President of Robert 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe for decades for alleged gross abuse of human rights, but they cannot be 
said to have achieved the desired results. Other measures are suspension of membership or 
expulsion from international or regional bodies and refusal to admit a country to membership 
of these bodies.367 Measures like the aforementioned may not be sufficient to sway 
perpetrators of mass atrocities without the back-up of the threat or actual use of force.  
Therefore the affected state authorities should be left in no doubt that non-coercive measures 
and the use of military force are both options on the table, and if it remains intransigent in the 
face gentle persuasion by non-coercive measures, the use of force may follow. Such a 
strategy will be more effective than a stand-alone use of non-coercive measures.  
iii.Non-coercive military measures 
This section discusses measures of a military nature but which do not involve the threat or the 
use of force, with the same objective, that military force should be applied as the last resort 
and only after non-coercive measures have proved inadequate.These entail arms embargoes 
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on the sale of military equipment and spare parts to the affected state, and cessation of 
military cooperation and training programmes.368 The Commission’s Report concedes that 
results vary.369 It is argued that embargoes on the sale of military hardware and spare parts 
will not lead to a change in the actions of perpetrators of atrocity, because this equipment can 
be sourced from the black market, as there are always people, other states, or organisations 
that will be prepared to breach international embargoes for financial gain. With the 
proliferation of armaments on the international market and the competition among arms 
producing countries to sell arms to any interested buyer, be it a state or non-state actor, 
perpetrators of mass atrocities will not be persuaded to end them due to a shortage of 
weapons, because there will always be sellers of arms as long as there are willing buyers, and 
therefore, as a negative inducement, armed embargoes are of minimum value as a means in 
ending mass atrocities. 
It is submitted that non-military measures alone cannot bring relief to victims of atrocities 
without the back-up of the threat or actual use of force. Besides, if the international 
community has to wait until all non-military measures have been exhausted before resorting 
to coercive military force, a large number of people who military intervention is meant to 
save would already be dead, and therefore, salvation would have come too late. Thus, the use 
of force for human protection purposes may be a reasonable first option in some humanitarian 
crises such as the Rwanda genocide, because the genocide took place over a short period of 
time, and therefore, non-coercive measures would not have had the time to be effective, and 
would have come too late to save the lives of victims.  Consequently, in cases similar to the 
Rwanda genocide, the use of force as a first option is justified, because it will halt the 
genocide in its early stages and save hundreds of thousands of lives.Weiss concurs and, while 
referring to the Balkan wars, makes a plausible case that “earlier military intervention would 
conceivably have been more humanitarian than attempting less coercive measures prior to 
military ones, many of the people whom humanitarian intervention is intended to save could 
be dead or have fled,”370 if time is spent on applying all the alternatives to military 
intervention. Thus, prevention is not the single most important priority as the ICISS Report 
claims. As Weiss puts it:  
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Most of the mumbling and stammering about prevention is a superficially 
attractive but highly unrealistic way to try and pretend that we can finesse the hard 
issues of what essentially amounts to humanitarian intervention. The ICISS’s 
discourse about prevention is a helpful clarification, but it nonetheless obscures the 
essence of the most urgent part of the spectrum of responsibility, to protect those 
caught in the crosshairs of war.371 
The primary purpose of the responsibility to protect is to save lives, but not to tarry while 
lives are lost. This implies the use of force, and therefore, R2P is essentially humanitarian 
intervention couched in a different expression. Measures calculated to prevent mass atrocities 
are unrealistic, and cannot achieve their goals, and therefore, the threat or use of force is 
always likely to be more effective because it will get the attention of those who perpetrate 
atrocities.  What needs to be done is to ensure that military interventions are carried out with 
the mandate of the UN Security Council, with clearly operational guidelines, in order to 
ensure that powerful states do not use the pretext of protecting vulnerable people as a pretext 
to interfere in the domestic affairs of weaker states. To be legitimate and to receive 
international approval, it is necessary that an intervention should be authorized by the UN 
Security Council, because unilateral interventions set a dangerous precedent which other 
states may exploit and thereby undermine the international order. 
Military action  
This section focuses on the coercive military dimension of R2P as formulated by ICISS, as it 
is the most controversial aspect of R2P372 because it legitimises the use of force for human 
protection purposes, and also because the ICISS Report accorded it great importance.The 
ICISS Report implied that non-coercive measures have not always proved effective, and 
therefore, this strengthens the case for the military option. This can be deduced from the 
objective of the Commission, which was to devise a mechanism that would make the use of 
force for human protection purposes legitimate by creating a balance between respect for 
sovereignty and respect for human rights. The section discusses the situations when military 
action for human protection purposes is warranted, and the tough thresholds established by 
the ICISS that must be met if military action is to be defensible.373 These thresholds or 
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criteria were designed in a way that will ensure that, if they were observed, it would be 
difficult for powerful countries to intervene in weak countries on no other grounds but 
primarily on humanitarian grounds. The criteria also set operational guidelines to ensure that 
disproportionate force will not be used in the attainment of the objective of the 
intervention.While the ICISS Report indicated that military force should be part of the 
strategies for implementing R2P, it overemphasised military force as “the centerpiece of R2P 
by focusing so much attention on the proposed guidelines for the use of force.”374 The 
importance accorded to the military dimension of R2P in the ICISS Report itself is 
demonstrated by a clear bias in favour of the military option over other options such as 
economic and political sanctions.375 A study of the ICISS report shows that, under the 
heading “The responsibility to react,”376 the military option is accorded more detailed 
treatment, from pages 31 to 37 inclusive, i.e. seven pages, while other options such as 
economic and political sanctions are dealt with only from pages 29 to 31, i.e. about two and a 
quarter pages;377 thereby demonstrating the importance the Commission attached to this 
aspect of R2P. The centrality of the military dimension is reflected in the ICISS report as 
follows: “By far the most controversial form of …intervention is military, and a great part of 
our report necessarily focuses on that.”378The ICISS took into account the fact that if the 
military aspect of R2P was not handled with circumspection, the concept would not receive 
international consensus because of the concerns of militarily weak states that they would be 
potential targets of armed force by aggressive major military powers.  Therefore, the 
Commission covered in great detail the circumstances under which force may be justified, in 
particular by making the Security Council the right body to confer legitimacy on an 
intervention.  The manner in which the Commission handled the military dimension of R2P 
definitely contributed to the unanimous adoption of the concept at the 2005 World Summit. 
To buttress this fact, the report provides detailed criteria for military intervention under six 
headings, namely: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, 
and reasonable prospects.379 Besides, the responsibility to rebuild, to provide full assistance 
with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation is required, “particularly after a military 
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intervention,” 380 which presupposes that the responsibility to rebuild arises only as a 
consequence of military action, thus reinforcing the importance of the military dimension. In 
the words of the ICISS Report, “responsibility to protect” implies above all else a 
responsibility to react to situations of compelling need for human protection.381 Thus, even 
though the Commission avoided the phrase “humanitarian intervention,”382 and also placed 
emphasis on prevention of crises and rebuilding the affected state in the aftermath of crisis, 
“the commission’s report was still very much focused on the question of military intervention 
in response to humanitarian crises and mass atrocities.”383 While Gareth Evans notes that “it 
is an absolute travesty of the RtoP principle to say that it is about military force and nothing 
else,”384 he shares the view that the military dimension of R2P is the most important aspect, 
with the assertion that “the question of military action remains the central one to the 
debate.”385 He asserts further that “…military intervention is not merely defensible; it is a 
compelling obligation.”386 In the view of Weiss, the central element of R2P is non-consensual 
intervention, rendering other elements of the concept secondary.387 He criticises the 2005 
World Summit Document refinement of the ICISS report concerning the use of force “as a 
step backward, as R2P lite” - because humanitarian intervention has to be approved by the 
Security Council.”388 The foregoing justify the focus on the military dimension of R2P, 
because the point is, even if it is argued that humanitarian intervention is not identical to R2P, 
the common denominator with the two concepts is that the use of force is an option, and 
therefore, the apprehensions of militarily weak states with humanitarian intervention apply in 
relation to R2P; and these fears have to be addressed in order to provide justification for the 
use of force for human protection purposes where necessary.   
The ICISS Report proposed that less intrusive and non-coercive measures should always be 
considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.389 The primary responsibility 
for protecting its nationals rests on the state, but when non-coercive measures fail to end 
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atrocities, and the state is unable or unwilling to discharge the responsibility to protect, it 
subverts its own sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility 
of the international community to intervene in the affected state.390 The international 
community’s responsibility to intervene in order to protect vulnerable victims in such a 
situation appears to compromise Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which enshrines the principle 
of non-intervention. Article 2(7) states: 
Nothing contained in present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state…but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. 
Nevertheless, the Article makes an exception with regard to measures taken under Chapter 
VII, which confers authority upon the Security Council when “necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”391 Therefore, any intervention conducted with 
Security Council mandate will be lawful. When prevention measures fail and hostilities break 
out in a state, and mass atrocities are taking place in a state, “it is not an option for the world 
to stand by and do nothing.”392 The problem is determining the most effective measures to 
bring an end to such atrocities. The Commission made a deliberate decision not refer to the 
use of force for the purpose of protecting or assisting people at risk as “humanitarian 
intervention,” because of its controversial nature, but rather preferred to refer to it either as 
“intervention” or “military intervention” for human protection purposes.393 It is argued that 
the change in terminology does not mask the fact that with both descriptions the use of force 
is the common denominator. The only difference between the two is that in the case of R2P 
the use of force is one among other measures in tackling the issue of mass atrocities, and 
before the use of force, R2P requires that non-coercive measures should be applied, thereby 
making the use of force a last resort. However, as has been argued, in certain situations it will 
be unreasonable for the international community to test the efficacy of non-coercive measures 
before resorting to the use of force, because the latter measure may come too late for the 
victims of mass atrocities. 
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As has already been noted, non-coercive military measures are not always sufficient to end 
atrocities, and therefore, the ICISS proposes that when non-military measures fail to resolve a 
humanitarian crises, then “in extreme cases – but only in extreme cases”394 military force 
may be applied. It has been argued that if quiet and public diplomacy “are not founded on a 
realistic possibility that they will be backed up, if necessary, by other measures, then they 
will ring hollow and lose credibility.”395 In other words, non-military measures are not 
enough to persuade a state perpetrating atrocities against its own people to cease and desist, 
and therefore, unless there is a credible threat to use force or actual force is applied, atrocities 
cannot be ended through diplomacy or economic sanctions alone. As observed by Frank 
Chalk et. al., in the contemporary era, no genocide or crimes against humanity, once 
underway, was halted through soft-power measures; and thus, for example, “Crimes against 
humanity in East Pakistan in 1971 and the killing fields of Cambodia in 1978 were stopped 
by intervening militarily.”396 This goes to buttress the argument that non-coercive measures 
alone are not sufficient to stop mass atrocities, and thereby strengthens the case for the 
military option  
 Nevertheless, military intervention for humanitarian purposes, in the view of the 
Commission is an exceptional and extraordinary measure, and therefore, to be warranted, 
there must be an extraordinary level of human suffering in the form of large scale loss of life, 
“actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not,” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, 
actual or apprehended, whether carried by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”397 
Thus, military intervention, because of its gravity, has to be conducted primarily in response 
to excessive human suffering, such as mass killings, ethnic cleansing, rape etc., and not in 
advancement of any other agenda. The expression “actual or apprehended” appears flexible 
enough to permit preventive or anticipatory use of force; for if there is a reasonable 
apprehension of imminent genocide, then it would be unreasonable to wait for it to happen 
before action is taken, but rather, there would be justification for armed intervention at the 
earliest indication of impending atrocities. This blurs the line between preventive measures 
and forceful military action as a first option. Indeed, the ICISS Report makes it clear that the 
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“international community should not be placed in the morally untenable position of being 
required to wait until genocide begins” before reacting, and therefore, military action can be 
“legitimate as an anticipatory measure in response to clear evidence of likely large scale 
killing.”398 This statement seems to be at variance with the Commission’s statement in its 
report that “prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is 
contemplated,” 399 because prevention is the most important dimension of R2P.400 The 
rationale behind regarding prevention as the most important dimension of R2P is that 
successful prevention makes the other dimensions of R2P unnecessary, because the absence 
of conflict usually means there is minimum gross human rights abuses, making the need to 
intervene to protect victims or to rebuild the affected state, thereafter, irrelevant. 
The danger with preventive or anticipatory military action, however, is that on the one hand 
the danger apprehended may never occur, and it may be used as a pretext to advance the 
national interest of the intervening state or states. On the other hand, to wait for atrocities to 
start may cause irreparable harm to victims of atrocities, because “in most cases, by the time 
mass atrocities are apprehended as imminent, the window for prevention has been closed.”401 
Evans appears to be a strong advocate of the military aspect of R2P, for as he asserts, if R2P 
is to take root to ensure that there are no more Rwandas, then the international community 
has to identify and apply credible principles for intervention in general “and military action in 
particular.”402 
The ICISS Report acknowledges the norm of non-intervention, but asserts that there are 
“exceptional circumstances” in which, for purposes of maintaining a stable international 
order, it is in the interest of the international community to react, when order has broken 
down in a state leading to genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large scale.403 The exceptional 
circumstances must be cases of extreme violence that “shock the conscience of mankind,”404 
or that threaten international peace and security,405 thereby requiring coercive military action. 
The Report then attempts to define what exactly it means by “exceptional circumstances” by 
establishing the threshold of violence that has to be crossed before coercive military force for 
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human protection purposes can be justified. To this end, the report establishes six criteria that 
must be satisfied before the decision to use force is made. The purpose of these criteria is to 
ensure that, when strictly observed before military intervention is initiated, there will be 
international consensus that the primary objective of the intervention is to protect victims of 
gross human rights abuses purposes, and not for the advancement of other agendas. 
3.4.7. The six criteria for military intervention or precautionary principles 
This section discusses the criteria that must be satisfied before the decision to intervene is 
made. The ICISS Report calls them precautionary principles, because they assist in drawing 
the line as to when military intervention is justified before the intervention takes place. R2P is 
a comprehensive concept which frames intervention as a continuum of measures406 from 
various types of political, economic, and military sanctions, with military action as a last 
resort. Thus, under R2P, intervention does not consist only of the use of force, and therefore, 
it is a requirement that before force is used, non-coercive measures should be applied to give 
the perpetrators of the atrocities in question the opportunity to halt them. Force is to be used 
only after non-coercive measures have proved inadequate in stopping the atrocities, because 
of the grave implications accompanying the use of force, for both the target state and the 
interveners as, already observed.  The Commission took the view that “in extreme and 
exceptional cases, the responsibility to react may involve the need to resort to military 
action.”407 The Commission was persuaded during consultations with stakeholders that there 
was strong opposition to infringements on sovereignty.408 However while it acknowledges the 
importance of the principle of non-intervention, it found that there is general acceptance that 
“there must be limited exceptions to the non-intervention rule for certain kinds of 
emergencies.”409 Plausible as this sounds, this has raised concerns among weaker countries 
that R2P confers legitimacy on interference in the domestic affairs of weaker states by 
powerful states.410 Nevertheless, since its formulation in 2001, R2P has gained significance 
as a mechanism for the “prevention of genocide and mass atrocities and about protecting 
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potential victims.”411Despite the fears of militarily weak states about the potential abuse of 
R2P by powerful countries, R2P has gained international consensus as a mechanism for the 
protection of victims of egregious human rights, as demonstrated in the unanimous 
endorsement of the concept by over 170 world leaders at the 2005 World Summit. 
The Commission listed the following criteria which have to be satisfied in order to justify the 
use of force for human protection purposes, namely: just cause, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means, reasonable prospects, and right authority.412Fulfilment of the criteria 
assists in determining that the primary goal of the intervention is to protect the human rights 
of victims of abuse. 
 Just cause 
This section focuses on the just cause threshold; that is, the kind of harm sufficient to serve as 
a catalyst for military intervention to override the principle of non-intervention.  The 
Commission took into account the fact that sovereignty is to be respected, and therefore, 
exceptions to the principle of non-intervention should be limited, and in the light of the 
gravity of military intervention, “there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to 
human beings”413 before force is used for human protection purposes.The just cause principle 
seeks to find moral and ethical justification for intervention, and has its foundations in the 
just war or bellum justus theory which “makes the use of force just and the cause of war 
legitimate,”414 especially where it becomes necessary to wage war in defence of victims of 
tyranny or gross human rights abuses.The phrase ‘just war,’ like ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
is an oxymoron, and as rightly observed by Tucholsky, “There is no such thing as a just 
war,”415 because war always involves violence, death, and human suffering.416 Nevertheless, 
under certain circumstances, the use of force may be a necessary option in the international 
arena. Krieg shares this view, observing that with the exception of pacifism that rejects the 
use of force entirely, “all models of just war theory have accepted the fact that in certain 
scenarios the use of force may within limits be justifiable.”417 Thus, the ICISS was of the 
view that, in extreme and exceptional cases, the responsibility to protect may involve the 
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need to resort to military action.418 The threshold for just cause however is set high, and 
therefore, military intervention is justified only where there is serious and irreparable harm 
occurring to human beings or imminently likely to occur, 419 in order to limit exceptions to 
the principle of non-intervention. The just cause criterion was intended to create expectations 
of the situations when the international community and in particular the Security Council, 
should use force in the face of human catastrophes and to limit the arbitrary casting of the 
veto by the five permanent members of the Security Council for selfish purposes.420 The 
Commission identifies two conditions that military intervention for human protection 
purposes must aim to halt or avert: (i) “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with 
genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect 
or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or (ii) large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or 
apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”421 The 
term ‘large scale’ was not defined, because opinions on the phrase will differ,422 what is large 
scale is relative and what may be considered large scale in one situation may pale into 
relative insignificance when compared to another situation. For example, few atrocities 
compare to the horror of the Rwanda genocide; yet, regardless of the scale, every incident of 
mass killing is intolerable. Therefore, the Commission’s view was that military action is a 
legitimate response to clear evidence of likely large scale killing.423 The view of the 
Commission justifies anticipatory military intervention for human protection purposes, so 
that the international community will not have to wait for actual large scale killing to 
commence before taking action, because the action may come too late for the victims of gross 
human rights abuses. 
The Commission was of the view that the just cause criterion for the decision to intervene 
would be amply satisfied if either or both of conditions (i) and (ii) are met. These conditions 
are amplified to include: actions precisely defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention that 
involve large scale loss of life; crimes against humanity and violations of humanitarian laws 
as defined in the  Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols; manifestations of ethnic 
cleansing, including killing of members of a particular group in order to eliminate their 
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presence from a particular area or their removal from a geographic area; situations of state 
collapse resulting in the exposure of population to mass starvation and/or civil war or; 
overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes where the state affected is unwilling or 
unable to cope or call for assistance leading to loss of life.424 The objective of the just cause 
threshold is to ensure that  the horror of the Rwandan genocide is never repeated, because it 
serves as a guide to the international community as to when timely action should be taken in 
defence of vulnerable people. Thus, the international community should not wait until mass 
atrocities have already started, but should be able to take action where evidence points to 
imminent mass killing or ethnic cleansing. Anticipatory military intervention is to ensure that 
the international community is not placed in the untenable position of coming too late to the 
rescue of victims of human rights abuses. Anticipatory intervention is, therefore, a preventive 
measure, aimed at stopping mass atrocities before they start. If this principle had been applied 
in Rwanda, the genocide would not have started, or at least the number of victims would not 
have been on such a large scale. 
The idea behind R2P was that, in the face of excessive violations of human rights in the form 
of mass killings or ethnic cleansing, coercive force may be used to protect the victims, and  
therefore, the expansion of the concept to include natural and environmental catastrophes is 
controversial because these are not man-made phenomena; and therefore, it is submitted that 
the affected state should not be held accountable where it fails to call for assistance or rejects 
such assistance in the face of its inability cope. The reason for rejecting foreign assistance 
may be due to the fear that powerful states may use the humanitarian crisis as a pretext to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of the affected state, because it may not always be easy to 
draw a line between humanitarian assistance and occupation or regime change agendas. Thus, 
even where a state fails to ask for external assistance or rejects such assistance when offered, 
measures short of coercive military force would be more appropriate, and therefore, the 
military force dimension of R2P should not be applicable. It is for this reason that the 
Commission limited the threshold for just cause to cases of violence that genuinely “shock 
the conscience of mankind,”425 such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, as justification for 
military intervention. 
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The Commission excluded from the just cause criteria the following: situations of human 
rights violations falling short of outright killings and ethnic cleansing, such as systematic 
racial discrimination, or repression of political opponents; the overthrow of a democratic 
government, and; the use of force by a state to rescue its own nationals on foreign territory, 
the latter being already covered by the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. The exclusion of these situations is due to the fact that they do not deserve to be 
addressed by coercive military force, because other non-coercive measures such as political, 
economic, or non-coercive military sanctions would be sufficient to address them. For 
example, the system of apartheid was brought to an end in South Africa mainly through 
political and economic pressure. The system was abominable and brutalisedSouth African 
society, but it did not bring about mass killings on the scale of the Rwandan genocide, and 
therefore, external coercive intervention was not needed. Consequently, in the absence of a 
deliberate policy of mass killing of a section of the population or ethnically cleansing a 
minority from a geographical area by a government, military intervention is not justified. 
Right Intention 
The objective of this section is to discuss the primary purpose of intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, which, regardless of the intentions or motives of an intervening state, 
must be to avert or halt human suffering. This is to ensure that military intervention for 
human protection purposes is not used as a pretext for the advancement of the ulterior 
motives of the interveners. This view is shared by St. Augustine, who stressed that war can be 
justified only if it is conducted with the right intent; that is, putting an end to a grave injustice 
or for the restoration of peace.426 Therefore, any use of force with a regime change agenda, as 
occurred with NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya that has transformed the country into a 
failed state,427 is not a legitimate objective. The Commission noted that even though 
overthrowing a government is not a legitimate objective, “disabling that regime’s capacity to 
harm its own people may be essential to discharging the mandate of protection.”428 This is a 
disingenuous proposition, because the overthrow of a government cannot be prohibited while 
the incapacitation of that government is tolerated; for disabling the regime facilitates its 
overthrow, as occurred in Libya during NATO’s intervention. What the Commission is 
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inferring here is that overthrowing a regime should not be the primary objective of 
intervention for human protection purposes, and therefore the intervening states should not go 
in with that objective, but they can achieve that objective by disabling the regime to ensure its 
overthrow. The Commission’s provides an ambiguous guideline which is likely to be abused. 
Similarly, the Commission proposed that, while occupation of territory should not be an 
objective, it may not be able to be avoided, though it proposed that there should be an initial 
commitment to return occupied territory to its sovereign owner.429 The Commission made no 
effort, however, to specify the duration of such unavoidable occupation, which, for all 
practical purposes, could last for decades. An example is NATO’s occupation of Afghanistan, 
which though not an R2P situation, is an example of enduring occupation of one country by a 
powerful force. Military intervention for human protection purposes should be for the 
protection of human rights, but not in advancement of geopolitical and strategic goals of the 
interveners, such as regime change or the occupation of the target state and control of its 
resources or exporting democracy. 
To satisfy the fulfilment of the “right intention” criterion, the Commission proposed that 
military intervention should always take place on a collective or multilateral rather than 
single-country basis.430 Other ways to ensure the fulfilment of the right intention criterion 
depend on whether and to what extent the intervention is actually supported by the people 
who would benefit from it, and whether and to what extent regional countries are supportive 
of the intervention.431 It is submitted that collective or multilateral military intervention, 
which is an intervention with UN Security Council mandate, is not always enough to satisfy 
the ‘right intention” criterion, because  the Security Council lacks the capacity to control or 
monitor the operational aspects of an intervention, after it has authorised it. This is partly 
because the Security Council does not have its own army and invariably depends on other 
countries or organisations to fulfil its mandate of maintaining international peace and 
security, and partly because the authorisation given by the Security Council to an intervening 
state or organisation can be misinterpreted or abused as illustrated by NATO’s intervention in 
Libya, where the organisation misinterpreted Security Council Resolution 1973 which 
authorised intervention to protect civilians, to effect regime change. To avoid this theSecurity 
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Council should lay down strict operational guidelines for an intervention it authorises, in 
order to eliminate the abuse of its mandate. 
To be fair to the Commission, it acknowledged that the humanitarian motive is not the only 
one driving the intervening states or organisation even where an intervention is authorised by 
the Security Council.  Complete disinterestedness or the absence of narrow self-interest at all 
is unrealistic, because it cannot be expected that an intervening state will do so without 
expecting any benefits accruing to its national or strategic goals.Therefore, however altruistic 
an intervening state’s motive may be, the financial cost and potential cost in lives of military 
personnel make it politically imperative that the intervening state should be able to claim 
some degree of self-interest in the intervention.432 Aside from the cost in finances and in 
lives, other motives of an intervening state may be to avoid refugee outflows into its territory, 
or to avoid a haven for drug producers or terrorists developing in the state’s 
neighbourhood.433  Thus, as pointed out by Michael Walzer, absolute disinterestedness is 
highly unlikely.434 Robert Murray shares this view, asserting that a pragmatic approach to 
R2P allows states to carefully decide where an intervention will take place “under what 
conditions and just how beneficial such intervention might be to their own interests.”435 
Evans and Sahnoun, however, are of the view that intervention for altruistic motives is 
possible, because in an interdependent world “with crises as capable as they now are of 
generating major problems elsewhere…it is in every country’s interest to resolve such 
problems, quite apart from the humanitarian imperative.”436 It is submitted that while total 
disinterestedness is ideal, a state will not intervene in another on human protection grounds 
alone without taking into account its own self-interest, such as considerations of risk to its 
military personnel, the financial costs involved and strategic benefits. In other words, it is 
unrealistic to expect that an intervention will be motivated solely by compassion for 
humanity. However, even if compassion for humanity is not the sole driving force for 
intervention, it should take precedence over self-interestedness. As Parekh puts it, the 
intervention should be disinterested in the sense that the humanitarian aspect should not 
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become secondary to an otherwise self-interested intervention.437 It is reasonable that an 
intervening state expects to benefit from the operation, but as long as the overriding objective 
is to protect victims of human rights, it satisfies the right intention criterion.  
Last resort 
This section discusses the requirement that the military option should be the last resort after 
preventive or peaceful options have been exhausted, because if non-coercive measures prove 
adequate, then it obviates the need to resort to the controversial measure of using force in 
violation of the target state’s sovereignty. Prior to the use of force, every diplomatic and non-
military alternative for prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis must have 
been explored,438 and therefore, the use of force can only be justified when non-coercive 
methods has been fully discharged.439 For example, where the conflict is between a state and 
an insurgent group, deployment of peacekeepers and observers is a better option than a 
coercive military response.440  However, this does not necessarily mean that every non-
military option must literally have been tried and failed, because often there will simply not 
be the time for the process to work itself out.441 Exploring every avenue for the prevention or 
resolution of the humanitarian crisis does not mean putting the option “in place and waiting 
around for it to fail.”442 What it does mean is that there must be reasonable grounds for 
believing that, in all the circumstances, if the measure had been attempted it would not have 
succeeded.443 This proposal is ambiguous, because it provides no guidance as to when or how 
to determine whether measures other than military force would not have succeeded if they 
had been attempted. This leaves room for an intervening state or organisation to be the sole 
judge as to whether other measures other than the use of military force would not have 
succeeded if they had been attempted prior to an intervention. Despite this possibility, there 
are situations (such as the Rwanda genocide) where it would be unreasonable to expect that 
non-coercive measures will succeed in halting atrocities, when time is of the essence in 
saving thousands of people from being slaughtered.  
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Thus, there is the possibility that military intervention may be premature, because no time 
was allowed to explore peaceful solutions to a humanitarian crisis. For example, with regard 
to the military intervention in Iraq on grounds that Iraq possessed weapons of mass 
destruction, it has been argued that there was ample time for the inspection process to have 
been carried through, and that resort to military action was, at the very least, premature.444 It 
is clear that whether an intervention is unilateral or collective, if the intervening states or 
organisations choose to, they do not have to explore prevention or peaceful solutions before 
resorting to military action, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that in all 
circumstances, if these measures had been attempted they would not have succeeded. As 
Sarkin has observed, “the future of RtoP does not look rosy,”445 because with such 
uncertainties and ambiguities the concept will continue to generate controversy and 
opposition from potential targets of interventions by powerful states. Regardless of this 
argument, where anticipatory military intervention becomes necessary in the face of a 
reasonable expectation that mass killing is imminent, it is preferable to take preemptive 
military action to save lives and risk international condemnation than do nothing.   
Proportional means 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the principle that the intensity and duration of the 
military action taken has to be commensurate with the stated objective and in line with the 
magnitude of the original provocation.446 The Commission proposed, for example, that the 
effect on the political system of the affected country should be limited to what is strictly 
necessary to achieve the purpose of the intervention, and the interveners should strictly 
observe international humanitarian law.447 As has been observed in relation to the Libya 
intervention, interveners do not always abide by the requirement to ensure that the effect on 
the political system of the target country should be limited to what is necessary to accomplish 
the objective of the intervention. Besides, again, as in the Libya case, interveners are likely to 
use disproportionate and indiscriminate force far beyond the magnitude of the original 
provocation. 
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Reasonable prospects 
This section discusses the principle that to justify a military intervention there must be a 
reasonable chance of success of halting or averting the human suffering that triggered the 
intervention in the first place.448 The intervention should not bring about a greater harm than 
the intervention was originally calculated to avert, and therefore, an intervention is not 
justified if it has no chance of success, and is likely to make matters worse by triggering a 
greater conflict.449 Thus, on purely utilitarian grounds, the application of the principle would 
be likely “to preclude military action against any one of the permanent members of Security 
Council…”450 and for that matter, any other major military power. This implies double 
standards, because in practice, it means that the use of force for human protection purposes 
can be applied only to militarily weak countries, and military action can never be taken 
against militarily powerful countries even if all the conditions required for intervention are 
met. This is unjust, because, without defending any atrocities perpetrated by any state, it is 
argued that the only reason why weak states are targets for military interventions is simply 
because they are weak militarily, and not that they have a monopoly on the perpetration of 
atrocities. The injustice is exacerbated by the fact that invariably interventions are carried out 
by the major military powers exempted from the application of the principle. In response to 
the issue of double standards, Evans argues that, “The reality that interventions may not be 
plausibly mounted in every justifiable case is no reason for them not to be mounted in any 
case.”451 This does not justify the double standards, but only reiterates the injustice by 
expressing it in another way that powerful countries are exempted from military intervention, 
but weak countries are legitimate targets of military intervention. It should therefore not come 
as surprise that the greatest opponents of humanitarian intervention would be militarily weak 
countries that see themselves as potential targets of military intervention. 
Right authority 
The objective of this section is to discuss the appropriate authority with the right to determine 
whether military intervention for humanitarian purposes should proceed.  The controversy 
about military intervention entails issues such as how and when it should be undertaken, and 
the right body to grant authorisation. In particular, it is critical to identify the right authority 
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which can grant the mandate for an intervention, because without identifying such an 
authority, unilateral interventions cannot be considered illegitimate. In the words of the ICISS 
Report, military intervention involves not only an intrusion into a sovereign state, but also the 
use of deadly force on a potentially massive scale; and therefore, identifying the institution 
with the right to authorize an intervention is a matter of critical importance,452 because 
without international consensus on the right authority, the target state of an intervention has 
the right to resist with its military forces a unilateral and illegal intervention,  thereby 
endangering international peace and security. The Commission sought to eliminate the danger 
of unilateral humanitarian military interventions conducted on the sole decisions of powerful 
states in the territories of weak countries ostensibly with the objective of saving lives, while 
the actual motives may be to defend strategic interests.  As expressed by von Schorlemer, 
“repeatedly, unilateral interventions genuinely or supposedly aimed at saving people’s live in 
third world countries were opportunistic in nature and stemmed from the intervening 
countries’ overwhelming power.”453 A major power is the sole judge as to whether conditions 
existed in the affected state to warrant an intervention and therefore such an intervention 
could be arbitrary; and consequently, the identification of the body under whose authority 
military intervention should be conducted is imperative.  Thus, the Commission was of the 
view that, when it comes to the authorisation of military intervention for human protection 
purposes, there is no better body than the United Nations Security Council which should be 
making the hard decisions about overriding state sovereignty, the decisions about the 
mobilisation of effective resources, including military resources, and the decisions about 
rescuing populations at risk454 in order to engender international  consensus and confer  
legitimacy on such operations. The basis of this authority is found in Article 42 of the UN 
Charter, which confers on the Security Council the discretion to “take such action by air, sea 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”455 
The Commission found that there was the overwhelming consensus in their consultations 
around the world about the Security Council as the rightful authority. Therefore, in the view 
of the Commission, if international consensus was to be attained as to when, where, how, and 
by whom military intervention is to take place then the Security Council should be at the 
                                                          
452ICISS Report, p. 47 
453S. von Schorlemer, The Responsibility to Protect as an Element of Peace – Recommendations  for its  
Operationalization.Policy Paper 28. Bonn: StiftungEntwicklung und Frieden, 2007. Quoted by L. Pingeot 
and W. Obenland, R2P: In whose name? Global Policy Forum, May 2014, p. 23. 
454ICISS Report, p. 49. 
455United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42. 
287 
 
centre of the consensus.456 Without agreement on the Security Council as the legitimate body 
to grant authorisation for military intervention, military intervention is reduced to the level of 
might is right, thereby granting powerful countries the licence to violate the sovereignty of 
weak countries at will.The Council is without doubt the most appropriate organ to authorise 
military intervention for human protection purposes because besides Article 42, another basis 
for this is Article 24 of the United Nations Charter. The Article states: 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Council acts on their behalf.457 
In other words, in matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security 
including the military intervention for human protection purposes, the Security Council, as 
the representative of the nations of the world, is the right body to confer legitimacy on any 
necessary action. Thus, when the Security Council authorises an intervention for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, in principle it is equivalent to the 
authorisation by the entire membership of the UN, and therefore, the legality of the 
intervention should be beyond question.  The Commission endorsed this view with the 
observation, that since the end of the Cold War, an intervention by the Security Council has 
“almost invariably been universally accepted as conferring international legality on an 
action.”458 However, the credibility and suitability of the Security Council in its current from 
as the right institution to authorise interventions raises questions. The Security Council is 
unrepresentative in its current composition, dominated by the major military powers of the 
world with different interests and agendas, exacerbated by the Council’s “inherent 
institutional double standards with the Permanent Five veto power.”459 Thus, in matters of 
military intervention, the political will of some members may be lacking; and therefore, it is 
unlikely that unanimity or even consensus would be attainable, because some members of the 
Security Council may use their vetoes to protect a state that is a potential target for military 
intervention as a consequence of gross abuses of human rights abuses in its territory. Sarkin, 
while expressing agreement that the Security Council is the appropriate body to 
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authorisemilitary intervention, criticizes the Security Council as a “highly politicized 
institution” in which “Its five permanent members wield veto power, frequently to protect 
their own interests, at the expense of preventing massive human rights violations.”460 He 
argues, therefore, that whether or not steps are taken in the face of massive human rights 
violations depends on Security Council politics, and calls for reform of the Security Council 
in order to address this anomaly.461 
Reform of the Security Council is long overdue; for as long as the five permanent members 
of the Council have the ultimate say as to whether an intervention should take place or not the 
credibility of the intervention will raise questions.  Reforms should involve stripping the five 
permanent members of the veto, or giving the veto to representatives of continents not 
already represented on the Council, such as Africa, or granting every member of the Security 
Council, permanent or temporary, the veto. Another alternative is to give every member 
country of the UN the veto in matters concerning international peace and security. This will 
go a long way to levelling the playing field, in the light of the fact that countries that are 
targets of military intervention make up the temporary members of the Council, and are also 
the majority in the General Assembly. However, in the light of the fact that only a handful of 
states have nuclear weapons, levelling the playing field may be an ideal, but not an attainable 
goal.  However, the Commission expressed support for Security Council reform with the 
observation that, despite misgivings about the Council, the “task is not to find alternatives to 
the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work much 
better than it has.”462The rest of the world should not relent in seeking these reforms because 
all the countries of the world are equal. The preamble of the UN Charter “…reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small...” No, nation, however powerful, has the right to the 
preservation of its sovereignty at the expense of the sovereignty of smaller countries. The 
veto should be used only in the interests of the international community, with the purpose of 
preserving international peace and security,but not in a capricious manner, to advance the 
national interests of states that wield it.463 
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Having established the Security Council’s role in military intervention for human protection 
purposes, the Commission noted that, before any military intervention can be carried out, 
Security Council authorisation must be sought by those calling for an intervention and the 
Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there 
is large scale killing or ethnic cleansing.464 As noted, the decision to intervene or not depends 
on the five permanent members, and since a decision may be influenced by the interests of 
these members, prompt authorisation for an intervention even in the face of mass atrocities 
may not be possible. The consequences of delayed action or inaction by the Security Council 
in such situations would be unilateral intervention by states or organisations with the 
capability, because it would be immoral for the world to stand idly by and watch the mass 
slaughter and ethnic cleansing of civilians. An example is of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
which was carried out unilaterally due to a deadlock in the Security Council arising from the 
threat of Russia and China to veto any resolution authorising the use of force465. Conversely, 
the likelihood that inaction may trigger unilateral intervention may compel the Security 
Council to grant prompt authorisation to those who seek to intervene. As Bellamy has 
observed, by prescribing the situations under which the international community has the 
responsibility to react, the ICISS was attempting to bring pressure to bear on the members of 
the Security Council to discharge their responsibility to take quick and decisive action to halt 
or avert a humanitarian crisis,466 in order to preempt unilateral military intervention. The 
Security Council is often paralysed by disagreement among the five permanent members as 
to situations when force may be used for human protection purposes. A clear prescription of 
the circumstances under which force may be used ensures that there would be no justification 
for any of the five permanent members to be an obstacle to necessary action in the face of 
mass atrocities. 
On the issue of the capricious use of the veto by the five permanent members as an obstacle 
to international action to halt or avert a humanitarian crisis, the Commission placed a 
limitation on the use of the veto: that a member should not use the veto unless its vital 
national interest was involved.467 This appears reasonable; but it still leaves room for abuse 
because, it is left to any of the five permanent members to decide when its vital national 
interest is at stake that warrants the use of the veto. Conversely, none of the five permanent 
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members would carry out a military intervention for human protection purposes, unless its 
vital national interest is at stake; the result being the exposure of vulnerable populations to 
gross violations of human rights without any protection. The solution to the capricious use of 
the veto would be to request the five permanent members to disclose the reasons behind the 
exercise of their veto to the international community to enable it to make an assessment as to 
whether the use of the veto in a particular circumstance was justified.468 This will engender a 
degree of accountability in the exercise of the veto, thereby diminishing the use of the veto as 
an obstacle to action for human protection purposes; for if the veto wielding members of the 
Council are compelled to disclose the reasons for using their veto, there is the likelihood that 
the veto would not be used frequently, and also the likelihood of consensus among them 
where the protection of human rights is concerned will be enhanced. 
When the Security Council fails to act 
This section discusses other options for the authorisation of military intervention when the 
Security Council fails to take action to avert or halt a humanitarian crisis, or rejects a request 
for intervention, or fails to grant such request within a reasonable time. Where the Security 
Council is unable or unwilling to act, it should grant timely authorisation to other capable 
actors to take action; for if refuses to grant permission for other actors to intervene or it is 
slow in granting permission, it would pave the way for unilateral interventions, setting a 
dangerous precedent for other actors to follow, which would in turn undermine the credibility 
of the Council as the custodian of the authority to secure international peace and security. The 
view of the Commission was that even though the Security Council is the primary authority, 
it should not be the last; and therefore; if the Council fails to act, alternatives to discharging 
the responsibility to protect cannot be entirely discounted.469 Action that bypasses the 
Security Council undermines the international order, but this has to be weighed against the 
imperative of protecting the lives of vulnerable people.470 As noted, there are situations where 
the Security Council is paralyzed by the exercise of the veto by a single member from taking 
military action.  In such circumstances, it would be unreasonable to close other options for 
coming to the assistance of suffering populations. The Commission provides the following 
possible alternatives: 
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The General Assembly of the UN 
One possible alternative according to the Commission would be to solicit support from the 
General Assembly meeting in an Emergency Special Session under the United for Peace, 
established to address situations where the Security Council fails to the take steps to maintain 
international peace and security.471 Even though the General Assembly has no power to 
authorize an intervention, the support of an overwhelming majority of member states would 
confer substantial legitimacy on an intervention.472 It is submitted that, if the Security 
Council, upon which the members states of the UN have conferred the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, fails to discharge the responsibility, 
then the General Assembly constituted by the member states should as a collective have the 
power to authorise a military intervention. The world, through the General Assembly, would 
be speaking with a united voice to take action to protect victims of excessive abuse of human 
rights where the Security Council has abdicated its responsibility, and therefore, the 
credibility of the military intervention in such a situation should be beyond question.  
Regional Organisations 
Another alternative is collective intervention by a regional or sub-regional organisation in the 
region where the humanitarian crisis occurs, since a crisis in one state in the region could 
have spill-over effects into other neighbouring countries. Article 52 of the UN Charter 
provides the authority for regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters relating to 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that the 
actions of these regional arrangements or agencies are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.473 In the 1990s, Africa faced many armed conflicts 
including conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Algeria, and Lesotho; and regional and sub-regional 
organisations in Africa, in particular the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development, had to find ways to resolve these conflicts 
themselves, which were manifested in military intervention.474 An example of intervention by 
a regional arrangement was ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia in 1990, through ECOMOG, 
the Ceasefire Monitoring Group of the organisation, and again in Sierra Leone in 1998 in the 
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face of UN Security Council’s inaction.475  A regional organization, besides being better 
placed to deal with a humanitarian crisis because it occurs in its geographical area, is also 
more likely to be motivated by humanitarian concerns and the will to have a quick resolution 
of the crisis.476 A corollary of the authority of regional organisations to conduct military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes is to seek approval after the event or ex post facto, as 
occurred in the case of ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which were 
carried out without Security Council approval, but was approved by the Council after the 
fact.477 
3.     Responsibility to rebuild 
The objective of this section is to discuss the third specific responsibility that R2P embraces, 
namely: the responsibility of intervening states to remain in the affected state long enough to 
ensure sustainable reconstruction.478Failure of the interveners to ensure that the causes that 
gave rise to the conflict are addressed will lead to the conflict erupting again. Furthermore, a 
state emerging from conflict would require all necessary assistance in order to stand on its 
feet again, and it is the responsibility of the interveners to stay long enough to assist in this 
regard.The responsibility to protect implies in addition to the responsibility to prevent and 
react, a commitment to follow through and rebuild.479 The responsibility to rebuild entails the 
responsibility to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with 
recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation, and addressing the causes of the harm the 
intervention was designed to halt or avert.480 If after a military intervention the affected 
state’s capacity to discharge its responsibility to protect breaks down, there should be a 
genuine commitment to help build “a durable peace, and promoting good governance and 
sustainable development.”481 Intervening states should not leave the affected state to be 
saddled with the problems that triggered the military intervention, but should address the root 
causes of the crisis that the intervention was intended to halt;482 otherwise, the possibility of 
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the reoccurrence of violence cannot be discounted.  The Commission’s Report recalled the 
statement of the UN Secretary-General that: 
Societies that have emerged from conflict have special needs. To avoid a return to 
conflict while laying solid foundation for development, emphasis must be placed 
on critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect 
for human rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; 
ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and 
displaced persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; 
curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and 
international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. Each priority is 
linked to every other, and success will require a concerted effort and coordinated 
effort on all fronts.483 
The passage identifies three areas namely, security, justice, and economic development as the 
most crucial aspects of the responsibility to rebuild that need to be addressed. On the security 
aspect, in order to avoid the violence in the aftermath of an intervention, it would be 
necessary to reintegrate ex-combatants into a national army and into other areas of productive 
society, and also to undertake the disarmament of ex-combatants and others. On the justice 
aspect, the passage requires creation of mechanisms to ensure respect for human rights, 
promotion of national unity, and the repatriation and settlement of refugees and displaced 
persons. On economic development, the passage emphasises the mobilisation of resources for 
reconstruction and economic recovery. All of these aspects are interconnected, and the 
achievement of the tasks involved will require the major commitment of the international 
community.  If preventive measures fail, military force is expected to end the crisis, and this 
should be followed by commitments towards helping the society overcome its potential 
susceptibility to subsequent violence.484 
The Commission’s Report s out the measures that have to be taken to achieve the security, 
justice, and economic aspects of the responsibility to rebuild. On security, the report states 
that an intervention force should provide basic security and protection for all members of a 
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population, regardless of origin, as everyone is entitled to basic protection for their lives and 
property.485 The intervention force should also address issues of disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration of ex-combatants into a rebuilt national army. On justice, the report requires 
the intervening force to establish a functioning judicial system, including the courts and the 
police, and to bring violators to justice. The intervening force has to address the issue of the 
legal rights of refugees and ensure the equal distribution of reconstruction assistance. 
Relating to economic development, the intervening force should encourage economic growth, 
the recreation of markets and sustainable development.486 To attain these goals, an 
intervening force should make prior arrangements for the rebuilding and reconstruction of the 
affected state before the intervention, because as has been noted, the responsibility to prevent, 
to react, and to rebuild are interconnected in the sense that one cannot be attained without the 
others.The interveners should stay long enough to ensure the rebuilding of state institutions 
and also to address the root causes of the conflict which necessitated the intervention, in order 
to prevent the conflict from being ignited again.  
3.5. From ICISS to the 2005 World Summit 
This section discusses the links between the ICISS Report and the 2005 World Summit, 
because these links set the stage for the formal endorsement of R2P by the international 
community at the United Nations Sixtieth Anniversary World Summit in September 2005. To 
this end, reference is made to the African Union’s embrace of R2P in the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union487 and its role in the adoption of R2P in the World Summit Outcome 
Document. The section examines the report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change488 as it relates to R2P, and the UN Secretary-General’s report In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.489Furthermore, the 
section discusses the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and argues that R2P as 
proposed in the ICISS Report differs substantially from that endorsed in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document, because in the World Summit Outcome Document, R2P does 
not contain the ICISS proposed criteria to guide decision-making about when to intervene; 
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there is no code of conduct for the use of the veto contained in the ICISS Report; and no 
alternative is provided for the use of force without the authorisation by the Security Council 
as contained in the ICISS Report.490 In this context, the chapter discusses paragraphs 139 and 
139 of the World Summit Outcome Document on R2P, and the three core pillars of the 
concept put forward by the two paragraphs and articulated by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in his report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in January 2009. These 
links are: 
3.5.1. Constitutive Act of the African Union 
The R2P concept was apparent in the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in 2000, 
and in force since 2003; thus, African countries were amenable to the proposals in the World 
Summit Document, thereby contributing to the unanimous endorsement of R2P by the World 
Summit. While the Act provides for “non-interference by any Member State in the internal 
affairs of another,”491 it at the same time reserves “the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State …in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.”492 Thus, prior to the endorsement and acceptance of R2p by the 2005 
World Summit, the Union had already embraced a concept of the responsibility to protect by 
the recognition that where a member state committed or permitted to be committed on its 
territory, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the principle of non-
intervention had to yield to the regional responsibility to protect.493 Thus, the Union 
acknowledged that when it comes to grave violations of human rights, the emphasis should 
not be on “non-interference,” but rather on “non-indifference.”494 The Union, therefore, 
recognised that it could not stand by passively in the face of atrocities perpetrated by any 
member state on its nationals, but it would take robust military action in defence of victims of 
human rights abuses. The position of the Union made it amenable to the adoption of R2P by 
the World Summit, and thereby, contributed to the unanimous endorsement of the concept. 
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3.5.2. UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Changes 
Another important link between the ICISS report and the World Summit Outcome Document 
was the report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. The 
Panel’s report adopted the recommendations of the ICISS, and drew on the ICISS’s core 
principles of R2P on the state’s responsibility to protect its people and the international 
community’s residual responsibility to protect where the state fails to discharge this 
responsibility, thereby contributing to the endorsement of R2P by the World Summit. In 
relation to R2P the report states:  
The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military 
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, 
ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign 
governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.495 
The significance of the Panel’s recommendation is that it endorsed the ICISS proposal that 
the UN Security Council is the appropriate body to authorize military intervention as a last 
resort in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other mass killings, and that those who 
challenge the authority of the  Security Council run the risk of undermining the international 
order.496 By implication, the Panel shared the view of the ICISS that the task is not to find 
alternatives to the Security Council as the source of authority, but to make it much better.497 
The differences between the Panels’ recommendations and that of the ICISS on the just cause 
criterion relates to the Panel’s addition of “serious violations of humanitarian law” as grounds 
for military  intervention, and the rejection of the limits on the use of vetoes by the five 
permanent members of the Security Council proposed in the ICISS Report.498Referring to 
humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Kosovo, the 
Panel’s report shared the view of the ICISS that the focus should not be on “the right to 
intervene,” but on the “responsibility to protect.” 499 Furthermore, on the guidelines for the 
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use of force, the Panel recommended five basic criteria of legitimacy, in addition to the UN 
Security Council being the right body to authorise military intervention. The report spells out 
“five basic criteria of legitimacy” which are basically identical to the precautionary principles 
in the ICISS report already discussed.500 On the whole, the Panel’s recommendations 
endorsed the proposals in the ICISS report, thereby enhancing consensus and the unanimous 
adoption of R2P, and in that way played a crucial role in preparing the stage for the 
endorsement of R2P by the World Summit. 
3.5.3. UN Secretary-General’s Report: In Larger Freedom 
Another link was the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s acceptance of the 
recommendations of the High-Level Panel in his report In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All,501 in which he stated “…I believe that we 
must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it,”502 
because there is no better alternative mechanism for the protection of victims of mass 
atrocities He made a formal appeal to the international community to: 
Embrace the “responsibility to protect” as a basis for collective action against 
genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this 
responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each 
individual State, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national 
authorities are unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, then the responsibility 
shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear 
insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under 
the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required.503 
The Secretary-General’s statement was an elaboration of the ICISS views expressed in its 
report, relating to the theme that the responsibility to protect its nationals from mass atrocities 
primarily lies with the state, supplemented by the international community’s responsibility to 
protect where the state fails; because mass atrocities perpetrated in one state can have 
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regional  or international implications, and therefore, the protection of the nationals of a state 
from mass atrocities is not the sole responsibility of the state, but also of the broader 
international community. In particular, the emphasis “on the importance of non-military 
responses being explored first …was enormously helpful in setting the scene for the World 
Summit debate.”504 The Secretary-General’s endorsement of R2P provided material for 
deliberation by the 2005 World Summit, and “in this way aspects of RtoP were adopted at the 
World Summit and subsequently endorsed by both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council.”505 The endorsement of R2P by the Secretary-General’s Report, which prioritised 
the use of non-coercive measures in reaction to mass atrocities allayed the apprehensions of 
world leaders, especially those from weak countries, about the use of force and made them 
amenable to the adoption of R2P. 
3.5.4. 2005 World Summit 
The 2005 World Summit of the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly held in New York 
from 14-16 September 2005 was attended by over 170 heads of state and government,506 and 
therefore, the unanimous endorsement of R2P was a manifestation of worldwide consensus 
on the concept.  The agenda was based on proposals contained in the Secretary-General’s 
report,507In Larger Freedom, aforementioned, which drew on the proposal of the ICISS. The 
outcome document reflected the international position on a number of crucial issues among 
which, for the purposes of this thesis, was the acceptance of the collective responsibility to 
protect civilians against genocide and other crimes against humanity. The outcome document 
called for timely and decisive collective Security Council action when national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity, and established two new bodies.508 The assembled world leaders at the 
World Summit showed their commitment to R2P by unanimously endorsing the wording of 
Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document which set out the core principles of the 
concept.These paragraphs, which endorsed the concept of R2P, are quoted below: 
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Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will 
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.509 
139.   The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. We stress the 
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping states build capacity to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.510 
The World Summit Outcome Document endorsed the ICISS proposal that the primary 
responsibility to protect its nationals lies with the state, and went further by specifying 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and their incitement as 
the crimes from which a state has a responsibility to protect its nationals. Furthermore, the 
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Document requested world leaders to encourage and help states to discharge this 
responsibility. The Document made a fundamental departure from the ICISS R2P 
proposition, which made provision for regional and sub-regional organisations to deal with 
matters relating to international peace and security under Article 52 of the UN Charter; and 
action by the General Assembly under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedures, where the Security 
Council fails to act. Thus, the Document conferred on the Security Council the exclusive 
authority to authorise interventions on a case by case basis when peaceful means prove 
inadequate, and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. While the Summit 
Document acknowledged military intervention as an option, it downplayed it, and instead, 
prioritised the use of peaceful means to protect victims of mass atrocities, stressing that 
military intervention is justified only when the national authorities manifestly fail to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
The assembled Heads of State and Government at the Summit made it clear that the 
responsibility to protect is not an adversary, but an ally of sovereignty, and arises from the 
positive notion of sovereignty as responsibility, rather than the narrower idea of humanitarian 
intervention,511 in order to make R2P more acceptable to world leaders.  In helping states to 
discharge their protection responsibilities, R2P seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not to 
weaken it. Thus, the member states of the UN accepted that each state has the responsibility 
to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and their incitement, and “act in accordance with it.” Under paragraph 138, this 
responsibility entails the prevention of these crimes. Thus, the emphasis is on prevention 
rather than on reaction. Members committed themselves to helping states to build the 
capacity to protect their populations from these crimes. However, member states are prepared 
to take collective action through the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, 
including action under Chapter VII, where a statemanifestly fails to protect its population 
from the four crimes, unlike the ICISS’ recommendation which spoke of a state being 
“unable or unwilling.”  Thus, paragraph 139 requires a higher threshold of a state’s failure to 
protect before enforcement action can be taken against it. Nevertheless, governments that 
grossly violate the human rights of their population can no longer seek immunity from 
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intervention behind sovereignty.512 However, the emphasis as the ICISS report states was not 
on the “right to intervene,” but responsibility to protect of every state.513 As a corollary, 
member states have a duty to assist in the prevention of mass atrocities “and to step in to 
protect populations in peril when needed.”514  The outcome document leaves no doubt that 
the Security Council is the right authority to authorise the use of force for human protection 
purposes. By implication, intervention without the authority of the Security Council military 
intervention for human protection purposes is not only unlawful, but it also sets a dangerous 
precedent for other states to follow, and undermines the established international order. 
The outcome document has been criticised, because it did not include some of the 
controversial recommendations of the ICISS, such as the limitations on the use of the veto,515 
criteria for the uses of military force, and the possibility of unilateral intervention. Weiss, for 
example, argues that while the ICISS had left open the possibility of unilateral intervention 
“the summit’s language could be seen to be step backward, as “R2P lite” – because it requires 
that humanitarian intervention has to be approved by the Security Council.” 516 This argument 
overlooks the fact that intervention without Security Council approval would not have 
received unanimous assent at the Summit. Doyle concurs that the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document would not have won the unanimous assent of member states without the 
two paragraphs above,517 which assert the role of the Security Council as the sole authority 
with the right to give the mandate for military intervention. These provisions outlawed 
unilateral military intervention for human protection purposes, thereby making the 
unanimous endorsement of R2p, possible at the Summit. 
The concept of R2P contained in the Summit Outcome Document is substantially different 
from the ICISS formulation. In the ICISS report, the crimes under the just war threshold are 
expressed in general terms as “large scale loss of life actual or apprehended with genocidal 
intent or not” or “large scale ethnic cleansing actual or apprehended”518 without defining 
“large scale loss of life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing.” These expressions are ambiguous 
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in the sense that what is “large scale” is relative, and therefore cannot set a proper standard or 
guidance for reaction in every case. The outcome document was specific on the crimes which 
would justify international reaction, namely, genocide war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.  This is a significant improvement, because it limits the ambiguity 
in the ICISS’s report.  The acceptance of R2P by the inclusion of these two paragraphs 
despite the differences between the language of the outcome document and the ICISS report 
affirms the success of the ICISS because fundamentally, the basis of the concept was its 
articulation in the ICISS report. Therefore, although the World Summit Outcome Document 
watered down the proposals in the ICISS Report, the important contribution made by the 
Commission to R2P and the protection of populations from mass atrocities should not be 
underestimated. 
3.5.5. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect - The 3 Pillars 
This section discusses the three pillars on which, according to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon the edifice of R2P is built, because the three pillars constitute a summary of the 
concept of R2P; and according to the Secretary-General’s report, they represent the way 
forward in implementing R2P.On the basis of the agreements in paragraphs 138-139, the 
Secretary-General concluded in his report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, that 
the responsibility to protect rests on the following three pillars,519 which are interlinked in the 
implementation of R2P, and even though there is no sequence in which the three pillars are to 
be applied, they are of equal importance and none may be dispensed with. 
1.  Pillar one:520 
The protection responsibility of the state 
The primary responsibility of the state protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and their incitement lies with the state. This 
responsibility is captured in the opening sentence of paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome 
Document, that, “we accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.” The 
Secretary-General emphasised that pillar one is critical to effective and timely prevention 
strategies, and emanates from the notion of sovereignty and pre-existing legal obligations of 
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states. The international community has a supplementary role to encourage and assist states in 
fulfilling this responsibility. To implement pillar one, the report suggests, among other steps, 
more research into why one society plunges into mass violence while others remain stable. 
Another way is for states to become parties to international instruments on human rights, 
international humanitarian law, and refugee law, as well as to the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The focus of pillar one is on the prevention of the four crimes, because in the 
words of the report, prevention is a key ingredient for a successful strategy for the 
responsibility to protect, because successful prevention of conflict renders unnecessary the 
other elements of R2P, i.e. the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. 
2.  Pillar two:521 
International assistance and capacity building 
The international community’s owes a commitment to assist states in fulfilling these 
obligations. Pillar two can be found in Paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome Document 
states this commitment, with the assertion that: “the international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility.” Paragraph 139 adds: 
“we also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States to build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before conflict breaks out.” 
With these commitments the international community omits itself to encourage States to fulfil 
their responsibilities (para. 138), assist them in the discharge or their responsibilities, (para. 
138), helping them to build capacity to protect (para. 139), and assist states under stress 
before crises break out (para.139).522 Encouraging states to meet their responsibility entails 
persuasion while assisting them to discharge their responsibilities involves “active 
partnership between the international community and the State.”523The language of this pillar 
represents a shift from the language of the ICISS Report, because the language of pillar two 
is devoid of confrontation, but rather stresses cooperation among states in assisting each other 
in discharging the responsibility to protect their populations contributed to the unanimous 
endorsement of R2P. 
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3.    Pillar three524 
Timely and decisive response. 
Paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome document reflects pillar three. The international 
community under this paragraph commits itself to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, 
and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.” This stresses that, in response to a crisis, peaceful and flexible means should be 
employed to find a solution. However, “should peaceful means be inadequate” and “national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” then “we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate.” The report emphasises that international reaction 
should not be limited to the use of force and furthermore, that international response should 
take place within institutions of the UN, i.e. the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.525 The report seeks to prioritise the use of peaceful means in the protection of 
victims of mass atrocities, and stresses that the use of force is just one of the means for 
achieving this, but not the most important, and should be used as a last resort. Furthermore, it 
stresses the central role of the Security Council in the authorisation of military intervention. 
Implementation of the three pillars does not have to be in a set sequence for moving from one 
to another.526 The pillars are of equal importance, and if the three pillars were unequal in 
importance, “the edifice of the responsibility to protect could become unstable…”527 
However, the report places more emphasis on pillar one, prevention, and on pillar two, 
capacity building. The use of force for human protection purposes is to be resorted to on a 
“case-by-case basis,” which means that while military force may be used to protect victims of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in some situations, this 
may not be so in other cases. As already observed, non-coercive measures alone are not 
adequate perpetrators of mass atrocities to change course, unless these measures are backed 
by the threat or the accrual use of force. Ban Ki-moon’s report makes the use of force an 
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option, but the emphasis is predominantly on preventing and rebuilding aspects of R2P. The 
phrase on a “case-by-case basis” implies that force may be used, depending on the 
circumstances in each humanitarian crisis. The emphasis on preventive measures, in the view 
of one writer, obscures what is truly novel about the concept of R2P, “namely generating and 
exercising the international responsibility to respond to mass atrocities when state authorities 
fail to protect their populations.”528Sarkin shares the view that the use of force as an option 
should be available when circumstances require, because non-coercive measures alone are 
unlikely to convince potential perpetrators of atrocities to desist or pressurise perpetrators to 
end them, unless backed by the use of force. As he puts it: 
...persuasion is likely to be less successful…Carrots are useful to induce improved 
behaviour, but the stick can ensure that that the inducement process is more likely 
to secure positive results. Where it is known that behind the carrot is the stick, the 
carrot is more likely to have a positive outcome. Thus, a stick in tandem with a 
carrot is much more likely to be an effective tool and more likely to have a 
successful outcome.529 
Non-coercive measures alone are not sufficient to end mass atrocities unless backed up by a 
credible threat or actual use of force. Therefore, although peaceful means for protecting 
victims of mass atrocities are preferable, the military option should always be an option on 
the table to be used if non-coercive measures prove inadequate. 
3.5.6. Evaluation of the Implementation of R2P 
This section evaluates the implementation of R2P in the prevention of mass atrocities and the 
protection of victims in specific cases, in order to evaluate the best way to implement the 
concept to investigate why there is intervention in some cases and inaction in others. The 
section provides brief discussions on Darfur, Kenya, Myanmar, and Libya, because they are 
post-R2P humanitarian crises. 
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i.  Darfur: 2003- 
The Darfur crisis started in 2003, when the janjaweedmilitia backed by the government of 
Sudan responded to a rebellion resulting in the mass killing of about 250,000 people and the 
displacement of over 2 million.530 This crisis, in the light of the core principles of R2P as 
formulated by the ICISS,531 was a clear case that required the application of the concept. The 
United Kingdom House of Commons International Development Committee shared this view 
with the statement that “if the responsibility to protect means anything, it ought to mean 
something in Darfur.”532 In spite of the continuing human suffering in Darfur, there has been 
no international coercive military action to protect the population since 2003, and therefore, it 
is argued that R2P failed in the situation in Darfur. It has been suggested that the failure was 
due to the lack of political will,533 because the humanitarian crises in Darfur qualify as an 
R2P situation in the sense that masses of the Sudanese populations have been subject to 
excessive human rights abuses which demonstrate that the state authorities have proved 
unable and unwilling to protect the population, or have manifestly failed to do so; yet the 
crisis is ongoing without international military action to end it, demonstrating the 
inconsistency in the  application of  R2P. 
ii. Kenya: 2008 
The diplomatic intervention in Kenya after the disputed 2007 elections was touted as the best 
recent example of R2P,534 because timely international intervention through diplomatic and 
political means prevented potential mass killings.The characterisation of the Kenyan scenario 
as falling under R2P was supported by UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, with a 
statement which reminded the government and the political and religious leaders of Kenya of 
their legal and moral responsibility to protect the lives of the innocent people regardless of 
their racial, religious, or ethnic origin.535 It has been argued that the only time the UN has 
actually applied R2P “was in the case of Kenya, early in 2008, after the disputed 
elections.”536 Others raised doubts about whether R2P applied to the Kenya 
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situation.537Taking into account the fact that about 1,500 people lost their lives with 300,000 
displaced during the crisis,538 it is the diplomatic intervention which possibly averted what 
could have ended in mass killings. Therefore, the use of diplomacy proved useful as a 
peaceful measure in preventing mass killing in Kenya, which thereby tempers the argument 
that it is unreasonable for the international community to give peaceful measures a chance to 
work before resorting to the use of force, for fear that the latter may come too late. 
iii. Myanmar: 2008 
On 3 May 2008, Burma’s Irrawaddy delta region was devastated by Cyclone Nargis leading 
to the death of about 138,000 and the displacement of about 1.5 million people.539 The 
continuous denial of access to humanitarian agencies by the Government of Burma and its 
refusal to accept international humanitarian assistance in the face of the massive humanitarian 
catastrophe led to a debate in the international community as to whether the humanitarian 
crisis in Burma amounted to an R2P situation.540 France’s Foreign Minister, Bernard 
Kouchner, argued that Burma’s denial of access to cyclone victims was a situation covered 
by R2P, because the deliberate mass suffering and death amounted to crimes against 
humanity, which falls within the ambit of R2P.541 France’s claim was rejected by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, UK, and UN officials.542 The 
consensus at the UN was that extending R2P to cover international response to natural 
disasters would stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility and therefore, 
render the concept meaningless.543 Edward Luck, then Special Adviser to the Secretary-
General on R2P, argued that “linking R2P to the situation in Burma is a misapplication of the 
doctrine.”544  With the rejection of France’s claim, there appears to be international consensus 
that R2P does not extend to natural and environmental catastrophes, as proposed by the 
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Commission. Had France succeeded in using R2P to legitimise its defence of intervention, it 
would have “confirmed the view that R2P is a ‘Trojan horse’,”545 because it confers 
legitimacy on the interference of powerful states in the affairs of weak states in the name of 
providing humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters. R2P should only be applied 
where there is deliberate commission or intended deliberate commission of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, or other atrocities by state authorities or non-state actors, which the state 
authorities are unable or unwilling to avert or halt. It should not be applied in cases of natural 
or environmental disasters, even if the state authorities reject international assistance for fear 
of interference in the target state’s domestic affairs, because to apply R2P in such situations 
constitute an the abuse of the concept, and therefore, will certainly elicit military resistance 
from the target state, which will require the intervener to apply disproportionate force to 
overcome, and thereby, threaten regional or international peace and security. 
iv. Libya: 2011 
The Libyan crisis started in February 2011, when Libyans rose against the rule of Gaddafi, 
leading to violent repression of demonstrations and threats made against the opposition by the 
regime.546 On 11 March 2011 the Security Counciladopted Resolution 1973 (2011), which 
imposed a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, “in order to help protect civilians.”547 The 
Resolution called on States that have notified the Secretary-General (UN) and the Secretary 
General of the League of Arab States, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance 
with the ban on flights. 
This was a collective intervention authorised by the Security Council and, therefore, entirely 
legal. The purpose was to establish safe havens to protect the Libyan people and foreign 
nationals residing in Libya exposed to shelling by Libyan forces.548 It was obvious from the 
beginning, however, that NATO had other intentions, as evidenced in the statement issued by 
the US President Obama, French President Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister Cameron, 
that “our duty and our mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect 
civilians, and we are doing that. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with 
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Qaddafi, in power.”549 It is clear from this statement that part of the objectives was to 
overthrow Gaddafi, and it cannot be stated with certainty whether the humanitarian motive 
was not subsumed under their goal of regime change. Indeed, some of NATOS’s actions were 
questionable, such as the bombing of a private residence leading to the killing of Gaddafi’s 
son Saif and Gaddafi’s three grandchildren.550 NATO also rejected diplomatic and peace 
negotiation offers by Gaddafi and the African Union for the resolution of the 
conflict.551Reinhard Merkel, professor of international law at Hamburg University, poses the 
question, “Have the interveners limited themselves in their military force to the boundaries 
set by Resolution 1973? [...] The answer to this question is easy - it is a clear No.” 552 On 
whether Libya was a good example of R2P, he observes: 
 The development of a Responsibility to Protect is one of the most positive 
achievements in the recent history of international law. Libya has made painfully 
clear that it needs protection from itself, namely from potential abuses of power. 
Resolution 1973 has not strengthened this developing norm of a universal duty to 
help in cases of grave and large scale crimes, nor has it provided it with teeth […], 
rather it has done severe damage to it.553 
Put in another way, the Libyan example has shown that even where an intervention occurs 
under a Security Council mandate, abuses by the interveners to advance strategic interests 
cannot be averted, because the Security Council has not got the capacity to micromanage the 
operational aspects of the intervention. NATO exceeded its mandate and facilitated the 
overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime, because the resolution could not provide precise rules of 
engagement, and thereby compromised the integrity of the operation554 and the integrity of 
R2P itself.  It is therefore argued that R2P operationalised through collective or multilateral 
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intervention does not necessarily provide the guarantee that the interveners will be guided by 
the primary legitimate intention of halting or averting human suffering. Despite the 
foregoing, other scholars have argued that the Libyan intervention demonstrated the 
international community’s “commitment to working through the Security Council to fashion 
responses to human protection crises.”555 
It is argued, however, that NATO’s intervention in Libya was a clear example of how R2P 
can be abused by powerful countries. NATO interpreted the Security mandate to suit its 
predetermined objective of regime change.  To achieve this NATO used force that was far 
beyond what was required to attain the objective of Security Council Resolution 1973, to  
protect civilians from mass atrocity, to the extent of bombing the private homes of Gaddafi, 
with the aim of killing him and facilitating regime change which was finally achieved. The 
result has been to render Libya a failed state; yet, because the intervention was conducted by 
a powerful organisation, no one held the leaders of NATO to account. This approach to the 
implementation of R2P will ensure that the credibility of military intervention for human 
protection purposes will always be in question because it demonstrates that even when an 
intervention has been authorised by the Security Council, there is no guarantee that the 
concept will not be abused by the interveners in furtherance of their geopolitical goals. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Traditional Westphalian sovereignty espoused the inviolability of state sovereignty and a 
state’s right to non-intervention in its internal affairs. Thus, a state had the right to determine 
how it would govern itself, free from interference by external actors, and therefore, how it 
treated its population was its own business, and the international community had no right to 
intervene militarily to stop the gross violations of the fundamental human rights of the 
population. The attitude of the international community was that intrastate conflicts that gave 
rise to gross human rights abuses were strictly an internal matter and not the concern of the 
international community necessitating intervention. Therefore, in the 1990s, in the face of 
grave humanitarian crises, particularly the genocide in Rwanda and the Srebrenica massacre 
in Bosnia, the international community failed to take effective action. This triggered debates 
as to whether the international community should continue to adhere unconditionally to the 
principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or whether the time 
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had come to take a different course. At the centre of the debates was how the international 
community should react when the fundamental human rights of populations are grossly and 
systematically violated within the boundaries of sovereign states. The atrocities committed 
during these humanitarian crises accentuated the need for a reconsideration of the 
justification for armed humanitarian intervention, because the international community 
considered it was immoral and unethical for the world to stand idly by while the mass 
slaughter of populations took place.  
It became widely accepted that sovereignty entails both rights and responsibilities, including 
the right of a state to the freedom to govern itself the way it deems fit, free from external 
interference. However,these rights are subject to the state’s responsibility to protect and 
promote the welfare of its nationals, and therefore, if it subjects its nationals to gross 
violation of their fundamental rights, its sovereignty yields to the international community’s 
responsibility to protect the population. Sovereignty therefore implies responsibility, and not 
a licence for governments to violate the human rights of its population; and therefore, a 
state’s entitlement to the benefits and rights of sovereignty is tied to its respect for the human 
rights of the population and if it fails in this regard, it is legitimate for external actors to 
intervene militarily to protect the population. Military intervention for human for the 
protection of victims of internal human rights abuses has serious implication for sovereignty; 
however, there are situations where it becomes absolutely necessary to use force to protect 
victims of excessive human rights abuses. In other words, drastic and unpleasant measures 
are sometimes necessary to stop the gross violations of the human rights of the citizens of a 
state by their own government; and therefore, in the face of gross human rights abuse within 
a state, the international community should not shy away from taking the necessary action to 
protect victims of abuse. Thus, sovereignty can be overridden in order to take action to 
protect victims of gross human rights abuses; and therefore, the time for radical changes to 
depart from the old orthodoxy of non-intervention had come, in the light of atrocities 
committed during the humanitarian crises in the 1990s. In order words, while under 
Westphalian sovereignty state sovereignty was supreme, the new understanding of 
sovereignty is that the interest of the population of a state takes precedence over state 
sovereignty, and the international community has an interest in the manner in which a state 
treats its own citizens; and therefore, the treatment of the citizens by a state of its citizens is 
no longer the exclusive business of that state.   
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While acknowledging that the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention offered vital 
protection to small and weak states, the international community had to find a balance 
between respect for sovereignty and the need to the protect human rights in order to ensure 
that the failures of Rwanda, Kosovo, and Bosnia were not repeated. Military intervention 
generates apprehension among militarily weak countries because of the potential for powerful 
countries to use it as a pretext for interfering in their internal affairs. However, in the face of 
horrendous mass atrocities, the international community had to place the protection of human 
rights above reverence of sovereignty, and to accept the principle that, in the face of gross 
abuse of human rights in a state, external military intervention to protect the population was 
legitimate.  
The debates about how the international community should react to gross abuses of human 
rights culminated in the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) by the Government of Canada in 2000, with the mandate to strike a 
balance between intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty, and to 
endeavor to build a new international consensus on how to respond in the face of massive 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The ICISS formulated the concept of R2P, 
which articulated the basic principles that sovereignty implies responsibility, and this 
responsibility primarily lies on the state to protect its people; but where the state is unwilling 
or unable to discharge this responsibility, its sovereignty has to yield to the broader 
international community’s residual responsibility to protect the vulnerable population. The 
Commission set out a continuum of measures for responding to gross violations of human 
rights under the three dimensions of R2P, namely: the responsibility to prevent - to address 
both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crisis putting 
populations at risk; the responsibility to react - to respond to situations of compelling human 
need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution and in extreme cases military intervention, and; and the 
responsibility to rebuild - to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance 
with recovery, reconstruction, and reconsideration, addressing the causes of the harm the 
intervention was designed to halt.The responsibility to prevent is an extremely important 
aspect of R2P, for if conflict can be prevented, then the controversial principle of 
humanitarian intervention would not arise, and it would not be necessary to rebuild shattered 
societies at great cost in finances and lives. Therefore, the ICISS Report singles out 
prevention as the most important dimension of the responsibility to protect. Similarly, the 
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responsibility to rebuild is important for the reconstruction of societies that have been 
destroyed by violent conflict.The responsibility to rebuild a state involves not only the 
rebuilding of the institutions of the state destroyed by conflict and the intervention itself, but 
also the resolution of the issues that gave rise to the conflict and the intervention, if the 
conflict is not to ignite again. The responsibility to rebuild arises after a military intervention. 
Interveners should devise a post intervention strategy and not just walk away from the 
smoking ruins of a state shattered by conflict; because failure to take effective steps to 
address the causes of the conflict, and to participate in the reconstruction of the state can lead 
to total anarchy and state failure after the intervention, as the example of NATO’s 
intervention in Libya demonstrates.  
However, the military dimension is the most controversial aspect of R2P, because military 
intervention entails the violation of the target state’s sovereignty with deadly force, which 
may cause deaths and destruction. Therefore, the use of force should be the last resort, and 
should be carried out only with the authorisation of the Security Council. The main 
motivation should be the protection of victims of gross human rights abuses. Military 
intervention should be carried out only if there is a prospect of success, and therefore, force 
should not be used, if it will exacerbate the problems it is meant to solve, and the force used 
in an intervention should be that, only necessary to achieve the objective of the mission. This 
aspect of R2P has come under criticism, because of potential for abuses in the 
implementation of the concept. For example, during NATO’s intervention in Libya, the 
organisation went in with the predetermined objective of regime change, contrary to the 
Security mandate to protect civilians, which was a clear example of how R2P can be abused 
by powerful countries even when authorised by the Security Council.  
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document endorsed in paragraphs 138 and 139 the ICISS 
proposal, that the primary responsibility to protect its nationals lies with the state, and went 
further, by specifying genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity 
and their incitement, as the crimes from which a state has a responsibility to protect its 
nationals. Furthermore, the Document requested world leaders to encourage, and help states 
to discharge this responsibility, but it vested in the Security Council, the exclusive authority 
to authorise interventions on a case by case basis, when peaceful means prove inadequate, 
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their population, from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this way the World Summit 
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Outcome Document tacitly strengthened the powers of the Security Council. While the 
Summit Document acknowledged military intervention as an option, it downplayed it, and 
instead, prioritised the use of peaceful means to protect victims of mass atrocities, stressing 
that, military intervention is justified, only when the national authorities manifestly fail to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. On the basis of the agreements in paragraphs 138-139 of the World Summit 
Outcome Document, the Secretary-General of the Security Council concluded in his 
report,Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, that the responsibility to protect rests on 
three pillars, which constitute a summary of the concept of R2P, and represent the way 
forward, in implementing R2P. Pillar one concerns the primary responsibility of the state to 
protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity, and their incitement, which lies with the state; pillar two deals with international 
community commitment to assist states in fulfilling these obligations, and; pillar three 
concerns the international community’s commitment, to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity. Implementation of the three pillars does not have to be in a set sequence, 
for moving from one to another. The pillars are of equal importance, and none can be 
dispensed with.  
In the end, it is observed, firstly, that sovereignty is no longer a barrier to international 
military action to protect victims of mass atrocities, and therefore, although Article 2(7) 
enshrines the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, the Security 
Council has determined, that, violent intrastate conflicts constitute a “threat to international 
peace and security,” justifying the use of force. Secondly, while total disinterestedness is 
ideal, a state will not intervene in another, motivated solely, by compassion for humanity. 
This explains why, there have been interventions in some instances, and inaction in others. 
Thirdly, because of the requirement that a military intervention should have a reasonable 
prospect of success, the use of force for human protection purposes, cannot be implemented 
against militarily powerful states, because this may lead to a greater conflict. Fourthly, an 
organisation that has been given Security Council mandate to intervene in another state, 
should adhere strictly to the terms of the mandate, in order to eliminate or, at least,minimise 
abuse and the disproportionate use of force in pursuance of the objective of the mission
315 
 
CHAPTER 4 
4. CONCLUSION 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains how the aims of the thesis have been fulfilled. It weaves together the 
conclusions from all the chapters, and then, presents broad general conclusions to the thesis. 
It explains the significance of the thesis, and its contribution to knowledge, relating to 
military intervention for human protection purposes. The chapter identifies the findings of the 
thesis, and then, discusses the implications of the findings. It summarises what has been 
learned, and explains how the lessons learned can be applied, by making recommendations.   
The aim of this thesis has been to discuss the concept of humanitarian intervention, and the 
concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P), and; to investigate how best to apply the 
concepts in the face of humanitarian crises, in order to address concerns about their 
implementation. To this end, the thesis investigates: whether a state has a duty to protect the 
human rights of its population; whether this duty is an attribute of its sovereignty; whether a 
breach of this duty can be a justification for external military intervention; whether there is a 
duty to intervene, and if so, whose duty it is; why interventions have taken place in some 
states, and why there has been inaction in others; whether a state or an organisation has a 
right to intervene in another state; whether there are situations in which it would be wrong, 
not to intervene, and; what authority has the power to determine when and how interventions 
should be carried out.  
Much of the scholarly literature on military intervention for human protection purposes, deals 
with the legality and legitimacy of the military dimension of the concepts. The significance of 
this thesis is that, while it deals with the legality and legitimacy of the military dimension of 
the two concepts, it takes a different approach by focusing the investigation on the following 
questions: what are the reasons for the potential abuse of the concepts, for the advancement 
of the national, strategic, and geopolitical interests of the interveners, and; what are the 
reasons for the propensity to use disproportionate force in the attainment of the stated 
objective of human protection by powerful states? Thus, the research focuses on the question: 
whether powerful states that use force to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states on 
grounds of humanity are motivated by altruism or national or geopolitical interests. 
Answering this question will address the research problem, which is, why there is the 
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potential for abuse of the concepts and the indiscriminate use of force, in their 
implementation.  
The central argument of the thesis is that there are double standards, selectivity, abuses, and 
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in the implementation of R2P by powerful 
countries, and; that, whether a military intervention is unilateral, or sanctioned by the UN 
Security Council, there is the potential for abuse; and in addition, disproportionate, 
indiscriminate, and unjustifiable force may be used, which pose the greatest threat to the 
survival of the concept.  
This thesis argued that the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty confers on states the 
right to govern themselves in any manner they choose, free from interference by external 
actors. The concept connotes the idea that, internally, a state has exclusive jurisdiction over 
matters within its territory, free from intervention by outside actors. However, sovereignty 
has undergone an evolution from the traditional Westphalian concept of the supremacy of the 
state to the concept of sovereignty with the people at the centre, and therefore, in the current 
international order, where a state perpetrates egregious human rights abuses against its 
citizens, sovereignty is no longer a barrier to military intervention. The worldwide 
recognition of human rights and the acknowledgement by the international community that 
the manner in which a state treats its citizens is no longer the sole business of the state, but 
also a matter of international concern, has resulted in the softening of international attitudes 
towards armed intervention in the internal affairs of states.  
This thesis argued that the failure of the Security Council to act decisively in the face of 
humanitarian crises in the 1990s contributed to the perpetration of mass atrocities during 
these crises. Grave human rights abuses were committed during these crises, but the Security 
Council was paralysed from acting, either by disagreements among the five permanent 
members or lack of political will. The inability of the Security Council to react to grave 
abuses of human rights triggered international debate as to how the international community 
should react when the fundamental human rights of populations are grossly and 
systematically violated within the boundaries of sovereign states. At the heart of the debate 
was whether the international community should continue to adhere unconditionally to the 
principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or take a different 
course in the interest of human rights. The debate culminated in the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 by the 
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Government of Canada, with the mandate to find a balance between respect for sovereignty 
and intervention for purposes of protecting human rights. The ICISS came up with the 
concept of R2P that articulates the theme that sovereignty entails responsibility and this 
responsibility primarily lies on the state to protect its people, but where the state is unwilling 
or unable to discharge this responsibility, its sovereignty has to yield to the broader 
international community’s responsibility to protect the vulnerable population.  
This thesis argued that in the light of international norms relating to human rights, 
sovereignty has been re-characterised as responsibility, which implies that: state authorities 
are responsible for protecting the fundamental rights and welfare of citizens; state authorities 
are responsible internally to the citizens and externally, to the international community, 
through the UN, and; and agents of state are accountable for their acts of commission and 
omission. The ICISS, while recognising the sacredness of sovereignty acknowledged that 
there was international recognition, that in certain circumstances, such as extreme violations 
of human rights, there must be exceptions to the non-intervention principle. Thus, in the 
event of large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, military intervention for human protection 
purposes is justified. The Security Council is the most appropriate body to take the necessary 
steps to maintain international peace and security, including the protection and promotion of 
human rights.  In order to avoid the abuse of R2P, the ICISS proposed that the new approach 
to military intervention for human protection purposes should ensure that: there are clear 
criteria on whether, when, and how to intervene; the use of force is the last resort; military 
intervention is carried out with the primary objective of alleviating human suffering; only the 
force necessary to attain the objective of the intervention is used, and; the interveners would 
stay in the affected country long enough to participate in the reconstruction of the state.  
This thesis argued that the importance of the World Summit of the 60th Session of the UN 
General Assembly held in New York from 14-16 September 2005, which was attended by 
over 170 heads of state and government, was that it endorsed the ICISS proposal, that, the 
primary responsibility to protect its nationals lies with the state, and went further by 
specifying genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and their 
incitement as the crimes, from which a state has a responsibility to protect its nationals. 
Furthermore, the Document requested world leaders to encourage and help states to discharge 
this responsibility, and vested in the Security Council the exclusive authority to authorise 
interventions on a case- by-case basis when peaceful means prove inadequate, and national 
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authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. While the Summit Document acknowledged 
military intervention as an option, it downplayed it, and instead, prioritised the use of 
peaceful means to protect victims of mass atrocities, stressing that military intervention is 
justified only when the national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
4.2. Findings of the thesis 
The thesis makes the following findings:  
i. A state has a responsibility to protect the human rights of its population, and this duty 
is an attribute of its sovereignty.1 
ii. Failure to discharge this responsibility can provide a justification for external military 
intervention.2 
iii. A right to intervene does not exist under international law, and; yet, there are 
situations in which it would be morally wrong not to intervene.3 
iv. The international community has a responsibility, under R2P, to intervene to protect 
the victims of gross violations of human rights perpetrated on them by their own 
governments, if the state authorities are unable or unwilling to halt the abuses.4 
v. The Security Council is the body with the exclusive authority to grant authorisation 
for military intervention for human protection purposes, and; to determine when 
and how interventions should be carried out.5 
vi. There is inconsistency and selectivity in the application of military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes.6 
vii. The use of force to save lives usually entails taking lives, including innocent ones,7 
and therefore, whether a military intervention for human protection purposes is 
                                                          
1ICISS Report, p. XI 
2 T. G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, Ideas in Action, 2d. ed. 2012, p. 15. 
3UN Charter, Article 2(7).  
4ICISS Report, p. XI. 
5 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, para. 139. 
6ICISS Report, p. 37 
7 B.A Valentino, The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth About a Noble Notion, Foreign  
    Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6, (2011), p. 64. 
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unilateral, or sanctioned by the UN Security Council, there is the potential for 
abuse, and in addition, the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force.8 
4.3. Discussion of the findings 
i. This thesis has found that a state has a duty to protect the human rights of its population, 
and that this duty is an attribute of its sovereignty.9 
 From Chapter 2, we found that sovereignty is the most important, if not the only, principle of 
international law that defines all the rules of international law, and in sum, is the cornerstone 
of international law.10 Sovereignty is defined as the independent and unrestricted power of a 
state within its internal jurisdiction, and serves as a defence for weak states against powerful 
countries.11 Originally, sovereign authority was considered to be absolute, perpetual, and 
undivided, and in terms of which the private interest of the ruler or ruling class superseded 
the common interest.12 However, at the centre of the earliest conception of sovereignty by 
political theorists of early modern Europe, such as Hobbes and Bodin, was the 
acknowledgement of the interdependence of authority and responsibility; and that sovereignty 
entailed responsibilities.13 
From Chapter 2, we found that the concept of sovereignty as it is understood currently was 
established by the Peace Treaties of Westphalia signed at Munster and Osnabruck in 1648 
between European States, which ended the Thirty Years War.14 In the classic Westphalian 
system of international order, state sovereignty meant that the government of the state was 
competent to act without restraint within its borders, and the interference by one state in the 
internal affairs of another was not permissible.15 
                                                          
8 A. Abbas, Assessing NATO’s Involvement in Libya, United Nations University, (27 October 2011). Available at:  
http://unu.edu/publications/articles/assessing-nato-s-involvement-libya [Accessed 30 august 2016]. On  
  Kosovo, see A. Krieg, Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations,  
  Springer, 2013, p. 89. 
9 ICISS Report, note 1 supra, p. XI. 
10F. Perez, Cooperative Sovereignty from independence to Interdependence in the Structure of International  
  Environmental Law, Springer, Netherlands, (2000), p. 13. 
11 T. G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention, Ideas in Action, 2d. ed. 2012, p. 15. 
12 E Andrew,  “Jean Bodin on Sovereignty”, Republics of Letters: A journal for the Study of Knowledge, Politics,  
and the Arts 2, No. 2 (June 1, 2011), pp. 75-84 at 76-77. 
13L. Glanville, Sovereignty & the Responsibility to Protect, A New History, The University of Chicago Press, 2014,  
p. 6. 
14 F Hinsley, Sovereignty, and (London): Basic Books, (1966), p. 126: also Abiew, note 31 supra, pp. 26-27. 
15 TG Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action, 2d. ed.  Polity Press, 2011, 16. 
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This thesis defines sovereignty as a state’s freedom to determine and control affairs within its 
territory in accordance with its own laws, without the dictates of any external power, subject 
to the requirements of international law. The thesis argues that the principle of non-
intervention based on state sovereignty has come under close scrutiny, and is no longer 
accepted unquestionably in the current international order. Neither the absolute concept of 
sovereignty, nor the Westphalian notion of sovereignty is practicable in the contemporary era, 
because of the internationalisation of human rights, the influences of globalisation and the 
interdependence of states. Strict application of these notions of sovereignty may serve as a 
protection for tyrannical and oppressive governments, and at the same time, be an 
impediment to action to protect victims of human rights abuses. In addition, unrestrained 
sovereignty may present a threat to international peace and stability, because every state may 
consider it a sovereign right to do whatever it wishes, with no regard for international law. 
However, even the earliest theorists, who defended absolute sovereignty, acknowledged that 
sovereignty entailed responsibilities, and; that it was not unlimited, but subject to higher 
norms, in the form of the laws of God, the laws of nature, the laws of nations and 
constitutional restrictions. Therefore, in the contemporary international order, sovereignty 
does not imply that a state is above international law, and; therefore, a state has a duty to 
protect its nationals; a duty that is inherent in sovereignty itself.  
ii. This thesis has found that failure to discharge the state’s responsibility to protect its 
nationals can provide a justification for external military intervention.16 
From Chapter 3, we found that during the Cold War, there was a split between the Capitalist 
West and the Communist East, and these two hostile blocks avoided intervention in intrastate 
conflicts in order to avoid a larger confrontation.17 The end of the Cold War raised a new 
opportunity for the realisation of the objectives of the UN Charter, of maintaining 
international peace and security, and of securing justice and human rights; and a changed 
attitude towards human rights became evident.18 Consequently, the end of the Cold War 
made humanitarian intervention a widely accepted norm, with the frequent use of human 
rights concerns as grounds for intervention.19 Humanitarian intervention has been defined as 
                                                          
16Weiss, note 2, p. 15. 
17Ibid. p. 38. 
18R. Cohen, ‘From Sovereign Responsibility to R2P.’ In TheRoutledge Handbook of the Responsibility to  
Protect, W. A. Knight and F. Egerton, eds., 2012, pp. 7-8. 
19F. D. Armstrong & H. Lambert, International Law and International Relations, Cambridge University Press,  
2010, p. 179. 
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coercive action by one state or group of states, involving the use of armed force, in the 
territory of another state, without the consent of the affected state, with the aim of averting 
mass suffering or death among the population of the target state.20 
The thesis defines humanitarian intervention as the use of force by a state or group of states 
in the territory of another state, without the consent of the target state, with the stated 
objective of averting or halting gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the government of 
the target state on the inhabitants of the target state. The thesis argues that the frequency of 
humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states has not been observed rigidly; partly 
because of international concerns for human rights, and; partly because of voluntary 
limitations placed by states on their own sovereignty, through the assumption of international 
obligations, and their membership of international organisations. Sovereignty has therefore 
been eroded, and absolute freedom of states from interference in their domestic affairs is an 
illusory goal, because of the interdependence of states. Thus, much as sovereignty may be 
considered as a bulwark of protection for weak countries against powerful countries, respect 
for state sovereignty should be balanced with the need to address matters of international 
concern, such as the protection of human rights. If the principle of non-intervention is rigidly 
adhered to without exception as provided by Article 2(7) of the Charter, it can be an 
impediment to necessary and prompt action in defence of victims of atrocities, because no 
alternatives would remain for the international community to protect victims of gross human 
rights abuses, when peaceful methods fail. Therefore, the excessive abuse of the human rights 
of a people, by their own government in its territory, is no longer accepted as that 
government’s own business, and may lead to external armed intervention, if peaceful efforts 
fail. Consequently, sovereignty is no longer a barrier to armed intervention to protect victims 
of mass atrocities.  
The thesis further argues that the United Nations Charter commits the UN to two conflicting 
ideals. On the one hand, the UN commits itself to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
On the other hand, the organisation and its members undertake to respect state sovereignty by 
making it inviolable, with a prohibition on intervention in the domestic affairs of states, and a 
                                                          
20A. Roberts, “The So-Called ‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Yearbook of International Humanitarian  
Law, 2000, vol. 3, pp. 3-51. 
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prohibition on the use of force. Thus, the Charter affirms both the primacy of human rights, 
and the importance of state sovereignty. The Charter’s provisions are therefore contradictory 
and ambiguous, and provide no guidance as to how to reconcile these two ideals, namely, the 
importance of human rights and the reverence for state sovereignty. However, the thesis 
argues that human rights are peremptory norms of international law from which no 
derogation is permitted, and therefore, should take precedence over the reverence for 
sovereignty. Therefore, the time has come for the redefinition of sovereignty from the 
traditional state-centred notion to a people-centred notion of sovereignty, in the interest of 
promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
iii. This thesis has found that a right to intervene does not exist under international law.21 
From Chapter 1 we found that at the core of humanitarian intervention is the right of a state to 
intervene in another, in the name of human rights.22 The doctrine has its roots in St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ just war theory, which justified coercive intervention to prevent or halt egregious 
human suffering, and his writings on just war implied that tyranny was an abhorrent crime 
that could be legitimately opposed by every means including military action, if necessary.23  
By the end of the 19th century, the right of humanitarian intervention had gained wide 
acceptance,24 and most international lawyers agreed on the right to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds.25 
The thesis argues that the fact that most writers recognised that a right of humanitarian 
intervention existed does not provide legal justification for that right. The right of 
humanitarian intervention endorsed by the end of the 19th century by majority of writers, 
sought to justify unilateral military intervention. The right empowered more powerful states 
to determine when a crisis existed, and to determine the appropriate response, which 
invariably was not based on international law. The interventions were motivated by religious 
solidarity and strategic interests, and not necessarily by humanitarian considerations. The 
only basis was the advancement of the interests of the intervening states, through unilateral 
action, clothed in the robes of humanitarianism. These states could only justify their 
                                                          
21UN Charter, Article 2(7).  
22G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All, The Brookings  
    Institution, 2008, p. 56. 
23 B. Simms & D. B. J. Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 31. 
24 A. Mandelstam, International Protection of Minorities (1923) 367 at 391. 
25 T. J., Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 7th Edition, Percy Winfield , Macmillan,    
    London, (1925), pp. 127-128. 
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interventions upon the successful outcome, regardless of the lack of any justification in law, 
for their actions. 
The thesis argues that there is no legal basis for a claim of the right of humanitarian 
intervention by an individual or group of states in the current international world order. The 
drafters of the UN Charter wanted to ensure that states will not resort to self-help in resolving 
interstate disputes; hence; the provisions on the prohibition of the use of force contained in 
Article 2(4) that leaves no room for humanitarian intervention, and the principle of non-
intervention in Article 2(7) respectively. To this end, there was no provision for states to take 
either individual or collective action in the interest of human rights, and therefore, there is no 
international law principle that makes unilateral humanitarian intervention lawful.  
The thesis argues, however, that there are situations in which it would be morally wrong not 
to intervene. For example, if the international community had reacted with an armed 
intervention at the beginning of the Rwanda genocide, thousands of lives would have been 
saved. The lack of political will on the part of world leaders meant that adequate resources 
could not be marshalled to facilitate a timely intervention to save lives.  The attitude of the 
international community to the crisis was inexcusable, because one would have expected that 
world leaders would have learnt a lesson from the horrors of the Holocaust, and therefore, 
taken steps to ensure that killings on a massive scale should not happen again. To put it 
bluntly, the world abandoned Rwanda. The international community was aware that mass 
killings were going on in Rwanda, yet; the international community watched the genocide 
unfolding, but did little to halt or alleviate the suffering of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 
The international community abdicated its responsibility to come to the assistance of the 
helpless victims of horrendous mass atrocities. Although it has been argued that no right to 
intervene exists in international law, a unilateral intervention by any state or organisation in 
this particular instance would have been justified on moral grounds. Therefore, the argument 
can be made that, in some situations, it is wrong for the international community to abstain 
from intervening in a state to alleviate human suffering. 
iv. This thesis has found that the international community has a responsibility, under R2P, to 
intervene to protect the victims of gross violations of human rights, perpetrated on them by 
their own governments, if the state authorities are unable or unwilling to halt the abuses.26 
                                                          
26ICISS Report, p. XI. 
324 
 
However, before armed force is used, less intrusive and non-coercive measures should always 
be considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.27 When non-coercive 
measures fail to end atrocities, and the state is unable or unwilling to discharge the 
responsibility to protect, it subverts its own sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention 
yields to the responsibility of the international community to intervene in the affected state.28 
From Chapter 4, we found that, during the 1990s, the international community failed to 
respond effectively, to several humanitarian crises, during which grave violations of human 
rights were perpetrated.29 The failure of the international community to react triggered 
debates as to whether the international community should adhere to unconditionally to the 
principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, or  whether the 
time had come to take a different course.30These debates culminated in the establishment of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 by the 
Government of Canada, with the mandate to reconcile intervention for human protection 
purposes and sovereignty.31 The ICISS came up with the concept of R2P, which articulated 
the basic principles, that sovereignty implies responsibility, and this responsibility primarily 
lies on the state to protect its people; but where the state is unwilling or unable to discharge 
this responsibility, its sovereignty has to yield to the broader international community’s 
responsibility to protect the vulnerable population.32 The ICISS re-characterised sovereignty 
as responsibility, with the implication that it was the function of state authorities to protect 
the lives and safety of citizens and to promote their welfare; and state agents were 
accountable for their acts of commission and omission.33 R2P was unanimously adopted by 
the 2005 World Summit of more than 170 world leaders as the roadmap for responding to 
mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.34 
                                                          
27ICISS Report, p. XI 
28Ibid. p. XI. 
29J-Mark, Iyi, Humanitarian Intervention and the AU-ECOWAS intervention Treaties under International Law:  
Towards a Theory of Regional Responsibility to Protect, Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 2016,  
p. 1. 
30 K. A. Annan, Secretary-General Reflects on ‘Intervention’ in Thirty-Fifth Annual Ditchley Foundation Lecture,   
    26 June 1998, Press Release SG//SM/6613. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980626.sgsm6613.html [Accessed 22 October 2016] 
31The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
December 2001, (Hereinafter ICISS Report), p. 2. 
32Ibid. p. XI. 
33ICISS Report, p. 13. 
34The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, Resolution A/Res/60/1, para 139. Available at  
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The thesis argues that the primary responsibility to protect its nationals rest with the state, and 
it is only when the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility that the 
responsibility of the international community is activated. Thus, this principle imposes a duty 
on the international community to take action to avert or halt atrocities only where the state 
authorities fail to do so. State authorities are better placed to evaluate the potential for a 
humanitarian crisis and come up with the best way to handle it, unless they are the 
perpetrators or the crisis overwhelms them. In the event that the state authorities are 
overwhelmed by a humanitarian crisis, they should ask for international assistance, or accept 
it when offered.  If the state fails to ask for assistance or rejects international assistance in the 
face of grave violations of human rights, then the international community should not just 
stand by, but step in to bring relief to the victims. Therefore, under the concept of R2P, the 
international community has a duty to intervene in a state to protect victims of gross human 
rights violations. However, the discharge of this responsibility by the international 
community in such situations should be motivated by the imperative to protect the vulnerable 
victims of human rights abuse, and not be used as a pretext to subvert the sovereignty of the 
state to advance the interests of the interveners.  
The thesis further argues that much as it is reasonable to give non-coercive measures a 
chance to work before the use of force, if the international community has to wait to give 
these measures the time to prove whether or not the affected state is unwilling or unable to 
avert serious harm to its population, it may lead to the closure of the window for taking 
preventive action, especially if the state authorities of the affected state are the perpetrators of 
the atrocities. Furthermore, it may lead the international community to delay in taking 
preventive measures, with the expectation that the conflict from which atrocities have arisen 
will resolve itself. Therefore, where there is reasonable expectation that atrocities are 
imminent, the international community should not be placed in the position of having to wait 
until they are actually carried out, but should take anticipatory military action to avert or 
impede the harm. 
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v. The thesis has found that the Security Council is the body with the exclusive authority to 
determine when and how interventions should be carried out, and to grant authorisation for 
military intervention for human protection purposes.35 
In Chapter 4, we found that the ICISS was of the view that, when it comes to the 
authorisation of military intervention for human protection purposes, there is no better body 
than the United Nations Security Council which should be making the hard decisions about 
overriding state sovereignty, the decisions about the mobilisation of effective resources, 
including military resources, and the decisions about rescuing populations at risk,36 in order 
to engender international consensus and confer  legitimacy on such operations. The basis of 
this authority is found in Article 42 of the UN Charter, which confers on the Security Council 
the discretion to “take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”37 When the Security Council failed to act, the 
ICISS proposed that the UN General Assembly or regional organisations could take action.38 
However, the 2005 World Summit conferred upon the Security Council, the exclusive 
authority to determine, when, and how, military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
should be carried out.39 
The thesis argues, however, that the credibility and suitability of the Security Council in its 
current from as the right institution to authorise interventions raise questions. The Security 
Council is unrepresentative in its current composition, dominated by the major military 
powers of the world with different interests and agendas. Thus, in matters of military 
intervention, the political will of some members may be lacking; and therefore, it is unlikely 
that unanimity or even consensus would be attainable, because some members of the Security 
Council may use their vetoes to protect a state that is a potential target for military 
intervention as a consequence of gross abuses of human rights abuses in its territory.  
Therefore, the Security Council has to be reformed, in order to make it a suitable body 
responsible for authorising interventions. Reforms should involve stripping the five 
permanent members of the veto, or giving the veto to representatives of continents not 
already represented on the Council, such as Africa, or granting every member of the Security 
                                                          
35World Summit Document, note 5 supra, para. 139. 
36ICISS Report, p. 49. 
37United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42. 
38ICISS Report, p. 53. 
39World Summit Document, note 5 supra, para. 139. 
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Council, permanent or temporary, the veto. Another alternative is to give every member 
country of the UN the veto in matters concerning international peace and security. This will 
go a long way to levelling the playing field, in the light of the fact that countries that are 
targets of military intervention make up the temporary members of the Council, and are also 
the majority in the General Assembly.  
vi. The thesis has found that there is inconsistency in the application of military intervention 
for humanitarian purposes.40 
In Chapter 4, we found that, to justify a military intervention there must be a reasonable 
chance of success of halting or averting the human suffering that triggered the intervention in 
the first place.41 The intervention should not bring about a greater harm than the intervention 
was originally calculated to avert; and therefore, an intervention is not justified if it has no 
chance of success, and is likely to make matters worse by triggering a greater conflict.42 
Thus, on purely utilitarian grounds, the application of the principle would be likely to exclude 
military action against any one of the permanent members of Security Council,43 and for that 
matter, any other major military power.  
We also found in Chapter 4 that there must be the right intention behind an intervention, 
which implies thatthe primary purpose of an intervention should be to avert or halt human 
suffering; however, absolute disinterestedness of the intervener is highly unlikely.44 
Nevertheless, the interveners should be disinterested, in the sense that the humanitarian 
aspect should not become secondary to an otherwise self-interested intervention.45 
First, the thesis argues, with regard to the issue of a reasonable chance of success, that there is 
an implication of double standards, because in practice, it means that the use of force for 
human protection purposes can be applied only to militarily weak countries, and military 
action can never be taken against militarily powerful countries, even if all the conditions 
required for intervention are met. This is unjust, because, without defending atrocities 
                                                          
40Ibid. p. 37 
41 Ibid. 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
44R. W, Murray, ‘Humanitarianism, Responsibility or Rationality? Evaluating Intervention as State Strtegy’. In  
    Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, A. Hehir& R. Murray,  
    eds., Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 31. 
45 B. Parekh, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, International Political Science Review, (January 1997), Vol.  
18, no. 1, pp. 49-69, 55. 
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perpetrated by any state, it is argued that the only reason why weak states are targets for 
military interventions is simply because they are weak militarily, and not that they have a 
monopoly on the perpetration of atrocities. The apparent injustice is exacerbated by the fact 
that, invariably, interventions are carried out by the major military powers exempted from the 
application of the principle. Put in another way, this implies that powerful countries are 
exempted from military intervention, but weak countries are legitimate targets of military 
intervention. It should therefore not come as surprise that the greatest opponents of 
humanitarian intervention would be militarily weak countries that see themselves as potential 
targets of military intervention. 
Second, in relation to the issue that the primary purpose of an intervention should be to 
alleviate human suffering, it is submitted that while total disinterestedness is ideal, a state will 
not intervene in another on human protection grounds alone, without taking into account its 
own self-interest, such as considerations of risk to its military personnel, the financial costs 
involved, and other strategic benefits. In other words, it is unrealistic to expect that an 
intervention will be motivated solely by compassion for humanity. However, even if 
compassion for humanity is not the sole driving force for intervention, it should take 
precedence over self-interestedness. It is reasonable that an intervening state should benefit 
from the operation; but as long as the overriding objective is to protect victims of human 
rights, it satisfies the right intention criterion. This is to ensure that military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes is not used as a pretext for the advancement of the ulterior motives of 
the interveners.  
 vii.  The thesis has found that the use of force to save lives usually entails taking lives, 
including innocent ones;46 and therefore, whether  a military intervention for human 
protection purposes is unilateral, or sanctioned by the UN Security Council, there is the 
potential for abuse, and in addition, the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force. For 
example, NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, without Security Council authorisation. 
Images of NATO’s aerial bombardment of the country were witnessed on television.47 The 
indiscriminate bombing killed civilians, and 48 Human Rights Watch put the death toll from 
NATO air strikes at 500 civilians.49  NATO planes were flying too high and too fast to 
                                                          
46 Valentino, note 7 supra, p. 64. 
47 ‘NATO attack on Yugoslavia begins’, CNN, (March 24 1999). 
48 Children reported killed when NATO bomb missed target, CNN (April 28, 1999). 
49 Valentino, note 29, p. 64. 
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protect civilians on the ground.50 With regard to a Security Council-authorised intervention 
where there was abuse and the disproportionate use of force, Libya is a good example. This 
was a collective intervention authorised by the Security Council and, therefore, entirely legal. 
The purpose was to establish safe havens to protect the Libyan people and foreign nationals 
residing in Libya exposed to shelling by Libyan forces.51 It was obvious from the beginning, 
however, that NATO had other intentions to overthrow Gaddafi.52  NATO even bombed a 
private residence leading to the killing of Gaddafi’s son,Saif, and Gaddafi’s three 
grandchildren.53It also rejected diplomatic and peace negotiation offers by Gaddafi and the 
African Union for the resolution of the conflict.54 
The thesis argues that the amount of force used in an intervention should be that which would 
minimise death and destruction. Interveners should not use disproportionate and 
indiscriminate force far beyond the magnitude of the original provocation, for there is no 
justification for the killing of the innocent, by literally killing an ant with a sledgehammer. 
The Kosovo and Libya examples have shown that whether an intervention is unilateral or 
collective, abuses by the interveners to advance strategic interests, and the disproportionate 
use of force occur. It is argued that NATO’s intervention in Libya and Kosovo were clear 
examples of how R2P can be abused by powerful countries, and demonstrates that, whether 
implementation of R2P is through collective or multilateral intervention, there is no guarantee 
that the interveners will be guided by the primary legitimate intention of halting or averting 
human suffering. It is argued further that despite the abuses, no one held the political leaders 
of NATO to account, because the intervention was conducted by a powerful organisation. 
This lack of accountability will ensure that the credibility of military intervention for human 
protection purposes will always raise questions. 
4.4. Recommendations 
In order to minimise or eliminate abuses in the implementation of R2P, this thesis makes the 
following recommendations: 
                                                          
50Ibid. p. 65. 
51UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011),para. 12. 
52B. Obama, D. Cameron, N, Sarkozy, Libya’s Pathway to Peace, New York Times, 14 April 2011.  
53B. Barber, Libya: ‘This is NATO’s dirty War – The west’s approach to Libya is self-deluding, hypocritical and is   
proving to be counterproductive.’ The Guardian, 2 May 2011. Available at   
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/02/nato-gaddafi-libya-air-strikes [Accessed 22 October  
      2016]. 
54Libyan rebels reject Gaddafi’s ‘peace’ overture, Aljazeera, 5 April 2011, Available at  
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/04/20114555816181123.html [Accessed 22 October 2016] 
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a. The Security Council should be the body with the exclusive authority to determine 
when and how interventions should be carried out, and to grant authorisation for 
military intervention for human protection purposes. To pre-empt powerful states 
from taking unilateral action in defence of victims of human rights abuse, the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should exercise their 
prerogative of the veto in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations. The exercise of the veto should be done in the global interest, and not 
in the national interests of the permanent members of the Council. In particular, the 
Security Council should implement the enforcement mechanism provided under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, including the protection of human rights, effectively, 
in order to avoid giving a pretext to powerful states to carry out unilateral 
interventions. Where the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act, it should grant 
timely authorisation to other capable actors to take action; for if it rejects the request 
of other actors to intervene, or it is slow in granting permission, it would pave the way 
for unilateral interventions, setting a dangerous precedent for other actors to follow, 
which would in turn undermine the credibility of the Council as the custodian of the 
authority to secure international peace and security. Where an intervention is carried 
out with the blessing of the Security Council, then it would be in a position to frame 
the authorising resolution in clear and precise language, laying down clear operational 
guidelines, in order to eliminate or minimise abuse and the disproportionate use of 
force in its implementation; 
b. The current composition of the Security Council, dominated by the five permanent 
veto-wielding members, makes it an unsuitable body for discharging the foregoing 
responsibilities.  Therefore, there is the need to reform the United Nations Security 
Council in order to make it work better in maintaining international peace and 
security. Reforms should involve stripping the five permanent members of the veto, or 
giving the veto to representatives of continents not already represented on the 
Council, such as Africa, or granting every member of the Security Council, permanent 
or temporary, the veto. Another alternative is to give every member country of the UN 
the veto in matters concerning international peace and security. Until the Security 
Council is able to overcome its paralysis, occasioned by disagreements among the 
five permanent members, concerning matters of international peace and security, the 
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authorisation of the Security Council should not always be an absolute prerequisite for 
military intervention for human protection purposes.  The Security Council should 
actively take enforcement measures to protect human rights; otherwise unilateral 
humanitarian intervention would be legitimate when egregious human rights abuses 
occur. When an intervention has been sanctioned by the Security Council, or even 
when an intervention is unilateral, interveners should not take sides in an internal 
conflict. Protection should be extended to all non-combatants and civilians, and not 
only to the section of the population that is opposed to the state authorities. NATO 
took sides during the intervention in the Libya by bombing only the supporters of the 
regime, while providing air cover for the rebels, thereby facilitating regime change, 
which undermined the primary objective of the operation;  
c. The United Nations should have its own standing army, to be deployed by with the 
authority of the Security Council, to respond to humanitarian crises. Unlike the 
current system, in which the Organisation depends on the voluntary contributions of 
soldiers form member states for UN missions on an ad hoc basis, a standing army 
would ensure prompt and reliable reaction to humanitarian crises. The army would 
comprise soldiers from member countries that are willing to make contributions. The 
leadership of the army would be appointed by consensus in the General Assembly, or 
by a special committee created by the General Assembly, solely for this purpose, or 
by the Secretary-General. If the UN has its own army, it will ensure that: 
i. Exceptions to the principle of non-intervention would be limited to 
situations where there is serious and irreparable harm perpetrated 
against vulnerable populations.  Irreparable harm in this context 
involves the crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. It is only when this threshold has been met, 
that there will be legal, moral, and ethical justification for military 
intervention.  The certainty, which this threshold brings, implies that, 
when it has been met, a reformed Security Council will be compelled 
to act, by the deployment of the UN army, thereby eliminating 
unilateral intervention by powerful states with their own agendas. 
Since the army would be under the control of the Security Council, it 
would be possible to hold the military leadership accountable for any 
abuses in the implementation of the R2P intervention. 
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ii.  Military intervention for human protection purposes would be carried 
out with the primary objective of averting or halting human suffering, 
andmilitary intervention for humanitarian purposes would not be used 
as a pretext for the advancement of the ulterior motives of the 
interveners. Thus, military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
would not be carried out for regime change, or for the reinstatement of 
deposed regimes, or for the promotion of democracy, but would be 
solely for the intended purpose of alleviating human suffering.  
iii. The amount of force used in an intervention would be that which 
would minimise death and destruction. Since the intervention would be 
carried out by a UN army, the military leadership would be expected to 
abide strictly by the operational guidelines laid down by the Security 
Council to use only the minimum force necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the intervention. If disproportionate and indiscriminate 
force is used, leading to the large scale killing of non-combatants, the 
military leaders would be held accountable to the UN, and thereby, 
serve as an incentive for restraint. 
iv. The UN army would only use of force as a last resort in the protection 
of victims of gross human rights violations, and non-coercive measures 
would be exhausted before the resort to military action. The UN army 
would not be eager to use force in resolving humanitarian crises, unlike 
other potential interveners, and when it does, it would be in the form of 
peace enforcement. Peace enforcement, in this context, would involve 
the use of force, or the threat of the use of force to ensure that state 
authorities or the warring factions in an intrastate conflict comply with 
Security Council resolutions calculated to maintain or restore peace. 
This could be attained by the use of force, or the threat of the use of it, 
to separate the belligerents in an internal conflict, and by creating safe 
havens for civilians. The UN army would not intervene in the target 
state as an invading or conquering army, and; as an army representing 
the entire membership of the UN, it would have the cooperation of the 
state authorities of the affected state. 
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v. It is acknowledged that even the creation of a UN army would not 
eliminate the double standards and inconsistencies in the application of 
the military aspect of R2P, because force cannot be used against 
powerful countries. What is certain, though, is that the UN army would 
not be selective in intervening in humanitarian crises, because the 
primary motivation for an intervention would not be for the 
advancement of national, strategic or geopolitical interests, but to bring 
relief to suffering populations, wherever they may be. 
4.5. Contribution 
The contribution of the thesis can be found in the recommendations, calculated to address the 
double standards, selectivity, abuses, and the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of 
force, in the implementation of R2P by powerful countries, which the thesis argues, pose the 
greatest threat to the survival of the concept. As this thesis argues, the concept is abused by 
powerful countries that intervene in others, because the interventions are not necessarily 
motivated by humanitarian considerations, but rather by the advancement of national, 
strategic or geopolitical interests of the interveners. Compassion for humanity, which is the 
primary consideration for launching a military intervention for human protection purposes, is 
often subsumed under other considerations. Thus, the decision to intervene is influenced by 
parochial considerations, and to this end, interventions have been carried out with the primary 
goal of achieving regime change or promoting the interveners’ concept of democracy in the 
target country. Consequently, while interventions have taken place in some countries, other 
countries with similar circumstances of mass atrocities have been ignored, because the major 
world powers have no strategic interests in the affected countries. The decision to intervene 
in a particular country is also influenced by the relative balance of military power between 
the target state and the intervener, and therefore, the weaker the target country, the more 
eager the desire to intervene therein. Conversely, it is inconceivable that military intervention 
will be implemented against a militarily powerful country, even if all the conditions for 
intervention are met. The injustice inherent in the implementation of R2P is exacerbated by 
the fact that most interventions are carried out by powerful countries, to whom the 
implementation of the concept does not apply.  
With regard to the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, the thesis argues that 
interventions, instead of providing protection, destroy the infrastructure and economy of the 
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target country, as the example of Libya has demonstrated. The disconcerting aspect of the 
implementation of R2P is that the powerful countries that carry out interventions are not held 
to account for any abuses. Thus, although they purport to be carrying out the responsibility to 
protect, the irony is that they are not responsible for any abuses in the course of their 
operations. The apprehension of militarily weak countries about R2P arises from the double 
standards, selectivity, abuses, and the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by 
powerful countries, in the implementation of the concept. The recommendations are aimed at 
addressing these concernsin order to ensure the survival of the concept. 
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